The Second Term of President Rouhani

Having won the 12th presidential election held on May 19 bygarnering 57% of the votes, Hojatoleslam Hassan Rouhani received official approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the last week. And then, attending in swearing-in ceremony at Islamic Consultative Assembly, he has begun his second term as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Considering his election promises and political balances in the country, Rouhani was expected to make some changes in the cabinet for his second term. He had more than two months to put together his cabinet and conduct those changes.

Pressures on Rouhani during the Formation of the Cabinet

While preparing his new cabinet,President Rouhani faced some pressures from different segments of society and various political factions. Tensions rose between Rouhani and hardliners /conservatives who threatened Rouhani with Bani Sadr's fate. Bani Sadr was the first president of Iran who had to flee the country before completing his second year in office even though he had won 70% of the popular vote. Rouhani's brother was arrested for alleged corruption files. Likewise, the hostility between Rouhani's team and Revolutionary Guards has come to a head.

Additionally, reformist groups that supported Rouhani through the elections, pressured on himto coordinate the formation of cabinet and allocatea considerable number of ministerial seats to their fellows. Women organizations also launched a campaign to have women in the future cabinet. Former President Ahmadinejad had previously paved the way for women to be in the cabinet by appointingMarziyeh VahidDastjerdi as Minister of Health in his second cabinet.During his election campaign Rouhani underlined gender equality and women's rights and thus encouraged the movement to demand higher roles in the government. Thus, women's rights groups led campaigns to force President Rouhani, who selected three women as vice-presidents in his first term, to assign women as ministers. Meanwhile Vice President for Women and Family Affairs ShahindokhtMolaverdi stated she would not continue her job in the office if there were no women ministers. The parliament also supported the women's rights movement and 175 MPs signed a joint statement to have women appointed as ministers.

The biggest pressure that Rouhani faced, while picking his cabinet members, came from Supreme Leader Khamenei. Even though Khamenei has no authority over forming the cabinet, it has become a custom for presidents to get their cabinet members approved by Khamenei both as a matter of courtesy and also because it makes it easier to defend their choices. It was claimed that Rouhani and Khamenei had serious disputes over picking figures as ministers. Later on, the office Khamenei issued a statement confirming the authority of president to form his cabinet.However, it also indicated that Khamenei has been especially interested in selection of ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Intelligence becausetheir operations fall to the jurisdiction of Supreme Leader. Additionally, it is thought that Rouhani looked for the consent of Khamenei for some other ministers because he used to criticize performance of government on economy, education and culture during his first term.

New Cabinet of Rouhani 

Considering the wishes of Supreme Leader, current political situation in the country, Rouhani was expected to form coalition government with many technocrats. In fact, he heldnumerous meetings with many people from the both sides of political spectrum, and high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Finally, he made the final version of the cabinet members' list and presented it to the approval of parliament on August 8.

According to the constitution of Iran, the ministers are answering both the parliament and the President. Profile and quality of people nominated by president to oversee ministries are reviewed in the parliament; only those approved by the parliament takeover ministerial seats. The parliament is to review the nominees during the next week. This process is expected to be passed relatively smooth because the majority of the deputiesare considered to be pro-Rouhani. Notwithstanding, it is likely that some heated debates take place since the parliament reviews proposed ministers and their projects one by one.

Eshaq Jahangiri, who ran in the elections but then withdrew in favor of Rouhani, maintains his position as the vice president. Rouhani proposed 17 ministers, and excluded Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Ministry of Science is one of the most controversial ministries as the office-holder appoints university rectors. It is claimed that the office is currently left empty because of the disagreement between Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei. Accordingly,eight out 17 seating ministers arereplaced. Foreign Affairs Minister Zarif, Interior Minister Abdol-Reza Fazli, Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi, and Petroleum Minister BijanNamdarZanganeh maintained their positions.

One of the most interesting changes in the cabinet took place with related to the Ministry of Defense. Officers from the Revolutionary Guards were used to assume this post since 1993, however, for the first time President Rouhani has selected an officer from the army (artesh) to manage defense portfolio. Brigadier General Amir Hatami, former Deputy Defense Minister, has been proposed as the Minister of Defense. Thus, the Revolutionary Guards was not able obtain a post in the cabinet for the first time since the 1980's.

Another significant changewas about economy. Masoud Karbasianreplaced Ali Tayyeb-Niaas the proposed minister for Economic Affairs and Financein the 12th government.Karbasian previously served as a deputy minister at various ministries including Economic Affairs, Industry, Mining and Trade; and he is also known for his studies on globalization.

There are three controversial figures in the proposed cabinet. The first one is SeyedAlirezaAvaie who is proposed as Minister of Justice. It is claimed that, while he was a prosecutor in Dezful,he Avaie took part in the controversial executions of regime's opponents in 1988. Avaie, who was the head of Tehran Justice Administration from 2005 to 2014, is also added in the sanctions list of EU for alleged human rights violations. The second controversial figure is Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, 36, the youngest person in the proposed cabinet in order to seat as the Minister of Communications and Information Technology instead of Mahmoud Va'ezi. Jahromi is claimed to be responsible of the surveillance of online networks at the Ministry of Intelligence under former president Ahmadinejad. As for the proposed Minister of Energy, Habibollah Bitaraf, he took part in the occupation of U.S. Embassy taking American diplomats hostage in 1979.

Most of the ministers in the new government of Rouhani are technocrats. Some of them, Minister of Social Welfare Ali Rabi'ee, Minister of Energy HabibollahBitaraf, and Minister of Petroleum BijanNamdarZanganeh, previously served as ministers under Khatami governments.However, a few of them have political careers and affiliated with political parties (Bijan NamdarZanganeh - Kargozaran Party, Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports MesudSoltanifar - National Trust Party, Minister of Agriculture Mahmoud HojjatiNajafabadi - Islamic Participation Party. According to laws in Iran, Minister of Intelligence has to be a faqih (religious jurist). Current Intelligence Minister Mahmud Alavi, who was reinstated to his position, claims to be politically impartial. Minister of Interior Abdol-Reza Rahmani Fazli is known to be close with Ali Larijani, Speaker of Parliament.
Despite all the pressures, there is no woman in the new cabinet. Rouhani assigned two women (MasumeEbtekar and Laya Joneidi) as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs and Vice President for Legal Affairs. Molaverdi is appointed as an advisor about Citizenship Rights.
Rouhani'sproposed list for the new cabinet disappointed both his female supporters and the reformists.

Considering the distribution of seats in the parliament, this may not create a problem for Rouhani to get approval for his. However, if Rouhani won't take steps to compensate anticipations of the reformists and women's rights movement’s, the implicit coalition between technocrats and reformists may begin to dissolve in the mid run. The exclusion of Revolutionary Guards from the cabinet is a step forward for civilianization of politics. However, it is likely that the Revolutionary Guards, through their political alliances,would challenge President Rouhani in order to protect their interests invested in the system, which may raise new debates on civil-military relations. In his second term as president, Rouhani will focus on economic reforms. In this respect he is expected to avoid new crises in foreign policy, take steps to support economy, and persist on his discourse on constructive interaction, dialogue and cooperation. Still, this won't make much difference to Iran's policy towards the Middle East. Similar to his first term, Rouhani is expected to focus on economic policies and economic relations in his second term, and leave the management of existing crises in the Middle East to the Revolutionary Guards.

15.08.2017
http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14486?dil=en

Iranian Politics after the Presidential Election

2017-06-02

Incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has won a landslide victory in the presidential elections held on May 19, and secured the second term in office. Approximately 73 per cent of the 55-million electorates went to the polls. Rouhani received 57 per cent of the casted votes by considerably improving his supporters in comparison to the previous presidential elections.  Having assessed objections and claims of irregularities made by some people including Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, the leading contester against Rouhani, the Guardian Council confirmed the election results on May 30. Rouhani is expected to form his new cabinet in the forthcoming days. So, how will be the future of Iranian politics from now on?

Significance of the Elections

Many claim that Iranian elections are sham elections because the regime predetermines the results by means of vetoing candidates. Additionally, it is claimed that powers of the elected offices including the presidency have been severely constrained. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei possesses the real power in the country. Although such criticisms are valid to some extent, it does not mean that the presidential elections are completely insignificant. First, the presidency is the second most authorized position in the country. Even if the Supreme Leader determines the general policies, influence of the president in the process of decision-making and policy-making is undeniable. Moreover, the president who is in charge of the state apparatus implementing the political decisions has an undeniable significant position in the system. That's why; considerable differences may take place in domestic politics, economics and foreign policies – within the margins of general policies of the country  - after someone else replaces the office holder. Iranian people experienced well this case after the 2005 presidential elections. The eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought significant breaks and changes in Iranian politics, which also closely affected ordinary Iranian people. Therefore, presidential elections have been quite electrifying almost each time, and the voter turn out did not fall below 70 percent, even if elections are held within the frame of a narrow political arena. Additionally, the fact that candidates who are regarded to be favored by the Supreme Leader have failed to get office after some elections indicates the significance of voting.

