The Second Term of President Rouhani

Having won the 12th presidential election held on May 19 bygarnering 57% of the votes, Hojatoleslam Hassan Rouhani received official approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the last week. And then, attending in swearing-in ceremony at Islamic Consultative Assembly, he has begun his second term as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Considering his election promises and political balances in the country, Rouhani was expected to make some changes in the cabinet for his second term. He had more than two months to put together his cabinet and conduct those changes.

Pressures on Rouhani during the Formation of the Cabinet

While preparing his new cabinet,President Rouhani faced some pressures from different segments of society and various political factions. Tensions rose between Rouhani and hardliners /conservatives who threatened Rouhani with Bani Sadr's fate. Bani Sadr was the first president of Iran who had to flee the country before completing his second year in office even though he had won 70% of the popular vote. Rouhani's brother was arrested for alleged corruption files. Likewise, the hostility between Rouhani's team and Revolutionary Guards has come to a head.

Additionally, reformist groups that supported Rouhani through the elections, pressured on himto coordinate the formation of cabinet and allocatea considerable number of ministerial seats to their fellows. Women organizations also launched a campaign to have women in the future cabinet. Former President Ahmadinejad had previously paved the way for women to be in the cabinet by appointingMarziyeh VahidDastjerdi as Minister of Health in his second cabinet.During his election campaign Rouhani underlined gender equality and women's rights and thus encouraged the movement to demand higher roles in the government. Thus, women's rights groups led campaigns to force President Rouhani, who selected three women as vice-presidents in his first term, to assign women as ministers. Meanwhile Vice President for Women and Family Affairs ShahindokhtMolaverdi stated she would not continue her job in the office if there were no women ministers. The parliament also supported the women's rights movement and 175 MPs signed a joint statement to have women appointed as ministers.

The biggest pressure that Rouhani faced, while picking his cabinet members, came from Supreme Leader Khamenei. Even though Khamenei has no authority over forming the cabinet, it has become a custom for presidents to get their cabinet members approved by Khamenei both as a matter of courtesy and also because it makes it easier to defend their choices. It was claimed that Rouhani and Khamenei had serious disputes over picking figures as ministers. Later on, the office Khamenei issued a statement confirming the authority of president to form his cabinet.However, it also indicated that Khamenei has been especially interested in selection of ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Intelligence becausetheir operations fall to the jurisdiction of Supreme Leader. Additionally, it is thought that Rouhani looked for the consent of Khamenei for some other ministers because he used to criticize performance of government on economy, education and culture during his first term.

New Cabinet of Rouhani 

Considering the wishes of Supreme Leader, current political situation in the country, Rouhani was expected to form coalition government with many technocrats. In fact, he heldnumerous meetings with many people from the both sides of political spectrum, and high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Finally, he made the final version of the cabinet members' list and presented it to the approval of parliament on August 8.

According to the constitution of Iran, the ministers are answering both the parliament and the President. Profile and quality of people nominated by president to oversee ministries are reviewed in the parliament; only those approved by the parliament takeover ministerial seats. The parliament is to review the nominees during the next week. This process is expected to be passed relatively smooth because the majority of the deputiesare considered to be pro-Rouhani. Notwithstanding, it is likely that some heated debates take place since the parliament reviews proposed ministers and their projects one by one.

Eshaq Jahangiri, who ran in the elections but then withdrew in favor of Rouhani, maintains his position as the vice president. Rouhani proposed 17 ministers, and excluded Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Ministry of Science is one of the most controversial ministries as the office-holder appoints university rectors. It is claimed that the office is currently left empty because of the disagreement between Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei. Accordingly,eight out 17 seating ministers arereplaced. Foreign Affairs Minister Zarif, Interior Minister Abdol-Reza Fazli, Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi, and Petroleum Minister BijanNamdarZanganeh maintained their positions.

One of the most interesting changes in the cabinet took place with related to the Ministry of Defense. Officers from the Revolutionary Guards were used to assume this post since 1993, however, for the first time President Rouhani has selected an officer from the army (artesh) to manage defense portfolio. Brigadier General Amir Hatami, former Deputy Defense Minister, has been proposed as the Minister of Defense. Thus, the Revolutionary Guards was not able obtain a post in the cabinet for the first time since the 1980's.

Another significant changewas about economy. Masoud Karbasianreplaced Ali Tayyeb-Niaas the proposed minister for Economic Affairs and Financein the 12th government.Karbasian previously served as a deputy minister at various ministries including Economic Affairs, Industry, Mining and Trade; and he is also known for his studies on globalization.

There are three controversial figures in the proposed cabinet. The first one is SeyedAlirezaAvaie who is proposed as Minister of Justice. It is claimed that, while he was a prosecutor in Dezful,he Avaie took part in the controversial executions of regime's opponents in 1988. Avaie, who was the head of Tehran Justice Administration from 2005 to 2014, is also added in the sanctions list of EU for alleged human rights violations. The second controversial figure is Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, 36, the youngest person in the proposed cabinet in order to seat as the Minister of Communications and Information Technology instead of Mahmoud Va'ezi. Jahromi is claimed to be responsible of the surveillance of online networks at the Ministry of Intelligence under former president Ahmadinejad. As for the proposed Minister of Energy, Habibollah Bitaraf, he took part in the occupation of U.S. Embassy taking American diplomats hostage in 1979.

