Turkey-Iran Relations after the JDP

 After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as well as profound changes in international, regional and domestic contexts surrounding it. Particularly fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations in the course of seventeen years have been very puzzling, and complicated, which made it worthy of study. Once, relations between the two states have so improved that some pundits regarded it as an evidence of shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. Soon later, Ankara and Tehran embroiled in a regional competition that reminded the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the 16th century with its strategic and sectarian implications. Later on, they have developed amicable relations. Against this background one may question how could we understand that very dynamic nature of Turkish-Iranian relations? Considering this complicated and dynamic picture, we should analyse decisive factors in the relations between Ankara and Tehran. In other words, what has changed - and has been changing - in Turkish-Iranian relations after the JDP? In order to comprehend the complicated and dynamic interactions between Ankara and Tehran, this research goes beyond the JDP period in Turkey and put forwards a review of the history of Turkish-Iranian relations. And then, it focuses on the JDP period and analyse relations between Ankara and Tehran from diplomatic, economic and regional perspectives. Finally, it makes some speculations on the future of Turkish-Iranian relations. It argues that the complicated relationship between the two countries have been determined by a configuration of geopolitical context, structural factors, and the ruling elite. The JDP elite have employed rationalization, institutionalization and compartmentalization strategies to further Turkish-Iranian relations. However, they could not go beyond the diplomatic culture that set the longer history of interactions between the two countries on a fine course between bitter rivalry and friendly relations.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337090886_Turkey-Iran_Relations_after_the_JDP

The Aging Culture of Neighborhood in Turkey-Iran Relations

Originally published at https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/15688, on March 16, 2021.

 

In late February, 2021, some news outlets headlined a new ‘tension’ between Turkey and Iran. Arguably the crisis had erupted over a statement by Iraj Masjidi, the Iranian ambassador to Bagdad, denouncing Turkish military operations in the north of Iraq as a violation of the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Mohammad Farazmand, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, to declare its distress concerning the ‘baseless’ statement. The Ministry warned the ambassador that rather than standing against Turkey’s fight against terrorism as embodied by the PKK, Iran should lend support to Ankara. In return, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Derya Örs, the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, in order to convey its discomfort at a statement by Süleyman Soylu, the Interior Minister, who talked of the presence of PKK militants on Iranian soil. Despite a background of inflammatory media reports interpreting the events as a new round in the crisis between the two countries, those developments did not escalate into animosity between the two states. 

Likewise, nearly three months ago, there was another ‘diplomatic crisis’ between the two states over an anonymous poem recited by President Recep T. Erdoğan on December 10 at the victory parade in Baku on the occasion of the Azerbaijani triumph over Armenia in the Karabagh dispute. The poem highlighted the sorrowfulness over the division of historic Azerbaijan, and amplified Iranian anxiety over the Azerbaijan question. In line with the Iranian public uproar over Erdoğan’s recitation, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad J. Zarif, tweeted a ‘disrespectful’ text in his social media account. The poem crisis was swiftly managed by diplomats on both sides before it escalated into a watershed moment. 

 In the meantime, Zarif paid an official visit to Istanbul in January, where he talked with his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on potential stability in the Caucasus based on the idea of a 3+3 format proposed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (Turkey, Russia, Iran plus Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia). Soon after that, Turkish, Russian and Iranian delegations met in Sochi on February 16-17 in order to hold the ‘15th round of the International Meeting on Syria in the Astana format’. Later, on February 21, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani held a phone conversation with President Erdoğan, when they exchanged ideas for the desired removal of US sanctions on Iran. 

The above-mentioned developments in Turkish-Iranian relations in a short span of time prove how bilateral relations between the two states are diverse, complicated, and intertwined. They also display how Turkey and Iran are experiencing concurrent instances of cooperation, rivalry, and resentment. It is puzzling, however, for many to grasp the nature of Turkish-Iranian relations.  

The Persistent Dynamics of Cooperation and Rivalry 

Above all else, the simultaneous operation of patterns of cooperation, rivalry and resentment is not a novel phenomenon. The history of Turkish-Iranian relations is full of numerous instances of cooperation and amicable relations between the two states accompanied by a discourse of historical rivalry. Moreover, the dynamics of cooperation and rivalry have revolved around common or similar themes. 

First of all, the legacy of the historical Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, imbued with sectarian differences and geopolitical concerns, has haunted the minds of the elite in both countries, underpinning suspicion and mistrust of each other. After the emergence of nation-states, transnational movements, particularly Pan-Turkism, appeared as a national security concern on the Iranian side given the large numbers of Turkish-speaking people settled in that country. Since then, Iran has been preoccupied with a fear of Pan-Turkism. Additionally, the Iranian revolution of 1979 strained Turkish-Iranian relations because of Ankara’s disquiet over the Iranian export of revolution or Islamic radicalism. Recently, it has evolved into growing Turkish concerns with Pan-Shi’ism and proselytizing activities promoted by Tehran. Finally, geopolitical shifts in the Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the new geopolitical landscape in the Middle East after the Gulf Wars have led to the reinvigoration of Iranian and Turkish dreams of building their past empires in new forms and exerting political, economic and cultural influences. Thus, new geopolitical realities unleashed Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the Caucasus and the Middle East, particularly over Iraq, where historical Iranian-Ottoman rivalries were centered. 

Counter to the aforementioned dynamics of rivalry and resentment, common religious bonds and cultural commonalities have constituted a durable base for cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Many diplomats commonly recall nearly four hundred years of stability across the border between two nations as evidence of friendship and good-neighborhood. In this respect, strategic dictums of neighborhood require at least a minimum level of interaction between nearby states for the sake of border security and the management of cross-border relations. Likewise, economic considerations and trade interests constitute rational bases for collaboration between the two states. Finally, overwhelming strategic threats that render both countries vulnerable, such as great power interferences that currently threaten both Iranian and Turkish interests, emerge as a factor that forces them to cooperate. 

A number of issues surrounding border security such as smuggling and unrestrained movements of tribes and armed bands has continued to be a constant theme of both friction and partnership between the neighbors. The Kurdish question especially, embodied by the Kurdish movements seeking an autonomous or an independent and united Kurdistan state, has emerged both as a source of dispute and cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. While fighting ‘separatist’/ ‘terrorist’ movements on their soils, both Turkey and Iran have built intricate relations with Kurdish parties in Iraq and have watched each other apprehensively. In this regard, aside from occasional security and intelligence cooperation, Turkey has repeatedly blamed Iran for either directly or indirectly supporting Kurdish rebels, and frustrating the Turkish fight against them. 

 The Culture of Neighborhood 

Attempting to explain enigmatic relations between Turkey and Iran, short-sighted analyses lean on the selective use of history in order to provide further evidence such as historical rivalry or cooperation to explain their positions. However, the dynamics of cooperation, rivalry and resentment have been there and working simultaneously for over a century. That is why current cases of tensions or friendly statements would be very familiar to Iranian and Turkish officials of the 1920s. The continuity and the simultaneity of similar dynamics for cooperation and rivalry could be explained by the prevalence of a culture of neighborhood between modern Iran and Turkey. 

