Showing posts with label Iran security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran security. Show all posts

ABD ve İsrail’in İran’a Yönelik Askerî Saldırıları: Bölgesel ve Küresel Yansımalar

 28 Şubat 2026’da ABD askeri unsurları ile İsrail Savunma Kuvvetleri (IDF) koordine-

li ve müşterek olarak İran siyasi liderlerini, nükleer tesislerini, askeri komuta kademesini

ve askeri tesislerini hedef alan füze saldırıları ve hava saldırıları başlatmıştır. Saldırılara

karşılık olarak İran silahlı kuvvetleri İsrail’e ve bölgede ABD askeri üslerine ev sahipliği

yapan Basra Körfezi ülkeleri Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE), Bahreyn, Katar, Kuveyt ve

Suudi Arabistan’a insansız hava aracı (İHA) ve füze saldırıları ile karşılık vermiştir. Karşı-

lıklı saldırıların kapsamı zamanla ekonomik altyapı, enerji tesisleri ve ticari tesisleri hedef

alacak şekilde genişlemiştir. Nihayet İran dünya günlük petrol sevkiyatının yaklaşık yüzde

yirmisinin geçtiği Hürmüz Boğazı’nı trafiğe kapatmıştır. Böylece çatışmalar, çok-boyutlu

ve çok-cepheli bir hal almıştır. 40 gün süren karşılıklı saldırılar 8 Nisan 2026’da ilan edi-

len ateşkese kadar devam etmiştir.


İranlı yetkililer müşterek ABD ve İsrail saldırılarını Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Sözleş-

mesi’ne aykırı biçimde İran İslam Cumhuriyeti’ne karşı “haksız, hukuk dışı, gayri meşru”

saldırı ve “dayatılmış bir savaş” şeklinde nitelendirmiştir. Amerikalıların “Destansı Öfke

Operasyonu”, İsraillilerin ise “Kükreyen Aslan Operasyonu” adını verdikleri bu saldırı-

lar, Amerikalı ve İsrailli yetkililer tarafından yeni bir savaşın başlangıcı değil, İran İslam

Cumhuriyeti’nin yıllardır ABD’ye ve İsrail’e karşı sürdürdüğü doğrudan ve dolaylı çeşitli

saldırılara karşılık düzenlenen bir askeri operasyon ve halihazırda devam eden silahlı ça-

tışmanın bir parçası olarak nitelendirilmiştir (IDF, 2026a). İran’a göre ABD ve İsrail’in

saldırıları BM Şartı’nın güç kullanımını yasaklayan 2/4 maddesinin açık bir ihlali, hukuk-

suz, gayri meşru ve haksız bir savaştır. İranlılar Amerikan-İsrail saldırılarına karşı “Ger-

çek Vaat IV” (Sadık Vaat) operasyonu başlatmıştır. İran tarafı bu operasyon kapsamındaki

askeri hamlelerin “saldırganların üslerine ve tesislerine karşı meşru müdafaa kapsamında

atılan gerekli ve orantılı savunma operasyonları” olduğunu ileri sürmüştür (Iravani, 2026).


ABD ve İsrail ile İran arasında ortaya çıkan çatışmalar tarafların nitelikleri, çatışma-

ların kapsamı ve çatışmaların geniş bir alana yayılmış olması itibariyle bölgesel ve küresel

dinamikleri etkilemiştir. Dünyanın en büyük askeri gücü ABD ile iki bölgesel gücün, İran

ve İsrail’in dahil olduğu çatışma Orta Doğu’nun güvenlik dinamiklerini sarsmıştır. İran’ın

bölgesel müttefikleri olan devlet-dışı aktörlerin de çatışmalara dahil olması, bölgede

ABD’nin müttefiki olarak bilinen Basra Körfezi ülkelerinin İran tarafından saldırıya uğ-

raması, Doğu Akdeniz’den Basra Körfezi’ne tüm bölgeyi ve bölge ülkelerini etkisi altına

almıştır. Çatışmaların kısa süre içerisinde dünyanın en büyük petrol ve doğal gaz rezervle-

rinin bulunduğu Basra Körfezi etrafında yoğunlaşması ve Hürmüz Boğazı’nın kapatılması

bilhassa enerji güvenliği açısından küresel ekonomiyi ve siyaseti yakından etkilemiştir.


Bu çalışmanın amacı ABD/İsrail’in İran’a yönelik saldırıları ile başlayan çatışmanın

ve etkilerinin akademik bir şekilde incelenmesidir. Bu doğrultuda öncelikle taraflar ara-

sındaki husumetin arka planı ve ABD/İsrail – İran çatışmasının nedenleri tartışılmaktadır.