Most of the ministers in the new government of Rouhani are technocrats. Some of them, Minister of Social Welfare Ali Rabi'ee, Minister of Energy HabibollahBitaraf, and Minister of Petroleum BijanNamdarZanganeh, previously served as ministers under Khatami governments.However, a few of them have political careers and affiliated with political parties (Bijan NamdarZanganeh - Kargozaran Party, Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports MesudSoltanifar - National Trust Party, Minister of Agriculture Mahmoud HojjatiNajafabadi - Islamic Participation Party. According to laws in Iran, Minister of Intelligence has to be a faqih (religious jurist). Current Intelligence Minister Mahmud Alavi, who was reinstated to his position, claims to be politically impartial. Minister of Interior Abdol-Reza Rahmani Fazli is known to be close with Ali Larijani, Speaker of Parliament.
Despite all the pressures, there is no woman in the new cabinet. Rouhani assigned two women (MasumeEbtekar and Laya Joneidi) as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs and Vice President for Legal Affairs. Molaverdi is appointed as an advisor about Citizenship Rights.
Rouhani'sproposed list for the new cabinet disappointed both his female supporters and the reformists.

Considering the distribution of seats in the parliament, this may not create a problem for Rouhani to get approval for his. However, if Rouhani won't take steps to compensate anticipations of the reformists and women's rights movement’s, the implicit coalition between technocrats and reformists may begin to dissolve in the mid run. The exclusion of Revolutionary Guards from the cabinet is a step forward for civilianization of politics. However, it is likely that the Revolutionary Guards, through their political alliances,would challenge President Rouhani in order to protect their interests invested in the system, which may raise new debates on civil-military relations. In his second term as president, Rouhani will focus on economic reforms. In this respect he is expected to avoid new crises in foreign policy, take steps to support economy, and persist on his discourse on constructive interaction, dialogue and cooperation. Still, this won't make much difference to Iran's policy towards the Middle East. Similar to his first term, Rouhani is expected to focus on economic policies and economic relations in his second term, and leave the management of existing crises in the Middle East to the Revolutionary Guards.

15.08.2017
http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14486?dil=en

Politics and Media in Iran

11.09.2017, https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/politics-and-media-in-iran/

In Iran, where no political party is institutionalized or established on a national scale, media plays an important role in bringing different political opinions and reactions to the people. However, Iran is usually listed among countries with no freedom of press. For instance, in 2014 the country ranked 173rd among 180 countries in Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders. Regardless of the discussions on the accuracy of such assessments, Iranian media undoubtedly does not enjoy a complete freedom of press.

Contrary to popular belief, the pressure on Iranian media is not exerted by the government but by the establishment, the Islamic Republic regime. Thus, concerns on press freedom continue even after the change ofruling administrations.The status of media has not seen much improvement during the time of Hassan Rouhani who came into power following the June 2013 presidential elections. The regime views the media as a way to educate people according to certain values, inform them on issues and even as a tool to shape politics. "Free press" is perceived as a potential threat to the regime since it could be utilized by its enemies, which forces the regime to impose strict control over media.

In the Islamic Republican regime, freedom of press is legally constrained in order to protect public interests and Islamic principles. According to press and criminal laws, main press crimes include spreading propaganda against the state, defamation of religion, and creating fabricated news. Besides these crimes, the regime has unwritten red lines which are criticizing the leader of Iran's Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and questioning the principle of velayat-e faqih which constitutes the basis of Islamic Republican system. Additionally, Iranian government, security organizations, and judiciarymay prohibitpublishing on certain subjects. The media, compelled to survive within strict boundaries, has some significant challengesincluding editorial independence, state censorship on certain issues, and self-censorship by media professionals to avoid violating the regime's red lines.

According to current regulations all media outlets have to obtain publication permission from Press Supervisory Board under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The board, consisting of Minister of Culture, a university professor and a member each from  following institutions; Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Supreme Judiciary Council, Supreme Council of the Religious Seminary of Qom, has the authority to transfer perpetrators ofpotentialoffends to the Press Court or Revolutionary Courts, and cancel licenses when it deems to be necessary.

Iranian press has had its glory days during the first term of President Mohammad Khatami at the end of 1990's.  There was an increase in the number of magazines and newspapers some of which had a circulation of almost a million. However, numerous newspapers and magazines were shut down following the new regulations in the Press Law in 2000. The pressure on the media continued during the governments of Ahmadinejad. Despite the increased pressure, types of media were widened with the spread of the Internet during this period.

Today the most efficient type of media in Iran is the news agencies with their number close to 20; they prepare news for printed and visual media and publish in several languages. The monopoly of the official news agency of the countryIRNAcame to an end with the establishment of ISNA in 1999 to support the reformist government, and Fars News Agency (FNA) in 2003 to present views of the radicals and conservatives. FNA, managed by directors with close ties to Revolutionary Guards, is accepted as the most influential news agency in Iran. In addition to that Iran has more than 42 million of Internet users, many news portals and more than 60, 000 thousand personal blogs that are regularly updated. Tabnak, Asr-e Iran and Khabaronline are the most visited news sites.

Despite this variety in the media, the principal news sources for 80% of Iranian people are radio and TV. The broadcast of radios and TV channels are under the monopoly of the state and managed by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). IRIB is supervised by a board consisting of a representative from legislature, judiciary, executive branches; however, the director-general is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. IRIB has 8 national, and 29 local TV channels and almost 50 national or local radio channels. International TV channels such as Al-Alam and Press TV are also controlled by IRIB.

