Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment

Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment

Turkish foreign policy has been on a steep-learning curve since 2015, whereby reliance on hard power has come to undergird its external conduct. Through a levels-of-analysis framework, the article will delineate its meaning, boundaries, and limitations, and problematize how it fits into underlying trends in Turkish foreign policy and security culture. It will argue that while the literature highlights the quest for strategic autonomy, middle power activism, realist turn, and militarization as the main characteristics of the qualitative change, it was the convergence of these longer-term trends and especially the increased propensity to use coercive instruments as part of a realist turn that defined this period. The discussion section will offer a plausible account of the transformation, drawing on insights from neoclassical realism. It will argue that the post-2015 transformation of Turkish behaviour represents an adjustment failure, namely a delayed reaction to external-systemic contingencies by devising corresponding strategies.

Kardaş, Ş., Sinkaya, B., & Pehlivantürk, B. (2025). Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 25(1), 11-30.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/389256776_Scope_drivers_and_manifestations_of_the_realist_turn_in_Turkish_foreign_policy_a_case_of_delayed_strategic_adjustment 

Evolution of Türkiye’s Engagement in the Middle Eastern Regional Order: The Normalization Agenda and Beyond

 This article analyzes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East during the turbulent years initiated with the Arab Spring. In due course, Turkish policy considerably shifted from proactive engagement with the region in the early 2000s to a bid to leading regional transformation, particularly in the initial years of the Arab Spring. However, the reversal of the Arab Spring increasingly presented a blowback for Türkiye’s regional engagements. The ensuing regional insecurity resulted in a realist turn in Turkish foreign policy, with frequent resort to military instruments and coercive diplomacy. Eventually, regional policies of Türkiye corresponded to the search for de-escalation and normalization within the emerging Middle Eastern order since 2020. The article argues that changing regional dynamics corresponding with domestic conditions influenced and shaped Türkiye’s policies towards the Middle East. Recently, under the impact of the regional-systemic pressures coupled with changing domestic conditions, recalibrating its regional engagement, Türkiye has prioritized the normalization agenda. It argues that while normalization agenda will remain an important objective for Türkiye’s regional policies, it will evolve in a partial manner, and case-by-case, conditional on the unfolding regional order and Ankara’s strategic priorities.

https://wsps.ut.ac.ir/article_98367_67b42d82c5c89837a1edef94ce040048.pdf

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bayram-Sinkaya

https://www.academia.edu/126224411/Evolution_of_T%C3%BCrkiyes_Engagement_in_the_Middle_Eastern_Regional_Order_the_Normalization_Agenda_and_Beyond

Introduction to Middle East Politics: Leading Factors, Actors and Dynamics

This study has aimed at increasing familiarity of students with regard to major issues in Middle East politics, and providing a framework that would help to analyze regional politics. In this regard, there are two points to be considered. The first one is the necessity of addressing an issue regarding the region through a synchronic and comparative perspective. The second is the fact that any issue addressed in political analyses is a part of a complicated process shaped by interaction of a number of factors in a specific place and historical context. In this study, firstly main factors that are effective in Middle East politics, such as physical and human geography, economy and history are examined. In the second part, leading actors that play critical roles in regional politics, i.e. states, international organizations and extra-regional powers, and the roles of these actors in Middle East politics are discussed. Lastly, contextual factors that emerge in the Middle East, and regional and global dynamics are addressed briefly. It also addressed the question how does structural factors, actors in the region and regional and global dynamics affect each other. 

