Showing posts with label Turkish Foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkish Foreign policy. Show all posts

Conceptualizing Compartmentalization in International Relations: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy

 1. Introduction

Globalization has deepened complexity in international politics by diffusing power, multiplying the number of actors, and creating interdependencies among actors across various issue areas and regions. While states pursue multiple agendas, external and domestic issues have become increasingly entangled. The widening complexity in international politics has given way to puzzling patterns and forms of bilateral relations among states, diverging from the conventional and holistic understanding of amity, enmity, or neutrality (Aydinli & Rosenau, 2005). A particularist and compartmentalized approach to foreign relations is also gaining ground, whereby states work with other counterparts in various issue-areas or loci in order to realize mutual gains and mitigate shared concerns. There has been no shortage of scholarly attention to decipher those apparently contradictory foreign policy behaviors by states in this complex, globalized yet transitioning world system.

We study here compartmentalization as a ‘form of foreign policy behavior practiced by states’ and a ‘cognitive prior adopted by leaders’ (Acharya, 2009) to cope with challenges arising from complex interactions in contemporary world affairs. We will argue that compartmentalization essentially involves a practical-cognitive approach to foreign policy decision-making at times of contradictory pressures arising from competing or mutually exclusive alternative sets of relationships or choices at either domestic or external levels. Such usually high-stake decision-points are more likely to arise during times of systemic polarity, intense strategic rivalry, systemic transitions, or in the case of multifaceted relations, wherein interest divergence in some areas goes hand-in-hand with shared interests in other areas which are worth not foregoing. At such junctures, compartmentalization emerges as one of the alternative avenues to make cooperation possible, by allowing the parties to ‘agree to disagree,’ as the popular saying goes.

Although compartmentalization has been used in the literature for quite some time to describe contradictory positions and complex relations between various states, there is no systematic analysis of this concept, nor has there been a well-established operational definition instructing such analyses. Most uses of ‘compartmentalization’ are idiosyncratic, as scholars employ the term in a casual sense. The purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive framework which can be used for foreign policy analysis, by conceptualizing compartmentalization as a foreign policy behavior at practical and cognitive levels. What follows is an attempt to define compartmentalization, by suggesting a typology of different forms of this behavior and its main components. This section will also delineate the concept further to differentiate it from other similar concepts used in foreign policy analysis, particularly transactionalism and hedging. Then the article will engage in an extensive review of the literature employing the concept of compartmentalization in the study of Turkish foreign policy. In addition to tracing the evolution of how this concept has been applied, this section will overview various manifestations of issue-based and actor-based compartmentalization. Rather than engaging in a detailed case study analysis to test the applicability of the compartmentalization hypothesis, the purpose of this inquiry will be to provide an illustrative survey of how Türkiye’s relationship with several countries, such as Russia, Iran, Israel or the United States, had elements of compartmentalization. Next, the discussion on the drivers of compartmentalization in Turkish foreign policy conduct will also highlight how it has emerged as a cognitive prior, shaping the leaders’ approach to foreign policy. The concluding section will revisit the role of compartmentalization as a strategic-cognitive process in Turkish foreign policy of late, referring to the pressures exerted by the securitization of the regional environment.

2. What is Compartmentalization? Delineating the Boundaries

How do we conceptualize compartmentalization as a foreign policy behavior? Compartmentalization may refer to a number of interrelated phenomena. Traditionally, compartmentalization in foreign policy studies referred to the division of power and labor among various bureaucratic institutions (Clifford, 1990; Mueller, 2013; Delreux & Earsom, 2024). This practice is mainly justified on rationalist grounds, as decision-makers are often assumed to separate different issues from each other at cognitive and practical levels to manage simultaneous and complex challenges. As Smyth notes (Smyth, 2021, pp. 414-415) it refers to “the way in which decision-making processes organize themselves to isolate specific issues for consideration within discrete compartments” that “fit well with economic rationalist perspectives on human action that see people as rational actors seeking to maximize their utility in any given situation.”

The concept is also used to refer to the insulation of domestic politics from foreign policy, the delinking of economic and trade policies from diplomatic and security relations, or the detachment of a specific foreign policy issue from other disputes. In a related sense, different issue domains can be delineated as “compartments,” which are usually driven by distinctive focus, logics or dynamics (Choiruzzad, 2017, p. 46). In this respect, a typical example for compartmentalization is the isolation, at the height of the Cold War, of nuclear risks from the entire set of problems in relations between the two superpowers, which agreed on a compromise in that issue area. Likewise, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 could be viewed as a textbook example of compartmentalization, in which the concerned parties, namely Iran and the United States, successfully insulated the nuclear issue from other questions and reached a compromise (Akbarzadeh, 2024). Recently, there were references to this concept in the Biden administration’s approach to the relations with China in the context of climate change.[1]

Compartmentalization is also increasingly used as an analytical tool to explain contradictions and apparent inconsistencies in state behavior. Several recent studies employed the concept of compartmentalization as an explanatory framework to understand puzzling foreign relations of various countries, especially in their bilateral relations with certain counterparts (Délano, 2009; Patrick & Bennet, 2014; Cornell, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kundnani & Puglierin, 2018; Rudd, 2022; Brugier, 2022; Tsintsadze-Maas, 2024).  In that genre, the concept has been employed in the analyses of Turkish foreign policy, particularly in its relations with Russia and Iran, as will be reviewed below. Before moving to the Turkish case, this section will seek to delineate the analytical boundaries of the concept.