The 12th presidential election held on My 19 was regarded to be important because of two additional factors. First there was question around whether President Rouhani could secure a second term. Although all presidents since 1981 have been consecutively elected for the second time, many observers doubted the possibility of Rouhani's second term. Due to his foreign, economic and cultural policies, President Rouhani has some times confronted the conservatives who consider themselves as the owner of the regime. He has also been subjected to Khamenei's direct and indirect censure regarding some developments. For this reason, many speculated about the confirmation of his candidacy by the Guardian Council. Additionally, the ongoing discussions over the nuclear deal and the anti-Iran statements of the US President Trump have shadowed Rouhani's biggest achievement in his previous term, the diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue, the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions, and the dilution of international pressure over Iran. On the other hand, the continuing distress of ordinary Iranian citizens despite recent improvements in economy was a major challenge for Rouhani. Likewise, there has been no significant improvement in areas such as political rights and freedoms, and human rights. For instance, the leaders of reformist Green Movement has kept being under house arrest and in the last four years, approximately three thousand people were executed for various reasons. The weaknesses of Rouhani in these have raised some doubts about his election success by maintaining the alliance, which had brought him to the presidency in 2013.

The second reason why the 12th presidential elections were particularly important was the challenge of Ebrahim Raisi, who has been considered as Khamanei's favorite candidate and potential successor. His performance throug the elections could have determine both his political career and the future of Iran. Moreover, though he defined himself as bipartisan candidate, conservative and neo-radical parties unıted to endorse Raisi, which added further excitement to the elections.

During the election campaign, Raisi had three issues in his agenda: the economic failure of Rouhani's government, poverty and corruption. Raisi, who has accused Rouhani of managing the economy in accordance with the interest of foreigners and a group of minorities, promised to support domestic production, increase employment and advance the cash payments for the poor. On the other hand, Rouhani defended his own foreign and economic policy and built his campaign on the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, the maintenance of constructive engagement in foreign policy, the reinforcement of the private sector and the attraction of foreign capital to the country. Rouhani, who drew attention to Raisi's career as an attorney general and his relations with the Revolutionary Guards and neo-radicals, tried to consolidate his potential supporters who voted for him in the previous election, namely the young, women, minorities, reformists and technocrats. He claimed that if Raisi would take the office, Iran would enter a period full of tensions in foreign policy, and the domestic pressures would increase as in the Ahmadinejad period. He achieved to consolidate his supporters.

Agenda of Iranian Politics after the Election

The primary issue in the second period of Rouhani will be the struggle against unemployment and the economic development, which were prominent topics during the election campaign. According to the official figures, the unemployment rate is currently around 13 percent; however, unemployment especially among the youth is higher. Rouhani will likely adopt five policies in order to provide economic growth and to boost employment:

1.  The first policy is the reinforcement of the private sector. Although this issue has been on the agenda since the early 1990s, it is one of the structural weaknesses of the Iranian economy. The Iranian economy is largely in the hands of public institutions including military institutions and religious foundations. However, both the discourse of ‘resistance economy’, and the ‘existence of strategic sectors’ make it difficult to take further step in this respect.

2.  The second part of the economic policies is to increase share of non-oil products in the national income. The fluctuations in oil prices leave the Iranian economy in a difficult situation. Therefore, Iran aims to promote increasing non-oil products in exports, and concentrates on the long-term gas agreements. Significant improvements have been made in this regard. Iran already exports gas to Armenia and Iraq as well as Turkey. A number of agreements are also on the agenda to sell gas to Pakistan and India.

3.  The third element which will be highlighted in Rouhani's economy policy is tourism. In this context, he aims to renew the domestic and international civil aviation fleet and to improve hotel infrastructure. In 2015, approximately 5 million foreign tourists visited Iran. The government aims to raise this figure up to 20 million and to raise the tourism income to about 30 billion dollars by 2025.

4.  An important part of Rouhani’s economy policy, as it is shown in his previous term and promised in the election campaign is inviting foreign capital and investment to the country. In order to struggle against unemployment, in other words to create one million job opportunities per year, the government is projected to invest 200 billion dollars for the next 5 years, one third of which is supposed to be come through international investments. However, any attempt to attract further tourists and foreign capital faces serious criticism and opposition from the conservatives. In addition, some legal amendments need to be made in order to take effective steps in these areas. Therefore, it is expected that there will be heated discussions on these issues in the forthcoming period. On the other side, the ongoing sanctions on Iran poses serious challenges for the foreign investments.

5.  During his election campaign, Rouhani promised the removal of remaining sanctions on Iran, which will directly affect economy. However, the remaining international sanctions on Iran are imposed either because human rights violations, or because of alleged Iranian support for international terrorism, and its foreign policy. Therefore, the removal of remaining sanctions requires a comprehensive revision of Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics, which is highly difficult in the current political conditions. Moreover, the removal of sanctions on Iran is unthinkable in a period when the new US administration is committed to increase pressure over Iran.

Rouhani promised to strengthen fundamental rights and freedoms, improve socio-economic status of women, and improve political conditions of ethnic and religious minorities during his campaign. In this regard, he had issued a declaration named "The Charter on Citizens' Rights" in December 2016. In the forthcoming period, it may be expected that Rouhani will struggle to provide freedoms and rights indicated within this charter. However, the conservative front opposing Rouhani, and the increasing security concerns will make it difficult to take further steps in this regard.

In his first speech after the elections, Rouhani said, "Iranian people rejects extremism and wants more links with the outside world". In this context, emphasizing the achievements made in his previous period, especially the nuclear deal, Rouhani stated that the "constructive interaction" and "win-win" approach would continue in Iranian foreign policy. However, the changing American policies towards Iran make many in Iran to question the rationality of Rouhani foreign policy. Considering the recent change in the US-Iran relations, it is estimated that Iran will give priority to developing good relations with the European countries in the upcoming period.

Iran's Middle East policy is not expected to change significantly in the next four years. As a matter of fact, these policies were hardly questioned during the period of election campaign. It is claimed actually the Revolutionary Guards handles Iranian files towards the regional crises because they are deemed as primary security matters. In this respect, President Rouhani's approach is not different from the current Iranian rhetoric and policies. As a matter of fact, in the press statement after the election, he stated that the primary issue in Syria and Iraq is the "struggle against terrorism", and added that they would continue supporting the administrations in Baghdad and Damascus. However, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is supported by Trump administration, and the proxy fights around the region are likely to increase in the forthcoming period. This may bring security institutions, the Revolutionary Guards, and security policies into prominence in Iran, and may restrict maneuver capability of Rouhani with regard to foreign policy, economy and politics.

There is no other election in Iran until February 2020. Therefore, it is expected that there will be relative stability in the elected offices and institutions. 40 per cent of the Iranian parliament, and most of the city councils are in the hands of pro-Rouhani people, which will help him. However, potential interventions of Supreme Leader Khamanei, the Guardian Council and the judiciary under the control of conservatives, and security and intelligence institutions may hinder some policies of the government, and weaken the president, as in the second term of the former president Mohammad Khatami. Recently increasing threats against Iran, and the rising security concerns may provide a justification for further securitization in the country, and containing President Rouhani.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5115?s=orsam|english 

Political Factions and Candidates for Presidential Elections in Iran

2017-04-26

Iran is headed towards twin elections to be held on 19 May. The twelfth presidential elections will take place at the same time with city/village council elections. The Council of Guardians, the body in charge of supervising elections in Iran, identified six persons among hundreds of hopefuls registered to run in the presidential elections, and the campaigning process has officially begun.

Political Factions and Candidates

One of the candidates is current president Hassan Rouhani. He has held high level positions since the revolution, and has good ties with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. For long years Rouhani served as his representative in the Supreme National Security Council. Rouhani was also known to have close relations with a leading ‘pragmatist’ figure Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in last January. Rouhani, who was elected as president in June 2013, currently represents the technocrat-reformist alliance. The reformist faction that has been under heavy pressure for a long time views Rouhani as relatively closer to their position and supports him. Reformist Policymaking Council, a temporary umbrella organization that coordinates reformist movements,has aimed to reduce the risk of losing elections because of multiple candidates running from the same faction and has endorsed Rouhani for the presidential election.