 ORSAM Resource, no.1, April 2016 https://orsam.org.tr/en/introduction-to-middle-east-politics-leading-factors-actors-and-dynamics/ 

 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328127488_Introduction_to_Middle_East_Politics_-_Leading_Factors_Actors_and_Dynamics https://www.academia.edu/29295126/Introduction_to_Middle_East_Politics_Leading_Factors_Actors_and_Dynamics_pdf

Implications of the Syrian Civil War on the Alawites

Introduction

Virtually all Syrian people were excited with the outbreak of public protests against the ruling Baath regime in March 2011. /e protesters then took some measures in order to prove that the ethnic and religious divisions of people did not inhibit them from coming together for change and overcoming sectarian incitements. One popular slogan chanted at the demonstrations was “One, One, the Syrian people are one!” However, the initial accord among people coming from various ethnic and religious backgrounds gradually eroded when the opposition demonstrations turned into armed clashes with the security forces. /e clashes, which gradually appeared in a sectarian form, deepened communal divisions and triggered inter- communal anxieties for a number of reasons and then turned into a protracted social conÁict and civil war (AtlıoÌlu, 2018).
/e civil war that has inÁicted Syria for over eight years has profoundly affected all people in the country in terms of politics, security, and economy. In this regard, because of the Alawite origins of the Assad family, which has been ruling for over four decades, the prospective position of the Alawite community has been deemed critical for the fate of the Baath regime and Assad rule. Considerable literature is found on the history of the Alawites and their relations with the Baath regime (Goldsmith, 2011, 2015), however the implications the civil war has had on the Alawites are rarely addressed in the literature aside from a few local case studies and research reports (Nakkash, 2013). Most existing media reports and think-tank analyses overlook the complex relations the Alawites have with the Assad rule and opposition. /is article is committed to analyzing the civil war’s political and social effects on the Alawites. /e research is mainly based on secondary resources, media reports, and news portals.

Syrian Alawites

Alawi notion refers both to a religious sect and an ethnic group that has existed in the coastal mountain chains of northwest Syria. Alawism, which initially emerged as a religious sect, in time turned into an identity based on blood ties regardless of whether one performs the religious rituals (Khudr, 2011). Alawites speak Arabic, but have certain dialectal differences. Based on these differences in both their beliefs and languages, some sources maintain different claims as to the origins of Alawites. According to the dominant view, Alawism emerged in the 10th century as a result of the transformation of an esoteric-mystic movement led by Muhammad Ibn Nusayr (d. 868) and is regarded as an extreme Shiite branch (ghulat). Alawism has also been called Nusayriya, because of the name of its founder (Friedman, 2010; Moosa, 1987). Although most Alawites claim to be Muslims (Kramer, 1987), their fundamentalist opponents continue to question their relationship with Islam due to the mysterious and syncretic aspects of that faith.
When the Syrian crisis started, the Alawites constituted 10-12% (2-2.5 million) of the total population, most of whom were living in the coastal region of Latakia and Tartus provinces. However, most large Syrian cities have big or small Alawite communities that had either migrated from the countryside or come from Alawite-populated regions, especially during the Baath rule. A signiácant portion of the Alawites who settled in the cities was working in state-owned enterprises, government offices, state media organs, or security institutions (Balanche, 2013).

Alawites’ relations with the Baath regime

One of the most controversial issues about Alawites is their relation to the Baath regime, which had seized power in Syria in 1963 (Mercan, 2012, pp. 58–74; Salık, 2016, pp. 45–52). /e domination of the Alawite-originating Assad family, who have ruled the Baath party and the country since 1970, has made this issue viable. Indeed, the Baath Party had been very attractive to the Alawites since its 

