Implications of the Syrian Civil War on the Alawites
Introduction
Virtually all Syrian people were excited with the outbreak of public protests against the ruling Baath regime in March 2011. /e protesters then took some measures in order to prove that the ethnic and religious divisions of people did not inhibit them from coming together for change and overcoming sectarian incitements. One popular slogan chanted at the demonstrations was “One, One, the Syrian people are one!” However, the initial accord among people coming from various ethnic and religious backgrounds gradually eroded when the opposition demonstrations turned into armed clashes with the security forces. /e clashes, which gradually appeared in a sectarian form, deepened communal divisions and triggered inter- communal anxieties for a number of reasons and then turned into a protracted social conÁict and civil war (AtlıoÌlu, 2018).
/e civil war that has inÁicted Syria for over eight years has profoundly affected all people in the country in terms of politics, security, and economy. In this regard, because of the Alawite origins of the Assad family, which has been ruling for over four decades, the prospective position of the Alawite community has been deemed critical for the fate of the Baath regime and Assad rule. Considerable literature is found on the history of the Alawites and their relations with the Baath regime (Goldsmith, 2011, 2015), however the implications the civil war has had on the Alawites are rarely addressed in the literature aside from a few local case studies and research reports (Nakkash, 2013). Most existing media reports and think-tank analyses overlook the complex relations the Alawites have with the Assad rule and opposition. /is article is committed to analyzing the civil war’s political and social effects on the Alawites. /e research is mainly based on secondary resources, media reports, and news portals.
Syrian Alawites
Alawi notion refers both to a religious sect and an ethnic group that has existed in the coastal mountain chains of northwest Syria. Alawism, which initially emerged as a religious sect, in time turned into an identity based on blood ties regardless of whether one performs the religious rituals (Khudr, 2011). Alawites speak Arabic, but have certain dialectal differences. Based on these differences in both their beliefs and languages, some sources maintain different claims as to the origins of Alawites. According to the dominant view, Alawism emerged in the 10th century as a result of the transformation of an esoteric-mystic movement led by Muhammad Ibn Nusayr (d. 868) and is regarded as an extreme Shiite branch (ghulat). Alawism has also been called Nusayriya, because of the name of its founder (Friedman, 2010; Moosa, 1987). Although most Alawites claim to be Muslims (Kramer, 1987), their fundamentalist opponents continue to question their relationship with Islam due to the mysterious and syncretic aspects of that faith.
When the Syrian crisis started, the Alawites constituted 10-12% (2-2.5 million) of the total population, most of whom were living in the coastal region of Latakia and Tartus provinces. However, most large Syrian cities have big or small Alawite communities that had either migrated from the countryside or come from Alawite-populated regions, especially during the Baath rule. A signiácant portion of the Alawites who settled in the cities was working in state-owned enterprises, government offices, state media organs, or security institutions (Balanche, 2013).
Alawites’ relations with the Baath regime
One of the most controversial issues about Alawites is their relation to the Baath regime, which had seized power in Syria in 1963 (Mercan, 2012, pp. 58–74; Salık, 2016, pp. 45–52). /e domination of the Alawite-originating Assad family, who have ruled the Baath party and the country since 1970, has made this issue viable. Indeed, the Baath Party had been very attractive to the Alawites since its
Virtually all Syrian people were excited with the outbreak of public protests against the ruling Baath regime in March 2011. /e protesters then took some measures in order to prove that the ethnic and religious divisions of people did not inhibit them from coming together for change and overcoming sectarian incitements. One popular slogan chanted at the demonstrations was “One, One, the Syrian people are one!” However, the initial accord among people coming from various ethnic and religious backgrounds gradually eroded when the opposition demonstrations turned into armed clashes with the security forces. /e clashes, which gradually appeared in a sectarian form, deepened communal divisions and triggered inter- communal anxieties for a number of reasons and then turned into a protracted social conÁict and civil war (AtlıoÌlu, 2018).
