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Conceptualizing Compartmentalization in International Relations: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy
1. Introduction
Globalization has deepened complexity in international politics by diffusing power, multiplying the number of actors, and creating interdependencies among actors across various issue areas and regions. While states pursue multiple agendas, external and domestic issues have become increasingly entangled. The widening complexity in international politics has given way to puzzling patterns and forms of bilateral relations among states, diverging from the conventional and holistic understanding of amity, enmity, or neutrality (Aydinli & Rosenau, 2005). A particularist and compartmentalized approach to foreign relations is also gaining ground, whereby states work with other counterparts in various issue-areas or loci in order to realize mutual gains and mitigate shared concerns. There has been no shortage of scholarly attention to decipher those apparently contradictory foreign policy behaviors by states in this complex, globalized yet transitioning world system.
We study here compartmentalization as a ‘form of foreign policy behavior practiced by states’ and a ‘cognitive prior adopted by leaders’ (Acharya, 2009) to cope with challenges arising from complex interactions in contemporary world affairs. We will argue that compartmentalization essentially involves a practical-cognitive approach to foreign policy decision-making at times of contradictory pressures arising from competing or mutually exclusive alternative sets of relationships or choices at either domestic or external levels. Such usually high-stake decision-points are more likely to arise during times of systemic polarity, intense strategic rivalry, systemic transitions, or in the case of multifaceted relations, wherein interest divergence in some areas goes hand-in-hand with shared interests in other areas which are worth not foregoing. At such junctures, compartmentalization emerges as one of the alternative avenues to make cooperation possible, by allowing the parties to ‘agree to disagree,’ as the popular saying goes.
Although compartmentalization has been used in the literature for quite some time to describe contradictory positions and complex relations between various states, there is no systematic analysis of this concept, nor has there been a well-established operational definition instructing such analyses. Most uses of ‘compartmentalization’ are idiosyncratic, as scholars employ the term in a casual sense. The purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive framework which can be used for foreign policy analysis, by conceptualizing compartmentalization as a foreign policy behavior at practical and cognitive levels. What follows is an attempt to define compartmentalization, by suggesting a typology of different forms of this behavior and its main components. This section will also delineate the concept further to differentiate it from other similar concepts used in foreign policy analysis, particularly transactionalism and hedging. Then the article will engage in an extensive review of the literature employing the concept of compartmentalization in the study of Turkish foreign policy. In addition to tracing the evolution of how this concept has been applied, this section will overview various manifestations of issue-based and actor-based compartmentalization. Rather than engaging in a detailed case study analysis to test the applicability of the compartmentalization hypothesis, the purpose of this inquiry will be to provide an illustrative survey of how Türkiye’s relationship with several countries, such as Russia, Iran, Israel or the United States, had elements of compartmentalization. Next, the discussion on the drivers of compartmentalization in Turkish foreign policy conduct will also highlight how it has emerged as a cognitive prior, shaping the leaders’ approach to foreign policy. The concluding section will revisit the role of compartmentalization as a strategic-cognitive process in Turkish foreign policy of late, referring to the pressures exerted by the securitization of the regional environment.
2. What is Compartmentalization? Delineating the Boundaries
How do we conceptualize compartmentalization as a foreign policy behavior? Compartmentalization may refer to a number of interrelated phenomena. Traditionally, compartmentalization in foreign policy studies referred to the division of power and labor among various bureaucratic institutions (Clifford, 1990; Mueller, 2013; Delreux & Earsom, 2024). This practice is mainly justified on rationalist grounds, as decision-makers are often assumed to separate different issues from each other at cognitive and practical levels to manage simultaneous and complex challenges. As Smyth notes (Smyth, 2021, pp. 414-415) it refers to “the way in which decision-making processes organize themselves to isolate specific issues for consideration within discrete compartments” that “fit well with economic rationalist perspectives on human action that see people as rational actors seeking to maximize their utility in any given situation.”