establishment due to its secular and socialist orientations. /e socialist agenda of the Baath presented the needy Alawites with economic opportunities, and its secular nationalism enabled their religious differences to be ignored. After ánally taking power, Haáz Assad recruited Alawite people to control key positions in government institutions, especially in security institutions (Alkan, 2013). /e Baath regime’s intelligence and security services were so intertwined with the Alawi community that practically one person from almost each Alawite family worked for one of these organizations (Nakkash, 2013, p. 11; Holliday, 2013, pp. 44–45).
While the Assad rule brought the Alawites to power, it also put the Alawite community under pressure and transformed Alawism. According to some assessments, the commitment to support Assad rule had almost completely replaced common faith and ethnic ties as the most important bond connecting Alawites (Khudr, 2011; Karfan, 2005). Additionally, the Assads’ association with the Baath regime and the ‘Muslim Arab nation project’ prevented Alawites from freely developing their distinct cultural, social, and religious identities. Unlike other faith groups, Alawites had not been allowed to establish any authority or institution that would guide the community and observe religious principles (Landis, 2003; Mervin 2013). With the Assad family’s monopolization of power, traditional Alawite community leaders, tribal sheikhs, landlords, and intellectuals were neutralized and lost their leadership roles. In the words of Harling and Birke, one of the main challenges of the ongoing tragedy was that no such thing as an Alawite community. In their words, Alawites “were the most confused and anomic segment of the Syrian society” (Harling and Birke, 2013).
Although Alawites were more easily employed in the public sector because of their relative advantages in accessing power networks, this did not mean that they had a general high standard of living. Contrary to the improvements in Alawites’ living conditions in the árst decades of Baath rule, inequality increased among the Alawites, and wealth was gradually concentrated in the hands of a small group directly linked to the Assad family and their allies (Goldsmith, 2011, pp. 47–48; Hurd, 2013).
In the aftermath of the eruption of anti-regime demonstrations, the regime tried every means to ensure Alawites’ loyalty. On the one hand, it increased pressure over the Alawites leaning toward the opposition. On the other hand, the regime’s propaganda apparatuses attempted to ignite sectarian fears among Alawites by presenting the opposition as fundamentalist fanatics threatening their well-being and survival and by exploiting the sectarian affiliations of the victims

of armed clashes (Nakkash, 2013, p. 6). Meanwhile, the growing clout of Islamist groups among the ranks of the opposition heightened Alawites’ anxiety; thus, the fate of their own community depended on the fate of the Assad regime (Hurd, 2013; Goldsmith, 2011).
The Opposition and Alawites
Despite the intricate relations between the Baath regime and Alawites, saying that all Alawites supported the Assad administration is difficult. Alawites who have opposed the Baath regime and struggled against the Assad administration have always been around. Alawites’ dissatisfaction with the Assad rules’ repressive policies and corruption increased over time. Additionally, the appearance of the Assad rule as Alawites’ representative and protector has caused reactions among many Alawites who believe that Assad has been pursuing his own personal interests rather than the interests of Alawites as a community (Goldsmith, 2011).
Considering the complicated relationship between the regime and the Alawites, a signiácant number of opposition águres tried to convince the Alawites to join their rank in the early stages of the confrontation. In Bassma Kodmani’s (2011) words, “If the democratic opposition in Syria is going to succeed, it must árst convince the Alawites that they can safely turn against the Assad regime.” In a speech at the árst meeting of Friends of the Syrian People in Tunisia on February 24, 2012, Burhan Ghalioun, the árst president the Syrian National Council (SNC), addressed the Alawite concerns and stated that Alawites could not be held responsible for “the acts of corrupt dictators” and “the crimes conducted by the Assad-Makhlouf maáa” (Ghalioun, 2012).
Despite the opposition’s attempts to reach them, Alawites did not participate in the protests in large groups; but many people from different segments of the community were found individually taking part in the opposition demonstrations. For instance, Alawite actress Fadwa Soliman became one of the most famous faces of the rebellion in Homs. Some Alawite dissidents like Waheed Saqr and Monzer Makhous associated with the SNC. Even some Alawite soldiers and intelligence officers like Zubaida al-Meeki, Yaseen Sulayman, and Nasr Mustafa mutinied against the regime and joined the Free Syrian Army. However, the Alawites who joined the opposition’s ranks lost the harmony they had initially achieved with the opposition because of the increasing inÁuence of Islamic extremists. /e rise of anti-Alawism among the rebels, especially among armed groups, and the rise of extremist elements increased the concerns of the Alawite community. Furthermore, the attempts at regime change had not received Alawite support because of the uncertainty about Alawites’ situation in case of a regime change and what would happen to the thousands of them who worked in the security organizations and various government institutions. Hence, Alawite dissidents separated from the Assad regime, but they did not want to take up arms together with the rebels and worried about emerging sectarian clashes (Barnard, 2013). /e Alawite dissidents who distanced themselves from both the Assad rule and the opposition that had organized abroad mostly joined the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change in Syria (NCC). However, the NCC was viewed by most of the opposition and armed rebels as collaborating with the regime.