/e civil war that has inÁicted Syria for over eight years has profoundly affected all people in the country in terms of politics, security, and economy. In this regard, because of the Alawite origins of the Assad family, which has been ruling for over four decades, the prospective position of the Alawite community has been deemed critical for the fate of the Baath regime and Assad rule. Considerable literature is found on the history of the Alawites and their relations with the Baath regime (Goldsmith, 2011, 2015), however the implications the civil war has had on the Alawites are rarely addressed in the literature aside from a few local case studies and research reports (Nakkash, 2013). Most existing media reports and think-tank analyses overlook the complex relations the Alawites have with the Assad rule and opposition. /is article is committed to analyzing the civil war’s political and social effects on the Alawites. /e research is mainly based on secondary resources, media reports, and news portals.
Syrian Alawites
Alawi notion refers both to a religious sect and an ethnic group that has existed in the coastal mountain chains of northwest Syria. Alawism, which initially emerged as a religious sect, in time turned into an identity based on blood ties regardless of whether one performs the religious rituals (Khudr, 2011). Alawites speak Arabic, but have certain dialectal differences. Based on these differences in both their beliefs and languages, some sources maintain different claims as to the origins of Alawites. According to the dominant view, Alawism emerged in the 10th century as a result of the transformation of an esoteric-mystic movement led by Muhammad Ibn Nusayr (d. 868) and is regarded as an extreme Shiite branch (ghulat). Alawism has also been called Nusayriya, because of the name of its founder (Friedman, 2010; Moosa, 1987). Although most Alawites claim to be Muslims (Kramer, 1987), their fundamentalist opponents continue to question their relationship with Islam due to the mysterious and syncretic aspects of that faith.
When the Syrian crisis started, the Alawites constituted 10-12% (2-2.5 million) of the total population, most of whom were living in the coastal region of Latakia and Tartus provinces. However, most large Syrian cities have big or small Alawite communities that had either migrated from the countryside or come from Alawite-populated regions, especially during the Baath rule. A signiácant portion of the Alawites who settled in the cities was working in state-owned enterprises, government offices, state media organs, or security institutions (Balanche, 2013).
Alawites’ relations with the Baath regime
One of the most controversial issues about Alawites is their relation to the Baath regime, which had seized power in Syria in 1963 (Mercan, 2012, pp. 58–74; Salık, 2016, pp. 45–52). /e domination of the Alawite-originating Assad family, who have ruled the Baath party and the country since 1970, has made this issue viable. Indeed, the Baath Party had been very attractive to the Alawites since its
establishment due to its secular and socialist orientations. /e socialist agenda of the Baath presented the needy Alawites with economic opportunities, and its secular nationalism enabled their religious differences to be ignored. After ánally taking power, Haáz Assad recruited Alawite people to control key positions in government institutions, especially in security institutions (Alkan, 2013). /e Baath regime’s intelligence and security services were so intertwined with the Alawi community that practically one person from almost each Alawite family worked for one of these organizations (Nakkash, 2013, p. 11; Holliday, 2013, pp. 44–45).
While the Assad rule brought the Alawites to power, it also put the Alawite community under pressure and transformed Alawism. According to some assessments, the commitment to support Assad rule had almost completely replaced common faith and ethnic ties as the most important bond connecting Alawites (Khudr, 2011; Karfan, 2005). Additionally, the Assads’ association with the Baath regime and the ‘Muslim Arab nation project’ prevented Alawites from freely developing their distinct cultural, social, and religious identities. Unlike other faith groups, Alawites had not been allowed to establish any authority or institution that would guide the community and observe religious principles (Landis, 2003; Mervin 2013). With the Assad family’s monopolization of power, traditional Alawite community leaders, tribal sheikhs, landlords, and intellectuals were neutralized and lost their leadership roles. In the words of Harling and Birke, one of the main challenges of the ongoing tragedy was that no such thing as an Alawite community. In their words, Alawites “were the most confused and anomic segment of the Syrian society” (Harling and Birke, 2013).