The concept is also used to refer to the insulation of domestic politics from foreign policy, the delinking of economic and trade policies from diplomatic and security relations, or the detachment of a specific foreign policy issue from other disputes. In a related sense, different issue domains can be delineated as “compartments,” which are usually driven by distinctive focus, logics or dynamics (Choiruzzad, 2017, p. 46). In this respect, a typical example for compartmentalization is the isolation, at the height of the Cold War, of nuclear risks from the entire set of problems in relations between the two superpowers, which agreed on a compromise in that issue area. Likewise, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 could be viewed as a textbook example of compartmentalization, in which the concerned parties, namely Iran and the United States, successfully insulated the nuclear issue from other questions and reached a compromise (Akbarzadeh, 2024). Recently, there were references to this concept in the Biden administration’s approach to the relations with China in the context of climate change.[1]
Compartmentalization is also increasingly used as an analytical tool to explain contradictions and apparent inconsistencies in state behavior. Several recent studies employed the concept of compartmentalization as an explanatory framework to understand puzzling foreign relations of various countries, especially in their bilateral relations with certain counterparts (Délano, 2009; Patrick & Bennet, 2014; Cornell, 2016; Kang & Kim, 2017; Kundnani & Puglierin, 2018; Rudd, 2022; Brugier, 2022; Tsintsadze-Maas, 2024). In that genre, the concept has been employed in the analyses of Turkish foreign policy, particularly in its relations with Russia and Iran, as will be reviewed below. Before moving to the Turkish case, this section will seek to delineate the analytical boundaries of the concept.
2.1. Issue-based vs. Actor-based Conceptualization
Compartmentalization can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, compartmentalization can have an issue-based meaning in the sense that it refers to the separation of policy domains from one another in a relationship with a single actor. In that respect, states may resort to this instrument to maintain cooperative forces against the backdrop of conflictual dynamics. It thus, for instance, offers a balance between long-term security and short-term economic interests. Secondly, compartmentalization also has an actor-based meaning, whereby it implies the tendency to conduct relations with one actor in isolation from others. States may use this instrument in pursuit of mutually exclusive partnerships, i.e., with two or more rival actors or blocs. Thus, for instance, it may particularly help states balance off treaty-based and long-established alliance dynamics with the ad hoc or emerging relationships with non-allies.
In a related sense, the concept may also be used to refer to the role of the leaders at the domestic-external nexus. Considering the contradictory expectations by the domestic and international audiences, leaders often confront challenges in decision making. Compartmentalization can be a tool to reconcile the tensions arising from differences in the domestic agenda and foreign policy priorities.
2.2. Compartmentalization at Cognitive and Practical Levels
Compartmentalization operates at two distinct but interrelated levels: cognitive and practical. Firstly, it functions as a cognitive process on the part of decision-makers, who may employ it to manage contradictory pressures for cooperation and contention arising from various sources. Relying on their previously held ideas, perspectives, worldviews or rational calculations, decision-makers may adopt compartmentalization at a cognitive level, as they decide with whom (actor-based compartmentalization) or on which issues (issue-based compartmentalization) they will cooperate. Secondly, at the practical level, compartmentalization can be conceived as a foreign policy behavior, whereby policy makers take actions such as detaching the country’s bilateral relations with various actors from each other (actor-based compartmentalization), or forging cooperative frameworks in order to handle complex, multifaceted and otherwise conflictual relations with certain counterparts (issue-based compartmentalization).
Here, Acharya’s (2012, p. 193) conceptualization of “cognitive priors” as “the preexisting ideas … of individuals or societies -whether they are worldviews, causal ideas, or principled ideas” can help us better understand the cognitive dimension of compartmentalization. Actors could bring various preexisting beliefs, ideas or schemas to new situations as they respond to them. There is a wealth of political-psychology scholarship looking at how those cognitive priors are informed or how individuals -leaders- organize the world in their mind. These are beyond this article’s focus, and for our purposes here, what matters is whether cognitive factors matter causally. At this point, while it is also beyond the scope of this study to analyze the role of ideas in international relations, it is helpful to recall Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993, p. 12) contention that ideas have the potential to influence policy outcomes through various causal pathways. They could serve as roadmaps, affect strategic interactions, or become embedded in institutions. In that respect, compartmentalization can also be viewed as part of the cognitive priors that leaders bring with them, which eventually affect the way they process information, respond to strategic environment, and eventually make foreign policy decisions. Thus, compartmentalization emerges as a result of a cognitive-strategic process, whereby the ideas shared by the elites and the policy practices -material factors- mutually interact.
for the rest of the article visit:
https://www.allazimuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Kardas-and-Sinkaya-2025_online.pdf
The Structure of Iran’s Armed Forces and the IRGC–Army Relationship
Key Takeaways
- Artesh, which literally means "army," is a branch of Iran’s armed forces that
surpasses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in both manpower and
conventional firepower.