İkinci kısımda ABD/İsrail – İran çatışmasında tarafların hedefleri ve çatışmanın seyri ele

alınmaktadır. Arkasından çatışmanın hem İran üzerindeki hem de ABD ve İsrail üzerinde-

ki etkileri ile bölgesel yansımaları incelenmektedir. Çalışmanın son kısmında gelişmelerin

Türkiye’ye etkileri tartışılmaktadır ve çatışma sonrası İran’ın ve Orta Doğu’nun durumu

değerlendirilmektedir.


https://www.tuba.gov.tr/files/yayinlar/raporlar/TUBA.978-625-6110-82-3.pdf




ISIS Attacks in Tehran

ISIS Attacks in Tehran

2017-06-09

On Wednesday, June 7, two terrorist attacks were carried out early in the morning on the Iranian parliament, and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Revolution and the founder of Islamic Republic. It was reported that, four attackers with rifles, guns and suicide vests entered inan administrative buildingattached to the parliament.  While security forces killed the three through the ensuing clashes, one detonated his suicide vest.It was stated that one of two people that attacked on the mausoleum of Khomeini detonated a bomb vest, and the other was shot. 17 people died and more than 40 were wounded in these twoterrorist attacks.
ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks that occurred in Tehran for the first time after a long time.So-called news agency of ISIS, Amaq released a short video recorded by the assailantsat the time of ongoing clashes in the parliament.Like in any instance when there are many doubts and few reliable information, a lot of conspiracy theories were put forward after the terrorist attacks in Iran. Analyses concerning the attacks have entangled with conspiracy theories.

Theories...
First of all, it was questioned how an armed and bomb attack could be carried out in the parliamentary complex and the mausoleum of Khomeini, the places that are considered to have high level security in Tehran, the capital city where security measures are taken at an extremely intensive level.The selection of targets, and style of the attackshave also been discussed. Some people pointed out to the factional politics and disputes that were reshaped after the last presidential election in Iran, especially disagreements and differences between the Revolutionary Guards and the Rouhani government. Furthermore, it was found quite intriguing that both the Chairman of the Parliament AliLarijani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei referred to the attacks as “some insignificant incidents” in their first reactions.
Even though ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks, some people associated the attacks with Trump administration’s policy towards Tehran. Indeed, in his visits to Saudi Arabia and Israel on May 21-22, US President Donald Trump, who is known for his anti-Iran rhetoric, accused Iran of supporting terrorist organizations and destabilizing the Middle East, and stated that the Iranian regime should be isolated. Besides, it was also pointed out that the attacks in Tehran took place a short while after Michael D’Andrea, who is claimed to have played an effective role in the operation that killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has taken charge of the Iran file in the CIA. The Revolutionary Guards released a statement after the incidents where it reminded that the terrorist attacks occurred a short time after the meeting between US President Trump and the ‘reactionary’ government leaders in the region, and it has claimed that these countries played a role in theterrorist attacks. In the same line, General Hussein Salami, Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary Guards,argued that the terrorist attack was a result of a joint project between Saudi Arabia, Israel and the USA that aimed to destroy Iranian power.
Most of the statements made by Iranian sources after the terrorist attacks targeted the Saudi Arabia. In a televised speech on May 3, Saudi Minister of Defense and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmanhad stated that Iran had been waging a war against his country, but ‘Saudi Arabia would not wait idle for the upcoming war, but carry the conflicts to Iran instead’. On June 7, only a few hours before the attacks, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir spoke to al-Arabiya TV, asking that Iran should be punished for its interventions in the region and its support for terrorism. In a letter to the Security Council, Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, Gholamali Khoshroo reminded of the speeches of Prince Mohammed and al-Jubeir and underlined that the attacks took place a very short time after these statements were made.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zarif, indirectly targeted Saudi Arabia in the message he gave on twitter: ‘Terror-sponsoring despots threaten to bring the fight to our homeland. Proxies attack what their masters despise most: the seat of democracy.’Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei released a message of condolence for the victims of the attack. In his message, he stated that the terrorist attacks ‘showed the hostility of the agents of imperialism against noble Iranian nation and everything connected with the revolution’. He continued his message as follows: ‘the most absolute consequence of the attack will be nothing but the increase in the hatred against US government and its regional agents such as Saudi Arabia.’
Despite the harsh criticism against the Saudi Arabia, Minister of Intelligence Mahmoud Alavi indicated that ‘it was too early to say that Saudi Arabia was behind the attack’ and the studies on this issue was still going on. Having claimed that there is an overt relationship between the Saudi Arabia and terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, Alavisaid that ‘currently they have no evidence regarding the role of Saudi Arabia in the attacks.’