Alawite dissidents organized a conference for the árst time on March 23-24, 2013 in Cairo with the demand that a democratic regime be established in place of the Assad regime (Oweis, 2013a). /e Cairo conference did not turn into a new Alawite movement, but the anti-regime Alawites formed a movement called Upcoming Syria (Ghad Suriyah) in Istanbul in November 2015. Being the árst movement to join the opposition against the Assad rule and address Alawites directly, Upcoming Syria’s goal was to cooperate with the Syrian revolutionaries to guarantee the security of the Alawite community and their share in the future social and political structure (Terdiman, 2016).

Effects of the Civil War on the Alewives

The civil war in Syria, gradually colored by sectarian motives, triggered both the social cleavages and inter-communal conÁicts that have caused great losses for each party and displaced millions of people. Greater numbers of Alawites started to view the rebellion as an anti-Alawite movement rather than a popular revolution. Consequently, common group bonds and feelings developed among the Alawites despite their differences (Inskeep, 2013).
In addition to the ineffectiveness security of forces in stabilizing the country and preventing the spread of armed clashes , the resulting communal security concerns among the Alawites led them take arms in mid -2012 . Alawi youths either joined the army or militia groups such as the Popular Committees, National Defense Forces , and numerous militia organizations (Nakkash , 2013 ; Holliday , 2013).
One consequence of the civil war and communal insecurity in the country is
massive population displacements. /e displacements and population movements

with regard to Alawites took shape in two forms: one, the migration of Alawites to more secure regions from the places they had felt insecure and two, migrations from all across Syria to cities known to be predominantly Alawite.
Another effect of the civil war on the Alawites was their increased reaction against the Assad family (Stratfor, 2015; Sherlock, 2015; Dandachi, 2014). /e criticisms such as the regime’s erroneous policies had brought the country to this situation and Assad would not leave power no matter what and no matter how many Alawites died increased. As the conÁict extended and the Alawite losses increased, reactions against the regime increased, especially among the relatively poor Alawites living in the inner regions. More and more Alawites began to consider their community not as the owner or beneáciary of the regime, but as a tool used by Assads. Even some Alawites inclined towards the opposition. However, either because of obscurity of the opposition plans for the future of Syria and Alawite community, or because of growing extremism among the opposition that ignited sectarian fears among the Alawites, caused the majority of Alawites to coalesce with Assad’s rule. Finally, combined with other effects of the civil war on their community, some Alawites have started to seek for a redeánition of their communal identity.

https://insanvetoplum.org/content/5-online-first/5-m0379/sinkaya.pdf

Turkish-Iranian Rapprochement and President Erdogan's Visit to Iran

09.10.2017

There has been a remarkable rapprochement between Ankara and Tehran in recent months. It is clear that certain developments in the Middle East have played a significant part in this rapprochement. The apparent rivalry between Turkey and Iran in various scenes that intensified after the Arab Spring and the subsequent regional crises adversely affected interests of the both countries. Especiallyongoing crises in Syria and Iraq for years have led an implicit understanding between the two governments to cooperate with each other for solutionof the regional issues, and not to rely much on extra-regional great powers. Additionally,the two countries have shared similar agendas to fight againstextremism, terrorism and sectarianism in the region. Recently, the growing partnership between the United States and PYD, affiliated tothe PKK, in Syria,hasdistressedboth Ankara and Tehran. The progress recorded in the Astana process started in January 2017 that aimed to contain armed clashes in Syrian, has served a confidence-building step in the relations between the two countries. Lastly, the 'independence referendum' held in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is regardedas a common threatby the both countries. Meanwhile, the mutual exchanges between the Chiefs of the General Staffs in Turkey and Iran in a short span of time have added security and military dimensions to the growing cooperationbetween the two countries.

Institutionalization of bilateral relations,as well as regional security concerns and common security threats, has played a major role in the improvement of relations between Turkey and Iran. The establishment of the High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) between the two countries in 2014, and the invocation the Preferential Trade Agreement amidst occasionally rising tensions,areprofound steps taken in the name of institutionalizing bilateral relations. As a matter of fact,HLCC has been gathering in Ankara and Tehran by turns with the participation of the presidents and a large number of ministers for four years.