2.1. Issue-based vs. Actor-based Conceptualization

Compartmentalization can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, compartmentalization can have an issue-based meaning in the sense that it refers to the separation of policy domains from one another in a relationship with a single actor. In that respect, states may resort to this instrument to maintain cooperative forces against the backdrop of conflictual dynamics. It thus, for instance, offers a balance between long-term security and short-term economic interests. Secondly, compartmentalization also has an actor-based meaning, whereby it implies the tendency to conduct relations with one actor in isolation from others. States may use this instrument in pursuit of mutually exclusive partnerships, i.e., with two or more rival actors or blocs. Thus, for instance, it may particularly help states balance off treaty-based and long-established alliance dynamics with the ad hoc or emerging relationships with non-allies.

In a related sense, the concept may also be used to refer to the role of the leaders at the domestic-external nexus. Considering the contradictory expectations by the domestic and international audiences, leaders often confront challenges in decision making. Compartmentalization can be a tool to reconcile the tensions arising from differences in the domestic agenda and foreign policy priorities.

2.2. Compartmentalization at Cognitive and Practical Levels

Compartmentalization operates at two distinct but interrelated levels: cognitive and practical. Firstly, it functions as a cognitive process on the part of decision-makers, who may employ it to manage contradictory pressures for cooperation and contention arising from various sources. Relying on their previously held ideas, perspectives, worldviews or rational calculations, decision-makers may adopt compartmentalization at a cognitive level, as they decide with whom (actor-based compartmentalization) or on which issues (issue-based compartmentalization) they will cooperate. Secondly, at the practical level, compartmentalization can be conceived as a foreign policy behavior, whereby policy makers take actions such as detaching the country’s bilateral relations with various actors from each other (actor-based compartmentalization), or forging cooperative frameworks in order to handle complex, multifaceted and otherwise conflictual relations with certain counterparts (issue-based compartmentalization).

Here, Acharya’s (2012, p. 193) conceptualization of “cognitive priors” as “the preexisting ideas … of individuals or societies -whether they are worldviews, causal ideas, or principled ideas” can help us better understand the cognitive dimension of compartmentalization. Actors could bring various preexisting beliefs, ideas or schemas to new situations as they respond to them. There is a wealth of political-psychology scholarship looking at how those cognitive priors are informed or how individuals -leaders- organize the world in their mind. These are beyond this article’s focus, and for our purposes here, what matters is whether cognitive factors matter causally. At this point, while it is also beyond the scope of this study to analyze the role of ideas in international relations, it is helpful to recall Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993, p. 12) contention that ideas have the potential to influence policy outcomes through various causal pathways. They could serve as roadmaps, affect strategic interactions, or become embedded in institutions. In that respect, compartmentalization can also be viewed as part of the cognitive priors that leaders bring with them, which eventually affect the way they process information, respond to strategic environment, and eventually make foreign policy decisions. Thus, compartmentalization emerges as a result of a cognitive-strategic process, whereby the ideas shared by the elites and the policy practices -material factors- mutually interact.

for the rest of the article visit:

https://www.allazimuth.com/2025/11/26/conceptualizing-compartmentalization-in-international-relations-the-case-of-turkish-foreign-policy/

https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Kardas-and-Sinkaya-2025_online.pdf 

Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment


Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment

Turkish foreign policy has been on a steep-learning curve since 2015, whereby reliance on hard power has come to undergird its external conduct. Through a levels-of-analysis framework, the article will delineate its meaning, boundaries, and limitations, and problematize how it fits into underlying trends in Turkish foreign policy and security culture. It will argue that while the literature highlights the quest for strategic autonomy, middle power activism, realist turn, and militarization as the main characteristics of the qualitative change, it was the convergence of these longer-term trends and especially the increased propensity to use coercive instruments as part of a realist turn that defined this period. The discussion section will offer a plausible account of the transformation, drawing on insights from neoclassical realism. It will argue that the post-2015 transformation of Turkish behaviour represents an adjustment failure, namely a delayed reaction to external-systemic contingencies by devising corresponding strategies.


