The Structure of Iran’s Armed Forces and the IRGC–Army Relationship

 

Key Takeaways

- Artesh, which literally means "army," is a branch of Iran’s armed forces that

surpasses the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in both manpower and

conventional firepower.

- Army’s Pahlavi-era origins, coupled with the fact that many of its senior officers

had received training in the US, fostered suspicion among the revolutionaries in

terms of its fidelity and in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, certain measures

were swiftly undertaken to restructure it into a force loyal to the emerging Islamic

Republic.

 

- Established in April 1979 as a militia force tasked with maintaining public order

and safeguarding the revolution in its immediate aftermath, the IRGC gradually

developed in parallel to Army and eventually came to possess its own ministry,

distinct from the Ministry of Defense.

-  During the Iran–Iraq War, significant rivalries and tensions emerged between the

Army and the IRGC, particularly over issues of command, control, and military

strategy.

- While the Army approached the war through a conventional military

lens –emphasizing weaponry, technology, and manpower– the IRGC prioritized

ideological commitment, emphasizing faith, martyrdom, and revolutionary zeal

as the core elements of its strategy.

- Despite undergoing “Islamization,” proving loyalty to the regime, and playing a

critical role during periods of crises, the Army remained largely sidelined in favor

of the IRGC, which was consistently entrusted with the most prestigious and

influential assignments.

- Although the Army occupies a central role in Iran’s overall defense strategy,

the IRGC holds a clear advantage in terms of access to advanced weaponry and

military technology.

- In recent decades, the IRGC –particularly through its Quds Force– has emerged

as a central instrument of Iran’s regional projection, extending its influence from

Iraq and Lebanon to Syria and Yemen.

- The Army was deliberately excluded from political affairs and confined strictly to

its role within the framework of military doctrine.

- The Army is often regarded as more conciliatory and as a potential partner in the

event of a prospective regime change. Nevertheless, there remains little doubt

about its overall loyalty to the Islamic Republic and its adherence to the principle

of Wilayat-e Faqih.

For the rest of the analysis in Turkish see, https://www.iramcenter.org/uploads/files/I%CC%87ran_Silahli_Kuvvetlerinin_Yapisi_ve_Devrim_Muhafizlari-Ertes%CC%A7_I%CC%87lis%CC%A7kisi_Son_b_.pdf 

Iranian Politics after the Presidential Election

2017-06-02

Incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has won a landslide victory in the presidential elections held on May 19, and secured the second term in office. Approximately 73 per cent of the 55-million electorates went to the polls. Rouhani received 57 per cent of the casted votes by considerably improving his supporters in comparison to the previous presidential elections.  Having assessed objections and claims of irregularities made by some people including Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, the leading contester against Rouhani, the Guardian Council confirmed the election results on May 30. Rouhani is expected to form his new cabinet in the forthcoming days. So, how will be the future of Iranian politics from now on?

Significance of the Elections

Many claim that Iranian elections are sham elections because the regime predetermines the results by means of vetoing candidates. Additionally, it is claimed that powers of the elected offices including the presidency have been severely constrained. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei possesses the real power in the country. Although such criticisms are valid to some extent, it does not mean that the presidential elections are completely insignificant. First, the presidency is the second most authorized position in the country. Even if the Supreme Leader determines the general policies, influence of the president in the process of decision-making and policy-making is undeniable. Moreover, the president who is in charge of the state apparatus implementing the political decisions has an undeniable significant position in the system. That's why; considerable differences may take place in domestic politics, economics and foreign policies – within the margins of general policies of the country  - after someone else replaces the office holder. Iranian people experienced well this case after the 2005 presidential elections. The eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought significant breaks and changes in Iranian politics, which also closely affected ordinary Iranian people. Therefore, presidential elections have been quite electrifying almost each time, and the voter turn out did not fall below 70 percent, even if elections are held within the frame of a narrow political arena. Additionally, the fact that candidates who are regarded to be favored by the Supreme Leader have failed to get office after some elections indicates the significance of voting.