Among the candidates confirmed by the Council of Guardians, current Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri and former minister Mostafa Hashemi-Taba are regarded as pro-reform figures, as well. The nomination of Jahangiri is not a bid for running against President Rouhani, but as part of a strategy to field an alternative figure to represent technocrat-reformist front if Rouhani would be vetoed. Jahangiri is expected to contribute the campaign of the President by propagating achievements of the current government, and eventually to withdraw from the race in favor of Rouhani. Hashemi-Taba, one of the founders of technocratic the Executives of Construction (Kargozaran) party, is not considered an influential contender to challenge Rouhani

While the technocrat-reformist faction unified behind President Rouhani, conservative/principalist parties sought for a joint candidate to compete against the incumbent President. A number of conservative associations and parties that come together under the Popular Front for Islamic Revolutionary Forces (JAMNA) tried to choose joint nominees. For the first time the JAMNA hold two conventions to vote for presidential prospects in order to identify the joint nominee. Eventually the JAMNA nominated five people, and asked them to withdraw before the election-day in favor of the most popular one. Thus, many of high-profile conservative figures gave up the idea of running for the presidential elections. One of the joint nominees of the JAMNA, Mehrdad Bazrpash did not officially register for running in the elections. The Council of Guardiansdid not confirm qualifications of Alireza Zakani and Hamidreza Hajibabaie, both nominated by the JAMNA. Hence, only two of the joint nominees of JAMNA, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, have found opportunity to run. Qalibaf, who has been the mayor of Tehran for almost ten years, had previously run for the presidential elections in 2005 and 2013, and he had garnered almost 15 percent of the casted votes in both elections. Qalibaf is not the most popular candidate of the conservatives because he was ranked the fourth in the preliminary voting of JAMNA. The first nomination of JAMNA is S. Ebrahim Raisi, who was the most popular figure in the JAMNA voting. However, he did not show up in JAMNA conventions, and described himself as an independent candidate.

Although the JAMNA unified numerous conservative groups, Motalefeh (the Islamic Coalition Party), one of the oldest conservative movements that believed to be influential in the bazaar of Tehran did not join the camp. Instead, it nominated Mostafa Mir-Salim, former Minister of Culture, who passed the filter of the Council of Guardians. It is difficult to estimate his prospective performance because neither Mir-Salim, nor his political party run on their own in previous elections.

The surprise in the process of identification of nominees came from former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He both supported the bid of Hamid Baqaie, who served as vice-president while Ahmadinejad was in office, and also nominated himself. In fact, his prospective come-back and candidacy was on the agenda for a long time. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei made it public in the last September that he did not welcome Ahmadinejad’s running in the elections. Then, the latter had ostensibly succumbed to the ‘advice’ of Supreme Leader. The Council of Guardians banned both Ahmadinejad and Baqaie from running in the presidential elections.

Contest between Rouhani – Raisi

After the Council of Guardians’ final decision on naming the presidential candidates,the election is expected be a contest between Rouhani and Raisi. Both areamong the ulema and are educated in law.  Rouhani has mostly engagedin political positions and has taken charge of security-related missions. Raisi hastaken missions in judicial affairs. He is still the prosecutor of the Special Court of Clerics. He has become the chairman of Astan-e Qodse Razavi, one of the richest religious foundations in Iran. This foundation has businesses on a wide scale in various parts of the country. The chief managers of religious foundations are being appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, and answer only to him.  It is inconceivable that such a high-level official joins the election contest without permission from Khamenei. That is why Raisi is considered to be favorite candidate of Khamenei. Moreover, some people claim that Raisi has been grooming for the post of Supreme Leader after Khamenei. However, a possible defeat, or a victory with small margins may shadow his claim for the post of Supreme Leader.

Raisi has two vulnerabilities. The first is his alleged role in the summary executions of imprisoned regime opponents in 1988. On the other hand, this indicates how hardliner he is, and how he is committed to the regime. The second vulnerability of Raisi is his being lack of a political career. That is, he is not known by wider segments of the society, which may also be translated into leverage. As a matter of fact, he could not be blamed for systemic corruption and deficiencies. Additionally, he has managed to fulfill the self-appointed but the failed mission JAMNA by making himself as the single joint candidate of conservative faction with the help of massive disqualifications made by the Council of Guardians. The self-presentation of Raisi as an independent and non-partisan contester further facilitates his work. He has already secured support of traditional conservatives embodied by JAMNA. He also aims to get support of neo-radicals by employing some figures from the cabinet of former President Ahmadinejad. Currently, former secretary general of the Supreme National Security Council Saeid Jalili and a hardliner ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi have endorsed Raisi. Then, the continuation of claims of Mir-Salim and Qalibaf until the end of contest will be decisive. Especially the attitude of Qalibaf, who had garnered almost six million votes in the last presidential election, will be critical in shaping the election results.

Rouhani is considered as the joint candidate of technocrat, reformistand pragmatist factions. He is also known to have close relations with Khamanei. Although the latter occasionally criticize some policies and practices of the government, it does not mean a turn against Rouhani. Eventually, four-year performance of the Rouhani government will be put on vote on 19 May. In this respect, the nuclear deal and economic issues will come into prominence. Although the nuclear deal has been presented as a victory by the government, it is subjected to serious criticisms. Particularly some problems faced in the removal of sanctions and the harsh discourse of the Trump administration towards IranleadsIranian people to question both relations with the West and the nuclear deal.The nuclear deal has allowed the removal of constraints on Iranian oil exports, the return of some Iranian assets frozen in the United States, purchasing new airplanes for civil aviation etc. Although Iranian economy has recorded considerable growth rates in the last two years, socio-economic conditions of low-income and rural people has not improved. Considering this point into account, Raisi is expected to put forward a populist agenda. In this respect, one of the liabilities of the Rouhani government is corruption. Especially, the case of astronomic salaries of some high-level officials in public enterprises is likely to pose a serious challenge to the campaign of Rouhani. 

The technocrat-reformist alliance working in coordination with president Rouhani managed to record a considerable success in the parliamentary elections that were held in February 2016. Because the same alliance is maintained for the presidential elections, it is likely that it might reiterate a similar performance.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5098?s=orsam|english 

 2017-04-26

Iranian Politics after Rafsanjani

2017-01-23

Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, issued a message regarding the assassination attempt against Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in May 1979, and stated, "The evils should know that Hashemi is alive because the (Islamic) movement is alive." Hashemi died onJanuary 8, 2016,however, the fate of the Islamic movement and the 'revolution' isquestionable.

Some people argue that the revolution is institutionalized and settled down with the establishment ofIslamic Republic. According to someothers, the revolution was already over when the Islamic Republic was established. The death of Rafsanjani will flamethe debates on the fate of the revolution and the Islamic movement, andthe future of the Islamic Republic.

Rafsanjani in Iranian Politics

Rafsanjani, who wasrelatively inactivebefore therevolution but played an important role in the mobilization of ulama, came to the forethroughout the establishment of Islamic Republic. Together with Ayatollah Beheshti and HojatoleslamAli Khamenei, he became one of the three prominent leaders of the Islamic Republican Party that shapedthe new regime. Beheshti was killedin a terrorist attack in 1981. Khamenei held the presidential office, while Rafsanjani served as the speakerof the parliament during the 1980s.

Rafsanjani’s power was largely derived from Ayatollah Khomeini’s confidence in and support for him.Rafsanjani representedthe ‘reason of state' against the extremists through the process of the consolidation of regime. On some occasions he stood with the leftists, while on some other occasions sided with the conservatives. He was at the centre of the Irangate scandal. He played a critical role to end of the Iraq war, andresuscitated the Iranian nuclear program.

He experienced both the topand the bottom of popularity throughout his political career ... He received more than 90 per cent of the casted votes in the presidential elections in 1989, but he could not have secured enough votes to become a deputy in the parliamentary elections in 2000.

Both his political activities, and his family were always parts of intensive public debates. He was held responsible for the assassination of opponents of the regime, inside or outside Iran. He liberalized the Iranian economy and opened it to international markets. For this reason, his supporters called him the 'Commander of Reconstruction' (Sardar-e Sazandegi), whereas his opponents called him “Akbar Shah” due to his ever-growing political and economic power. Some saw him as a symbol of degeneration and corruption. That's why he was at the centre of stories on 'millionaire mullahs'. The scholarly career of Rafsanjani, who came from Iranian ulama, is also controversial. While his supporters called him an Ayatollah, in his message of condolence the Leader Khamenei recalled him with a lower rank, ‘Hojatoleslam.’