There are TV channels broadcasting through satellites to Iran where radio and TV broadcast is under the monopoly of the state. Satellite dishes were prohibited in 1994 to inhibit this type of broadcast that was supported by foreign states and anti-regime groups. Despite this prohibition, at least 40% of Iranians are believed to have connections to the international broadcasts through satellites.

The Outlook of Iranian Media 

Even though Iranian media has serious problems with regard to the press freedom, it is highly active and diverse within the allowed limits. Almost all the principal media sources are owned by certain political groups, people or institutions. According to their institutional ties and editorial policies, media of Iran can be divided into five categories.

Firstly, a portion of the media is directly connected to Supreme Leader Khamenei. As previously mentioned IRIB, which holds the monopoly of radio and TV broadcasting, is controlled by Supreme Leader Khamenei. IRIB also publishes a daily newspaper named Jam-e Jam and various weekly and monthly magazines. Government reshuffles do not change its editorial policy much since IRIB is not affiliated with the government. Supreme Leader Khamenei assigns the editors of Kayhan (The Cosmos), a newspaper which was formed before the Revolution, and Ettelaat, the oldest newspaper in Iran. Khorasan, a newspaper based in Mashhad but gets distributed nationally, and Qods also supervised by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Additionally, Khamenei still owns the licence of Jomhouri-e Eslami, a newspaper which was once owned by Islamic Republican Party. These newspapers usually reflect Khamenei's stance.

The second category is the media affiliated with the government which sometimes called "national media". The principal element of this category is government's official news agency IRNA and its daily newspaper Iran. Some other news agencies in the "national media" are ISNA, ILNA, and Mowj, all are managed by various institutions associated with the government.  The media of this category work according to political views of the ruling government since they are directly linked to the government.

The third category of the media consists of the reformist press. The major reformist newspapers are Afetab-e Yazd, mostly controlled by reformist religious group of Ruhaniyun, Etemad, published by Elias Hazrati who is a member of National Trust Party, and Shargh which was shut down for 4 times since 2002. Besides these newspapers, the magazines Chashmandaz-e Iran, Nasim-e Bidari, Mehrname, and Gozaresh belong to this category. Reformist news websites include Asr-e Iran, Fararu,and Diplomasi-yi Irani.

The newspapers which are not supervised by Khamenei but still have a conservative voice could form another group.  Resalat reflects the views of Motelefeh Party and the Islamic Society of Engineers; both are known for their close ties to the Bazaar of Tehran. Hamshahri, which used to be the most influential newspaper of the reformists, has had a more conservative view since 2003 as it is owned by Tehran Municipality. Hamshahri Media Group has many periodicals including Hamshahri Diplomatic.

Last category of the Iranian press could be entitled as neo-radical since it consists of media that used to immensely support Ahmadinejad and now harshly criticizes the government of Rouhani. Vatan-e Emrooz and Javan newspapers, Fars and Tasnim news agencies, Rajanews and Mashreghnews news portals belong to this category.

Media and Politics under President Rouhani

Following his election as a president, Rouhani took two actions with related to the press. The first one aimed to increase his influence on the media, as the press is the most important tool for the government in Iranian system, where power of elected officials are structurally limited. The government affiliated press as well as the reformist press have widely supported Rouhani government to survive both in social and political spheres. Traditionally conservative press also supports the government of Rouhani on some aspects.  Thus, the government is not only influential on its affiliated press but also on reformist and traditionally conservative press. However, this is not an absolute and unquestioned support and since the press applauds the government's achievements but  avoids its deficiencies. According to his opponents, the government of Rouhani both harshly criticizes the governments of Ahmedinejad, and also divides the people as the moderates and the extremes to compensate for his weakness. The dissenting journalists express discomfort about not being allowed to speak during the meetings held by the President and not being included in the President's tours.

On July 22, 2015 Ministry of Culture sent a secret notice to the press about things to consider while covering Iran's nuclear program. Ministry's Spokesperson Hossein Noushabadi stated that the notice is in line with the decisions of Supreme National Security Council and these decisions are binding for everyone. The9-Dey newspaper's license was canceled and Kayhangot a warning for not conforming to these decisions. This is regarded as the most significant evidence for the government's desire to increase its control over the media. However, this pressure is not only aimed at the opponents of Rouhani's government but also the reformists. For instance, a site named Entekhab was temporarily barred access in October 2014 and the publication of the Roozan newspaper was suspended because of the story it ran about the death anniversary of Ayatollah Montazeri. After a well-known reformist journalist Mohammed Quchani could obtain a license for the Aseman newspaper in February 2014, itgot shut down only after publishing six issues because of an article criticizing Qisas (eye for eye) laws.

As his opponents claim that he "controls the media", President Rouhani says nuclear negotiations are unjustly criticized in various reports and the government's achievements in many fields are not sufficiently covered in the press. He even claimed that state-run TV channel "IRIB is 100% against the government". Rouhani's advisor in charge of cultural affairs and government's representative in IRIB Board of Directors Husameddin Ashna once stated that the IRIB administration refuse implementing the board's decisions.  At his speech on National Journalism Day, Ashna said that the small press is under huge supervision however, the bigger ones are under almost no supervision at all. He also mentioned some publications of Ettelaat and Kayhan and asked "Why can't we do anything about these?"