Accordingly, Turkey and Iran recognize each other as neighboring states with distinctive identities and interests, even though they may have some commonalities and shared interests. Additionally, they acknowledge the steadiness of the dynamics of cooperation and rivalry, which have turned out to be structural factors that could not be eliminated easily in the given international/regional conditions. However, the absence of territorial disputes between the two states has helped them to develop and maintain a neighborhood relationship based on the preservation of a fine line between cooperation and rivalry. They have become careful to keep each other at arm’s length; while refraining from building intimate relations, they have been sensitive not to antagonizing each other. Even at times of heightened rivalry, the two states have not engaged in hostile activities against each other. 

That culture of neighborhood based on a ‘realist’ assessment of surrounding conditions over Turkish-Iranian relations has occasionally been challenged by change of leadership or geopolitical shifts in the nearby regions. As a result, while tension and rivalry have escalated at some times between the two states, at other times they have achieved remarkable rapprochement. However, given the continuous and simultaneous impulses for competition and partnership, Turkish-Iranian relations have always been restored on the basis of the culture of neighborhood and have continued to operate along the fine line between cooperation and rivalry. 

In this framework, Turkey-Iran relations have achieved apparent shifts from a cooperative to a competitive relationship, which has actually remained within the margins set by the culture of neighborhood. As an example of this situation, Turkish-Iranian relations of the past two decades have witnessed many shifts between alignment and rivalry. First, a considerable rapprochement took place between Ankara and Tehran from 2001 to 2011. That rapprochement was facilitated by the rationalization of bilateral relations, growing economic opportunities for both sides, and looming geopolitical threats arising from the American occupation of Iraq. However, geopolitical opportunities and threats that emerged in nearby countries, particularly in Iraq and Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the growing self-confidence of Ankara and Tehran to project themselves as regional powers, led to an estrangement in Turkish-Iranian relations between 2011 and 2016. Changing geopolitical considerations in Turkey and Iran after 2016 unleashed a new process of cooperation between the two states at different sectors and levels. 

As a result of the persistent but diverse dynamics of cooperation and rivalry in Turkish-Iranian relations, there was a considerable number of instances of friction between Ankara and Tehran even at times when cooperative relations prevailed, and the reverse has also been true. It is also clear in the examples given above concerning the recent past of Ankara-Tehran relations. Hence, the nature of Turkey-Iran relations defies simplistic explanations centered on geopolitics, identity, or elite preferences, but reflects an aging culture of neighborhood based on the maintenance of relations on a fine line between cooperation and rivalry.

This opinion is originally published via Hypotheses, on March 16, 2021, and available at the following link https://ovipot.hypotheses.org/15688

Turkish-Iranian Rapprochement and President Erdogan's Visit to Iran

09.10.2017

There has been a remarkable rapprochement between Ankara and Tehran in recent months. It is clear that certain developments in the Middle East have played a significant part in this rapprochement. The apparent rivalry between Turkey and Iran in various scenes that intensified after the Arab Spring and the subsequent regional crises adversely affected interests of the both countries. Especiallyongoing crises in Syria and Iraq for years have led an implicit understanding between the two governments to cooperate with each other for solutionof the regional issues, and not to rely much on extra-regional great powers. Additionally,the two countries have shared similar agendas to fight againstextremism, terrorism and sectarianism in the region. Recently, the growing partnership between the United States and PYD, affiliated tothe PKK, in Syria,hasdistressedboth Ankara and Tehran. The progress recorded in the Astana process started in January 2017 that aimed to contain armed clashes in Syrian, has served a confidence-building step in the relations between the two countries. Lastly, the 'independence referendum' held in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is regardedas a common threatby the both countries. Meanwhile, the mutual exchanges between the Chiefs of the General Staffs in Turkey and Iran in a short span of time have added security and military dimensions to the growing cooperationbetween the two countries.

Institutionalization of bilateral relations,as well as regional security concerns and common security threats, has played a major role in the improvement of relations between Turkey and Iran. The establishment of the High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) between the two countries in 2014, and the invocation the Preferential Trade Agreement amidst occasionally rising tensions,areprofound steps taken in the name of institutionalizing bilateral relations. As a matter of fact,HLCC has been gathering in Ankara and Tehran by turns with the participation of the presidents and a large number of ministers for four years.

President Recep T. Erdoganpaid a visit to Tehran on October 4, in order to attend the fourth meeting of the HLCC.Erdogan, along with the Iranian President Rouhani, chaired the HLCC.President Erdoğan also met the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In addition to bilateral economic, political and security relations, however, regional affairs marked the agenda of the visit.

Bilateral Relations

During the visit, four memorandums of understanding were singed between the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Iran and the Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade; the two central banks; the Turkish Prime Ministry Archives and the Iranian National Library and finally between TRT and IRIB. What’s more, the presidents of the two countries shared a joint statement that covers a wide range of issues from bilateral economic relations and to a number of regional issues. The parties have reiterated their goal to reach trade volumebetween the two countries above the level of $ 30 billion.

Four points regarding bilateral relations came to the forefront. The first is to trade with national currencies and the opening of branches of the Iranian and Turkish national banks in the two countries. This issue has been on the agenda for some years, but not been put into practice because of the American and UN sanctions against Iran. The second issue was to keep the three customs gates (Doğubeyazıt, Kapıköy and Esendere) on the land border of the two countries open for twenty-four hours in order to encourage mutual trade and travel. The third issue was energy cooperation. It was agreed that more Turkish investors would be involved in the efforts to develop the Iranian natural gas industry, while Turkey would increase the amount of gas it bought from Iran. However, detailed information was not provided in this topic. In addition to the mutual interests of the two countries in the energy sector, this issue will continue to be on the agenda of Turkey-Iran relations in the coming days as the current gas pipeline agreement, which was signed in 1996, is about to expire.

Regional Cooperation

As the visit was realized just after the Turkish Chief of the General StaffHulusiAkar had visited Tehran on October 2, the attention was drawn upon military-security cooperation. Besides, prospective cooperation between Turkey and Iran against the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG), which heldthe referendum despite all warnings, was brought to the agenda. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Iraq had previously gathered in New York on 20 September and issued a joint declaration signifying their commitment to preserving Iraq's territorial integrity, and their opposition to the referendum. During Erdogan's visit, strong messages were given in the joint statement of the presidents, the joint press conference and the Erdogan-Khamenei meeting, for the development of security cooperation between the two countries and the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq.

It was emphasized in the joint declaration that strengthening current cooperation mechanisms between the two countries againstthe PKK and PJAK elements in the borders of the two countries and taking joint steps tofight organized crime and terrorism are in the interests of both countries. Paying homage the Iraqi constitution, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq, the parties rejected the 'illegal and illegitimate referendum' held in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and asked Iraqi Kurdish officials to step back. In this context, the Iraqi government’smeasures to protect its territorial integrity and political unityare backed up. During his meeting with Erdogan, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that the referendum is a betrayal anda threat to the future of the region. He also stated that Iran and Turkey should take every possible step to fight the referendum.

One of the most significantoutcomes of the visit was the establishment of a consultation mechanism between Turkey, Iran and Iraq to coordinate their sanctions against the KRG. At a press conference with Erdogan, Rouhani stated that the three countries would not allow the political borders of the region to change and would take necessary and serious measures against such a development. President Erdogan said that the three countries would take more serious decisions together, and if the KRG do not step back, it would be isolated. Erdoganalso said that they would decide together with Iraq and Iranwhether to stop the oil exports from the Kurdistan region.