Technocracy and Moderation

Because he was always one of the leading figures in Iranian politics, and because of his pragmatism, it is not easy to name his political affiliation. His standwas always named under different political factions. Soon after the death of Khomeini, he allied with conservatives and purged the Islamic leftists and extremists from power. Underhis administration, technocracy rather than political movements,and moderation in political discourse became prominent. For this reason, he was seen asprotector of technocrats and 'moderates'. In order to curb rigid attitudes of the conservatives, he acted together with technocrats and reformists.

He was severely criticized by many reformers due to corruption charges, and his role in political assassinations etc..He stood up as the last hope of the reformers against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the second round of the presidential elections in 2005, but helost. He won the sympathy of some reformist opposition because of the covert support he gave to the Green Movement that appearedin 2009. He supported his close colleagueHassan Rouhani during the last presidential elections and the February elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. Rouhanicould have garnered the support of the reformists in this process. Thus, an alliance has been formed among technocrats, moderates and reformists.

Technocrat-Reformist Alliance

It is hard to say that Rafsanjani was a popular leader. Besides his wealth, his political power was based on three important bases. First, his close relations with Ayatollah Khomeini helped him gain a great respect among the revolutionary Islamic circles. The second is the crucial roleshe playedin the establishment of the regime andthe subsequent years. He was, after all, the black box of 37 years after the revolution in Iran. This gave him a reputation for being one of the founders of the regime and gave him a great power. As a matter of fact, the historical anecdotes that he delivered from time to time became the hot topicin Iranian politics and set the agenda. The third source of Rafsanjani's support is his influence on bureaucracy and technocrats. Hebecame a respected leader and he was followed due to his steps in the direction of development and reconstruction under his presidency, the cadres he helped to settle in Iranian bureaucracy, and because he was believed to represent the reason of state.

Rafsanjani in his later times, andthe political trend represented by him came closer to the reformists because of the three reasons. First, they agreed to keep values ​​and institutions that represent the 'republic' in the Islamic Republicanregime. Monopolization of power in the hands of one single person,the supreme leader, and the constraints imposed on manoeuvre capability and authority of the elected president and the parliament in the name of building 'Islamic order' and preserving 'Islamic values',was spoiling the 'Islamic Republic.' In this regard,the technocrats and the reformists corresponded on the preservation of authorities of elected representatives, rule of law, human rights, freedom of press, etc..The second reason was the fact that the reformist movement was very weakened and marginalized. The reformist leaders and the leaders of the Green Movement,Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mahdi Karrubi are still under house arrest. The former president, Muhammad Khatami, is deliberately kept away from public view. Many of the religious intellectuals that formed intellectual foundations of the reformist movement fled abroad. Under these circumstances, both Rafsanjani and Rouhani became champions of the reformist hopes. Another factor that unitedthe technocrats, Rafsanjani's followers, and the reformists is their agreementto pursue 'rational' and moderate' policiesin foreign relations instead of ideological struggle and aggression.

The technocratic-reformist alliance is likely to continue after the death of Rafsanjani. His funeral already showed that the alliance is alive. More than two million people attended the funeral, and slogans were shouted in favour of Mousavi, leader of the 'Green Movement'. As a matter of fact, it seems difficult for the reformist to raise a new leader among themselvesunder current conditions. Therefore, it is likely that the technocrats, the moderation front, and the reformistsget together around President Rouhani, which will culminate in consolidation of his power.

Khamenei’sstrife for balancing, and the opportunity for Rouhani

Afterthe death of Rafsanjani, only Khamenei of the trio that played critical roles in the establishment of the regime is alive. Khamenei, whoascended to the office ofSupreme Leader with the support of Rafsanjani in 1989, consolidated his strength over time and monopolized power in his own hands. However, Rafsanjani was still seen as a leader that could balance him. Now, in his absence, it is clear that Khamenei will be stronger.

There are two points to be considered here. First, Rafsanjani's power should not be exaggerated. Despitehis so-called power, his children were imprisoned for various reasons.His bid for candidacy in the presidential elections of 2013 was rejected. Although he received most of the votes in the last elections of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Jannatihas taken the chairmanship of the council. The second is balances within the regime. Although the poweris monopolized in the hands of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, known for his conservatism, various factions that differed on some points continue to claim for power. The ulama, Revolutionary Guards, bazaar and other pressure groups are trying to influence politics in different ways. Underthese conditions, Khamenei, as the leader of the country, will likely try to remainabove factions as much as possible and to maintain a balance between themwith regard to sharing power. Thiscaution is crucial for the preservation of Islamic Republican regime.

In many circles, it is thought that President Rouhani lost his protector and became lonely after Rafsanjani’s death. However, Rouhani is close to the Leader Khamenei as much as he is to Rafsanjani and it is difficult to fit him in a certain political faction just like Rafsanjani. After Rafsanjani's death, Rouhani was deprived of a significant support in the face of his opponents; nevertheless, this development can pave the way forRouhanito be the leader of the technocratic-reformist coalition.Aside from discussions on flattening of the revolution, the prospective consolidation of Rouhani’s power in Iranian politicswill serve to institutionalizethe regime of Islamic Republic that claims to have taken its legitimacy from the revolution.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5057?s=orsam|english

Iranian Politics After the Nuclear Deal

2016-06-10

A new stage of the nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Barjam), which was signed in July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1, the implementation phase has begun in January 2016. This development, which signifies that the sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program are lifted, has certainly and mostly pleased President Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian architect of the deal. Rouhani, who built his whole political strategy onthe solution of the nuclear issue through diplomatic means, described the deal as victory for Iran. In addition to the nuclear deal, the results of Iranian elections for Islamic Consultative Assembly and Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, held on 26 February 2016, have also reassured him. The elections were a success for the supporters of Rouhani even though they did not secure an absolute majority in the Parliament and Assembly of Experts, whereas the Principalists, who had been harshly criticizing the policies of the Rouhani government and the nuclear deal, lost the upper hand in the Parliament.

Rouhani’s Search for a New Social Contract: A ‘Second Barjam’

Although it has primarily aimed at addressing the controversies around the Iranian nuclear program, the deal is also expected to make significant changes, both in domestic and foreign policies of Iran due to its economic and political consequences. Plenty of speculations and evaluations have been made in this respect, many of which regard the deal as a turning point in Iranian politics and speak of an “Iran after the deal.” In his article, published in the journal namedMiddle East Report, ArangKeshavarzian describes the nuclear deal as a new “social contract” for Iran. Indeed, Rouhani had stated that Iran took a step forward in its foreign affairs,owing to this deal. Having been encouraged with the election results, Rouhani, in his Norouz message, stated that the nuclear deal was a historic success to be remembered proudly. He also said that “a national plan of action, a second barjam” had to be developed in order to address the financial and political problems of Iran, which already has begun with the elections.

However, right after the elections, Rouhani encountered new problems. On the one hand, the disputes related with the nuclear deal continued intensively, while on the other, the dynamism and tension in Iran's politics escalated after the elections. The political tension in Iran reached its peak soon after the elections, as a war of words took place between Rouhani’s ally Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chairman of Expediency Discernment Council, and the Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On 23 March 2016, Rafsanjani tweeted "The world of tomorrow is a world of discourses, not missiles.”Inreaction to that, in his speech on 30 March, Khamenei said that "those who stated that the country's future lies in negotiations rather than missiles are either ignorant or traitors.”In response, Rafsanjani said that his tweet was only a part of what he meant to say, and that he was misunderstood, reminding that he himself initiated Iran's missile program.

Currently in Iran, the most important topic that causes disputes is the implementation of the nuclear deal. At the same time,the dispute over the ballistic missile program can be seen as another extent of the nuclear-related disputes. Ayatollah Khamenei never opposed or supported the nuclear deal publicly, even though he supported the negotiations from the very beginning. He did, however, point out that the Western countries could not be trusted entirely. Indeed, it has been more than three months since the nuclear deal is implemented and yet there are still problems with the sanctions relief. The European Union extended its sanctions against Iran by one year, due to the claims of violation of human rights. Likewise, having lifted their sanctions imposed on Iran exclusively for the nuclear program, the United States still continues to impose sanctions on Iran due to its policies towards Syria, alleged support for terrorism, and violations of human rights etc..Early in April 2016, Jacob Lew, US Secretary of the Treasury, said in his statement that the US financial system would stay closed to Iran. Likewise, both US and Iranian authorities confirmed that Iran only received $3 billion of its assets outside the country, which is supposedly around $100 billion.