ISIS – Iran Showdown
Those who try to explain the terrorist attacks in Tehran within the framework of factional politics, Iran-US relations, or regional developments either underestimate the fact that the attacks were perpetrated by ISIS,or implicitly assume a relationship between ISIS, the USA and other regional countries. However, one of the ideological motivations ofISIS is to stand against ‘rafidi’ and ‘Safavid Iran,’ and fight the Shiites. Iran also claimed that it has been fighting against terrorism across the borders. However, those who have been skeptical of Iranian policy towards Middle East policy, and that have dubious ideas about ISIS draw attention that ISIS had not carried out a serious attack in Iran despite their ostensible animosity, and they questioned why ISIS did not take actions in Iran? Now, the recent attacks in Tehran, the capital of Iran, took place in two places which are symbolically significant for Iranian regime revealed that Iran is not exempted from ISIS attacks.
Although the Tehran attacks are the most effective attempt of ISIS, they were not the first ISISplots in Iran. Minister of Intelligence Alavi indicated that ‘more than one hundred terrorist attacks had been prevented within the last two years’. In a video released in Persian in early March 2017, ISIS claimed that Iran discriminated against Sunni minority and called ‘the Sunni to rebel against the Shiite Iranian regime’.
Additionally, apart from the external threats, some segments of Iranian population are anxious for ethnical-sectarian reasons.Given the obstacles before activities of political associations, some ethnical-sectarian groups have taken arms and so far carried out various armed attacks against the Iranian government.Moreover, ISIS has been trying to reach out ‘the Sunnite Kurdish, Baluchi and Arab people’ for a while, and recruiting new fighters among those people. Indeed, it was revealed that all of the assailants who carried out the Tehran attack were Iranian citizens recruited by ISIS, and previously fighting for the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria.
The attacks in Tehran will lead the Iranian security policies and security institutions to the forefront, independently from the perpetrators and reasons. It is not expected that Iranian regional policy will change considerably. In his statement after the attacks, Khamenei said that Iran would proceed on its own way and the terrorist attack would only serve to increase the determination of the Iranian nation. Indeed, Khamenei utilized these incidents to justify Iranian regional policies and said: ‘had Iran not stoodagainstthehotspot of terrorism in theregion, thecountrywouldhavefacedmore severe problems.’ Therefore, Iranian government is likely to exploitthe Tehran attacks in order to weaken growling resentment inside the country against policies towards the Middle East, and to strengthen the ‘legitimacy’ of its regional policies.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5119?s=orsam|english 

Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani

Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani

2016-08-15


Since its foundation in 1979,The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Revolutionary Guards, IRGC) has been regarded as one of the “fundamental” pillars of Iranian politics. Revolutionary Guards, who are constitutionally charged with “safeguarding the revolution and its achievements”, have always involved in politics. IRGC, like other security institutions in Iran, is directly subordinated to Supreme Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Hamanei and its relations with Iranian governments have been practiced in different forms.IRGC’s political clout gradually increased under the presidency of Mahmud Ahmedinecad that generated a debate on “militarization” of the Iranian regime. Likewise, in the meantime, influence of IRGCalso increased in economy due to the effects of sanctions imposed on Iran for thenuclear issue.

IRGC’s role in Iranian politics and economy has been regarded as one of the biggest challenges for Hassan Rouhani, who was elected as president in June 2013.There were some speculations about the prospective tension between President Rouhani, who has been known with pragmatism, and IRGC that has a rigid ideological standing.So, how didrelations between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards evolve in the intervening three years?This study reviews relations between the Rouhani government and IRGC.