Kardaş, Ş., Sinkaya, B., & Pehlivantürk, B. (2025). Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 25(1), 11-30.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/389256776_Scope_drivers_and_manifestations_of_the_realist_turn_in_Turkish_foreign_policy_a_case_of_delayed_strategic_adjustment 

Evolution of Türkiye’s Engagement in the Middle Eastern Regional Order: The Normalization Agenda and Beyond

 This article analyzes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during the turbulent years initiated with the Arab Spring. In due course, Turkish policy considerably shifted from proactive engagement with the region in the early 2000s to a bid to leading regional transformation, particularly in the initial years of the Arab Spring. However, the reversal of the Arab Spring increasingly presented a blowback for Türkiye’s regional engagements. The ensuing regional insecurity resulted in a realist turn in Turkish foreign policy, with frequent resort to military instruments and coercive diplomacy. Eventually, regional policies of Türkiye corresponded to the search for de-escalation and normalization within the emerging Middle Eastern order since 2020. The article argues that changing regional dynamics corresponding with domestic conditions influenced and shaped Türkiye’s policies towards the Middle East. Recently, under the impact of the regional-systemic pressures coupled with changing domestic conditions, recalibrating its regional engagement, Türkiye has prioritized the normalization agenda. It argues that while normalization agenda will remain an important objective for Türkiye’s regional policies, it will evolve in a partial manner, and case-by-case, conditional on the unfolding regional order and Ankara’s strategic priorities.


https://wsps.ut.ac.ir/article_98367_67b42d82c5c89837a1edef94ce040048.pdf

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bayram-Sinkaya

https://www.academia.edu/126224411/Evolution_of_T%C3%BCrkiyes_Engagement_in_the_Middle_Eastern_Regional_Order_the_Normalization_Agenda_and_Beyond


Turkey-Iran Relations after the JDP

 After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, regional and domestic contexts surrounding it. Particularly fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations in the course of seventeen years have been very puzzling, and complicated, which made it worthy of study. Once, relations between the two states have so improved that some pundits regarded it as an evidence of shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. Soon later, Ankara and Tehran embroiled in a regional competition that reminded the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the 16th century with its strategic and sectarian implications. Later on, they have developed amicable relations. Against this background one may question how could we understand that very dynamic nature of Turkish-Iranian relations? Considering this complicated and dynamic picture, we should analyse decisive factors in the relations between Ankara and Tehran. In other words, what has changed - and has been changing - in Turkish-Iranian relations after the JDP? In order to comprehend the complicated and dynamic interactions between Ankara and Tehran, this research goes beyond the JDP period in Turkey and put forwards a review of the history of Turkish-Iranian relations. And then, it focuses on the JDP period and analyse relations between Ankara and Tehran from diplomatic, economic and regional perspectives. Finally, it makes some speculations on the future of Turkish-Iranian relations. It argues that the complicated relationship between the two countries have been determined by a configuration of geopolitical context, structural factors, and the ruling elite. The JDP elite have employed rationalization, institutionalization and compartmentalization strategies to further Turkish-Iranian relations. However, they could not go beyond the diplomatic culture that set the longer history of interactions between the two countries on a fine course between bitter rivalry and friendly relations.


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337090886_Turkey-Iran_Relations_after_the_JDP


The Aging Culture of Neighborhood in Turkey-Iran Relations

Originally published at https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/15688, on March 16, 2021.

 

In late February, 2021, some news outlets headlined a new ‘tension’ between Turkey and Iran. Arguably the crisis had erupted over a statement by Iraj Masjidi, the Iranian ambassador to Bagdad, denouncing Turkish military operations in the north of Iraq as a violation of the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Mohammad Farazmand, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, to declare its distress concerning the ‘baseless’ statement. The Ministry warned the ambassador that rather than standing against Turkey’s fight against terrorism as embodied by the PKK, Iran should lend support to Ankara. In return, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Derya Örs, the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, in order to convey its discomfort at a statement by Süleyman Soylu, the Interior Minister, who talked of the presence of PKK militants on Iranian soil. Despite a background of inflammatory media reports interpreting the events as a new round in the crisis between the two countries, those developments did not escalate into animosity between the two states. 

Likewise, nearly three months ago, there was another ‘diplomatic crisis’ between the two states over an anonymous poem recited by President Recep T. Erdoğan on December 10 at the victory parade in Baku on the occasion of the Azerbaijani triumph over Armenia in the Karabagh dispute. The poem highlighted the sorrowfulness over the division of historic Azerbaijan, and amplified Iranian anxiety over the Azerbaijan question. In line with the Iranian public uproar over Erdoğan’s recitation, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad J. Zarif, tweeted a ‘disrespectful’ text in his social media account. The poem crisis was swiftly managed by diplomats on both sides before it escalated into a watershed moment. 

 In the meantime, Zarif paid an official visit to Istanbul in January, where he talked with his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on potential stability in the Caucasus based on the idea of a 3+3 format proposed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (Turkey, Russia, Iran plus Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia). Soon after that, Turkish, Russian and Iranian delegations met in Sochi on February 16-17 in order to hold the ‘15th round of the International Meeting on Syria in the Astana format’. Later, on February 21, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani held a phone conversation with President Erdoğan, when they exchanged ideas for the desired removal of US sanctions on Iran. 