The second action the government of Rouhani took with the press was expanding the press freedom.  In this context, Rouhani promised to re-open several NGOs that got shut down in 2009 including a journalist organization, the Press Union however, there has been no steps towards it. Moreover, Minister of Culture Ali Jannati prompted a debate in the country when he stated during a speech in March 2014 that the precautions has been taken since 1979 such as filtering the Internet to control the flow of information is "absurd". In response, Friday Prayer leader of Tehran, Mohammad Ali Movahedi-Kermani said Minister of Culture should take measures so as to "prevent the enemies from corrupting the Iranian society with their dangerous culture". Popular social media sites such as Youtube, Facebook and Twitter are still blocked.

Consequently, President Rouhani attempted to implement two big projects to control the press but also to expand their freedom however, he was not successful in either of them. Moreover, during Rouhani's term, freedom of press got worsened as even publishing pictures of an important member of the reformist movement Mohammad Khatami was prohibited by the establishment.

Iranian Politics after the Presidential Election

2017-06-02

Incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has won a landslide victory in the presidential elections held on May 19, and secured the second term in office. Approximately 73 per cent of the 55-million electorates went to the polls. Rouhani received 57 per cent of the casted votes by considerably improving his supporters in comparison to the previous presidential elections.  Having assessed objections and claims of irregularities made by some people including Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, the leading contester against Rouhani, the Guardian Council confirmed the election results on May 30. Rouhani is expected to form his new cabinet in the forthcoming days. So, how will be the future of Iranian politics from now on?

Significance of the Elections

Many claim that Iranian elections are sham elections because the regime predetermines the results by means of vetoing candidates. Additionally, it is claimed that powers of the elected offices including the presidency have been severely constrained. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei possesses the real power in the country. Although such criticisms are valid to some extent, it does not mean that the presidential elections are completely insignificant. First, the presidency is the second most authorized position in the country. Even if the Supreme Leader determines the general policies, influence of the president in the process of decision-making and policy-making is undeniable. Moreover, the president who is in charge of the state apparatus implementing the political decisions has an undeniable significant position in the system. That's why; considerable differences may take place in domestic politics, economics and foreign policies – within the margins of general policies of the country  - after someone else replaces the office holder. Iranian people experienced well this case after the 2005 presidential elections. The eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought significant breaks and changes in Iranian politics, which also closely affected ordinary Iranian people. Therefore, presidential elections have been quite electrifying almost each time, and the voter turn out did not fall below 70 percent, even if elections are held within the frame of a narrow political arena. Additionally, the fact that candidates who are regarded to be favored by the Supreme Leader have failed to get office after some elections indicates the significance of voting.

The 12th presidential election held on My 19 was regarded to be important because of two additional factors. First there was question around whether President Rouhani could secure a second term. Although all presidents since 1981 have been consecutively elected for the second time, many observers doubted the possibility of Rouhani's second term. Due to his foreign, economic and cultural policies, President Rouhani has some times confronted the conservatives who consider themselves as the owner of the regime. He has also been subjected to Khamenei's direct and indirect censure regarding some developments. For this reason, many speculated about the confirmation of his candidacy by the Guardian Council. Additionally, the ongoing discussions over the nuclear deal and the anti-Iran statements of the US President Trump have shadowed Rouhani's biggest achievement in his previous term, the diplomatic solution of the nuclear issue, the removal of the nuclear-related sanctions, and the dilution of international pressure over Iran. On the other hand, the continuing distress of ordinary Iranian citizens despite recent improvements in economy was a major challenge for Rouhani. Likewise, there has been no significant improvement in areas such as political rights and freedoms, and human rights. For instance, the leaders of reformist Green Movement has kept being under house arrest and in the last four years, approximately three thousand people were executed for various reasons. The weaknesses of Rouhani in these have raised some doubts about his election success by maintaining the alliance, which had brought him to the presidency in 2013.

The second reason why the 12th presidential elections were particularly important was the challenge of Ebrahim Raisi, who has been considered as Khamanei's favorite candidate and potential successor. His performance throug the elections could have determine both his political career and the future of Iran. Moreover, though he defined himself as bipartisan candidate, conservative and neo-radical parties unıted to endorse Raisi, which added further excitement to the elections.

During the election campaign, Raisi had three issues in his agenda: the economic failure of Rouhani's government, poverty and corruption. Raisi, who has accused Rouhani of managing the economy in accordance with the interest of foreigners and a group of minorities, promised to support domestic production, increase employment and advance the cash payments for the poor. On the other hand, Rouhani defended his own foreign and economic policy and built his campaign on the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, the maintenance of constructive engagement in foreign policy, the reinforcement of the private sector and the attraction of foreign capital to the country. Rouhani, who drew attention to Raisi's career as an attorney general and his relations with the Revolutionary Guards and neo-radicals, tried to consolidate his potential supporters who voted for him in the previous election, namely the young, women, minorities, reformists and technocrats. He claimed that if Raisi would take the office, Iran would enter a period full of tensions in foreign policy, and the domestic pressures would increase as in the Ahmadinejad period. He achieved to consolidate his supporters.

Agenda of Iranian Politics after the Election

The primary issue in the second period of Rouhani will be the struggle against unemployment and the economic development, which were prominent topics during the election campaign. According to the official figures, the unemployment rate is currently around 13 percent; however, unemployment especially among the youth is higher. Rouhani will likely adopt five policies in order to provide economic growth and to boost employment:

1.  The first policy is the reinforcement of the private sector. Although this issue has been on the agenda since the early 1990s, it is one of the structural weaknesses of the Iranian economy. The Iranian economy is largely in the hands of public institutions including military institutions and religious foundations. However, both the discourse of ‘resistance economy’, and the ‘existence of strategic sectors’ make it difficult to take further step in this respect.