The principal expectation of Iran from the nuclear deal was the removal of sanctions related to the nuclear program. In fact, the exclusion of Iran from international money transfer system, i.e., SWIFT, and EU and US sanctions on all kinds of transactions of the Central Bank of Iran, dealta heavy blow to the international transactions and trade of Iran. Though these sanctions are now officially lifted, banking transactions in Iran still have not gone back to normal, due to technical problems and the complex situation of the sanctions. Also European banks and large conglomerates are operating extremely cautiously when it comes to transactions with Iran, because they somehow still fear of being exposed to the US sanctions.

The continuing problems in the implementation of the deal, though Iran has fulfilled its obligations, make Rouhani more vulnerable. In his speech in Mashhad on 21 March 2016, Khamenei stated that the nuclear deal crossed certain red lines and - without naming, but implying Rouhani-,he said, "those who propose a second, third barjams" as a solution for the problems ofthecountry "...are playing with fire.” He believes that "second barjam" means negotiating with the USA and changing some of Iran's fundamental policies in order to solve Iran's economic, social and political problems. There are three reasons why "Second barjam" is dangerous: Demands of the USA will never end, revolution will lose its meaning if Iran changes its regional politics, and as seen recently, the US government, whichfails to fulfill its own obligations, cannot be trusted.

After Khamenei's harsh criticisms, Major General Ali Jafari, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps said "The nuclear deal has never been considered a document to be proud of."  Since early April, there have been talks in Friday prayings about how the nuclear deal remains inconclusive and how the western countries do not keep their promises. Since Rouhani and his supporters played a part in the nuclear deal, they were also the target of criticisms.

During this period, when criticisms on the nuclear deal increased, M. JavadZarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and ValiollahSeif, Governor of Central Bank of Iran, visited the USA for negotiations. On 20April 2016, Rouhani responded to criticisms in his speech, saying that it had only been three months since the implementation of the deal and reminded that Iran's oil sales which nearly stopped because of the sanctions were now back to normal and that now many foreign investors were preparing for investments in Iran.

Dynamics of Iranian Politics after the Nuclear Deal

There are three aspects of the rising political tension that apparently revolves around the nuclear deal. The first one is related to Iran’s relations with the West. Rouhani's foreign policy strategy aimed to enhance Iran’s relations with the West after the resolution of the nuclear dispute. In this regard, he became the first president to participate in World Economic Forum after a long period of time. Additionally, after a 16-year interval, he paid visits to some European capitals as the president.With regard to the relations with the West, Khamenei said "I do not favor cutting ties with the West, but we must know whom we are dealing with … we must have relations with the whole world, except for the USA and the Zionist regime, but the world is not limited to the West and Europe."

The second aspect of the political dynamism inIran is related to the reconstruction of the Iranian economy and its opening up to the outside world. Rouhani proposed a "second barjam" while Khamenei proposed a "resistance economy" in their Norouz messages. Khamenei designated the new Persian year (1395) that began with Norouz, as the year of "Resistance Economy: Action and Implementation". The term "resistance economy" was initially put forward,when Iran faced with the sanctions. The utilization of this term for the economy of "Iran after the sanctions" is rather meaningful. The resistance economy, which means ongoing enemy threats and an attempt to minimize Iran's weaknesses on the economic field, is completely different from Rouhani's view of economic integration with the outside world; since the resistance economy is based on the idea of self-sufficient economy and restrainingengagements with the West. Khamenei and his conservative supporters believe that sustaining economic relations with the West would harm the economic independence of Iran and that the West might try to increase its political and cultural influence on Iran through foreign investments.

Third, the ballistic missile program of Iran has turned into a new controversial issue by the Western countries. This subject previously came up during the nuclear negotiations. Then, it was agreed that the sanctions related to Iranian missile program would continue for five more years, and Iran would not develop ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Revolutionary Guards tested a missile which had a range of 1060 miles (1700 km) and a payload of 1653 pound (750 kg) in March 2016, which was considered ‘dangerous and provocative’ by the USA, UK, France and Germany. Moreover, they brought the case to the UN Security Council by blaming Iran for violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This developmentextremely disturbed the Iranian security elite and the conservatives. Accordingly, when the Westbrought up the missile program before addressing the problems related the implementation of the nuclear deal has given credibility to the claims, as put forward by Khamanei, that the West is not trustworthy and the Western demands will never end.

Rouhani wants the nuclear deal to be the beginning of a new era in Iranian politics, but both the state of relations with the West, and the differences of opinion with regardto basic economic policies are the main faultlines in Iranians politics since the revolution. These faultlines,which may roughly be described as disagreements between the conservatives and the reformists,are the major battlegroundsbetween the "globalists" and "nativists," as stated by Mahmood Sariolghalam. This long-term struggle has nowadays turned into a dispute and competition over the continuation ofthe power of Rouhani. Both the uncertainties in the implementation of the nuclear deal and the next presidential elections to be held in June 2017, lead to the intensification of this struggle.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4715?s=orsam|english

 2016-06-10

مصاحبه با «سینکایا»، استاد دانشگاه ترکیه

1392/10/17 - 11:00:00  

تاثیر پرونده «ضراب» در روابط تهران- آنکارا

مصاحبه با «سینکایا»، استاد دانشگاه ترکیه
«بایرام سینکایا»، استادیار گروه روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه «ییلدیریم بیازیت» است. سال‌ها در مورد ایران تحقیق کرده و یکی از کارشناسان پرکار ترک در حوزه سیاست ایران است. روابط تهران- آنکارا در دهه1990، روابط تهران- واشنگتن، رقابت ژئوپولیتیکی میان آنکارا و تهران در آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز و بیش از 20مقاله در مورد تحولات سیاسی در ایران نمونه کارهای او هستند. با نگاهی به رقابت ترکیه و ایران در مورد مناقشات منطقه‌ای و رسوایی مالی اخیر، وجوه دوگانه‌ای از سیاست خارجی ترکیه است که با «سینکایا» در مورد آن به گفت‌وگو نشستیم.