The above-mentioned developments in Turkish-Iranian relations in a short span of time prove how bilateral relations between the two states are diverse, complicated, and intertwined. They also display how Turkey and Iran are experiencing concurrent instances of cooperation, rivalry, and resentment. It is puzzling, however, for many to grasp the nature of Turkish-Iranian relations.  

The Persistent Dynamics of Cooperation and Rivalry 

Above all else, the simultaneous operation of patterns of cooperation, rivalry and resentment is not a novel phenomenon. The history of Turkish-Iranian relations is full of numerous instances of cooperation and amicable relations between the two states accompanied by a discourse of historical rivalry. Moreover, the dynamics of cooperation and rivalry have revolved around common or similar themes. 

First of all, the legacy of the historical Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, imbued with sectarian differences and geopolitical concerns, has haunted the minds of the elite in both countries, underpinning suspicion and mistrust of each other. After the emergence of nation-states, transnational movements, particularly Pan-Turkism, appeared as a national security concern on the Iranian side given the large numbers of Turkish-speaking people settled in that country. Since then, Iran has been preoccupied with a fear of Pan-Turkism. Additionally, the Iranian revolution of 1979 strained Turkish-Iranian relations because of Ankara’s disquiet over the Iranian export of revolution or Islamic radicalism. Recently, it has evolved into growing Turkish concerns with Pan-Shi’ism and proselytizing activities promoted by Tehran. Finally, geopolitical shifts in the Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the new geopolitical landscape in the Middle East after the Gulf Wars have led to the reinvigoration of Iranian and Turkish dreams of building their past empires in new forms and exerting political, economic and cultural influences. Thus, new geopolitical realities unleashed Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the Caucasus and the Middle East, particularly over Iraq, where historical Iranian-Ottoman rivalries were centered. 

Counter to the aforementioned dynamics of rivalry and resentment, common religious bonds and cultural commonalities have constituted a durable base for cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Many diplomats commonly recall nearly four hundred years of stability across the border between two nations as evidence of friendship and good-neighborhood. In this respect, strategic dictums of neighborhood require at least a minimum level of interaction between nearby states for the sake of border security and the management of cross-border relations. Likewise, economic considerations and trade interests constitute rational bases for collaboration between the two states. Finally, overwhelming strategic threats that render both countries vulnerable, such as great power interferences that currently threaten both Iranian and Turkish interests, emerge as a factor that forces them to cooperate. 

A number of issues surrounding border security such as smuggling and unrestrained movements of tribes and armed bands has continued to be a constant theme of both friction and partnership between the neighbors. The Kurdish question especially, embodied by the Kurdish movements seeking an autonomous or an independent and united Kurdistan state, has emerged both as a source of dispute and cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. While fighting ‘separatist’/ ‘terrorist’ movements on their soils, both Turkey and Iran have built intricate relations with Kurdish parties in Iraq and have watched each other apprehensively. In this regard, aside from occasional security and intelligence cooperation, Turkey has repeatedly blamed Iran for either directly or indirectly supporting Kurdish rebels, and frustrating the Turkish fight against them. 

 The Culture of Neighborhood 

Attempting to explain enigmatic relations between Turkey and Iran, short-sighted analyses lean on the selective use of history in order to provide further evidence such as historical rivalry or cooperation to explain their positions. However, the dynamics of cooperation, rivalry and resentment have been there and working simultaneously for over a century. That is why current cases of tensions or friendly statements would be very familiar to Iranian and Turkish officials of the 1920s. The continuity and the simultaneity of similar dynamics for cooperation and rivalry could be explained by the prevalence of a culture of neighborhood between modern Iran and Turkey. 

Accordingly, Turkey and Iran recognize each other as neighboring states with distinctive identities and interests, even though they may have some commonalities and shared interests. Additionally, they acknowledge the steadiness of the dynamics of cooperation and rivalry, which have turned out to be structural factors that could not be eliminated easily in the given international/regional conditions. However, the absence of territorial disputes between the two states has helped them to develop and maintain a neighborhood relationship based on the preservation of a fine line between cooperation and rivalry. They have become careful to keep each other at arm’s length; while refraining from building intimate relations, they have been sensitive not to antagonizing each other. Even at times of heightened rivalry, the two states have not engaged in hostile activities against each other. 

That culture of neighborhood based on a ‘realist’ assessment of surrounding conditions over Turkish-Iranian relations has occasionally been challenged by change of leadership or geopolitical shifts in the nearby regions. As a result, while tension and rivalry have escalated at some times between the two states, at other times they have achieved remarkable rapprochement. However, given the continuous and simultaneous impulses for competition and partnership, Turkish-Iranian relations have always been restored on the basis of the culture of neighborhood and have continued to operate along the fine line between cooperation and rivalry. 