The 12th presidential election held on My 19 was regarded to be important because of two additional factors. First there was question around whether President Rouhani could secure a second term. Although all presidents since 1981 have been consecutively elected for the second time, many observers doubted the possibility of Rouhani's second term. Due to his foreign, economic and cultural policies, President Rouhani has some times confronted the conservatives who consider themselves as the owner of the regime. He has also been subjected to Khamenei's direct and indirect censure regarding some developments. For this reason, many speculated about the confirmation of his candidacy by the Guardian Council. Additionally, the ongoing discussions over the nuclear deal and the anti-Iran statements of the US President Trump have shadowed Rouhani's biggest achievement in his previous term, the diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue, the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions, and the dilution of international pressure over Iran. On the other hand, the continuing distress of ordinary Iranian citizens despite recent improvements in economy was a major challenge for Rouhani. Likewise, there has been no significant improvement in areas such as political rights and freedoms, and human rights. For instance, the leaders of reformist Green Movement has kept being under house arrest and in the last four years, approximately three thousand people were executed for various reasons. The weaknesses of Rouhani in these have raised some doubts about his election success by maintaining the alliance, which had brought him to the presidency in 2013.

The second reason why the 12th presidential elections were particularly important was the challenge of Ebrahim Raisi, who has been considered as Khamanei's favorite candidate and potential successor. His performance throug the elections could have determine both his political career and the future of Iran. Moreover, though he defined himself as bipartisan candidate, conservative and neo-radical parties unıted to endorse Raisi, which added further excitement to the elections.

During the election campaign, Raisi had three issues in his agenda: the economic failure of Rouhani's government, poverty and corruption. Raisi, who has accused Rouhani of managing the economy in accordance with the interest of foreigners and a group of minorities, promised to support domestic production, increase employment and advance the cash payments for the poor. On the other hand, Rouhani defended his own foreign and economic policy and built his campaign on the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, the maintenance of constructive engagement in foreign policy, the reinforcement of the private sector and the attraction of foreign capital to the country. Rouhani, who drew attention to Raisi's career as an attorney general and his relations with the Revolutionary Guards and neo-radicals, tried to consolidate his potential supporters who voted for him in the previous election, namely the young, women, minorities, reformists and technocrats. He claimed that if Raisi would take the office, Iran would enter a period full of tensions in foreign policy, and the domestic pressures would increase as in the Ahmadinejad period. He achieved to consolidate his supporters.

Agenda of Iranian Politics after the Election

The primary issue in the second period of Rouhani will be the struggle against unemployment and the economic development, which were prominent topics during the election campaign. According to the official figures, the unemployment rate is currently around 13 percent; however, unemployment especially among the youth is higher. Rouhani will likely adopt five policies in order to provide economic growth and to boost employment:

1.  The first policy is the reinforcement of the private sector. Although this issue has been on the agenda since the early 1990s, it is one of the structural weaknesses of the Iranian economy. The Iranian economy is largely in the hands of public institutions including military institutions and religious foundations. However, both the discourse of ‘resistance economy’, and the ‘existence of strategic sectors’ make it difficult to take further step in this respect.

2.  The second part of the economic policies is to increase share of non-oil products in the national income. The fluctuations in oil prices leave the Iranian economy in a difficult situation. Therefore, Iran aims to promote increasing non-oil products in exports, and concentrates on the long-term gas agreements. Significant improvements have been made in this regard. Iran already exports gas to Armenia and Iraq as well as Turkey. A number of agreements are also on the agenda to sell gas to Pakistan and India.

3.  The third element which will be highlighted in Rouhani's economy policy is tourism. In this context, he aims to renew the domestic and international civil aviation fleet and to improve hotel infrastructure. In 2015, approximately 5 million foreign tourists visited Iran. The government aims to raise this figure up to 20 million and to raise the tourism income to about 30 billion dollars by 2025.

4.  An important part of Rouhani’s economy policy, as it is shown in his previous term and promised in the election campaign is inviting foreign capital and investment to the country. In order to struggle against unemployment, in other words to create one million job opportunities per year, the government is projected to invest 200 billion dollars for the next 5 years, one third of which is supposed to be come through international investments. However, any attempt to attract further tourists and foreign capital faces serious criticism and opposition from the conservatives. In addition, some legal amendments need to be made in order to take effective steps in these areas. Therefore, it is expected that there will be heated discussions on these issues in the forthcoming period. On the other side, the ongoing sanctions on Iran poses serious challenges for the foreign investments.

5.  During his election campaign, Rouhani promised the removal of remaining sanctions on Iran, which will directly affect economy. However, the remaining international sanctions on Iran are imposed either because human rights violations, or because of alleged Iranian support for international terrorism, and its foreign policy. Therefore, the removal of remaining sanctions requires a comprehensive revision of Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics, which is highly difficult in the current political conditions. Moreover, the removal of sanctions on Iran is unthinkable in a period when the new US administration is committed to increase pressure over Iran.