As a result, the two countries have expressed at the highest level that they will act together against the KRG’s independence initiative. It was also revealed that Turkey and Iran would coordinate their measures and sanctions against the KRG with the Iraqi central government. Hence, Ankara and Tehran seem to have decided to follow Baghdad before taking anyunilateral step against the KRG. Both countries, however, are likely to encourage the Iraqi central government to take rigorous measures against the KRG. In any case, the scope of cooperation and the measures to be taken against the KRGamongthe three countries will be determined by the course of Arbil-Baghdad relations.

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14513?dil=en

Türkiye-İran Yakınlaşması ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın İran Ziyareti

09.10.207

Ankara ile Tahran arasında son aylarda dikkat çekici bir yakınlaşma var. Bu yakınlaşmada Ortadoğu’da meydana gelişmelerin önemli payı olduğu açık. Arap baharının ardından Türkiye ile İran arasında çeşitli boyutları ile ortaya çıkan rekabet ve bölgesel krizler her iki ülkenin de menfaatlerini olumsuz etkiledi. Özellikle Suriye’de ve Irak’ta yıllardır süren krizler her iki hükümeti bölgesel meselelerin çözümünde işbirliği yapmak ve bölge dışı büyük güçlere itimat etmemek hususunda birleştirdi. Öte yandan bölgede aşırıcılık, terörizm ve mezhepçiliğe karşı mücadele iki ülkenin ortak gündemi oldu. Son aylarda ABD’nin PKK’nın Suriye kolu PYD ile aktif işbirliğine girmesi hem Ankara’yı hem de Tahran’ı rahatsız etti. Suriye meselesi ile ilgili olarak Ocak 2017’de başlayan Astana sürecinde kaydedilen ilerleme, iki ülke ilişkilerinde güven artırıcı bir adım oldu. Son olarak ‘Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi’nde düzenlenen ‘bağımsızlık referandumu’ iki ülkede ortak tehdit şekliden değerlendirildi. Bu süreçte iki ülke genelkurmay başkanlarının kısa süre içerisinde gerçekleştirdikleri karşılıklı ziyaretler ile Türkiye-İran ilişkilerine güvenlik ve askeri işbirliği boyutu eklendi.

Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişmesinde ortak güvenlik tehditleri ve bölgesel kaygıların yanı sıra ikili ilişkilerin kurumsallaşmasının büyük rolü var. Zaman zaman yükselen gerilime rağmen iki ülke arasında 2014’te Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi’nin(YDİK) kurulması ve Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesi ikili ilişkilerin kurumsallaşması adına atılan önemli adımlar oldu. Nitekim YDİK dört yıldır cumhurbaşkanları ve çok sayıda bakanın katılımıyla, istikrarlı bir şekilde dönüşümlü olarak Ankara ve Tahran’da toplanıyor.

Cumhurbaşkanı Recep T. Erdoğan YDİK’in dördüncü toplantısına katılmak üzere 4 Ekim’de Tahran’a gitti. Ziyaretin gündeminde hem ikili ilişkiler hem de bölgesel meseleler vardı. Erdoğan, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ruhani ile birlikte YDİK’e başkanlık etti. Ayrıca ‘İslam Devrimi Rehberi’ Ayetullah Ali Hamanei ile bir araya geldi.

İkili İlişkiler

Ziyaret sırasında İran Ekonomi ve Finans Bakanlığı ile Türk Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı arasında; iki ülke merkez bankaları arasında; Türkiye Başbakanlık Arşivleri ile İran Milli Kütüphanesi arasında ve TRT ile IRIB arasında dört ayrı mutabakat zaptı imzalandı. Ayrıca iki ülke cumhurbaşkanları ikili ilişkilerden çeşitli bölgesel meselelere kadar bir dizi konuyu içeren ortak bildiri yayınlandı. İki ülke arasında 30 milyar dolarlık ticaret hacmine ulaşma hedefi tekrar edildi.

Ziyarette ikili ilişkiler ile ilgili dört husus öne çıktı. Birincisi ulusal para birimleri ile ticaretin ve iki ülke ulusal bankalarının karşılıklı olarak şube açmalarının önünün açılması. Bu konu daha önce de gündeme geldiği halde İran’a yönelik Amerikan ve BM yaptırımları nedeniyle uygulamaya geçilememişti. İkinci konu, karşılıklı ticaretin ve gidiş-gelişlerin teşvik edilmesi için iki ülke kara sınırında bulunan üç gümrük kapısının (Doğubeyazıt, Kapıköy ve Esendere) yirmidört saat açık tutulmasında prensip olarak anlaşmaya varıldı. Üçüncü konu enerji işbirliği idi. İran doğal gaz sanayisini geliştirme çabalarına daha fazla Türk yatırımcının dahil olması, buna karşılık Türkiye’nin İran’dan aldığı gaz miktarını artırması konusunda görüş birliğine varıldı. Fakat bu konuda detaylı bilgi verilmedi. İki ülkenin enerji konusunda karşılıklı ilgisi ve çıkarının yanı sıra 1996 yılında imzalanan mevcut doğalgaz anlaşmasının süresinin dolmak üzere olması nedeniyle bu konu önümüzdeki günlerde Türkiye-İran ilişkilerinin gündeminde olmaya devam edecek.

Bölgesel İşbirliği

Ziyaretin, Genelkurmay Başkanı Org. Hulusi Akar’ın 2 Ekim’de Tahran’a yaptığı ziyaretin ardından yapılması dikkatlerin muhtemel askeri-güvenlik işbirliğine çevrilmesine neden oldu. Yanı sıra, Türkiye’nin ve İran’ın bütün uyarılara rağmen referandumu yapan ‘Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi’ne (IKBY) karşı muhtemel işbirliğini gündeme getirdi. Türkiye, İran ve Irak dışişleri bakanları daha önce 20 Eylül’de New York’ta bir araya gelmiş, ortak bir bildiri yayınlamıştı. Bildiride tarafların Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğüne bağlılığı ve referanduma karşı oldukları vurgulanmıştı. Erdoğan’ın ziyareti sırasında cumhurbaşkanları ortak bildirisinde, ortak basın açıklamasında ve Erdoğan-Hamanei görüşmesinde iki ülke arasında güvenlik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi ve Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğünün korunması için güçlü mesajlar verildi.

Ortak bildiride iki ülke sınırlarında PKK ve PJAK unsurlarına karşı mevcut işbirliği mekanizmalarının güçlendirilmesinin ve organize suç örgütleri ile terörizme karşı mücadelede ortak adımlar atılmasının iki ülkenin de menfaatine olduğu vurgulandı. Irak anayasasına, toprak bütünlüğüne ve egemenliğine saygı yinelenerek Irak Kürdistan Bölgesinde yapılan‘illegal ve gayrimeşru referandum’ reddedildi ve bu adımın geri alınması talep edildi. Bu çerçevede, Irak hükümetinin toprak bütünlüğünü ve siyasi birliğini koruması için attığı adımlara destek verildi. Erdoğan ile görüşmesinde Ayetullah Hamanei, referandumun bölgeye ihanet ve bölgenin geleceğine tehdit olduğunu belirtti. İran ve Türkiye’nin referandumla mücadele için mümkün olan her adımı atması gerektiğini söyledi.