In this framework, Turkey-Iran relations have achieved apparent shifts from a cooperative to a competitive relationship, which has actually remained within the margins set by the culture of neighborhood. As an example of this situation, Turkish-Iranian relations of the past two decades have witnessed many shifts between alignment and rivalry. First, a considerable rapprochement took place between Ankara and Tehran from 2001 to 2011. That rapprochement was facilitated by the rationalization of bilateral relations, growing economic opportunities for both sides, and looming geopolitical threats arising from the American occupation of Iraq. However, geopolitical opportunities and threats that emerged in nearby countries, particularly in Iraq and Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the growing self-confidence of Ankara and Tehran to project themselves as regional powers, led to an estrangement in Turkish-Iranian relations between 2011 and 2016. Changing geopolitical considerations in Turkey and Iran after 2016 unleashed a new process of cooperation between the two states at different sectors and levels. 

As a result of the persistent but diverse dynamics of cooperation and rivalry in Turkish-Iranian relations, there was a considerable number of instances of friction between Ankara and Tehran even at times when cooperative relations prevailed, and the reverse has also been true. It is also clear in the examples given above concerning the recent past of Ankara-Tehran relations. Hence, the nature of Turkey-Iran relations defies simplistic explanations centered on geopolitics, identity, or elite preferences, but reflects an aging culture of neighborhood based on the maintenance of relations on a fine line between cooperation and rivalry.

This opinion is originally published via Hypotheses, on March 16, 2021, and available at the following link https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/15688

Türkiye-İran Yakınlaşması ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın İran Ziyareti

Türkiye-İran Yakınlaşması ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın İran Ziyareti

09.10.207


Ankara ile Tahran arasında son aylarda dikkat çekici bir yakınlaşma var. Bu yakınlaşmada Ortadoğu’da meydana gelişmelerin önemli payı olduğu açık. Arap baharının ardından Türkiye ile İran arasında çeşitli boyutları ile ortaya çıkan rekabet ve bölgesel krizler her iki ülkenin de menfaatlerini olumsuz etkiledi. Özellikle Suriye’de ve Irak’ta yıllardır süren krizler her iki hükümeti bölgesel meselelerin çözümünde işbirliği yapmak ve bölge dışı büyük güçlere itimat etmemek hususunda birleştirdi. Öte yandan bölgede aşırıcılık, terörizm ve mezhepçiliğe karşı mücadele iki ülkenin ortak gündemi oldu. Son aylarda ABD’nin PKK’nın Suriye kolu PYD ile aktif işbirliğine girmesi hem Ankara’yı hem de Tahran’ı rahatsız etti. Suriye meselesi ile ilgili olarak Ocak 2017’de başlayan Astana sürecinde kaydedilen ilerleme, iki ülke ilişkilerinde güven artırıcı bir adım oldu. Son olarak ‘Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi’nde düzenlenen ‘bağımsızlık referandumu’ iki ülkede ortak tehdit şekliden değerlendirildi. Bu süreçte iki ülke genelkurmay başkanlarının kısa süre içerisinde gerçekleştirdikleri karşılıklı ziyaretler ile Türkiye-İran ilişkilerine güvenlik ve askeri işbirliği boyutu eklendi.

Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişmesinde ortak güvenlik tehditleri ve bölgesel kaygıların yanı sıra ikili ilişkilerin kurumsallaşmasının büyük rolü var. Zaman zaman yükselen gerilime rağmen iki ülke arasında 2014’te Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi’nin(YDİK) kurulması ve Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesi ikili ilişkilerin kurumsallaşması adına atılan önemli adımlar oldu. Nitekim YDİK dört yıldır cumhurbaşkanları ve çok sayıda bakanın katılımıyla, istikrarlı bir şekilde dönüşümlü olarak Ankara ve Tahran’da toplanıyor.

Cumhurbaşkanı Recep T. Erdoğan YDİK’in dördüncü toplantısına katılmak üzere 4 Ekim’de Tahran’a gitti. Ziyaretin gündeminde hem ikili ilişkiler hem de bölgesel meseleler vardı. Erdoğan, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ruhani ile birlikte YDİK’e başkanlık etti. Ayrıca ‘İslam Devrimi Rehberi’ Ayetullah Ali Hamanei ile bir araya geldi.

İkili İlişkiler

Ziyaret sırasında İran Ekonomi ve Finans Bakanlığı ile Türk Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı arasında; iki ülke merkez bankaları arasında; Türkiye Başbakanlık Arşivleri ile İran Milli Kütüphanesi arasında ve TRT ile IRIB arasında dört ayrı mutabakat zaptı imzalandı. Ayrıca iki ülke cumhurbaşkanları ikili ilişkilerden çeşitli bölgesel meselelere kadar bir dizi konuyu içeren ortak bildiri yayınlandı. İki ülke arasında 30 milyar dolarlık ticaret hacmine ulaşma hedefi tekrar edildi.