Nuclear Deal, Iranian politics and Revolutionary Guards
Rouhani’sassociation with some reformist figures before and after the elections, moderation and flexibility in foreign policy and his discourses on economic liberalization drew IRGC’s reaction. However, having forged close relations with security bureaucracy and due to his stance in the “political center”, Rouhani did not encounter opposition from IRGC.Indeed, Rouhani observed balances while he was forming his cabinet and he did not give place to “fervent” reformists. He appointed, formerIRGC commanders, Hossein Dehghan as as Minister of Defense and Ali Shamkhani as a secretary of Supreme National Security Council.
IRGC’s first criticism against President Rouhani came afterhis phone conversationwith President Obama in September 2013.IRGCCommander, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “the president took a firm and appropriate position during his stay” in New York,“but,” he added“just as he refused to meet Obama, he should also have refused to speak with him on the telephone.”
Nuclear negotiations that began in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1countrieswere criticized at times by news websites and journals. When those criticisms became harsh, Rouhani stated that “a small group has been busy with sabotages, baseless accusations and lies.” He added that his government was well aware of each step of this group and wouldtake necessary measures when the time was ripe. Shortly after Rouhani’s statements, in November 2014, an article published in Sahamnews, a pro-reformist news portal,claimed that Intelligence Unit of IRGC stepped into action in order to overthrow the Rouhani government. According to the aforementioned article, Intelligence Unit of IRGC, in coordination with Isargaran(Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution), and former officials at the time of Ahmedinecad government and some journalists, set up “safe houses” in which anti-government propaganda activities was organized. It was suggested that Rouhani gave information and submitted relevant documents about this subject to LeaderHamanei at a private talk; but nothing appeared publiclyabout this matter. Anyway, President Rouhani said in a speech he gave in December 2015, “When weapons, wealth and media are in control of a single institution, an inevitable result would be corruption.” These comments ware regarded by many pundits as criticism against IRGC.
While nuclear deal was coming to and end, IRGC took a cautious stance. On the one hand, IRGC Commander Jafari appreciated achievements and “selfless efforts” of the negotiating team, on the other hand, he continued to remind redlines of the Iran. He drove attention to controversial issues with related to the removal of sanctions.
In a speech shortly after the parties agreed on the nuclear deal in July 2015, Rouhani stated that even after the conclusion of deal, Iran should preserve its prudence and moderation. He also said, “we should not think that we can talk and move whatever we want after the deal, and the others did not react to the change of our course”.This statement drew a rebuff from IRGC Commander Jafari, who said, “some people argues that we should decide our activities in accordance with the will of enemy, and says we cannot speak or move as we liked because the others would react. It means, before anything else, questioning of independence and honor of the regime.” He added that those people sitting in important posts should speak in a “measured” way.
The battle of words between the government and IRGC has continued over the meaning of the nuclear deal. Both President Rouhani and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarifargued that “the nuclear deal have liftedthe shadow of war over Iran and made it more secure.” However,it is stated in various speeches of some IRGC commanders that security of Iran has not been ensured by means of negotiations and dialogue with enemy,but by the heroic and altruistic resistance of the people and “deterrent power” of Iran.Jafaristressed that “the deal did not end or reduce hostility of the United States towardstheIslamic Republic of Iran”, and he claimed that the “enemy continuously attempts to infiltrate into Iran.”Actually, these “warnings” are almost replica of various statements of Khamenei.Indeed, Khameneihas been talking about the possibility of “infiltration of enemy into Iran by economic and cultural means.” Soon after those warnings about “infiltration of enemy”, Intelligence Unit of IRGCarrested five journalists allegedly for “being members of a network of influencedepended on America or Britain.” President Rouhani reacted to these detentions. Rouhani said that security agents should not act like a press judge and he called that warnings of the leader on the “infiltration of foreigners” should not be over-exploited.
Another debate President Rouhani and IRGC Commander Jafari that revolved around the essence of the nuclear deal took place in the last April. In his speech for the occasion of Norouz(Iranian New Year), Rouhani recalled the nuclear deal as an achievement to be proud of the Iranian nation and he said that Iran should alsoconclude“a national plan of action, a secondbarjam(the Persian acronym for the nuclear deal)” to solve itspolitical, economic and social problems.Leader Khamenei criticized these statements at first.  Subsequently, Major GeneralJafari said, “Thenucleardeal has neverbeenconsidered a documentto be proud of it, andpeoplereluctantlysupported [it]. Whatare the benefits of the first deal, so that we are asking a second one?” In response to these criticisms, Rouhani repeated that barjamis a political and legal source of pride for Iranian nation and he reminded how much the Iranian people were suffering under sanctions.He statedthat Iran alsoneedssomeadditional time just as “therestorationorreconstruction of a ruintakesome time. Only three months have passed since the deal came into effect.”