رسوایی مالی اخیر جایگاه سیاسی اردوغان را به‌شدت متاثر کرده است و او را مجبور به تغییر نیمی از اعضای کابینه‌اش کرده است. آیا احتمال سقوط کابینه اردوغان می‌رود؟
مطمئنا جایگاه اردوغان را به‌شدت متزلزل کرده است، اما نمی‌توان ادعا کرد یا انتظار داشت که به سقوط کابینه اردوغان منجر می‌شود. حتی بیش از 17دسامبر و افشای جنبه‌هایی از این پولشویی‌ها، بازنگری در کابینه اردوغان در جریان بود، چراکه سه‌وزیر جابه‌جاشده برای انتخابات پیش‌رو شهرداری‌ها ثبت‌نام کرده بودند و قاعدتا باید از سمت رسمی خود استعفا می‌دادند. از میان 10وزیر جابه‌جاشده، تنها سه‌وزیر در این رسوایی درگیر هستند. اردوغان به سرعت و با شدت در مقابل این رسوایی موضع گرفت و قول داده با شدت با آن برخورد کند. به علاوه با تکیه بر پایگاه اجتماعی‌اش به خوبی طرفدارانش را بسیج می‌کند و اتفاقا برهمین اساس وقایع 17دسامبر را توطئه‌ای علیه دولت توصیف کرد که توسط ساختارهای دولتی موازی هماهنگ شده است و با حمایت جنبش «فتح‌الله گولن» روبه‌رو است که قصد دارد کل ساختار دولت را تصاحب کند. به‌علاوه اردوغان دست به اقداماتی زد؛ پلیس‌های رده بالا را تغییر داد گروهی را که متهم به همکاری با «دولت موازی» بودند و با قدرت‌دادن به دولت سعی کرد جلو اقدامات مشابه علیه دولت را بگیرد. با این حال و در مجموع باید گفت که رسوایی فساد مالی به سقوط اردوغان منجر نمی‌شود.
  به نظر شما رسوایی مالی چگونه و تا چه حدود می‌تواند به روابط آنکارا با تهران آسیب بزند؟
می‌توان از جنبه‌های مختلف به نقش ایران در این مساله نگاه کرد. نخست اینکه بازرگان متهم اول پرونده (رضا ضراب)، شهروند ایرانی است که البته به تابعیت ترکیه هم درآمده است؛ بازرگانی که تجارت طلا در برابر گاز را مدیریت کرده است. انتقادها بیشتر به جنبش طرفدار «فتح‌الله گولن» مرتبط است که این شکل از تجارت را غیرقانونی معرفی می‌کند و مدعی است ایران از سود این تجارت علیه منافع ترکیه در سوریه استفاده می‌کند. مفسران نزدیک به منابع دولتی معتقدند که بررسی‌ها به‌دنبال بی‌اعتبارکردن «هالک‌بانک» و مدیرکل آن سلیمان اصلان است که اکنون در بازداشت به سر می‌برد. چراکه این مدیر رده بالای دولتی در مقابل فشارهای آمریکا برای تجارت با ایران مقاومت کرده است. با وجود فشارهای آمریکا، تجارت با ایران برای اکثر مردم ترکیه مهم و غیرقابل چشم‌پوشی است؛ حتی با وجود تحریم‌های آمریکا و سازمان ملل. اعتراضات هم بیشتر فشاری است برای مبارزه با فساد دولتی.
  چه گروه‌های سیاسی و اجتماعی علیه رسوایی مالی بسیج شدند؟ بازیگران این روزهای اعتراض بیشتر چه کسانی هستند؟
اعتراض‌ها بیشتر توسط گروه‌های نزدیک به چپ‌ها و سوسیالیست‌ها سازماندهی می‌شود و به لحاظ سیاسی هم بیشتر چپ‌ها معترضند. البته سطح و انسجام اعتراضات اصلا در حد و اندازه اعتراضات «پارک گزی» نیست. به هر حال، اعتراضات «گزی» از طریق گروه‌های مختلفی انجام شد اعتراضات اخیر علیه رسوایی مالی چندان نمی‌تواند یادآور «ائتلاف» ژوئن گذشته باشد.
  به‌طور سنتی ارتش و دستگاه قضایی در ترکیه در دست نیروهای مخالف اسلام‌گرایان است یا به عبارت دیگر اپوزیسیون دولت عدالت و توسعه است، این تا چه میزان به حفظ شفافیت و افشای چنین رسوایی‌هایی کمک می‌کند؟
بله در ترکیه عرف سیاسی این است که این دو نهاد بازوهای قدرتمند نیروهای «کمالیست» هستند، نیروهایی که چندان به لحاظ مفاهیم دموکراتیک قابل دفاع نیستند اما در عین حال مخالف حزب حاکم هستند. در کشمکش با نیروهای «کمالیست»، حزب حاکم از لیبرالیسم و دموکراتیزاسیون بیشتر دفاع کرده است. البته حزب حاکم بر حمایت‌های جنبش گولن و لیبرال‌ها بسیار حساب می‌کند. این کشمکش به‌کلی به روند لیبرالیزاسیون در ترکیه کمک کرده است.
  ترکیه تمایل داشت که در بحران سوریه به عربستان نزدیک شود. از سوی دیگر ترکیه در دورزدن تحریم‌ها به بازرگانان ایرانی کمک می‌کند، آیا ترکیه فقط با معیار «سود تجاری» رویکردهای سیاست خارجی خود را انتخاب می‌کند؟
قبل از هرچیز بگویم که نسبت به همکاری میان ترکیه و عربستان روی موضوع سوریه بسیار مردد هستم. همکاری میان دوکشور به‌وجود آمد ولی بیش از یکی، دوسال طول نکشید و در ژوئن 2013 و بعد از حمایت عربستان از کودتا علیه «محمد مرسی» تمام شد. با نظر برخی روزنامه‌ها هم موافق نیستم که مقامات ترک بعضی اقدامات غیرقانونی را تسهیل ‌کنند. مشخص بود که ترکیه از همان ابتدا هم با اعمال تحریم‌های اعمال‌شده علیه ایران موافق نبود. ترکیه اعلام کرده که خود را در مقابل تحریم‌های سازمان ملل، متعهد می‌داند و تعهدی به تحریم‌های آمریکا ندارد و از این‌رو تجار ترک می‌توانند تجارت خود را با ایران ادامه دهند. برخلاف موضع‌گیری‌های مختلفی که تهران و آنکارا نسبت به سوریه داشتند، هردو کشور می‌خواهند درمورد منافع اقتصادی با هم به همکاری برسند. ایران مشتاق دورزدن تحریم‌هاست و ترکیه به‌دنبال سود اقتصادی. استراتژی اقتصادی ترکیه توسعه صادرات است و برای این منظور نیازهای انرژیک جدی دارد و از این بعد هم این دو بازیگر می‌توانند روی هم حساب کنند.
  شما در مورد روابط دوجانبه ترکیه- ایران با محور «درگیری- همکاری» ارزیابی‌های متفاوتی داشته‌اید. در کتابتان دهه80 را دوران «روابط آرام»، دهه90 را دوره «ثبات‌بخشی» و دهه اخیر را دوره «عقلانیت» روابط تهران- آنکارا ارزیابی کرده‌اید، ارزیابی الان شما بعد از یک‌دهه در قدرت‌بودن «عدالت و توسعه» چیست؟
همانطور که اشاره کردید این دوره اخیر را دوره «عقلانیت» اسم‌گذاری کرده‌ام، چراکه هر دو کشور با کنار گذاشتن پیش‌فرض‌ها و نگرانی‌های ایدئولوژیک و امنیتی، در روابط با یکدیگر بر منافع اقتصادی دوجانبه تاکید داشتند. عقلایی‌شدن روابط دوجانبه، رویه مسلط بر این روابط شده است اما بعد از بهار عربی چشم‌اندازهای ژئوپولیتیکی هر دو کشور تغییراتی کرد، به‌ویژه به واسطه بحران سوریه حتی نزدیکی‌های سابق، تهدید شده است. با وجود سایه تفاوت‌هایی که دوکشور در مورد سوریه دارند روابط اقتصادی- سیاسی دوکشور نشان می‌دهد که دوکشور به خوبی توانسته‌اند روابط خود را در بخش‌های مختلف به خوبی مدیریت کنند.
  اما ایران و ترکیه گاهی به‌عنوان «رقبای منطقه‌ای» و گاهی «شرکای استراتژیک» تفسیر می‌شوند با کدام تعبیر بیشتر موافقید؟
به نظر من، ترتیبات ژئوپولیتیکی ترکیه و ایران، این دو کشور را به همکاری در سایر حوزه‌ها تشویق می‌کند. در حوزه انرژی، روابط خاصی وجود دارد. ایران منابع کانی زیادی دارد که ترکیه به آن نیازمند است. از سوی دیگر هر دوکشور رقابت شدیدی برای تحت‌تاثیر قراردادن همسایگان خود دارند. این رقابت البته وجه ایدئولوژیک هم دارد که ناشی از رویکردهای متفاوت آنها نسبت به نظام بین‌الملل به‌طور کلی و دیدگاه‌های مختلف سیاسی و اقتصادی است. من به‌عنوان محققی که روی روابط تهران- آنکارا تحقیق می‌کند این امکان را می‌بینم که در دوره روحانی روابط گسترش بیشتری پیدا کند، البته اگر بتواند با موفقیت تحریم‌ها را خنثی کند و با بازیگران منطقه‌ای و بین‌المللی همکاری بیشتری داشته باشد.
  ترکیه یکی از معدود همسایگان ایران است که از توافق تهران با قدرت‌های جهانی استقبال کرده است. با این وجود استراتژی «به صفررساندن مشکلات با همسایگان» که از سوی آقای «داوود اوغلو»، وزیرخارجه ترکیه اعلام شده، گاهی دچار نوسان می‌شود، این نوسان از کجا ریشه می‌گیرد؟
با وجودی که تفاوت‌های سیاسی و ایدئولوژیکی با ایران وجود دارد، ترکیه مصمم است که روابط را با تهران گسترش بدهد. هر ابتکار یا سیاستی که به گسترش روابط با مردم ایران منجر شود مورد استقبال ترکیه است چراکه رفاه در ایران به معنای رفاه، امنیت، ثبات و تعاملات اقتصادی با مردم ترکیه است. به علاوه ترکیه یکی از کشورهایی است که از کشمکش میان ایران و غرب ضرر کرده است. هر بهبودی میان ایران و غرب می‌تواند به توازن منافع ترکیه در ایران و غرب کمک کند. رویکرد «به‌صفررساندن مشکلات» در واقع بیان اراده و حسن‌نیت آنکاراست.
  بعضی آگاهان در ارزیابی موضع‌گیری‌های منطقه‌ای ترکیه- در مقایسه ترکیه با کشورهای عرب- آنکارا را تنها بازیگر منطقه‌ای می‌دانند که از بهبود رابطه تهران و واشنگتن استقبال می‌کند چه عواملی بیش از دیگر عوامل بر این رابطه موثر است؟
دولت عدالت و توسعه توجه خاصی به جهان اسلام دارد. ریشه‌های اسلامی عدالت و توسعه در جهت‌گیری‌های اینچنینی بسیار موثر بوده است. به علاوه افکار عمومی در ترکیه با اسراییل مخالف هستند. در این میان نباید منافع مشترک جدی دوطرف را نادیده گرفت. ما درمورد ژئوپولیتیک و منافع دو کشور بحث کردیم اما در این برهه روابط تهران- واشنگتن می‌تواند روابط تهران- آنکارا را هم تسریع کند و در صورت افزایش تنش میان تهران- واشنگتن، ممکن است سدی در برابر آن باشد.