2.  The second part of the economic policies is to increase share of non-oil products in the national income. The fluctuations in oil prices leave the Iranian economy in a difficult situation. Therefore, Iran aims to promote increasing non-oil products in exports, and concentrates on the long-term gas agreements. Significant improvements have been made in this regard. Iran already exports gas to Armenia and Iraq as well as Turkey. A number of agreements are also on the agenda to sell gas to Pakistan and India.

3.  The third element which will be highlighted in Rouhani's economy policy is tourism. In this context, he aims to renew the domestic and international civil aviation fleet and to improve hotel infrastructure. In 2015, approximately 5 million foreign tourists visited Iran. The government aims to raise this figure up to 20 million and to raise the tourism income to about 30 billion dollars by 2025.

4.  An important part of Rouhani’s economy policy, as it is shown in his previous term and promised in the election campaign is inviting foreign capital and investment to the country. In order to struggle against unemployment, in other words to create one million job opportunities per year, the government is projected to invest 200 billion dollars for the next 5 years, one third of which is supposed to be come through international investments. However, any attempt to attract further tourists and foreign capital faces serious criticism and opposition from the conservatives. In addition, some legal amendments need to be made in order to take effective steps in these areas. Therefore, it is expected that there will be heated discussions on these issues in the forthcoming period. On the other side, the ongoing sanctions on Iran poses serious challenges for the foreign investments.

5.  During his election campaign, Rouhani promised the removal of remaining sanctions on Iran, which will directly affect economy. However, the remaining international sanctions on Iran are imposed either because human rights violations, or because of alleged Iranian support for international terrorism, and its foreign policy. Therefore, the removal of remaining sanctions requires a comprehensive revision of Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics, which is highly difficult in the current political conditions. Moreover, the removal of sanctions on Iran is unthinkable in a period when the new US administration is committed to increase pressure over Iran.

Rouhani promised to strengthen fundamental rights and freedoms, improve socio-economic status of women, and improve political conditions of ethnic and religious minorities during his campaign. In this regard, he had issued a declaration named "The Charter on Citizens' Rights" in December 2016. In the forthcoming period, it may be expected that Rouhani will struggle to provide freedoms and rights indicated within this charter. However, the conservative front opposing Rouhani, and the increasing security concerns will make it difficult to take further steps in this regard.

In his first speech after the elections, Rouhani said, "Iranian people rejects extremism and wants more links with the outside world". In this context, emphasizing the achievements made in his previous period, especially the nuclear deal, Rouhani stated that the "constructive interaction" and "win-win" approach would continue in Iranian foreign policy. However, the changing American policies towards Iran make many in Iran to question the rationality of Rouhani foreign policy. Considering the recent change in the US-Iran relations, it is estimated that Iran will give priority to developing good relations with the European countries in the upcoming period.

Iran's Middle East policy is not expected to change significantly in the next four years. As a matter of fact, these policies were hardly questioned during the period of election campaign. It is claimed actually the Revolutionary Guards handles Iranian files towards the regional crises because they are deemed as primary security matters. In this respect, President Rouhani's approach is not different from the current Iranian rhetoric and policies. As a matter of fact, in the press statement after the election, he stated that the primary issue in Syria and Iraq is the "struggle against terrorism", and added that they would continue supporting the administrations in Baghdad and Damascus. However, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is supported by Trump administration, and the proxy fights around the region are likely to increase in the forthcoming period. This may bring security institutions, the Revolutionary Guards, and security policies into prominence in Iran, and may restrict maneuver capability of Rouhani with regard to foreign policy, economy and politics.

There is no other election in Iran until February 2020. Therefore, it is expected that there will be relative stability in the elected offices and institutions. 40 per cent of the Iranian parliament, and most of the city councils are in the hands of pro-Rouhani people, which will help him. However, potential interventions of Supreme Leader Khamanei, the Guardian Council and the judiciary under the control of conservatives, and security and intelligence institutions may hinder some policies of the government, and weaken the president, as in the second term of the former president Mohammad Khatami. Recently increasing threats against Iran, and the rising security concerns may provide a justification for further securitization in the country, and containing President Rouhani.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5115?s=orsam|english 

Political Factions and Candidates for Presidential Elections in Iran

2017-04-26

Iran is headed towards twin elections to be held on 19 May. The twelfth presidential elections will take place at the same time with city/village council elections. The Council of Guardians, the body in charge of supervising elections in Iran, identified six persons among hundreds of hopefuls registered to run in the presidential elections, and the campaigning process has officially begun.

Political Factions and Candidates

One of the candidates is current president Hassan Rouhani. He has held high level positions since the revolution, and has good ties with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. For long years Rouhani served as his representative in the Supreme National Security Council. Rouhani was also known to have close relations with a leading ‘pragmatist’ figure Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in last January. Rouhani, who was elected as president in June 2013, currently represents the technocrat-reformist alliance. The reformist faction that has been under heavy pressure for a long time views Rouhani as relatively closer to their position and supports him. Reformist Policymaking Council, a temporary umbrella organization that coordinates reformist movements,has aimed to reduce the risk of losing elections because of multiple candidates running from the same faction and has endorsed Rouhani for the presidential election.