Economic Activities of RG
Another source of disagreement between Revolutionary Guards and the Rouhani government is the role of IRGC in economy. Khatam-ol Anbiya Headquarter, engineering and construction unit of IRGShas taken over critical infrastructure projects in Iran, built roads, bridges, damsetc..The role of IRGC in economy gradually increased under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, some companies affiliated to the IRGC operated in wide spectrum from construction, chemistry, to telecom, finance, energy, and international trade.There are different estimations about the overall share of IRGC in Iranian economy. IRGCSpokesman Ramezan Sharif stated that “only 10%” of construction projects in Iran has been handled by the Revolutionary Guards.
Rouhani government is critical of economic activities of military institutions because of the difficulty in inspecting them and because itupsets the balances in the market. Besides, the government is vowed toreinforce private sector, which requires reduction of IRGC activities in economy.However, President Rouhani adopted a cautious rhetoricwith regard to the economic activities of IRGC. Having admired IRGC for its contribution to economy and defense of the country, he asked IRGC to fight against smuggling and get involve in major projects that are not undertaken by private sector.Likewise, Mohammad BagherNobaght, spokesman of the government, said that economic activities of IRGC should be limited with fields in which private sector has no interest or capacity to do.
A speech given by Rouhani on the Army Day (Rouz-e Artesh) in April 2014 has drawn attention to this issue. He said that the army has made great sacrifices in defense of the country, but did not ask “its share from the nation and the elected government.” This statement of Rouhani isregarded as a warning to IRGC thatwants to maintain its economic activities in return for its sacrifices.
IRGCCommander Jafari acknowledged in September 2014 that initially there were some doubts about the cooperation between the Guards and the government on economic issues. However, he added that the government was appreciatingIRGc’scapabilities in construction industry and they were cooperating on that subject.  Nevertheless, economic activities of IRGC significantly declined under the Rouhani government. Some operations ofIRGC-related companies, who are no more able to take “luxurious tenders” has been ceased. In return, Guardscommanders frequentlystated that the government should “give priority” toIRGC and Basij, which are ready to support the government in developing “resistance economy.” Commander Jafari,in several occasions, however, complained that the government does not utilize enough experiences and proposals IRGC and Basij.

Foreign policy is not discussed
Despite their disagreements on economic and political issues, the Rouhani government and the Revolutionary Guards have apparently been in an intimate cooperation with regard to foreign policy matters.The Rouhani government, whose first priority wassolution of the nuclear issue, has not questioned the role of IRGC in regional policies of Iran. As a matter of fact, Iranian policies towards Iraq and Syria have remained in the control of IRGC. After the rise of ISIS in June 2014, as a critical threat to Iraqi government, and consequently to Iran, IRGC and Iranian government reinforced their cooperation. The government supported the logistical support and the advisory missions provided by IRGC in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, President Rouhani said, “The courage of Sardar[Qassem] Soleimani is a source of pride and power.”Having praised the Qods Force andprowess of IRGC, Rouhani said, “Today, IRGC not only shoulders the burden of providing security to thecountry, but also provides security to those countries seeking help from the Islamic Iran and takes its place with its all capacity on those fields.”
The concord between the Rouhani government and Revolutionary Guards on security and foreign policy issueshas also reflected in the overall share of IRGC from the national budget, which has gradually increased. It took 3,3 billion USD from the national budget in 2013, which increased to 5 billion USD in 2014 and to 6.1 billion USD in 2015. There were some claims for the current year arguing that the amount allocated to IRGC in the draft version of the national budget prepared by the government was diminished 20 percent. Notwithstanding the debate on the budget cuts for IRGC, the overall defense budget of Iran has increased almost 15 percent.
Consequently, there have been some public debates and disagreements between President Rouhani and Revolutionary Guards over a number of issues including the role of IRGC in economy, nuclear talks and the meaning of the nuclear deal, cultural and political issues. However, the Rouhani government hasnot questionedforeign activities of IRGC and its role in Iranian foreign policy. Therefore, despite numerous disagreements and debates between Revolutionary Guards and the government, foreign policy issues, especially Iranian policies towards the Middle East were never brought into question.

This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of "Revolutionary Guards and Politics Under Rouhani”     
http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4826?s=orsam|english 


Security Outlook of Iran Under Ahmadinejad

Security Outlook of Iran Under Ahmadinejad*
Bayram Sinkaya
June 5, 2007

 Abstract

Developments in the aftermath of September 11 have profoundly influenced Iranian politics. Initially, Iran’s security environment has totally changed. For Iran, hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq were replaced by another hostile power that is more efficient; the United States. In addition to the US military presence in the Persian Gulf prior to the Iraq war of 2003, this new environment posed a notable security challenge to Iran. Increasing security challenges for Iran led to the consolidation of establishment regarding domestic politics in Iran which culminated in neo-conservatives’ ascent to power. This paper is aimed at analyzing the change in security challenges for Iran, and discussing Iran’s responses to the new security challenges.