Ziyaretin en önemli sonuçlarından birisi Türkiye, İran ve Irak arasında IKBY’ye karşı alacakları yaptırım kararlarını koordine etmek için istişare mekanizması kurulması oldu. Erdoğan ile birlikte yaptığı basın toplantısında Ruhani, üç ülkenin bölgedeki siyasi sınırların değişmesine izin vermeyeceklerini, bunun için gerekli ve ciddi tedbirleri alacaklarını belirtti. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, üç ülkenin bundan sonra birlikte daha ağır kararlar alacaklarını, geri adım atmaz ise IKBY’nin izole edileceğini söyledi. Erdoğan, ziyaretin ardından yaptığı açıklamada Kürdistan bölgesinden petrol ihracatının durdurulup durdurulmayacağına üç ülkenin birlikte karar vereceğini ifade etti.

Sonuç olarak, iki ülke IKBY’nin bağımsızlık girişimine karşı birlikte hareket edeceklerini en yüksek düzeyde ifade etti. Ayrıca Türkiye ve İran’ın IKBY’ye karşı alınacak tedbirleri ve yaptırım kararlarını Irak merkezi hükümeti ile koordine edecekleri ortaya çıktı. Dolayısıyla,Ankara ve Tahran, ayrı ayrı veya birlikte IKBY’ye karşı bir adım atmadan önce Bağdat’ı izlemeye karar vermiş görünüyor. Bununla beraber her iki ülkenin de Irak merkezi hükümetini IKBY’ye karşı sert tedbirler alması için teşvik etmesi muhtemel. Her hâlükârda üç ülke arasında IKBY’ye karşı alınacak tedbirlerin ve işbirliğinin kapsamını Erbil-Bağdat ilişkilerinin seyri belirleyecek.

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14513?dil=tr

İran Genelkurmay Başkanı Bagheri’nin Türkiye Ziyareti

İran Genelkurmay Başkanı Tümgeneral Muhammed Hüseyin Bagheri, Türk mevkidaşı Org. Hulusi Akar’ın daveti üzerine 15-17 Ağustos tarihlerinde Ankara’ya bir ziyaret gerçekleştirdi. Bagheri’ye İslam Devrimi Muhafızları Ordusu’nun Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Muhammed Pakpur dahil çok sayıda üst düzey askeri yetkiliden oluşan bir heyet eşlik etti. Bagheri,ziyaret sırasında Genelkurmay Başkanı Hulusi Akar, MİT Müsteşarı Hakan Fidan, Savunma Bakanı Nurettin Canikli ve Cumhurbaşkanı Recep T. Erdoğan ile görüştü.

Bagheri, Ankara’ya vardıktan sonra İran televizyonuna yaptığı açıklamada Türkiye’yi  bölgede ve İslam dünyasında önemli bir yeri olan mühim komşularından birisi diye nitelendirdi. Bölgesel gelişmeler ile güvenlik meselelerine işaret eden Bagheri, bu çerçevede böyle bir ziyaretin gerekli olduğunu belirtti. Nitekim, Bagheri’nin Ankara temaslarında üç husus öne çıktı; ikili güvenlik ilişkileri, sınır güvenliği ve terörizme karşı mücadele; Suriye’de meydana gelen gelişmeler ve Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi Hükümeti’nin (IKBY) bağımsızlık referandumu hazırlığı.

İkili Güvenlik İlişkileri ve Sınır Güvenliği

Türkiye ile İran ilişkilerinde öne çıkan en önemli hususlardan birisi sınır güvenliği. Türk yetkililer uzun yıllar boyunca PKK’nın İran sınırını kullanarak Türkiye topraklarında terör eylemleri yapmasından şikayetçi oldu. Ayrıca iki ülke arasındaki sınır, kaçakçılık ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı sorunlarıyla öne çıktı. Ankara ile Tahran arasında sınır güvenliğinin artırılması, terörizm, kaçakçılık ve uyuşturucu ile mücadele çerçevesinde çeşitli adımlar atıldı. Temelleri 1992’de atılan ortak güvenlik komisyonları (İçişleri bakanlıkları müsteşarlarından müteşekkil Yüksek Güvenlik Komisyonu, müsteşar yardımcılarından oluşan Ortak Güvenlik Komitesi ve sınır bölgelerinde görev yapan güvenlik görevlileri düzeyinde toplanan Güvenlik Alt Komiteleri) belirli aralıklarla toplandı ve bir dizi protokol imzalandı. Ne var ki 2010 yılından sonra ikili güvenlik işbirliği kesintiye uğradı.İkili siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler gelişme kaydederken güvenlik ilişkileri sınırlı kaldı. Güvenlik işbirliğindeki kesinti ve sınırdaki sorunların devam etmesi üzerine Türkiye sınır güvenliğini artırmak için İran sınırına 2 metre genişliğinde, 3 metre yüksekliğinde ve 500 kilometre uzunluğunda duvar örmeye karar verdi ve Ağustos ayının başında duvarın inşasına başladı. İran tarafı, Türkiye’nin sınıra duvar inşa etmesini hem sınır güvenliğinigüçlendirmesi, hem de kaçakçılıkla mücadele yardımcı olması temennisiyle ve memnuniyetle karşıladı.

Gerek bazı komşularındaki istikrarsızlık, gerekse çeşitli ayrılıkçı silahlı hareketlerin geçişken sınırları kullanması, İran için sınır güvenliği meselesini hep öne çıkardı.  PKK’nın İran kolu PJAK’ın yanı sıra KDP-İran ve Komala gibi İran Kürt militan hareketlerinin geçtiğimiz yıllarda silahlı faaliyetlerine tekrar başlaması İran’ı batı sınırlarında güvenlik alarmına geçirdi. Geçtiğimiz Mayıs ayında PJAK ile İran güvenlik güçleri arasında çıkan çatışmada iki İranlı askerin ölmesi ve yedi askerin yaralanmasından sonra Sınır Muhafızları Komutanı Kasım Rızayi, saldırganların  Türkiye’den girdiğini belirtmiş, sınırı koruma sorumluluğundan bahsederek Türkiye’yi eleştirmişti. Son aylarda İran’ın batı ve kuzeybatı (Irak ve Türkiye) sınırları ile ilgili hassasiyetini artıran iki önemli gelişme daha oldu. Birincisi, ABD’nin İran üzerindeki baskıyı artırması ve İran ile Suudi Arabistan arasındaki gerilim gibinedenlerle uluslararası güçlerin silahlı İran Kürt hareketini teşvik etmesi ihtimali belirdi. Nitekim bu Kürt milisleri son zamanlarda İran topraklarındaki silahlı faaliyetlerini artırdı. İran’ın sınır güvenliği hassasiyetini artıran ikinci husus ise IŞİD tehdidi. Haziran ayında Tahran’da İran Meclis binasına terörist saldırı düzenleyen IŞİD, bir müddettir İran’ı tehdit etmeye devam ediyor ve ülkedeki Sünnileri (Kürtleri ve Belucileri), Şii rejimine karşı ayaklanmaya çağırıyor.