Among the candidates confirmed by the Council of Guardians, current Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri and former minister Mostafa Hashemi-Taba are regarded as pro-reform figures, as well. The nomination of Jahangiri is not a bid for running against President Rouhani, but as part of a strategy to field an alternative figure to represent technocrat-reformist front if Rouhani would be vetoed. Jahangiri is expected to contribute the campaign of the President by propagating achievements of the current government, and eventually to withdraw from the race in favor of Rouhani. Hashemi-Taba, one of the founders of technocratic the Executives of Construction (Kargozaran) party, is not considered an influential contender to challenge Rouhani

While the technocrat-reformist faction unified behind President Rouhani, conservative/principalist parties sought for a joint candidate to compete against the incumbent President. A number of conservative associations and parties that come together under the Popular Front for Islamic Revolutionary Forces (JAMNA) tried to choose joint nominees. For the first time the JAMNA hold two conventions to vote for presidential prospects in order to identify the joint nominee. Eventually the JAMNA nominated five people, and asked them to withdraw before the election-day in favor of the most popular one. Thus, many of high-profile conservative figures gave up the idea of running for the presidential elections. One of the joint nominees of the JAMNA, Mehrdad Bazrpash did not officially register for running in the elections. The Council of Guardiansdid not confirm qualifications of Alireza Zakani and Hamidreza Hajibabaie, both nominated by the JAMNA. Hence, only two of the joint nominees of JAMNA, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, have found opportunity to run. Qalibaf, who has been the mayor of Tehran for almost ten years, had previously run for the presidential elections in 2005 and 2013, and he had garnered almost 15 percent of the casted votes in both elections. Qalibaf is not the most popular candidate of the conservatives because he was ranked the fourth in the preliminary voting of JAMNA. The first nomination of JAMNA is S. Ebrahim Raisi, who was the most popular figure in the JAMNA voting. However, he did not show up in JAMNA conventions, and described himself as an independent candidate.

Although the JAMNA unified numerous conservative groups, Motalefeh (the Islamic Coalition Party), one of the oldest conservative movements that believed to be influential in the bazaar of Tehran did not join the camp. Instead, it nominated Mostafa Mir-Salim, former Minister of Culture, who passed the filter of the Council of Guardians. It is difficult to estimate his prospective performance because neither Mir-Salim, nor his political party run on their own in previous elections.

The surprise in the process of identification of nominees came from former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He both supported the bid of Hamid Baqaie, who served as vice-president while Ahmadinejad was in office, and also nominated himself. In fact, his prospective come-back and candidacy was on the agenda for a long time. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei made it public in the last September that he did not welcome Ahmadinejad’s running in the elections. Then, the latter had ostensibly succumbed to the ‘advice’ of Supreme Leader. The Council of Guardians banned both Ahmadinejad and Baqaie from running in the presidential elections.

Contest between Rouhani – Raisi

After the Council of Guardians’ final decision on naming the presidential candidates,the election is expected be a contest between Rouhani and Raisi. Both areamong the ulema and are educated in law.  Rouhani has mostly engagedin political positions and has taken charge of security-related missions. Raisi hastaken missions in judicial affairs. He is still the prosecutor of the Special Court of Clerics. He has become the chairman of Astan-e Qodse Razavi, one of the richest religious foundations in Iran. This foundation has businesses on a wide scale in various parts of the country. The chief managers of religious foundations are being appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, and answer only to him.  It is inconceivable that such a high-level official joins the election contest without permission from Khamenei. That is why Raisi is considered to be favorite candidate of Khamenei. Moreover, some people claim that Raisi has been grooming for the post of Supreme Leader after Khamenei. However, a possible defeat, or a victory with small margins may shadow his claim for the post of Supreme Leader.

Raisi has two vulnerabilities. The first is his alleged role in the summary executions of imprisoned regime opponents in 1988. On the other hand, this indicates how hardliner he is, and how he is committed to the regime. The second vulnerability of Raisi is his being lack of a political career. That is, he is not known by wider segments of the society, which may also be translated into leverage. As a matter of fact, he could not be blamed for systemic corruption and deficiencies. Additionally, he has managed to fulfill the self-appointed but the failed mission JAMNA by making himself as the single joint candidate of conservative faction with the help of massive disqualifications made by the Council of Guardians. The self-presentation of Raisi as an independent and non-partisan contester further facilitates his work. He has already secured support of traditional conservatives embodied by JAMNA. He also aims to get support of neo-radicals by employing some figures from the cabinet of former President Ahmadinejad. Currently, former secretary general of the Supreme National Security Council Saeid Jalili and a hardliner ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi have endorsed Raisi. Then, the continuation of claims of Mir-Salim and Qalibaf until the end of contest will be decisive. Especially the attitude of Qalibaf, who had garnered almost six million votes in the last presidential election, will be critical in shaping the election results.

Rouhani is considered as the joint candidate of technocrat, reformistand pragmatist factions. He is also known to have close relations with Khamanei. Although the latter occasionally criticize some policies and practices of the government, it does not mean a turn against Rouhani. Eventually, four-year performance of the Rouhani government will be put on vote on 19 May. In this respect, the nuclear deal and economic issues will come into prominence. Although the nuclear deal has been presented as a victory by the government, it is subjected to serious criticisms. Particularly some problems faced in the removal of sanctions and the harsh discourse of the Trump administration towards IranleadsIranian people to question both relations with the West and the nuclear deal.The nuclear deal has allowed the removal of constraints on Iranian oil exports, the return of some Iranian assets frozen in the United States, purchasing new airplanes for civil aviation etc. Although Iranian economy has recorded considerable growth rates in the last two years, socio-economic conditions of low-income and rural people has not improved. Considering this point into account, Raisi is expected to put forward a populist agenda. In this respect, one of the liabilities of the Rouhani government is corruption. Especially, the case of astronomic salaries of some high-level officials in public enterprises is likely to pose a serious challenge to the campaign of Rouhani. 