Rouhani promised to strengthen fundamental rights and freedoms, improve socio-economic status of women, and improve political conditions of ethnic and religious minorities during his campaign. In this regard, he had issued a declaration named "The Charter on Citizens' Rights" in December 2016. In the forthcoming period, it may be expected that Rouhani will struggle to provide freedoms and rights indicated within this charter. However, the conservative front opposing Rouhani, and the increasing security concerns will make it difficult to take further steps in this regard.

In his first speech after the elections, Rouhani said, "Iranian people rejects extremism and wants more links with the outside world". In this context, emphasizing the achievements made in his previous period, especially the nuclear deal, Rouhani stated that the "constructive interaction" and "win-win" approach would continue in Iranian foreign policy. However, the changing American policies towards Iran make many in Iran to question the rationality of Rouhani foreign policy. Considering the recent change in the US-Iran relations, it is estimated that Iran will give priority to developing good relations with the European countries in the upcoming period.

Iran's Middle East policy is not expected to change significantly in the next four years. As a matter of fact, these policies were hardly questioned during the period of election campaign. It is claimed actually the Revolutionary Guards handles Iranian files towards the regional crises because they are deemed as primary security matters. In this respect, President Rouhani's approach is not different from the current Iranian rhetoric and policies. As a matter of fact, in the press statement after the election, he stated that the primary issue in Syria and Iraq is the "struggle against terrorism", and added that they would continue supporting the administrations in Baghdad and Damascus. However, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is supported by Trump administration, and the proxy fights around the region are likely to increase in the forthcoming period. This may bring security institutions, the Revolutionary Guards, and security policies into prominence in Iran, and may restrict maneuver capability of Rouhani with regard to foreign policy, economy and politics.

There is no other election in Iran until February 2020. Therefore, it is expected that there will be relative stability in the elected offices and institutions. 40 per cent of the Iranian parliament, and most of the city councils are in the hands of pro-Rouhani people, which will help him. However, potential interventions of Supreme Leader Khamanei, the Guardian Council and the judiciary under the control of conservatives, and security and intelligence institutions may hinder some policies of the government, and weaken the president, as in the second term of the former president Mohammad Khatami. Recently increasing threats against Iran, and the rising security concerns may provide a justification for further securitization in the country, and containing President Rouhani.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5115?s=orsam|english 

Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani

2016-08-15

Since its foundation in 1979,The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Revolutionary Guards, IRGC) has been regarded as one of the “fundamental” pillars of Iranian politics. Revolutionary Guards, who are constitutionally charged with “safeguarding the revolution and its achievements”, have always involved in politics. IRGC, like other security institutions in Iran, is directly subordinated to Supreme Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Hamanei and its relations with Iranian governments have been practiced in different forms.IRGC’s political clout gradually increased under the presidency of Mahmud Ahmedinecad that generated a debate on “militarization” of the Iranian regime. Likewise, in the meantime, influence of IRGCalso increased in economy due to the effects of sanctions imposed on Iran for thenuclear issue.

IRGC’s role in Iranian politics and economy has been regarded as one of the biggest challenges for Hassan Rouhani, who was elected as president in June 2013.There were some speculations about the prospective tension between President Rouhani, who has been known with pragmatism, and IRGC that has a rigid ideological standing.So, how didrelations between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards evolve in the intervening three years?This study reviews relations between the Rouhani government and IRGC.

Nuclear Deal, Iranian politics and Revolutionary Guards

Rouhani’sassociation with some reformist figures before and after the elections, moderation and flexibility in foreign policy and his discourses on economic liberalization drew IRGC’s reaction. However, having forged close relations with security bureaucracy and due to his stance in the “political center”, Rouhani did not encounter opposition from IRGC.Indeed, Rouhani observed balances while he was forming his cabinet and he did not give place to “fervent” reformists. He appointed, formerIRGC commanders, Hossein Dehghan as as Minister of Defense and Ali Shamkhani as a secretary of Supreme National Security Council.

IRGC’s first criticism against President Rouhani came afterhis phone conversationwith President Obama in September 2013.IRGCCommander, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “the president took a firm and appropriate position during his stay” in New York,“but,” he added“just as he refused to meet Obama, he should also have refused to speak with him on the telephone.”