Bu çerçevede İran, Türkiye ile sınır güvenliğinin artırılmasına büyük önem vermeye başladı.İki ülke arasında güvenlik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi için içişleri bakanları müsteşarları düzeyinde oluşturulan ortak çalışma grubunun ilk toplantısı 25 Temmuz’da Tahran’da düzenlendi. Bagheri’nin Türkiye ziyaretini değerlendiren Devrim Muhafızları Sözcüsü Ramezan Şerif, ülkesinin sınır güvenliğinin artırılması için Türkiye ile iyi bir anlaşma arayışında olduğunu söyledi.

Bagheri’nin ziyareti sonunda iki ülke arasında güvenlik alanında üst düzey ziyaretlerin sürdürülmesi konusunda mutabakata varıldı. Bagheri’nin açıklamalarına göre iki ülke ortak eğitim programlarının düzenlenmesi, askeri öğrenci değişimi ve terörizme karşı istihbarat paylaşımı yapılması konusunda adımlar atacak. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ise Türkiye ile İran’ın PKK’nın yerleştiği Kandil dağına ve Sincar’a ortak operasyonlar yapmasının an meselesi olduğunu söyledi. Erdoğan, bu meselenin uzun zamandan beri gündemde olduğunu ve Bagheri’nin ziyaretinde de bu konunun ele alındığını belirtti.

Bölgesel Meseleler ve Ankara-Tahran İlişkileri

Bagheri’nin Ankara temaslarında öne çıkan ikinci husus Suriye’deki gelişmelerdi. Astana sürecinde işbirliği yapan iki ülke Suriye’de oluşturulacak çatışmasızlık bölgelerinin belirlenmesi için çalışmalarını sürdürüyor. Bagheri’nin ziyaretinde de Suriye’de güvenliğin ve huzurun sağlanması için iki ülkenin çalışmalarını koordine etmesi, Astana müzakerelerinin devam etmesi, çatışmasızlık bölgelerinin kurulması ve soruna nihai çözüm bulunması için siyasi görüşmelerin sürdürülmesi hususları teyit edildi.

Ziyaretin üçüncü önemli gündem maddesi ise IKBY’nin bağımsızlık referandumu hazırlığı idi. Hem Ankara, hem de Tahran mevcut şartlarda bağımsızlık referandumunun Irak içinde ve bölgede istikrarsızlığa neden olacağını ileri sürüyor ve referandumun yapılmasına karşı çıkıyor. Bagheri, Ankara ziyaretinden sonra yaptığı açıklamada ‘referandumun yapılması yalnızca Irak’ı değil, İran ve Türkiye’yi de yakında ilgilendirir’ dedi ve iki ülke yetkililerinin referandumun yapılmaması konusunda hemfikir olduğunu belirtti.

Türkiye ve İran bölgesel politikalarındaki ve vizyonlarındaki farklılıklara rağmen terörizm (PKK ve IŞİD) tehdidine karşı ortak mücadele ile Irak ve Suriye’nin toprak bütünlüğünün korunması konusunda anlaşıyorlar. ABD’nin Suriye’de PKK’nın kolu PYD ile aktif bir işbirliğine gitmesi her iki ülkeyi de endişelendiriyor. Keza, iki ülke de ABD ile Rusya’nın Suriye’nin güneyindeki topraklar üzerinde yaptığı ateşkes anlaşmasını şaşkınlıkla karşıladı. Bölgede ortak tehditlerin artması, Ankara ile Tahran’ı birbirine yakınlaştırdı. Bu açıdan Eski Başbakan Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun 4-5 Mart 2016’da Tahran’a yaptığı ziyaret bir dönüm noktası olarak alınabilir. Davutoğlu’nuno ziyaret sırasında yaptığı“bölgenin kaderinin dış güçlere bırakılmaması” çağrısı Ankara ile Tahran ilişkilerine yeni bir ivme kattı. 15 Temmuz darbe girişiminde İran’ın Türkiye’ye destek vermesi ikili ilişkileri daha da güçlendirdi.

Geleneksel olarak her iki ülkede güvenlik elitleri tarihi, ideolojik ve  stratejik nedenlerle mütemadiyen diğerine karşı şüpheci yaklaşıyor. Bu nedenle güvenlik ve askeri işbirliği Türkiye-İran ilişkilerinin en zayıf tarafı olageldi. Bu açıdan bakıldığında geçen yıl Temmuz ayında İran Genelkurmay Başkanlığını devralan Bagheri’nin ilk yurt dışı ziyaretini Türkiye’ye yapması gerçekten tarihi bir olay. Bu ziyaretin Türk ve İranlı askeri yetkililer arasında gerçekleştirilen en yüksek düzeyli görüşme olması, iki ülke arasında ilişkilerin siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerin ötesine geçtiğini, iki ülkenin güvenlik alanında ve bölgesel meselelerde işbirliğini artırma eğiliminde olduğunu gösteriyor.Bagheri yaptığı açıklamalarda ziyaretin İran lideri Ayetullah Ali Hamanei’nin de onayıyla yapıldığını belirtti. Bu açıklama, İran devletinin hemen her kademesinin Türkiye ile güvenlik işbirliğini artırma isteğinin işareti olarak değerlendirilebilir.

23.08.2017

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14494?dil=tr

Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey

Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey 

Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri,Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Iran paid a 

three-day visit to Ankara on August 15, in response to invitation of his Turkish counterpart, 

General Hulusi Akar. Bagheri was accompanied by a crowded delegation of high-level military officials 

including Mohammad Pakpur, Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces. In addition to his counterpart 

Akar, Bagheri held meetings with Chief of MIT (National Intelligence Agency) Hakan Fidan, Defense 

Minister Nurettin Canikli and President Recep T. Erdogan.

At his arrival to Ankara, Bagheri spoke to Iranian state television and described Turkey as an 

important neighbor with a vital position in the region and the Islamic world. He

underlined thatthis visit to Turkey was necessary due to regional developments and security issues. 

Indeed, bilateral security relations, border security, and the fight against terrorism; 

developments in Syria, and the bid of Iraq Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) to hold 

a referendum for independence come into prominence during his meetings in Ankara.

Bilateral Security Relations and Border Security

Border security is an important concern for both countries. Turkish officials have long been 

complaining about PKK crossing the Iranian border to commit terror attacks in Turkish lands. 

Smuggling and drug trafficking are also challenging issues around the border. Ankara and Tehran took 

steps towards tightening the border security and to combat terrorism, smuggling and drug trafficking. 

Starting from 1992, there were several joint commissions for security (High Commission for Security 

which gathered undersecretaries of interior ministers of the two countries, Joint Security Committee 

which consisted of Deputy Undersecretaries and Subcommittees on Security which included border 

guards) holding meetings periodically and numerous protocols were signed. However, after 2010, 

the bilateral cooperation for security was interrupted. While bilateral political and economic relations 

kept on growing, security relations remained strained. The disruption of security cooperation despite 

advancing problems around the border led Turkey to build a 2-meter wide, 3-meter high wall to improve 

border security. The construction of the wall began in the early days of August and is planned to 

cover 500 kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border. Iran supported the idea, hoping the wall boosts 

the border security and diminishes smuggling.