Although Alawites were more easily employed in the public sector because of their relative advantages in accessing power networks, this did not mean that they had a general high standard of living. Contrary to the improvements in Alawites’ living conditions in the árst decades of Baath rule, inequality increased among the Alawites, and wealth was gradually concentrated in the hands of a small group directly linked to the Assad family and their allies (Goldsmith, 2011, pp. 47–48; Hurd, 2013).
In the aftermath of the eruption of anti-regime demonstrations, the regime tried every means to ensure Alawites’ loyalty. On the one hand, it increased pressure over the Alawites leaning toward the opposition. On the other hand, the regime’s propaganda apparatuses attempted to ignite sectarian fears among Alawites by presenting the opposition as fundamentalist fanatics threatening their well-being and survival and by exploiting the sectarian affiliations of the victims
While the Assad rule brought the Alawites to power, it also put the Alawite community under pressure and transformed Alawism. According to some assessments, the commitment to support Assad rule had almost completely replaced common faith and ethnic ties as the most important bond connecting Alawites (Khudr, 2011; Karfan, 2005). Additionally, the Assads’ association with the Baath regime and the ‘Muslim Arab nation project’ prevented Alawites from freely developing their distinct cultural, social, and religious identities. Unlike other faith groups, Alawites had not been allowed to establish any authority or institution that would guide the community and observe religious principles (Landis, 2003; Mervin 2013). With the Assad family’s monopolization of power, traditional Alawite community leaders, tribal sheikhs, landlords, and intellectuals were neutralized and lost their leadership roles. In the words of Harling and Birke, one of the main challenges of the ongoing tragedy was that no such thing as an Alawite community. In their words, Alawites “were the most confused and anomic segment of the Syrian society” (Harling and Birke, 2013).
Although Alawites were more easily employed in the public sector because of their relative advantages in accessing power networks, this did not mean that they had a general high standard of living. Contrary to the improvements in Alawites’ living conditions in the árst decades of Baath rule, inequality increased among the Alawites, and wealth was gradually concentrated in the hands of a small group directly linked to the Assad family and their allies (Goldsmith, 2011, pp. 47–48; Hurd, 2013).
In the aftermath of the eruption of anti-regime demonstrations, the regime tried every means to ensure Alawites’ loyalty. On the one hand, it increased pressure over the Alawites leaning toward the opposition. On the other hand, the regime’s propaganda apparatuses attempted to ignite sectarian fears among Alawites by presenting the opposition as fundamentalist fanatics threatening their well-being and survival and by exploiting the sectarian affiliations of the victims
of armed clashes (Nakkash, 2013, p. 6). Meanwhile, the growing clout of Islamist groups among the ranks of the opposition heightened Alawites’ anxiety; thus, the fate of their own community depended on the fate of the Assad regime (Hurd, 2013; Goldsmith, 2011).
The Opposition and Alawites
Despite the intricate relations between the Baath regime and Alawites, saying that all Alawites supported the Assad administration is difficult. Alawites who have opposed the Baath regime and struggled against the Assad administration have always been around. Alawites’ dissatisfaction with the Assad rules’ repressive policies and corruption increased over time. Additionally, the appearance of the Assad rule as Alawites’ representative and protector has caused reactions among many Alawites who believe that Assad has been pursuing his own personal interests rather than the interests of Alawites as a community (Goldsmith, 2011).
Considering the complicated relationship between the regime and the Alawites, a signiácant number of opposition águres tried to convince the Alawites to join their rank in the early stages of the confrontation. In Bassma Kodmani’s (2011) words, “If the democratic opposition in Syria is going to succeed, it must árst convince the Alawites that they can safely turn against the Assad regime.” In a speech at the árst meeting of Friends of the Syrian People in Tunisia on February 24, 2012, Burhan Ghalioun, the árst president the Syrian National Council (SNC), addressed the Alawite concerns and stated that Alawites could not be held responsible for “the acts of corrupt dictators” and “the crimes conducted by the Assad-Makhlouf maáa” (Ghalioun, 2012).
