Iran and Middle East Studies / İran ve Ortadoğu Çalışmaları

The independence of the Azerbaijan Republic in October 1991 and the ensuing Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute over Nagorno-­­Karabakh posed a new set of challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran. One such challenge was that Iran now faced a military conflict between its two neighbours, creating instability adjacent to its borders that eventually turned into a protracted conflict. Although Tehran claimed neutrality,   Azerbaijan blamed Iran for providing tacit support to the Armenians. Another challenge was the ascendance of Abulfaz Elchibey to power in Baku in June 1992, which sparked the so-called threat of pan-Turkism, arguably aimed at the territorial integrity of Iran. Elchibey was an ardent Turkish nationalist who forecasted the downfall of Iran and the “unification of two Azerbaijans” that alarmed Iranian officials about security risks arising from a powerful and independent Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, Baku and Tehran used to have pragmatic relations, particularly after the replacement o

  After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, regional and domestic contexts surrounding it. Particularly fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations in the course of seventeen years have been very puzzling, and complicated, which made it worthy of study. Once, relations between the two states have so improved that some pundits regarded it as an evidence of shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. Soon later, Ankara and Tehran embroiled in a regional competition that reminded the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the 16th century with its strategic and sectarian implications. Later on, they have developed amicable relations. Against this background one may question how could we understand that very dynamic nature of Turkish-Iranian relations? Considering this complicated

  Soon after the Arab Spring shattered Arab politics in the early 2010s, Bashar al-Assad, who had replaced his father as the head of the Baath regime in Syria, has faced with a cohort of domestic, regional and international challenges that aimed to force him to leave the power. Iran has remained one of few international actors that have stood alongside the Assad administration. In this regard, Iran’s policies have varied from diplomatic support to the mobilization of militia forces and troop deployment in support of Assad. Since then Iran’s motivations for standing behind Assad have been questioned by many analysts. Arguments that were put forward to explain Iranian policy toward Syria during the crisis have been ranged from a hypothetical view of Iranian fear of encirclement by the hostile forces to a sectarian consolidation under the Shiite axis. This article asserts that Islamic Republican regime in Iran has a keen interest in maintaining a foothold in Syria, and circulated several

  Revolutionary process in Yemen that begun in February 2011 ended up with the Houthi movement’s (that is also called Ansarollah) takeover of Sanaa, the capital city, on September 21, 2014. The takeover has drawn attention to Houthis’ ties with Iran and unleashed a debate on whether the Houthi movement is a new proxy of Tehran. Likewise, subsequent military intervention of Saudi-led international coalition to reverse the Houthis march to power is also discussed within the framework of a proxy war between Riyad and Tehran. However, the frame of proxy relationship leads to the underestimation of multi-layered, intersected confrontations among a multitude of actors, and changing characteristics of the protracted conflict. Indeed, the conflict in Yemen has evolved from the Houthi uprising to a prolonged civil war that drew leading regional powers and had regional ramifications. The Houthis also turned from local insurgents to national actors, and to virtually regional players. Unfolding of