For Iran, border security has always been a prominent issue due the instability of some of its neighbors 

and various separatist movements benefiting from the highly permeable nature of borders.  Recently, 

Iranian Kurdish militants such as PKK's Iranian branch PJAK as well as KDP-Iran and Komala have 

revitalized their activities, which alerted Iran to tighten the security of its western borders. In the last 

May, two Iranian soldiers died and seven more were injured in a clash between PJAK and Iranian security 

forces. Then, the commander of Iran's border guards Qassem Rezayee stated that the militants came 

through the Turkish border. Reminding the country's responsibility to protect its borders, Rezayee 

blamed Turkey for the incident. Recently, two other developmentshave increased Iranian concerns 

for security of the western and northeastern (Iraq and Turkey) borders. First, considering the increasing 

U.S. pressure on Iran under Trump, and the risingtension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iranians 

have been anxious with prospective support of international actors towards Iranian Kurdish movements.

In fact, Kurdish militia already escalated their armed attacks inside Iranian soils.  Second, the rise of 

ISIS threat to Iran has prompted its concerns about border security. ISIS, which recently attacked the 

Iranian parliament building in Tehran in the last June, has been calling Sunnis of 
the country (Kurds and Balochis) to rise up against the Shia regime. 

Following these incidents, the security of the Turkish border in the northwest of Iran has become even 

more significant for Tehran. In this respect, a joint working group was formed to enhance security 

cooperation between Turkey and Iran; and Undersecretaries of the Ministry of Interiors of both countries 

held the first meeting in Tehran on July 25. Commenting on Bagheri's visit to Turkey, Revolutionary 

Guards spokesperson Ramazan Sharif stated his country is seeking a good deal with Turkey to improve 

border security.

At Bagheri's visit to Turkey, both countries agreed on more meetings among senior security officials of 

the countries. According to Bagheri's account, Turkey and Iran settled upon arranging joint training 

programs, exchanging military students and sharing intelligence to combat terrorism. President Erdoğan

also stated that soon, Iran and Turkey might conduct a joint operation to Sinjar and Qandil Mountains 

where PKK is located. According to Erdoğan, this issue has long been on the table and is also recently 

discussed during Bagheri's visit.

Regional Issues and Ankara-Tehran Relations

The recent developments in Syria were another issue that came up during the talks of Bagheri in Ankara. 

Having been partners in the Astana talks, Turkey and Iran are currently working on the formation of 

de-escalation zones in Syria. During Bagheri's visit, the two countries affirmed their resolution to 

maintain Astana talks and holding political meetings to establish peace and security in Syria, to build

de-escalation zones and to find a definitive solution to the Syrian issue.

KRG's bid for independence referendum was also on the agenda of the meetings. Both Ankara and 

Tehran stand out against the independence referendum claiming under current conditions it would only 

lead to further instability in Iraq as well as in the region. In a statement upon his return from Ankara, 

Bagheri said the referendum is not only an Iraqi issue, but also involves Turkey and Iran, both of whom 

are in agreement for cancellation of the referendum.

Despite their differences on regional visions and policies, Turkey and Iran share the same perspective 

on the necessity of protecting territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq, and they share threats arising from 

terrorism (ISIS and PKK). Both countries are concerned about the U.S. cooperation with PYD, Syrian 

branch of PKK. Similarly, both Iran and Turkey are startled to see the U.S. and Russia agreed on 

ceasefire in southern Syria. The rise of common threats in the region has brought Ankara and Tehran 

closer. In this regard, the visit of former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's to Tehran in March 

2015 could be considered as a milestone, when he called "the destiny of this region should not be 

leaved to external forces." Since then bilateral relations between the two countriesfind a new 

momentum. The ties have grown even stronger after Iranian support for Turkey in the face of the 

July 15 coup attempt.

Security elites in both countries have traditionally been skeptical towards one another due to some 

ideological, historical, and strategic reasons. Therefore, security relations and military cooperation 

between the two countries were out of question. Therefore, the fact that Bagheri, who took over the post 

of the Chief of Staff for the Iranian Armed Forces in July 2016, made his first foreign trip to Turkey 

becomes truly historical.It was the first meeting among senior military officials of Turkey and Iran 

thereby it indicates the relations between these two countries have gone beyond economic and political 

aspects in order to enhance cooperation on security and regional issues. Bagheri underlined that 

Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, approved this visit. This statement illustrates 

the willingness of all parts of the Iranian administration to increase security relations with Turkey.

23.08.2017

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14494?dil=en

The Mosul Operation and Iran

2016-10-27

The tension between Ankara and the Baghdad government has escalated over the Turkish forces at the Bashika base, right after the approval of a motion in TGNA that allowed the deployment of Turkish soldiers outside the country, and prior to the beginning of Mosul offensive that has been cooked up for a long time to liberate it from ISIS. Haidar al-Abadi, Iraqi Prime Minister, stated on October 5, “I fear the Turkish adventure could turn into a regional war.” That statement of Abadi is most viewed as a threat to Turkey. Additionally, some people claimed that the Abadi government turned against Turkey because of the pressures of the United States and Iran, which are thought to be influential over Baghdad.

Indeed, the Iranian officials have stood with the Iraqi government through continuousstatements. Recently, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani implicitly criticized Turkey in a speech he gave on October 24. He said, “We regard as very dangerous [acts of] intervention by foreign countries without any coordination with the host country and believe that [for any foreign measure,] the Syrian and Iraqi governments must request help and demand that another country act against terrorism inside their territories. This [regulation] is based on international principles and [any move] contrary to it will exacerbate insecurity.”

Aside from internal and external pressures on the Iraqi government, aforementioned statement of Abadi actually indicates how interests of regional powers are overlapped particularly with regard to Mosul. Most probably, interests of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Kurdish movements that are powerful in the region will clash after the liberation of Mosul.

Iranian Interests and Concerns in Iraq, and Turkey

Iran places a special importance on Iraq, with whom it shares a border longer than 1,400 kilometers, for historical, cultural and strategic reasons. Ali Younesi, advisor to President Rouhani and former minister of intelligence, once stated on this regard in March 2015: “At the moment Iraq is not only the bastion of our civilization, it is also our identity, culture and capital and this is true now as in the past.The geography and culture of Iran and Iraq cannot be divided.’ Likewise, in his interview with As-Safir daily, Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to Iranian Leader Ayatollah Khamanei, and former minister of foreign affairs, said, “Iraq is more important than all of other Arab countries [including Syria].”

The greatest concern of Iran with regard to Iraq is the disintegration of that country or the domination of hostile or competing forces. The Tehran regime that has ‘strategic partnership’ with Baghdad pays attention to maintain territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq. That is why it has given over reaction to Turkey. Above else, according to Tehran, Turkish military presence in Iraq destroys sovereignty of Baghdad government. In fact, Iran prefers a weak government in Bagdad not to pose a threat to Tehran, but strong enough to keep its integrity. It is important for the preservations of Iranian achievement in Iraq in the last decade, as well.

Secondly, Iran is anxious with attempts of Turkey, a regional rivalry, arguably aimed at building its own spheres of influence inside Iraq. Since for a long time, Iran has been worried with claims of ‘Turkish nationalists’ with regard to Mosul and Kirkuk. Current Turkish military presence that has been deployed in a place very close to Mosul against the wishes of Baghdad, the close relations between Ankara and Masoud Barzani, President of KRG, and the questioning of borders in the region by some high-level Turkish officials have further amplified Iranian concerns.