Nuclear negotiations that began in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1countrieswere criticized at times by news websites and journals. When those criticisms became harsh, Rouhani stated that “a small group has been busy with sabotages, baseless accusations and lies.” He added that his government was well aware of each step of this group and wouldtake necessary measures when the time was ripe. Shortly after Rouhani’s statements, in November 2014, an article published in Sahamnews, a pro-reformist news portal,claimed that Intelligence Unit of IRGC stepped into action in order to overthrow the Rouhani government. According to the aforementioned article, Intelligence Unit of IRGC, in coordination with Isargaran(Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution), and former officials at the time of Ahmedinecad government and some journalists, set up “safe houses” in which anti-government propaganda activities was organized. It was suggested that Rouhani gave information and submitted relevant documents about this subject to LeaderHamanei at a private talk; but nothing appeared publiclyabout this matter. Anyway, President Rouhani said in a speech he gave in December 2015, “When weapons, wealth and media are in control of a single institution, an inevitable result would be corruption.” These comments ware regarded by many pundits as criticism against IRGC.

While nuclear deal was coming to and end, IRGC took a cautious stance. On the one hand, IRGC Commander Jafari appreciated achievements and “selfless efforts” of the negotiating team, on the other hand, he continued to remind redlines of the Iran. He drove attention to controversial issues with related to the removal of sanctions.

In a speech shortly after the parties agreed on the nuclear deal in July 2015, Rouhani stated that even after the conclusion of deal, Iran should preserve its prudence and moderation. He also said, “we should not think that we can talk and move whatever we want after the deal, and the others did not react to the change of our course”.This statement drew a rebuff from IRGC Commander Jafari, who said, “some people argues that we should decide our activities in accordance with the will of enemy, and says we cannot speak or move as we liked because the others would react. It means, before anything else, questioning of independence and honor of the regime.” He added that those people sitting in important posts should speak in a “measured” way.

The battle of words between the government and IRGC has continued over the meaning of the nuclear deal. Both President Rouhani and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarifargued that “the nuclear deal have liftedthe shadow of war over Iran and made it more secure.” However,it is stated in various speeches of some IRGC commanders that security of Iran has not been ensured by means of negotiations and dialogue with enemy,but by the heroic and altruistic resistance of the people and “deterrent power” of Iran.Jafaristressed that “the deal did not end or reduce hostility of the United States towardstheIslamic Republic of Iran”, and he claimed that the “enemy continuously attempts to infiltrate into Iran.”Actually, these “warnings” are almost replica of various statements of Khamenei.Indeed, Khameneihas been talking about the possibility of “infiltration of enemy into Iran by economic and cultural means.” Soon after those warnings about “infiltration of enemy”, Intelligence Unit of IRGCarrested five journalists allegedly for “being members of a network of influencedepended on America or Britain.” President Rouhani reacted to these detentions. Rouhani said that security agents should not act like a press judge and he called that warnings of the leader on the “infiltration of foreigners” should not be over-exploited.

Another debate President Rouhani and IRGC Commander Jafari that revolved around the essence of the nuclear deal took place in the last April. In his speech for the occasion of Norouz(Iranian New Year), Rouhani recalled the nuclear deal as an achievement to be proud of the Iranian nation and he said that Iran should alsoconclude“a national plan of action, a secondbarjam(the Persian acronym for the nuclear deal)” to solve itspolitical, economic and social problems.Leader Khamenei criticized these statements at first.  Subsequently, Major GeneralJafari said, “Thenucleardeal has neverbeenconsidered a documentto be proud of it, andpeoplereluctantlysupported [it]. Whatare the benefits of the first deal, so that we are asking a second one?” In response to these criticisms, Rouhani repeated that barjamis a political and legal source of pride for Iranian nation and he reminded how much the Iranian people were suffering under sanctions.He statedthat Iran alsoneedssomeadditional time just as “therestorationorreconstruction of a ruintakesome time. Only three months have passed since the deal came into effect.”

Economic Activities of RG

Another source of disagreement between Revolutionary Guards and the Rouhani government is the role of IRGC in economy. Khatam-ol Anbiya Headquarter, engineering and construction unit of IRGShas taken over critical infrastructure projects in Iran, built roads, bridges, damsetc..The role of IRGC in economy gradually increased under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, some companies affiliated to the IRGC operated in wide spectrum from construction, chemistry, to telecom, finance, energy, and international trade.There are different estimations about the overall share of IRGC in Iranian economy. IRGCSpokesman Ramezan Sharif stated that “only 10%” of construction projects in Iran has been handled by the Revolutionary Guards.