- Army’s Pahlavi-era origins, coupled with the fact that many of its senior officers
had received training in the US, fostered suspicion among the revolutionaries in
terms of its fidelity and in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, certain measures
were swiftly undertaken to restructure it into a force loyal to the emerging Islamic
Republic.
- Established in April 1979 as a militia force tasked with maintaining public order
and safeguarding the revolution in its immediate aftermath, the IRGC gradually
developed in parallel to Army and eventually came to possess its own ministry,
distinct from the Ministry of Defense.
- During the Iran–Iraq War, significant rivalries and tensions emerged between the
Army and the IRGC, particularly over issues of command, control, and military
strategy.
- While the Army approached the war through a conventional military
lens –emphasizing weaponry, technology, and manpower– the IRGC prioritized
ideological commitment, emphasizing faith, martyrdom, and revolutionary zeal
as the core elements of its strategy.
- Despite undergoing “Islamization,” proving loyalty to the regime, and playing a
critical role during periods of crises, the Army remained largely sidelined in favor
of the IRGC, which was consistently entrusted with the most prestigious and
influential assignments.
- Although the Army occupies a central role in Iran’s overall defense strategy,
the IRGC holds a clear advantage in terms of access to advanced weaponry and
military technology.
- In recent decades, the IRGC –particularly through its Quds Force– has emerged
as a central instrument of Iran’s regional projection, extending its influence from
Iraq and Lebanon to Syria and Yemen.
- The Army was deliberately excluded from political affairs and confined strictly to
its role within the framework of military doctrine.
- The Army is often regarded as more conciliatory and as a potential partner in the
event of a prospective regime change. Nevertheless, there remains little doubt
about its overall loyalty to the Islamic Republic and its adherence to the principle
of Wilayat-e Faqih.
For the rest of the analysis in Turkish see, https://www.iramcenter.org/uploads/files/I%CC%87ran_Silahli_Kuvvetlerinin_Yapisi_ve_Devrim_Muhafizlari-Ertes%CC%A7_I%CC%87lis%CC%A7kisi_Son_b_.pdf
İran Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Yapısı ve Devrim Muhafızları-Ordu İlişkisi
Temel Çıkarımlar
- Ordu (Erteş), İran silahlı kuvvetleri içinde hem nicelik hem de ateş gücü açısından
Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu’ndan (DMO) daha güçlü bir askerî güçtür.
- Ordu'nun Pehlevi kökenleri ve o dönemde üst düzey subaylarının çoğunun ABD’de
eğitim almış olmaları nedeniyle devrimciler arasında bu ordunun sadakatine
yönelik kuşkular oluşmuş ve Ordu'nun İslam Cumhuriyeti rejiminin hizmetinde
bir birime dönüştürülmesi için çalışmalar başlatılmıştır.
- Devrimden sonra asayişi sağlamak ve devrimi korumak amacıyla Nisan 1979’da
milis teşkilatı olarak kurulan DMO, zamanla Ordu’ya paralel olarak teşkilatlanan
ve hatta Savunma Bakanlığı’ndan ayrı bir bakanlığa sahip büyük bir askerî güce
dönüşmüştür.
- İran-Irak Savaşı sırasında kuvvetlerin sevk ve idaresi ile taktikler konusunda
Ordu ile DMO arasında ciddi rekabet ve görüş ayrılıkları ortaya çıkmıştır.
- Ordu, savaşa silah, teknoloji ve insan gücüne dayanan geleneksel bir yaklaşımla
bakarken DMO ideolojik adanmışlık, iman ve şehadet boyutunu ön plana
çıkarmıştır.
- Aradan geçen süreçte “İslamileştirilmesine”, rejime sadakatini kanıtlamış
olmasına ve kriz durumlarında sağladığı önemli katkılara rağmen Ordu DMO’ya
nispetle kenarda tutulmaya devam etmiş, prestijli görevler DMO’ya verilmiştir.