Additionally, contrary to its remarkable influence in among the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds, Iran could not reach into predominantly Sunni-Arab provinces like Mosul. For that reason, Iran views the Mosul operation as an opportunity to enlarge its influence into remaining parts of Iraq. The liberation of Mosul by the Iraqi forces, supported by Iran, would serve to this interest of Tehran. Hence, in addition to rebuilding the authority of Baghdad in that province, Iran, as the principal supporter of Iraq, would be regarded as one of the saviors of Mosul. Additionally, Iranian officials ask the inclusion of People’s Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi) into the Mosul operation. Thus, Iran could enlarge its influence in this region due to the Hashd al-Sha’abi that is supposed to be settled in here. Although it has been turned into an official security institution under the command of the Chief Commander of Armed Forces of Iraq, the Hashd al-Sha’abi is still an umbrella organization covering various militia forces. Some of them, including the Badr Force, Ashain ahle al-Haq, Ketaib-e Hezbollah, are known to have close relations with Iran. Likewise, Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, leader of a militia group named Hezbollah al-Nujaba, visited Tehran for the first time in August 2016, where he met with high-level officials. While talking to Ayatollah Mohsen, he said, “we follow Vilayat-e Faqih with the leadership of Imam Khamenei.”

Another reason that sparked Iranian reactions to Turkey is growing strategic cooperation between Ankara government and Saudi Arabia. Recently, Iran countered the joint statement declared after the 5thJoint Ministerial Meeting on GCC-Turkey Strategic Dialogue held in Riyad, on October 13. The foreign ministers called Iran, in the joint statement, “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in the region” and “to respond positively to the efforts of the United Arab Emirates to resolve the issue of the three islands Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.” They also expressed “their concern about the plans to involve sectarian militia forces, which perpetrated revenge attacks, mass killings, torture and clear human rights abuses against local population of the liberated areas, in the imminent Mosul operation.” In response to growing Turkish-Saudi cooperation, Iranian officials and analysts blame Turkey to dance to Saudi’s tune in Iraq, as the cases of Syria and Yemen. Iran who blames Saudi Arabia to be supporter of takfiri terrorism, even ISIS,accuses Turkey of similar behaviors.

Iranian Accusations against Turkey

Iran, considering the Turkish military and political presence as a threat to its interests in the region,criticizes  and charges Turkey mainly for three reasons. First, Iranian officials claim that Turkish activities and rhetoric with regard to the region, amplifies ethnic and sectarian differences. Accordingly, Turkish view of Iraqi society through sectarian lenses, i.e., the Shiites and the Sunnis, underestimating the unity of Iraqi nation, and its opposition to the inclusion of Hashd al-Sha’abi in the Mosul operation arguably for its being a Shiite organization is leading to destroy of Iraq. In fact, they often talk about the unity of Iraqi nation and the association of its people whether they are Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, or Arabs. Additionally, they underline that Hash al-Sha’abi is not exclusively consisted of Shiites, but every sector of Iraqi people including the Sunnis, Turkomans, Kurds, and Christians are part of that organizations. The second critique of Iranians towards Turkey revolves around claims on so-called Turkish support for ‘takfiri terrorists.’ Moreover, the Turkish insistence on take part in the Mosul operation, some argues, derives from its aim to back ‘terrorists.’ Finally, they claim that Turkey helps the American or Zionist plots to disintegrate Syria and Iraq. Bahram Ghasemi, Spokesman of Iranian Foreign Ministry, penned an opinion for Iran daily on October 19. “Unfortunately some of the regional countries do not want Iraq to maintain its integrity, do not approve current Iraqi government, and wish Iraq in a status close to its previous place in their history” he wrote.

The greatest advantage of Iran that has been trying to balance Turkey particularly in Iraq, and in the whole region, is its alliance with the Baghdad government. Thus, hundreds of Iranian soldiers are employed as ‘military advisor’ on the request and invitation of Baghdad government, and they could take part in military operations, and increase their sway over Hashd al-Sha’abi.Likewise, having been comfortable with its agreement with the Iraqi government, Iran fully supports the liberation of Mosul from ISIS. Hence, while constraining effects of its regional rivals, Tehran consolidates its own influence in Iraq on behalf of supporting the “unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and its struggle against terrorism.”

 2016-10-27

http://www.orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4945?s=orsam|english 

Effects of the Coup Attempt on Turkey-Iran Relations

2016-08-05

Turkish officials, notably President Recep T. Erdoğan showed strong reactions to the ambivalent statements of Turkey’s Western allies about the coup attempt of July 15. Against the ambivalent attitude of the West, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Cavuşoğlu stated, “one of the biggest support during the coup attempt has come from Russia.” Iran was also one of the states thatclosely followed the developments in Turkey on that night and clearly supported the Turkish government.

Iranian Government Supports Turkey

Iran was on red alert at the earlier hours of the coup attempt. The transactions were halted at the customs gates, the borders were closed and the flights between the two countries were suspended. Military units were deployed in the border regions in order to ensure security.A crisis desk was set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran in order to monitor the coup attempt.

In his first message on twitter at the earlier hours of the morning, Minister of Foreign Affairs Javad Zarifindicated that he was deeply concerned about the crisis in Turkey; that stability, democracy and security of Turkish people were paramount and it was necessary to remain united and prudent.Zarifshared another tweet almost three hours later that stated, “Turkish people’sbrave defense of democracy and theirelected government, proves that coups have no place in our region and are doomed to fail.” Zarif made three telephone conversations with his counterpart Cavusoglu on Saturday, July 16,in order to closely follow the developments and provide support. In a press statement made on the same day, the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran BahramGhasemitold that Iran was “deeply concerned about stability, security, unity, democracy and rule of law in Turkey” and stressed that Tehran supports democratically-elected government in Ankara.”

In the meantime, the Supreme National Security Council convened under the chairmanship of President Rouhani. Secretary of the Security Council Ali Shamkhani made a statement at the end of the meeting and summarized Iran’s official position as “the support for the legitimate government in Turkey and the rejection of the coup.”Speaker of the Parliament of Iran Ali Larijani sent a message to his Turkish counterpart Ismail Kahraman. In his message, he congratulated Turkish people, government and parliament for “the victory of the nation’s will, national sovereignty and democracyover a desperate and doomed measure” against the country’s democratically elected bodies. Larijani also said that Iran had a system based on the votes and demands of the people as well as Islamic principles and therefore, it always supported the elected governments and condemned the attacks to the Assembly, the symbol of democracy and national will.The Parliament of Iranheld a closed session on the coup attempt and heard Foreign Affairs Minister, Zarif on July 7. Hestated that a group in the army attempted to stage a coup but failed at the very beginning since the public showed resistance and defended democracy. Having indicated that building peace and stability in Turkey is of utter importance for Iran, Zarif said that he was the first minister of foreign affairs to condemn the coup attempt.

Iranian President Rouhani made a reference to the coup attempt in a speech made in Kermanshah on July 17, and added: “We live in a region, where some still think that they can transfer power through coups or overthrow a government elected by people’s votes with the use of military tanks, artillery, aircraft and helicopter ... the era of coups is over, and that coups and tanks are not the solution.”Rouhani called President Erdoğan on July 18and appreciated his “effective management” during the crisis and he stated that Iran would stand with Turkish nation and the legitimate government.