Despite the opposition’s attempts to reach them, Alawites did not participate in the protests in large groups; but many people from different segments of the community were found individually taking part in the opposition demonstrations. For instance, Alawite actress Fadwa Soliman became one of the most famous faces of the rebellion in Homs. Some Alawite dissidents like Waheed Saqr and Monzer Makhous associated with the SNC. Even some Alawite soldiers and intelligence officers like Zubaida al-Meeki, Yaseen Sulayman, and Nasr Mustafa mutinied against the regime and joined the Free Syrian Army. However, the Alawites who joined the opposition’s ranks lost the harmony they had initially achieved with the opposition because of the increasing inÁuence of Islamic extremists. /e rise of anti-Alawism among the rebels, especially among armed groups, and the rise of extremist elements increased the concerns of the Alawite community. Furthermore, the attempts at regime change had not received Alawite support because of the uncertainty about Alawites’ situation in case of a regime change and what would happen to the thousands of them who worked in the security organizations and various government institutions. Hence, Alawite dissidents separated from the Assad regime, but they did not want to take up arms together with the rebels and worried about emerging sectarian clashes (Barnard, 2013). /e Alawite dissidents who distanced themselves from both the Assad rule and the opposition that had organized abroad mostly joined the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change in Syria (NCC). However, the NCC was viewed by most of the opposition and armed rebels as collaborating with the regime.
The Opposition and Alawites
Despite the intricate relations between the Baath regime and Alawites, saying that all Alawites supported the Assad administration is difficult. Alawites who have opposed the Baath regime and struggled against the Assad administration have always been around. Alawites’ dissatisfaction with the Assad rules’ repressive policies and corruption increased over time. Additionally, the appearance of the Assad rule as Alawites’ representative and protector has caused reactions among many Alawites who believe that Assad has been pursuing his own personal interests rather than the interests of Alawites as a community (Goldsmith, 2011).
Considering the complicated relationship between the regime and the Alawites, a signiácant number of opposition águres tried to convince the Alawites to join their rank in the early stages of the confrontation. In Bassma Kodmani’s (2011) words, “If the democratic opposition in Syria is going to succeed, it must árst convince the Alawites that they can safely turn against the Assad regime.” In a speech at the árst meeting of Friends of the Syrian People in Tunisia on February 24, 2012, Burhan Ghalioun, the árst president the Syrian National Council (SNC), addressed the Alawite concerns and stated that Alawites could not be held responsible for “the acts of corrupt dictators” and “the crimes conducted by the Assad-Makhlouf maáa” (Ghalioun, 2012).
Despite the opposition’s attempts to reach them, Alawites did not participate in the protests in large groups; but many people from different segments of the community were found individually taking part in the opposition demonstrations. For instance, Alawite actress Fadwa Soliman became one of the most famous faces of the rebellion in Homs. Some Alawite dissidents like Waheed Saqr and Monzer Makhous associated with the SNC. Even some Alawite soldiers and intelligence officers like Zubaida al-Meeki, Yaseen Sulayman, and Nasr Mustafa mutinied against the regime and joined the Free Syrian Army. However, the Alawites who joined the opposition’s ranks lost the harmony they had initially achieved with the opposition because of the increasing inÁuence of Islamic extremists. /e rise of anti-Alawism among the rebels, especially among armed groups, and the rise of extremist elements increased the concerns of the Alawite community. Furthermore, the attempts at regime change had not received Alawite support because of the uncertainty about Alawites’ situation in case of a regime change and what would happen to the thousands of them who worked in the security organizations and various government institutions. Hence, Alawite dissidents separated from the Assad regime, but they did not want to take up arms together with the rebels and worried about emerging sectarian clashes (Barnard, 2013). /e Alawite dissidents who distanced themselves from both the Assad rule and the opposition that had organized abroad mostly joined the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change in Syria (NCC). However, the NCC was viewed by most of the opposition and armed rebels as collaborating with the regime.
Alawite dissidents organized a conference for the árst time on March 23-24, 2013 in Cairo with the demand that a democratic regime be established in place of the Assad regime (Oweis, 2013a). /e Cairo conference did not turn into a new Alawite movement, but the anti-regime Alawites formed a movement called Upcoming Syria (Ghad Suriyah) in Istanbul in November 2015. Being the árst movement to join the opposition against the Assad rule and address Alawites directly, Upcoming Syria’s goal was to cooperate with the Syrian revolutionaries to guarantee the security of the Alawite community and their share in the future social and political structure (Terdiman, 2016).