-Ordu, savunma stratejisinde merkezî bir konuma sahip olmasına rağmen
sofistike silahlara erişim açısından DMO daha avantajlıdır.
- Son on yıllarda DMO, bilhassa Kudüs Gücü aracılığıyla Irak’tan Lübnan’a,
Suriye’den Yemen’e kadar İran’ın Ortadoğu’daki varlığının temel unsuru hâline
gelmiştir.
- Ordu, siyasetin dışında tutulmuş ve askerî doktrindeki rolüyle sınırlı kalmıştır.
- Ordu, olası bir rejim değişikliğinde daha uzlaşmacı ve potansiyel bir işbirlikçi
olarak değerlendirilmektedir ancak Ordu’nun rejime ve Velayet-i Fakih ilkesine
sadakati konusunda şüpheye yer yoktur.
Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment
Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment
Turkish foreign policy has been on a steep-learning curve since 2015, whereby reliance on hard power has come to undergird its external conduct. Through a levels-of-analysis framework, the article will delineate its meaning, boundaries, and limitations, and problematize how it fits into underlying trends in Turkish foreign policy and security culture. It will argue that while the literature highlights the quest for strategic autonomy, middle power activism, realist turn, and militarization as the main characteristics of the qualitative change, it was the convergence of these longer-term trends and especially the increased propensity to use coercive instruments as part of a realist turn that defined this period. The discussion section will offer a plausible account of the transformation, drawing on insights from neoclassical realism. It will argue that the post-2015 transformation of Turkish behaviour represents an adjustment failure, namely a delayed reaction to external-systemic contingencies by devising corresponding strategies.
Kardaş, Ş., Sinkaya, B., & Pehlivantürk, B. (2025). Scope, drivers and manifestations of the realist turn in Turkish foreign policy: a case of delayed strategic adjustment. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 25(1), 11-30.
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ – İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ
Avrupa ülkelerinin çoğunun, bilhassa Almanya, Fransa ve İngiltere’nin İran ile geçmişi çok eskilere giden siyasi ve kültürel ilişkileri vardır. Avrupa Topluluğu’nun (AT) kurulmasından sonra üye ülkeler İran ile ilişkilerini ayrı ayrı yürütmüş, AT’nin İran ile kurumsal bir ilişkisi olmamıştır. Ancak AT ülkeleri 1980’lerden itibaren siyasi birlik vizyonu çerçevesinde İran ile ilişkilerinde koordinasyona gitmiştir. 1990’ların başından itibaren Avrupa Birliği (AB) İran ile kurumsal ilişkiler geliştirmiş ve bu ülkeye yönelik olarak görece tutarlı politikalar izlemiştir. AB İran’la angajmana girmiş, bir taraftan ticari ve ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirirken diğer taraftan diyalog mekanizmaları üzerinden İran hükümetinin içeride baskıcı, dışarıda radikal politikalarını ılımlaştırmayı hedeflemiştir. Bu süreçte bazı iniş çıkışlar yaşansa da AB ülkelerinin İran ile siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkilerinde önemli ilerlemeler kaydedilmiştir. Ancak 2003 yılından sonra İran’ın nükleer programı ikili ilişkilerin gündemini belirlemiştir. AB bu dönemde de Tahran ile angajman siyasetini sürdürerek nükleer meselenin müzakereler yoluyla çözülmesi için çalışmış, nihayet Temmuz 2015’te bu konuda anlaşmaya varılmasında ekili bir rol oynamıştır. Hatta, nükleer anlaşma (Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı, KOEP) AB’nin en önemli dış politika başarılarından birisi olarak görülmektedir. Bu bölümde Avrupa Birliği’nin İran ile ilişkileri tarihsel süreç içerisinde değerlendirilmekte ve Birliğin İran’a yönelik politikaları ele alınmaktadır. Bu kapsamda özellikle nükleer anlaşmaya giden süreçte AB’nin rolü ve anlaşma sonrasında AB–İran ilişkilerinde meydana gelen gelişmeler incelenmektedir.
- İlhan Sağsen & Mehmet Dalar (eds.), Avrupa Birliği'nin Küresel ve Bölgesel Politikaları, (Nobel, 2022) içinde.
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