منبع : روزنامه شرقامتیاز به خبر:

امتیاز امروز: امتیاز این هفته: 

ایرانشناس ترکیه ای: سال 2014 سال تعمیق شراکت راهبردی ایران و عراق بود

آنکارا – ایرنا – دکتر 'بایرام سینکایا' استاد دانشگاه و محقق ایرانشناس مرکز پژوهش های راهبردی خاورمیانه در تحلیلی از فرآیند روابط ایران و ترکیه نوشت: سال 2014 سال تعمیق و توسعه شراکت راهبردی ایران و عراق بود.

به گزارش ایرنا، سینکایا استاد دانشگاه 'یلدرم بیازیت' آنکارا در این گزارش مبسوط که روز چهارشنبه در تارنمای رسمی مرکز پژوهش های راهبردی خاورمیانه موسوم به (ORSAM) منتشر شد، تاثیرات تحولات مهم سال 2014 میلادی به ویژه برگزاری انتخابات عمومی در عراق، اشغال موصل توسط گروه تکفیری - تروریسی 'داعش' و تشکیل دولت جدید در عراق، بر فرایند مناسبات ایران و عراق را تحلیل کرده است.

سینکایا در گفت وگو با خبرنگار ایرنا در آنکارا درخصوص محتوای این گزارش توضیح داد: ایران هم به لحاظ سیاست های امنیت ملی و هم به خاطر استراتژی منطقه ای خود، تحولات عراق را از نزدیک دنبال می کند.

وی افزود: دولت ایران، در راستای منافع راهبردی خود در عراق، موضع محتاطانه و هوشمندانه ای را در انتخابات عمومی عراق اتخاذ کرد، در تشکیل دولت 'حیدر العبادی' نیز نقش مهمی را ایفا نمود و پس از بروز پدیده داعش در عراق، حمایت گسترده نظامی از دولت عراق در مبارزه با این گروه تکفیری اتخاذ کرد.

این ایرانشناس ترکیه ای می گوید: حمایت های سیاسی ایران از العبادی در فرایند تشکیل دولت جدید عراق، موجب شد که منافع ایران در عراق حفظ شده و روابط راهبردی ایران و عراق ادامه یابد.

به تحلیل استاد دانشگاه بیازیت، حمایت نظامی گسترده ایران از عراق در مبارزه با داعش، زمینه را برای توسعه و تعمیق روابط نظامی بین ایران و عراق را فراهم کرد و بنابراین ما شاهد این بودیم که تحولات مهم سال 2014 میلادی موجب افزایش نفوذ ایران در عراق و توسعه و تعمیق همکاریهای راهبردی بین دو کشور شده است.

سینکایا یکی از شاخص های مهم در فرایند روبه بهبود مناسبات تهران و بغداد را نیز انجام اولین سفر خارجی به تهران توسط حیدر البعادی ذکر می کند.

وی در تشریح فرازهایی از گزارش مبسوط خود مدعی شد، ایران در بغداد دولتی سازشکار و ضعیفی که نتواند تهدیدی علیه ایران باشد ولی دولتی مقتدر و فراگیر در داخل که بتواند انسجام ملی در عراق را حفظ کند، خواهان است.

سینکایا افزود: بی ثباتی در عراق و تعمیق مشکلات امنیتی می تواند زمینه تجزیه عراق و بروز جنگ داخلی در این کشور و یا روی کار آمدن حکومتی مخالف و ضد ایران در بغداد را فراهم کند که هریک از این احتمالات، به مفهوم تهدیدهای جدید علیه ایران خواهد بود.

این کارشناس ترک با خاطر نشان کردن اینکه ایران بدون قید و شرط به فراخوان نوری المالکی نخست وزیر پیشین عراق در کمک به جنگ علیه داعش، پاسخ سریع داده بود، افزود: ولی در این کمک، بیش از اینکه هدف نگهداری مالکی بر سر قدرت دنبال شود، اهداف استراتژیک ایران در عراق لحاظ شده است.

سینکایا می گوید: کمک موثر ایران به عراق در مبارزه با داعش در همین حال مانع از مطرح شدن فکر بازگشت دوباره سربازان آمریکایی به عراق شد که این امر می توانست موجبات نگرانی امنیتی ایران را فراهم سازد.

خاورم/2011**1275

انتهای پیام /*
http://khabarche.ir/خبر/1298756/ایرانشناس-ترکیه-ای--سال-2014-سال-تعمیق-شراکت-راهبردی-ایران-و-عراق-بود
http://irna.ir/fa/News/81436842/ 

معامله بزرگ نزدیک است؟ 

نتیجه مذاکرات وین: ادامه مذاکرات 

یکی از مهمترین نتایج مذاکرات هسته‌ای، آغاز مذاکرات دوجانبه بین وزرای خارجه ایران و آمریکا بعد از چندین سال بود.

نویسنده: دکتر بایرام سینکایا، مشاور مرکز تحقیقات استراتژیک خاورمیانه ترکیه و استاد دانشگاه ییلدیریم بیازیت

دیپلماسی ایرانی: آخرین دور مذاکرات هسته ای بین ایران و 1+5 (پنج عضو دائم شورای امنیت به همراه آلمان)، 24-17 نوامبر در وین برگزار شد. آخرین روز برای رسیدن به توافق نهایی 24 نوامبر بود. چند روز قبل از این تاریخ وزرای خارجه کشورهای درگیر در مسئله به منظور یافتن راهی برای گره گشایی از روند مذاکرات، راهی وین شدند. اما هیچ دورنمای مثبتی از این مذاکرات انتظار نمی رفت. با این حال طرفین در راستای گسترش برنامه اقدام مشترک (Joint Action Plan) به ادامه روند مذاکرات رضایت دادند. طرحی که در نوامبر 2013 به منظور رسیدن به یک توافق جامع در ارتباط با برنامه هسته ای ایران تا اول ژوئیه 2015 به امضا رسیده بود.

در قالب «برنامه اقدام مشترک» پیش بینی شده بود که تحریم های بین المللی علیه ایران تا زمانی که ایران فعالیتهای هسته ای و میزان  غنی سازی شده اش را کاهش نداده، همچنان ادامه یابد. همچنین پیش بینی شده بود که طرفین در این بازه زمانی می توانند به یک توافقق جامع دست یایند. از آنجایی که طرفین در شش ماه نخست مذاکرات نتوانستند به نتیجه ای جامع برسند، تصمیم به تمدید مذاکرات تا جولای 2014 گرفتند. در نتیجه برنامه اقدام مشترک برای بار دوم تا 24 نوامبر در وین تمدید شد.

عوامل چندی در از سرگیری دوباره مذاکرات دخیل بودند. اما دلیل اصلی تصمیم به از سرگیری دوباره مذاکرات به نوعی در منافع مشترک طرفین نهفته بود. در واقع از یک طرف ایران به دلیل شروع مذاکرات تا حدودی توانست از کاهش میزان تحریم های بین المللی علیه خود نفع ببرد و از سوی دیگر نیز آمریکا به نوعی توانست از سرعت عمل برنامه هسته ای ایران جلوگیری کند. دومین متغیر دخیل در از سرگیری مذاکرات به نوعی به مشروعیت داخلی دولت های حاکم در ایران و آمریکا بستگی داشت. به عبارتی عدم دست یافتن به یک توافق جامع منجر به کاهش مشروعیت دولت های حاکم در داخل می گردید و دولت های مزبور مورد انتقاد رقبای سیاسی داخلی خود که مخالف شروع مذاکرات بودند، قرار می گرفتند. علاوه بر این، شکست مذاکرات می توانست منجر به افزایش تنش بین ایران و آمریکا گردد که این نیز مورد دلخواه باراک اوباما و حسن روحانی نبود. علاوه بر این هیچ یک از طرفین مایل به ترک مذاکرات و متعاقبا پذیرفتن مسئولیت اینکه به عنوان اولین عامل در برهم زدن گفتگوها نقش داشتند، نبودند. نهایتا اینکه اگرچه توافق جامع هسته ای بین طرفین هنوز برقرار نشده است اما طرفین در طول مذاکرات توانسته اند حوزه های بسیاری را تحت پوشش قرار دهند. این اظهارات می تواند به نوعی مشروعیت دادن به ادامه مذاکرات قلمداد شود.