Effects of the Civil War on the Alewives
The civil war in Syria, gradually colored by sectarian motives, triggered both the social cleavages and inter-communal conÁicts that have caused great losses for each party and displaced millions of people. Greater numbers of Alawites started to view the rebellion as an anti-Alawite movement rather than a popular revolution. Consequently, common group bonds and feelings developed among the Alawites despite their differences (Inskeep, 2013).
In addition to the ineffectiveness security of forces in stabilizing the country and preventing the spread of armed clashes , the resulting communal security concerns among the Alawites led them take arms in mid -2012 . Alawi youths either joined the army or militia groups such as the Popular Committees, National Defense Forces , and numerous militia organizations (Nakkash , 2013 ; Holliday , 2013).
One consequence of the civil war and communal insecurity in the country is
massive population displacements. /e displacements and population movements
Effects of the Civil War on the Alewives
The civil war in Syria, gradually colored by sectarian motives, triggered both the social cleavages and inter-communal conÁicts that have caused great losses for each party and displaced millions of people. Greater numbers of Alawites started to view the rebellion as an anti-Alawite movement rather than a popular revolution. Consequently, common group bonds and feelings developed among the Alawites despite their differences (Inskeep, 2013).
In addition to the ineffectiveness security of forces in stabilizing the country and preventing the spread of armed clashes , the resulting communal security concerns among the Alawites led them take arms in mid -2012 . Alawi youths either joined the army or militia groups such as the Popular Committees, National Defense Forces , and numerous militia organizations (Nakkash , 2013 ; Holliday , 2013).
One consequence of the civil war and communal insecurity in the country is
massive population displacements. /e displacements and population movements
with regard to Alawites took shape in two forms: one, the migration of Alawites to more secure regions from the places they had felt insecure and two, migrations from all across Syria to cities known to be predominantly Alawite.
Another effect of the civil war on the Alawites was their increased reaction against the Assad family (Stratfor, 2015; Sherlock, 2015; Dandachi, 2014). /e criticisms such as the regime’s erroneous policies had brought the country to this situation and Assad would not leave power no matter what and no matter how many Alawites died increased. As the conÁict extended and the Alawite losses increased, reactions against the regime increased, especially among the relatively poor Alawites living in the inner regions. More and more Alawites began to consider their community not as the owner or beneáciary of the regime, but as a tool used by Assads. Even some Alawites inclined towards the opposition. However, either because of obscurity of the opposition plans for the future of Syria and Alawite community, or because of growing extremism among the opposition that ignited sectarian fears among the Alawites, caused the majority of Alawites to coalesce with Assad’s rule. Finally, combined with other effects of the civil war on their community, some Alawites have started to seek for a redeánition of their communal identity.
https://insanvetoplum.org/content/5-online-first/5-m0379/sinkaya.pdf
Another effect of the civil war on the Alawites was their increased reaction against the Assad family (Stratfor, 2015; Sherlock, 2015; Dandachi, 2014). /e criticisms such as the regime’s erroneous policies had brought the country to this situation and Assad would not leave power no matter what and no matter how many Alawites died increased. As the conÁict extended and the Alawite losses increased, reactions against the regime increased, especially among the relatively poor Alawites living in the inner regions. More and more Alawites began to consider their community not as the owner or beneáciary of the regime, but as a tool used by Assads. Even some Alawites inclined towards the opposition. However, either because of obscurity of the opposition plans for the future of Syria and Alawite community, or because of growing extremism among the opposition that ignited sectarian fears among the Alawites, caused the majority of Alawites to coalesce with Assad’s rule. Finally, combined with other effects of the civil war on their community, some Alawites have started to seek for a redeánition of their communal identity.
https://insanvetoplum.org/content/5-online-first/5-m0379/sinkaya.pdf
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