Rouhani government is critical of economic activities of military institutions because of the difficulty in inspecting them and because itupsets the balances in the market. Besides, the government is vowed toreinforce private sector, which requires reduction of IRGC activities in economy.However, President Rouhani adopted a cautious rhetoricwith regard to the economic activities of IRGC. Having admired IRGC for its contribution to economy and defense of the country, he asked IRGC to fight against smuggling and get involve in major projects that are not undertaken by private sector.Likewise, Mohammad BagherNobaght, spokesman of the government, said that economic activities of IRGC should be limited with fields in which private sector has no interest or capacity to do.

A speech given by Rouhani on the Army Day (Rouz-e Artesh) in April 2014 has drawn attention to this issue. He said that the army has made great sacrifices in defense of the country, but did not ask “its share from the nation and the elected government.” This statement of Rouhani isregarded as a warning to IRGC thatwants to maintain its economic activities in return for its sacrifices.

IRGCCommander Jafari acknowledged in September 2014 that initially there were some doubts about the cooperation between the Guards and the government on economic issues. However, he added that the government was appreciatingIRGc’scapabilities in construction industry and they were cooperating on that subject.  Nevertheless, economic activities of IRGC significantly declined under the Rouhani government. Some operations ofIRGC-related companies, who are no more able to take “luxurious tenders” has been ceased. In return, Guardscommanders frequentlystated that the government should “give priority” toIRGC and Basij, which are ready to support the government in developing “resistance economy.” Commander Jafari,in several occasions, however, complained that the government does not utilize enough experiences and proposals IRGC and Basij.

Foreign policy is not discussed

Despite their disagreements on economic and political issues, the Rouhani government and the Revolutionary Guards have apparently been in an intimate cooperation with regard to foreign policy matters.The Rouhani government, whose first priority wassolution of the nuclear issue, has not questioned the role of IRGC in regional policies of Iran. As a matter of fact, Iranian policies towards Iraq and Syria have remained in the control of IRGC. After the rise of ISIS in June 2014, as a critical threat to Iraqi government, and consequently to Iran, IRGC and Iranian government reinforced their cooperation. The government supported the logistical support and the advisory missions provided by IRGC in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, President Rouhani said, “The courage of Sardar[Qassem] Soleimani is a source of pride and power.”Having praised the Qods Force andprowess of IRGC, Rouhani said, “Today, IRGC not only shoulders the burden of providing security to thecountry, but also provides security to those countries seeking help from the Islamic Iran and takes its place with its all capacity on those fields.”

The concord between the Rouhani government and Revolutionary Guards on security and foreign policy issueshas also reflected in the overall share of IRGC from the national budget, which has gradually increased. It took 3,3 billion USD from the national budget in 2013, which increased to 5 billion USD in 2014 and to 6.1 billion USD in 2015. There were some claims for the current year arguing that the amount allocated to IRGC in the draft version of the national budget prepared by the government was diminished 20 percent. Notwithstanding the debate on the budget cuts for IRGC, the overall defense budget of Iran has increased almost 15 percent.

Consequently, there have been some public debates and disagreements between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards over a number of issues including the role of IRGC in economy, nuclear talks and the meaning of the nuclear deal, cultural and political issues. However, the Rouhani government hasnot questionedforeign activities of IRGC and its role in Iranian foreign policy. Therefore, despite numerous disagreements and debates between Revolutionary Guards and the government, foreign policy issues, especially Iranian policies towards the Middle East were never brought into question.

This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of "Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani”     

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4826?s=orsam|english 

 2016-08-15

Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics, book by Bayram Sinkaya

Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has been dubbed the ‘kingmaker’ in recent studies of Iranian politics, precipitating heated debates surrounding the potential militarization of the Iranian regime and giving rise to paradoxical understandings of the IRGC; whether as a military institution entering politics, or a political institution with a military history. 

Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics offers a way out of this paradox by showing that the IRGC is not a recently politicized institution, but has instead been highly politicized since its inception. It identifies the ways in which the IRGC relates to national political dynamics, examines the factors contributing to this relationship, and its implications on Iranian politics from the revolution up to the present day. The book examines the three decades following the revolution, uncovering the reasons behind the rise of the Revolutionary Guards and tracking the organization’s evolving relationship with politics. Establishing a theoretical framework from revolution and civil-military relations theories, this book provides new perspectives on the relationship between the IRGC and Iranian politics. 

This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East Studies and Iranian Studies, in particular Iranian Politics.