President Recep T. Erdoganpaid a visit to Tehran on October 4, in order to attend the fourth meeting of the HLCC.Erdogan, along with the Iranian President Rouhani, chaired the HLCC.President Erdoğan also met the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In addition to bilateral economic, political and security relations, however, regional affairs marked the agenda of the visit.

Bilateral Relations

During the visit, four memorandums of understanding were singed between the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Iran and the Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade; the two central banks; the Turkish Prime Ministry Archives and the Iranian National Library and finally between TRT and IRIB. What’s more, the presidents of the two countries shared a joint statement that covers a wide range of issues from bilateral economic relations and to a number of regional issues. The parties have reiterated their goal to reach trade volumebetween the two countries above the level of $ 30 billion.

Four points regarding bilateral relations came to the forefront. The first is to trade with national currencies and the opening of branches of the Iranian and Turkish national banks in the two countries. This issue has been on the agenda for some years, but not been put into practice because of the American and UN sanctions against Iran. The second issue was to keep the three customs gates (Doğubeyazıt, Kapıköy and Esendere) on the land border of the two countries open for twenty-four hours in order to encourage mutual trade and travel. The third issue was energy cooperation. It was agreed that more Turkish investors would be involved in the efforts to develop the Iranian natural gas industry, while Turkey would increase the amount of gas it bought from Iran. However, detailed information was not provided in this topic. In addition to the mutual interests of the two countries in the energy sector, this issue will continue to be on the agenda of Turkey-Iran relations in the coming days as the current gas pipeline agreement, which was signed in 1996, is about to expire.

Regional Cooperation

As the visit was realized just after the Turkish Chief of the General StaffHulusiAkar had visited Tehran on October 2, the attention was drawn upon military-security cooperation. Besides, prospective cooperation between Turkey and Iran against the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG), which heldthe referendum despite all warnings, was brought to the agenda. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Iraq had previously gathered in New York on 20 September and issued a joint declaration signifying their commitment to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity, and their opposition to the referendum. During Erdogan's visit, strong messages were given in the joint statement of the presidents, the joint press conference and the Erdogan-Khamenei meeting, for the development of security cooperation between the two countries and the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq.

It was emphasized in the joint declaration that strengthening current cooperation mechanisms between the two countries againstthe PKK and PJAK elements in the borders of the two countries and taking joint steps tofight organized crime and terrorism are in the interests of both countries. Paying homage the Iraqi constitution, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq, the parties rejected the 'illegal and illegitimate referendum' held in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and asked Iraqi Kurdish officials to step back. In this context, the Iraqi government’smeasures to protect its territorial integrity and political unityare backed up. During his meeting with Erdogan, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that the referendum is a betrayal anda threat to the future of the region. He also stated that Iran and Turkey should take every possible step to fight the referendum.

One of the most significantoutcomes of the visit was the establishment of a consultation mechanism between Turkey, Iran and Iraq to coordinate their sanctions against the KRG. At a press conference with Erdogan, Rouhani stated that the three countries would not allow the political borders of the region to change and would take necessary and serious measures against such a development. President Erdogan said that the three countries would take more serious decisions together, and if the KRG do not step back, it would be isolated. Erdoganalso said that they would decide together with Iraq and Iranwhether to stop the oil exports from the Kurdistan region.

As a result, the two countries have expressed at the highest level that they will act together against the KRG’s independence initiative. It was also revealed that Turkey and Iran would coordinate their measures and sanctions against the KRG with the Iraqi central government. Hence, Ankara and Tehran seem to have decided to follow Baghdad before taking anyunilateral step against the KRG. Both countries, however, are likely to encourage the Iraqi central government to take rigorous measures against the KRG. In any case, the scope of cooperation and the measures to be taken against the KRGamongthe three countries will be determined by the course of Arbil-Baghdad relations.

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14513?dil=en