Ziyarette ikili ilişkiler ile ilgili dört husus öne çıktı. Birincisi ulusal para birimleri ile ticaretin ve iki ülke ulusal bankalarının karşılıklı olarak şube açmalarının önünün açılması. Bu konu daha önce de gündeme geldiği halde İran’a yönelik Amerikan ve BM yaptırımları nedeniyle uygulamaya geçilememişti. İkinci konu, karşılıklı ticaretin ve gidiş-gelişlerin teşvik edilmesi için iki ülke kara sınırında bulunan üç gümrük kapısının (Doğubeyazıt, Kapıköy ve Esendere) yirmidört saat açık tutulmasında prensip olarak anlaşmaya varıldı. Üçüncü konu enerji işbirliği idi. İran doğal gaz sanayisini geliştirme çabalarına daha fazla Türk yatırımcının dahil olması, buna karşılık Türkiye’nin İran’dan aldığı gaz miktarını artırması konusunda görüş birliğine varıldı. Fakat bu konuda detaylı bilgi verilmedi. İki ülkenin enerji konusunda karşılıklı ilgisi ve çıkarının yanı sıra 1996 yılında imzalanan mevcut doğalgaz anlaşmasının süresinin dolmak üzere olması nedeniyle bu konu önümüzdeki günlerde Türkiye-İran ilişkilerinin gündeminde olmaya devam edecek.

Bölgesel İşbirliği

Ziyaretin, Genelkurmay Başkanı Org. Hulusi Akar’ın 2 Ekim’de Tahran’a yaptığı ziyaretin ardından yapılması dikkatlerin muhtemel askeri-güvenlik işbirliğine çevrilmesine neden oldu. Yanı sıra, Türkiye’nin ve İran’ın bütün uyarılara rağmen referandumu yapan ‘Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi’ne (IKBY) karşı muhtemel işbirliğini gündeme getirdi. Türkiye, İran ve Irak dışişleri bakanları daha önce 20 Eylül’de New York’ta bir araya gelmiş, ortak bir bildiri yayınlamıştı. Bildiride tarafların Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğüne bağlılığı ve referanduma karşı oldukları vurgulanmıştı. Erdoğan’ın ziyareti sırasında cumhurbaşkanları ortak bildirisinde, ortak basın açıklamasında ve Erdoğan-Hamanei görüşmesinde iki ülke arasında güvenlik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi ve Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğünün korunması için güçlü mesajlar verildi.

Ortak bildiride iki ülke sınırlarında PKK ve PJAK unsurlarına karşı mevcut işbirliği mekanizmalarının güçlendirilmesinin ve organize suç örgütleri ile terörizme karşı mücadelede ortak adımlar atılmasının iki ülkenin de menfaatine olduğu vurgulandı. Irak anayasasına, toprak bütünlüğüne ve egemenliğine saygı yinelenerek Irak Kürdistan Bölgesinde yapılan‘illegal ve gayrimeşru referandum’ reddedildi ve bu adımın geri alınması talep edildi. Bu çerçevede, Irak hükümetinin toprak bütünlüğünü ve siyasi birliğini koruması için attığı adımlara destek verildi. Erdoğan ile görüşmesinde Ayetullah Hamanei, referandumun bölgeye ihanet ve bölgenin geleceğine tehdit olduğunu belirtti. İran ve Türkiye’nin referandumla mücadele için mümkün olan her adımı atması gerektiğini söyledi.

Ziyaretin en önemli sonuçlarından birisi Türkiye, İran ve Irak arasında IKBY’ye karşı alacakları yaptırım kararlarını koordine etmek için istişare mekanizması kurulması oldu. Erdoğan ile birlikte yaptığı basın toplantısında Ruhani, üç ülkenin bölgedeki siyasi sınırların değişmesine izin vermeyeceklerini, bunun için gerekli ve ciddi tedbirleri alacaklarını belirtti. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, üç ülkenin bundan sonra birlikte daha ağır kararlar alacaklarını, geri adım atmaz ise IKBY’nin izole edileceğini söyledi. Erdoğan, ziyaretin ardından yaptığı açıklamada Kürdistan bölgesinden petrol ihracatının durdurulup durdurulmayacağına üç ülkenin birlikte karar vereceğini ifade etti.