The technocrat-reformist alliance working in coordination with president Rouhani managed to record a considerable success in the parliamentary elections that were held in February 2016. Because the same alliance is maintained for the presidential elections, it is likely that it might reiterate a similar performance.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5098?s=orsam|english 

 2017-04-26

Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani

2016-08-15

Since its foundation in 1979,The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Revolutionary Guards, IRGC) has been regarded as one of the “fundamental” pillars of Iranian politics. Revolutionary Guards, who are constitutionally charged with “safeguarding the revolution and its achievements”, have always involved in politics. IRGC, like other security institutions in Iran, is directly subordinated to Supreme Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Hamanei and its relations with Iranian governments have been practiced in different forms.IRGC’s political clout gradually increased under the presidency of Mahmud Ahmedinecad that generated a debate on “militarization” of the Iranian regime. Likewise, in the meantime, influence of IRGCalso increased in economy due to the effects of sanctions imposed on Iran for thenuclear issue.

IRGC’s role in Iranian politics and economy has been regarded as one of the biggest challenges for Hassan Rouhani, who was elected as president in June 2013.There were some speculations about the prospective tension between President Rouhani, who has been known with pragmatism, and IRGC that has a rigid ideological standing.So, how didrelations between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards evolve in the intervening three years?This study reviews relations between the Rouhani government and IRGC.

Nuclear Deal, Iranian politics and Revolutionary Guards

Rouhani’sassociation with some reformist figures before and after the elections, moderation and flexibility in foreign policy and his discourses on economic liberalization drew IRGC’s reaction. However, having forged close relations with security bureaucracy and due to his stance in the “political center”, Rouhani did not encounter opposition from IRGC.Indeed, Rouhani observed balances while he was forming his cabinet and he did not give place to “fervent” reformists. He appointed, formerIRGC commanders, Hossein Dehghan as as Minister of Defense and Ali Shamkhani as a secretary of Supreme National Security Council.

IRGC’s first criticism against President Rouhani came afterhis phone conversationwith President Obama in September 2013.IRGCCommander, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “the president took a firm and appropriate position during his stay” in New York,“but,” he added“just as he refused to meet Obama, he should also have refused to speak with him on the telephone.”

Nuclear negotiations that began in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1countrieswere criticized at times by news websites and journals. When those criticisms became harsh, Rouhani stated that “a small group has been busy with sabotages, baseless accusations and lies.” He added that his government was well aware of each step of this group and wouldtake necessary measures when the time was ripe. Shortly after Rouhani’s statements, in November 2014, an article published in Sahamnews, a pro-reformist news portal,claimed that Intelligence Unit of IRGC stepped into action in order to overthrow the Rouhani government. According to the aforementioned article, Intelligence Unit of IRGC, in coordination with Isargaran(Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution), and former officials at the time of Ahmedinecad government and some journalists, set up “safe houses” in which anti-government propaganda activities was organized. It was suggested that Rouhani gave information and submitted relevant documents about this subject to LeaderHamanei at a private talk; but nothing appeared publiclyabout this matter. Anyway, President Rouhani said in a speech he gave in December 2015, “When weapons, wealth and media are in control of a single institution, an inevitable result would be corruption.” These comments ware regarded by many pundits as criticism against IRGC.

While nuclear deal was coming to and end, IRGC took a cautious stance. On the one hand, IRGC Commander Jafari appreciated achievements and “selfless efforts” of the negotiating team, on the other hand, he continued to remind redlines of the Iran. He drove attention to controversial issues with related to the removal of sanctions.

In a speech shortly after the parties agreed on the nuclear deal in July 2015, Rouhani stated that even after the conclusion of deal, Iran should preserve its prudence and moderation. He also said, “we should not think that we can talk and move whatever we want after the deal, and the others did not react to the change of our course”.This statement drew a rebuff from IRGC Commander Jafari, who said, “some people argues that we should decide our activities in accordance with the will of enemy, and says we cannot speak or move as we liked because the others would react. It means, before anything else, questioning of independence and honor of the regime.” He added that those people sitting in important posts should speak in a “measured” way.

The battle of words between the government and IRGC has continued over the meaning of the nuclear deal. Both President Rouhani and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarifargued that “the nuclear deal have liftedthe shadow of war over Iran and made it more secure.” However,it is stated in various speeches of some IRGC commanders that security of Iran has not been ensured by means of negotiations and dialogue with enemy,but by the heroic and altruistic resistance of the people and “deterrent power” of Iran.Jafaristressed that “the deal did not end or reduce hostility of the United States towardstheIslamic Republic of Iran”, and he claimed that the “enemy continuously attempts to infiltrate into Iran.”Actually, these “warnings” are almost replica of various statements of Khamenei.Indeed, Khameneihas been talking about the possibility of “infiltration of enemy into Iran by economic and cultural means.” Soon after those warnings about “infiltration of enemy”, Intelligence Unit of IRGCarrested five journalists allegedly for “being members of a network of influencedepended on America or Britain.” President Rouhani reacted to these detentions. Rouhani said that security agents should not act like a press judge and he called that warnings of the leader on the “infiltration of foreigners” should not be over-exploited.