در واقع شش ماه بعد شکست مذاکرات و عدم قبول مسئولیت آن از سوی طرفین می توانست برآیند بدتری داشته باشد. به هر حال با وجود روشن نبودن جزئیات دقیق توافق جامع بین ایران و 1+5، رسیدن به نتیجه مثبت در روند مذاکرات قابل فرض است. در واقع درک این موضوع سخت خواهد بود که دو طرف بدون برخورداری از پیش فرض های اساسی تنها به منظور ادامه مذاکرات گفتگوها را تمدید کرده باشند. بنابراین دیدگاه های خوشبینانه و انتظارات مثبت از سوی طرفین، در تصمیم گیری برای ازسرگیری مذاکرات موثر بوده است.

چرا مذاکرات به یک نتیجه نرسید؟

فاکتورهای مختلفی در عدم دست یافتن به نتیجه دخیل هستند. ابتدا اینکه بحران ناشی از عدم اعتماد بین طرفین بسیار عمیق است. چنانکه نامه های ارسالی از سوی اوباما به رهبر ایران آیت الله علی خامنه ای به منظور حمایت از مذاکرات دیپلماتیک در راستای غلبه بر بحران بی اعتمادی کافی نبود. در واقع اوباما از این رهگذر، سرنوشت 35 سال تصمیم «وضعیت اضطراری» در قبال ایران را بازبینی می کند که مرجع اصلی تحریم های ایالات متحده علیه ایران بود. ملت ایران نیز به نوبه خود این تصمیم را به عنوان تناقض در گفتار و اعمال اوباما قلمداد می کنند. به عنوان شاهد مثال، جلسات دوجانبه و سه جانبه ای که بین وزیران امور خارجه دو کشور ایران و آمریکا به منظور رسیدن به پیشرفت در حل موضوعات گره خورده در روند مذاکرات برگزار می شود، بازخورد مثبتی را از خود نشان نمی دهد.

عامل دوم در به نتیجه نرسیدن توافق جامع بین ایران و غرب، وجود مخالفان داخلی توافق در هر دو طرف ماجرا است. کاهش مداوم در محبوبیت رئیس جمهور اوبامای دموکرات و افزایش آراء جمهوری خواهان در انتخابات ماه اکتبر گذشته، سبب شد تا ایران در رسیدن به توافق با دولت اوباما محتاط تر گردد. جمهوری خواهان از دور نظاره گر مذاکرات با ایران بوده و کنگره را جهت اعمال اقدامات لازم تحت فشار قرار می دادند. با انتخابات میان دوره ای آمریکا و در دست گرفتن گنگره از سوی اکثریت جمهوری خواهان، تیم مذاکره کننده ایرانی به نوعی در حالت تردید و دل نگرانی قرار گرفته است. در واقع با این شرایط ایران ملزم به اقدمات محتاط آمیز خواهد بود.

در طرف ایرانی رهبر جمهوری اسلامی ایران، آیت الله سید علی خامنه ای گفتمان دوجانبه ای را در طول مذاکرات پیش گرفت. اگرچه ایشان از دولت روحانی و تیم مذاکراه کننده اش حمایت می کند اما اغلب غیرقابل اعتماد بودن آمریکا و غرب را نیز مورد تاکید قرار می داد. علاوه بر این ترسیم خطوط قرمز ایران در مذاکرات هسته ای به عنوان یکی از حوزه های اصلی غیرقابل مذاکره مطرح می شد. این وضعیت برای اولین بار متقاعد کردن رهبر ایران در مسائل خاص توسط هیات ایرانی را به ارمغان آورد. از سوی دیگر پیشرفت برنامه هسته ای ایران در ده سال اخیر تبدیل به یکی از موضوعات مرتبط با حوزه «حاکمیت ملی» در ایران شد. در واقع گره خوردن مسئله هسته ای با موضوع حاکمیت ملی در ایران به نوعی تبدیل به یکی از پابندهای تیم مذاکره هسته ای ایران شده است. مخالفین روحانی نیز اتخاذ نگرش نرم از سوی تیم مذاکره کننده را به نوعی مصالحه در حقوق حاکمیت ملی قلمداد می کنند. اگرچه طیف وسیعی از جامعه ایرانی از روند مذاکرات هسته ای حمایت می کنند اما گره خوردن مسئله هسته ای با موضوع حاکمیت ملی در ایران، وضعیت را برای تیم مذاکره کننده اندکی سخت کرده است.

به سوی معامله بزرگ

دو نکته اساسی مورد اختلاف بین ایران و گروه 5+1 در روند مذاکرات هسته ای وجود دارد. اولین موضوع تاثیرگذار، اختلاف در میزان غنی سازی اورانیم است که ایران اجازه خواهد داشت تا به آن اندازه فعالیت کند. زمانی که آمریکا و متحدانش در تلاش برای عنوان کردن این گزاره اند که درصدد جلوگیری از دستیابی احتمالی ایران به سلاح هسته ای هستند، ایران نیز هرگونه محدودیت در غنی سازی و استفاده نظامی از برنامه هسته ای را رد می کند. موضوع مورد اختلاف بعدی، مسئله تحریم ها و کاستن از موانع پیش روی برنامه هسته ای ایران است. ایران خواهان لغو فوری تحریم ها و کاستن از موانع پیش روی برنامه هسته ای اش در مدت زمان کوتاهی است. اما آمریکا بیشتر متمایل به حل این مسائل در یک بازه زمانی طولانی مدت است.

توجه به این امر که در اکثر موارد در پشت توافقات بین المللی، روند مذاکرات طولانی ای را شاهد هستیم، پس طبیعی خواهد بود که مذاکرات پیچیده ای چون برنامه هسته ای ایران نیز بازه زمانی زیادی را برای خود اختصاص دهد. از این رو دوره مذاکرات بعد از چهار ماه توسط رهبران سیاسی مورد ارزیابی قرار گرفته و برنامه اقدام مشترک در صورت نیاز برای یک بار دیگر تمدید می شود.

به صورت کلی توسعه قابل توجه در روند مذاکرات را در امضای توافقنامه ژنو در نوامبر 2013 بین ایران و آمریکا شاهد بودیم. بعد از پشت سر گذاشتن تجربیات تلخ، وزرای خارجه ایران و آمریکا به بازی برگشته و به همراه کاترین اشتون، مسئول سیاست خارجی اتحادیه اروپا دیدارهای سه جانبه ای را ساماندهی کردند. در نهایت وزرای خارجه ایران و آمریکا برای اولین بار در آخرین روز مذاکرات به صورت دوجانبه به گفتگو پرداختند. پر واضح بود که دیدار وزرای خارجه دو کشور که از بعد از انقلاب 1979 ایران مراودات دیپلماتیک نداشته اند، راحت نخواهد بود. بنابراین می توان ادعا کرد که یکی از مهمترین نتایج این مذاکرات، آغاز مذاکرات دوجانبه بین دو طرف ایرانی و آمریکایی بعد از چندین سال بود.

این را نیز می توان ادعا کرد که سایر اعضای 5+1 از طولانی شدن روند مذاکرات با ایران به نوعی خسته شده اند. اما روسیه و چین از برنامه هسته ای ایران احساس خطر نمی کنند. از دید اعضای اروپایی 1+5، موضوع اساسی مورد اختلاف در برنامه هسته ای ایران از اختلافات نظر بین تهران و واشنگتن ناشی می گردد. از آنجایی که مذاکرات باز و مستقیم بین تهران و واشنگتن از سوی گروه مذاکره کنندگان بیشتر مورد تاکید قرار می گیرد، لذا ادامه مذاکرات دوجانبه بین ایران و آمریکا در روند آتی گفتگوها مورد انتظار است. همچنین می توان انتظار داشت که در کنار موضوع هسته ای ایران به عنوان اصل مسئله، سایر موضوعات بحث بر انگیز و منطقه ای نیز در قالب این مذاکرات بین دو طرف ایرانی و آمریکایی مورد بحث قرار گیرد. 

منبع: اورسام/ ترجمه: مقصود عهدی

انتشار اولیه: یکشنبه 14 دی 1393 / انتشار مجدد: سه شنبه 23 دی 1393

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