Sonuç olarak, iki ülke IKBY’nin bağımsızlık girişimine karşı birlikte hareket edeceklerini en yüksek düzeyde ifade etti. Ayrıca Türkiye ve İran’ın IKBY’ye karşı alınacak tedbirleri ve yaptırım kararlarını Irak merkezi hükümeti ile koordine edecekleri ortaya çıktı. Dolayısıyla,Ankara ve Tahran, ayrı ayrı veya birlikte IKBY’ye karşı bir adım atmadan önce Bağdat’ı izlemeye karar vermiş görünüyor. Bununla beraber her iki ülkenin de Irak merkezi hükümetini IKBY’ye karşı sert tedbirler alması için teşvik etmesi muhtemel. Her hâlükârda üç ülke arasında IKBY’ye karşı alınacak tedbirlerin ve işbirliğinin kapsamını Erbil-Bağdat ilişkilerinin seyri belirleyecek.

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14513?dil=tr

Turkish PM Erdoğan's Visit to Tehran: A New Milestone in Relations Between Turkey and Iran

Turkish PM Erdoğan's Visit to Tehran: A New Milestone in Relations Between Turkey and Iran
Assist. Prof. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya, Yıldırım Beyazit University IR


Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Iran's capital Tehran on 28-29 January 2014. The visit is a new milestone to improve relations between Turkey and Iran which have been in turbulence for various reasons in recent years. In this study, transformation of the Turkey-Iran relations in the context of Erdoğan's visit to Tehran, and potential obstacles before the development of relations between the two countries are discussed.   

A Milestone in Bilateral Relations: “High Level Cooperation Council”

During his Tehran visit, Turkish PM Erdoğan was accompanied by Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, and Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci. Within the scope of the visit, Erdoğan met with First Vice President Ishaq Jahangir, President Rouhani, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. During the talks, common concerns and expectations of both countries on regional issues, as well as the expectations on increasing the bilateral trade volume up to 30 billion dollars by the end of 2015, were expressed. Three agreements and a declaration (“A Cooperation Agreement to Form a Joint Trade Committee between Turkey and Iran”, “Preferential Trade Agreement [PTA]”, “A Cooperation Agreement Between Iran's Islamic Republic News Agency [IRNA] and Turkey's state-run Anadolu Agency [AA]”) were signed between the two countries.         

The most significant result of the visit is that Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iran's President Hassan Rouhani signed “a joint political declaration on establishing a High Level Cooperation Council”. Despite the positive developments in relations between Turkey and Iran over the last decade, both countries had some reservations that kept them from furthering their bilateral cooperation. Therefore, High Level Cooperation Council agreement, one of the most important foreign policy tools of Turkey over the past decade, has been signed with many countries so far; but even the idea was never even brought forward to sign it with Iran until recently. Also, despite the fact that the Iranian government seemed so willing to initiate regional cooperation with Turkey, Turkish officials did not lean towards meeting the expectations of Iran.           

There were two reasons underlying Turkey's prudent approach towards Iran: First reason was Iran's worsening relations with the U.S. and the West. While Iran was increasingly isolated from the international system due to both Iran's nuclear program, and also Ahmadinejad government's “radical foreign policy”, it was quite hard for Turkey to stand by this country at the expense of its traditional alliances. The second reason was Turkey's concerns regarding Iran's regional policies. Supporting the gradual “liberalization” and regional stability” of the region in economic and political terms, Turkey started to regard Iran's foreign policy towards countries such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in the region as a “destabilizing” factor; thus Turkey stayed away from Iran on regional issues.  

Within this framework, the government change in Iran that took place on August 2013, and the new President Hassan Rouhani's adopting an approach that attaches importance to diplomacy and cooperation instead of conflict in foreign policy allayed Turkey's concerns on Iran. Turkey responded positively to Rouhani's taking concrete steps on nuclear issue with a reconciliatory approach, and Iran's giving priority to developing relations with countries in the region. These developments brought forward the proposal for establishing a “High Level Cooperation Council” between the two countries, which comes to mean that both countries aim at developing bilateral relations comprehensively.                 

Rationalization and Compartmentalization of the Relations between Ankara and Tehran 

This positive development between Turkey and Iran does not mean that all  bilateral problems are solved and disagreements especially on regional issues are eliminated. Despite the current problems and disagreements, this positive development on bilateral relations shows that Turkey-Iran relations have been “rationalized” and “compartmentalized”. The process of rationalization and compartmentalization in bilateral relations appeared in early the 2000s. Rationalization pushes controversial issues into the background and brings forward cooperation and common points between the two countries. Compartmentalization, on the other hand, means to tackle bilateral relations in terms of security, culture, economy, and regional relations separately. This dynamic prevents any negative development that emerges in an issue area in bilateral relations from spoiling other issues.

The past few years have been a significant test for rationalization and compartmentalization of the relations between Ankara and Tehran. Because, as it could be remembered, within the framework of the NATO Missile Shield Program in 2011, the fact that the U.S. radars were deployed within Turkish borders, Patriot missile systems were installed on Turkey-Syria border, and Turkey and Iran opposed to one another over the developments both in Iraq and Syria severely threatened the ties between Ankara and Tehran. Interestingly enough, the trade volume between Turkey and Iran almost reached 22 billion dollars in 2012 with a new record during that period when the relations between Ankara and Tehran were severely threatened. This achievement shows that these two countries could actually cooperate by putting controversial issues aside.       