Notwithstandingthe evident support of the government officials to the Turkish government in the face of the coup, conservative circles and security bureaucracy harshly criticized Turkey. Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, stressed that ‘Iran is a state governed by religious democracy ... andis naturally against any illegal move and act of bullying to change popular governments’ and he stated that Iran opposesoverthrowing elected government in Turkey by a coup d’etat under the influence of whatever factors.Velayati added that Assad in Syria has also been elected and supported by his people and said: “We hope that a day would come when the Turkish administration would also respect the opinion and vote of the Syrian people and leave it to the Syrian people to determine their government”.Likewise, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Iran defended the legitimate government in Syria against external interference and terrorism to the same extent as it condemned the military coup attempt against President Erdoğan. Amir-Abdollahian added that Erdoğan and Assad“are two legitimate leaders of two important countries who have taken office through the votes of their nation and democracy.” Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani argued that ‘rejecting coups and supporting the governments elected based on people's real vote is a‘principled and fixed policy’ of Iran, and in this regard Turkey was no exception. “It is the reason for our presence in Syria too,”Shamkhani added.

Some Friday prayers’ leaders in Iran also addressed the coup attempt on July 22.Tehran Friday prayers’ leader, Ayatollah S. Ahmad Khatami was vocal in his criticisms towards Turkey.“The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemned the coup d'etat in Turkey … but Iran's support for Turkey does not mean we approve whatever Erdoğan does” he said.Khatami said that Iran attached importance to the votes of the people, thus was opposed to a military coup attempt in Turkey from the very beginning but would continue to criticize Turkish government. Claiming that Turkey supported ISIS, Khatami argued that President Erdoğan should apologize to all the victims of ISIS.

In the press conference held on July 24, Turkish Ambassador to Tehran R. HakanTekin informed Iranian media of the coup attempt.Tekin expressed his satisfaction with the attitudes of Iranian authorities to the military coup. When one journalist reminded that the FridayPrayers Leaders adopted a different attitude, Tekin said that Turkey felt uncomfortable in this sense and shared its concerns with their Iranian counterparts.

Why did Iran stand against the Coup?

Iranian officials’ stand against the coup, support for the elected government and emphasis on democracy in their statements with related to the coup attempt in Turkey is worthy of attention. One of the reasons for this attitude is that civil-military relations in Iran, which has beena very controversial issue. In the last couple of months, there are some heated debates between President Rouhani and the Revolutionary Guards, some of which publicly appeared in media. The statements of President Rouhani can be especially considered within this framework. Of course, the emphasis on supporting elected governments and democracy aimed at some foreign policy goals, as well. Iran has propagated for some years that it supported the leaders elected by the popular vote in the region, notably in Syria. Indeed, by comparing the Iranian support for the elected government in Turkey to its support for the ‘elected’ legitimate government in Syria, some officials and media outlets have claimed that Iran has followed a principled foreign policy.

Why did Iran stand against the coup attempt in Turkey and support President Erdoğan despite the differences between the two countries on regional affairs? In fact, Iran has been uncomfortable with Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East for a while. Some Iranians have partly blamed PresidentErdoğanfor ‘the high costs’ that Iran ‘paid in Syria and even in Iraq, including costs in life and financial costs.’Sadegh Kharrazi one of the prominent figures in diplomacy spoke in a panel titled “Turkey after the Coup Attempt” held in Tehran on July 26 and also attended by Ambassador Tekin, and claimed that the coup attempt was “the boomerang effect of Erdoğan’s grave mistakes ... in the region.” Likewise, a video footage that was uploaded on Youtubeon July 17 and alleged recorded in SayyidahZaynab shrine in Syria, apparently displayed the pleasure of Iranian militia with the coup attempt. On the other hand, Iran was concerned about the unpredictability of results of the coup attempt and the prospective instability in Turkey. These concerns also increased especially because it was not known who was behind the coup attempt. Since 1980, Turkey-Iran relations were negatively affected at times when the military was influential in Turkey’s politics.In the statement that the coup plottersforced a speaker to read on TRT, the national public broadcast agency of Turkey, they declared their commitment to NATO, which raised doubts on the Iranian side with the potential involvement of the USA in the coup attempt.Hence, the overthrow of the government in Turkey by a military coup might have caused Iranian government to face indefinable risks. It was also known that the FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization) that was behind the coup attempt has been known to be anti-Iran. Therefore, even though having discomforted with the regional policies of Turkey under President Erdoğan, Iranian administration preferred him, who also contributed to the improvement of Turkey-Iran relations, to remain in power.

Another reason why Iran stood against the coup is its efforts to convince Turkey to take its side in regional affairs.In this regard, Iranian officials claimed that those allies of Turkey or some states that has good relations with it were directly or indirectly involved in the coup attempt. While informing the Parliament of Iran, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarifsuggested that such states as Saudi Arabia and Qatar stood with the coup attempt. Hussein Sheikholeslam, a foreign affairs adviser to Larijani argued that Turkey was considering to reviseits policy towards Syria and this disturbed Saudi Arabia. One of the commanders of Revolutionary Guards, Yadollah Javani also claimed that Saudi Arabia supported the coup since Turkey was about to change its policy towards Syria. Senior military advisor to Khamenei, Yahya Rahim Safavi argued that the USA and Russia were informed of the coup attempt in advance. Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that there are strong suspicions about the role of the USA behind the coup attempt.

Iranian officials and journalists that claimed that ostensible allies of Turkey involved in the coup attempt,argued that Turkish government should approach to Iran. The attitude of Iranian government towards the coup and Zarif’s claim that he was the first minister of foreign affairs to condemn the coup should be considered in this direction. Kharrazi, who is mentioned above, despite all his criticism about the regional policies of Turkey said that “Iran is Turkey's lasting friend, not Qatar or Saudi Arabia” and added: “Iran and Turkey are the two most influential agents for solving regional problems.” Similarly, SadollahZarei, a well-known expert on security issues, said,“if Erdoğan behaves smartly and acts reasonably, against the increasing pressures of Europe and the USA and the security threats he should straightly approach to Iran.” Indeed, President Rouhani, when he talked to President Erdoğan after the coup attempt called attention to the role of foreign powers and terrorists in the regional instability. He later indicated that the military coup attempt was “This incident was a test for you to identify your domestic and foreign friends and enemies”. Likewise, in his meeting with Ambassador Tekin on July31, Ali Akbar Velayati said the “coup helped Turkey to distinguish ‘friend’ from ‘foe’.”

Turkish officials noted Iran’s support to Turkish government against the coup attempt but it is uncertain to what extent this will affect the regional policies of Turkey. Ambassador Tekinargued that the coup attempt would not affect the NATO membership of Turkey or lead a fundamental change in foreign policy. On the other hand, in his phone conversation with Rouhani, President Erdoğan said, “We are determined to join hands with Iran and Russia to resolve regional issues and intensify our efforts to restore peace and stability to the region.”However, considering the profound differences between the two countries on regional issues, it is very difficult to turn Turkey-Iran relations to a regional cooperation. Nevertheless, bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran successfully passed the test during the coup attempt.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4816?s=orsam|english

 2016-08-05