Another debate President Rouhani and IRGC Commander Jafari that revolved around the essence of the nuclear deal took place in the last April. In his speech for the occasion of Norouz(Iranian New Year), Rouhani recalled the nuclear deal as an achievement to be proud of the Iranian nation and he said that Iran should alsoconclude“a national plan of action, a secondbarjam(the Persian acronym for the nuclear deal)” to solve itspolitical, economic and social problems.Leader Khamenei criticized these statements at first.  Subsequently, Major GeneralJafari said, “Thenucleardeal has neverbeenconsidered a documentto be proud of it, andpeoplereluctantlysupported [it]. Whatare the benefits of the first deal, so that we are asking a second one?” In response to these criticisms, Rouhani repeated that barjamis a political and legal source of pride for Iranian nation and he reminded how much the Iranian people were suffering under sanctions.He statedthat Iran alsoneedssomeadditional time just as “therestorationorreconstruction of a ruintakesome time. Only three months have passed since the deal came into effect.”

Economic Activities of RG

Another source of disagreement between Revolutionary Guards and the Rouhani government is the role of IRGC in economy. Khatam-ol Anbiya Headquarter, engineering and construction unit of IRGShas taken over critical infrastructure projects in Iran, built roads, bridges, damsetc..The role of IRGC in economy gradually increased under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, some companies affiliated to the IRGC operated in wide spectrum from construction, chemistry, to telecom, finance, energy, and international trade.There are different estimations about the overall share of IRGC in Iranian economy. IRGCSpokesman Ramezan Sharif stated that “only 10%” of construction projects in Iran has been handled by the Revolutionary Guards.

Rouhani government is critical of economic activities of military institutions because of the difficulty in inspecting them and because itupsets the balances in the market. Besides, the government is vowed toreinforce private sector, which requires reduction of IRGC activities in economy.However, President Rouhani adopted a cautious rhetoricwith regard to the economic activities of IRGC. Having admired IRGC for its contribution to economy and defense of the country, he asked IRGC to fight against smuggling and get involve in major projects that are not undertaken by private sector.Likewise, Mohammad BagherNobaght, spokesman of the government, said that economic activities of IRGC should be limited with fields in which private sector has no interest or capacity to do.

A speech given by Rouhani on the Army Day (Rouz-e Artesh) in April 2014 has drawn attention to this issue. He said that the army has made great sacrifices in defense of the country, but did not ask “its share from the nation and the elected government.” This statement of Rouhani isregarded as a warning to IRGC thatwants to maintain its economic activities in return for its sacrifices.

IRGCCommander Jafari acknowledged in September 2014 that initially there were some doubts about the cooperation between the Guards and the government on economic issues. However, he added that the government was appreciatingIRGc’scapabilities in construction industry and they were cooperating on that subject.  Nevertheless, economic activities of IRGC significantly declined under the Rouhani government. Some operations ofIRGC-related companies, who are no more able to take “luxurious tenders” has been ceased. In return, Guardscommanders frequentlystated that the government should “give priority” toIRGC and Basij, which are ready to support the government in developing “resistance economy.” Commander Jafari,in several occasions, however, complained that the government does not utilize enough experiences and proposals IRGC and Basij.

Foreign policy is not discussed

Despite their disagreements on economic and political issues, the Rouhani government and the Revolutionary Guards have apparently been in an intimate cooperation with regard to foreign policy matters.The Rouhani government, whose first priority wassolution of the nuclear issue, has not questioned the role of IRGC in regional policies of Iran. As a matter of fact, Iranian policies towards Iraq and Syria have remained in the control of IRGC. After the rise of ISIS in June 2014, as a critical threat to Iraqi government, and consequently to Iran, IRGC and Iranian government reinforced their cooperation. The government supported the logistical support and the advisory missions provided by IRGC in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, President Rouhani said, “The courage of Sardar[Qassem] Soleimani is a source of pride and power.”Having praised the Qods Force andprowess of IRGC, Rouhani said, “Today, IRGC not only shoulders the burden of providing security to thecountry, but also provides security to those countries seeking help from the Islamic Iran and takes its place with its all capacity on those fields.”

The concord between the Rouhani government and Revolutionary Guards on security and foreign policy issueshas also reflected in the overall share of IRGC from the national budget, which has gradually increased. It took 3,3 billion USD from the national budget in 2013, which increased to 5 billion USD in 2014 and to 6.1 billion USD in 2015. There were some claims for the current year arguing that the amount allocated to IRGC in the draft version of the national budget prepared by the government was diminished 20 percent. Notwithstanding the debate on the budget cuts for IRGC, the overall defense budget of Iran has increased almost 15 percent.

Consequently, there have been some public debates and disagreements between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards over a number of issues including the role of IRGC in economy, nuclear talks and the meaning of the nuclear deal, cultural and political issues. However, the Rouhani government hasnot questionedforeign activities of IRGC and its role in Iranian foreign policy. Therefore, despite numerous disagreements and debates between Revolutionary Guards and the government, foreign policy issues, especially Iranian policies towards the Middle East were never brought into question.

This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of "Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani”     

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4826?s=orsam|english 

 2016-08-15