Potential Obstacles before the Relations between Turkey and Iran

In the coming months, Iran's President Rouhani is expected to pay an official visit to Turkey. It is likely that new agreements will be signed during that visit. On the other hand, despite the rationalization and compartmentalization in bilateral relations, there are still certain potential obstacles before the improvement of bilateral relations. 

Above all, it is worth recalling that during the mutual high-level visits between Turkey and Iran, customarily messages of goodwill and cooperation are delivered, some agreements are signed; but certain problems appear in putting these agreements into practice. These could be bureaucratic or technical problems, but the main problem stems from the fact that the political will does not follow the agreement. There are many agreements signed between Ankara and Tehran which could not be put into practice because of certain problems. For instance, the energy cooperation deal envisaging Turkey's prospecting, drilling, processing and marketing natural gas in Iran in 2007 was shelved after staying on agenda for a long time. Also, the “preferential trade agreement” which was signed during PM Erdoğan's visit was on the agenda for years. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid agreement which was expected to be signed during Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to Tehran in 2011 has just been signed.                 

It could be suggested that another potential obstacle before the bilateral relations is the potential weakening of Rouhani government's power. As mentioned above, the new approach Rouhani adopted in Iran's foreign policy eliminated Turkey's reservations towards Iran. Turkey's positive approach towards Iran during this period could also be assessed as a step to support and encourage Rouhani's government. However, taking into account the balance of power between political groups in Iran, Rouhani government's political future and capacity considerably depends on its performance and success on solving Iran's nuclear issue. Rouhani's failure on this issue could lead to change of balance in Iranian politics. Along the lines of this prospect, new developments that could take place in Iranian politics and foreign policy might present additional challenges for the relations between Turkey and Iran as well.

   
   
    http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2586

 31 January 2014

Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi

ADAM AKADEMİ Sayı 1 Haziran 2011

Başlık :Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi

Yazarlar :BAYRAM SİNKAYA

Özet

Türkiye’nin Batı bağlantısı uzun bir süre boyunca Ortadoğu ile ilişkilerinin şekillenmesinde değişik açılardan olumlu ya da olumsuz bir biçimde etkili olmuştur. Ancak bu süreç son birkaç yılda tersine dönmeye başlamıştır. Bu yeni dönemde Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ile ilişkileri öyle bir değişim göstermiştir ki bazı durumlarda Batı ile ilişkilerini olumsuz etkilemeye başlamıştır. Bu durum dikkate alınarak bu makalede Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası ve bu politikada Batının etkisi ele alınmıştır. Batı, Türkiye ve Ortadoğu arasındaki bu karşılıklı etkileşimin anlaşılabilmesi için Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası tarihi, bu üçlü ilişkilerdeki hâkim olan tarza göre belirli dönemlere ayrılmıştır. Makalede Türkiye’nin Batılı ve laik kimliği ile Batı ittifakına sıkı sıkıya bağlı olması nedeniyle bölgede hakim olan dinamiklerle çatışma içine girdiği, dolayısıyla Türkiye’nin uzunca bir süre bölgeden uzaklaştığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Ancak, 1990’lı yıllardan sonra hem Türkiye hem de bölge köklü dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu dönüşüm Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ülkeleri ile daha iyi ilişkiler kurmasını mümkün kılmıştır. Zamanla bölgenin jeopolitik yapısındaki değişiklikler nedeniyle de Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikasında Batı’nın etkisi giderek azalmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Ortadoğu, Batı, dış politika, güvenlik.

Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East from

the past to the present and the Impact of the West


ABSTRACT


Turkey’s alliance relationship with the West has dominated its Middle East policy for a long time and adversely or affirmatively affected it. However, this interaction seems to be reversed in the last couple of years. In this new era Turkish engagement with the Middle East so intensified that it started to adversely affect Turkey’s relations with the West in some cases. Considering that point, this article has dealt with Turkey’s relations with Middle East and searched for the Western impact on that relationship. In order to comprehend that interaction between the West, Turkey, and the Middle East, it divided history of Turkey-Middle East relations into several period in

accordance with the dominant form of interactions. It concluded that Turkey’s political identity as Western oriented and secular country and its strict alliance relationship with the West confronted with the regional dynamics in the Middle East, which culminated in Turkey’s distance relations with the region for a long time. However, after the 1990s, both Turkey and the regions has transformed profoundly that paved the way for better relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. In the course of time, because of the geopolitical shift in the region, the Western impact on this relationship gradually decreased.


Key Words: Turkey, Middle East, West, foreign policy, security.


http://ybuankara.academia.edu/BayramSinkaya/Papers/1155611/Gecmisten_Gunumuze_Turkiyenin_Ortadogu_Politikasi_ve_Bati_Etkisi

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