Introduction


Sources of and reasons for security challenges for Iran could be analyzed in two categories. Firstly, structural reasons which are existent independent of will of states and ruling regimes, includes geographic location, history, and demographic structure. They are always there and rarely changes. Iran is located in an area that has been at the heart of major geopolitical theories devised by A. Mahan, M. Spykman etc. For this reason throughout its history Iran has attracted the attention of major powers. On the other hand thanks to its historical roots and capabilities Iran has been a candidate for regional hegemony. This background left Iran today with border disagreements with several of its neighbors (disagreement over the small Gulf islands, status of the Caspian etc.) and historical animosities. Because Iran has been invaded many times, its current demographic structure is far from being homogeneous. Rather, contemporary population of Iran is composed of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities. Especially after penetration of nationalism to the geography where Iran is located, ethnic-nationalist movements emerged in Iran.
 The second group of reasons determining security challenges and security policies of Iran has been constructed ones, deriving from ideological posture of the ruling regime. For instance, the revolution in 1979 fundamentally altered ideological position of Iran from a pro-western and American ally to an anti-West, and anti-American. That is why the United States which was friendly to the Pahlavi regime has become a leading hostile power to the Islamic Republic. Ideological position of Iran has also directly affected its bilateral relations with its neighbors. Additionally, depending on the ideological position of the ruling regime, Iran faces challenges posed by regime opponents. Regime opponents living inside and outside Iran, try to overthrow the regime.

Security Challenges to the Islamic Republic


In accordance with this framework we can define major security challenges to Islamic Republic as follows.

1- Structural Challenges


a) Border disagreements with neighboring states: Iran has border disagreements with the UAE over the sovereignty of three islands (the Great and Lesser Tonbs and Abu Musa), Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, disagreement over the status of the Caspian Sea emerged in the 1990s. Iran’s disagreement with Iraq has been the most determinant one which culminated in the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Eight-year war with Iraq (1980-88) has imprinted Iran’s security policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Iraq continued to be perceived as the leading threat by the Iranian officials until the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and overthrown of Saddam regime.
b) Etnic-nationalist movements: The Iranian people is composed of many different ethnic and linguistic groups including Fars, Azari, Kurd, Balouch, Turkoman, Arap etc. Since the beginning of the 20th century, there have been ethnic-nationalist movements which surfaced at certain times, and even established independent states. Nevertheless Iran managed to keep its territorial unity, and to keep majority of these people loyal. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War in the early 1990s flamed Iran’s concerns regarding political stance of Azeris and Kurds living in Iran, yet ethnic-nationalist movements have not created major security threats to the Islamic Republic.

2. Conjectural Challenges


This kind of challenges to the Islamic Republic of Iran has sprung from the ideological posture of the regime. That is, it is directly related with the existence and survival of the regime. It could be analyzed under two headings as well.
a) Challenges deriving from the existence of the regime opponents: Since the establishment of Islamic Republic, there have been opposition movements extending from Mujaheden-Khalq to monarchists that fighting against the regime and denying its legitimacy. Struggle against counter-revolutionaries is a long term agenda of the revolutionary Iran. Additionally, developments throughout the Khatami administration caused some doubts in the establishment who are apprehensively watching the reform movement. In their view the reform movement might shelter regime opponents, who had been working against the Islamic Republic. Especially, according to many among the Revolutionary Guards and conservative lines the so-called liberals gathering around Khatami had been trying to dismantle the system of Islamic Republic.[1]
b) Challenges stemming from the existence of “hostile states”: Iran just after the revolution identified itself as an Islamic state. Moreover Iran asserted itself as the protector and defender of Islam, Islamic nations, and oppressed peoples of the world. This revolutionary agenda has also been enforced through the policies of exporting the regime. The policy of exporting revolution raised concerns among neighboring Muslim countries including Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq etc. On the other hand, Islamic Revolution in 1979 was perceived as a “Shiite movement” above else, and raised concerns in Sunni movements and those countries like S. Arabia championing the Sunni/Wahhabi branch of Islam. Nevertheless these concerns did not lead to “severe”/military conflicts between Iran and the neighboring countries with the exception of Iraq.
Revolutionary and anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli rhetoric of the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the policy of exporting revolution raised severe concerns in the United States and Israel. Eventually, these two states have become the leading enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Establishment in Iran viewed the United States both as an ideological threat, heading the cultural invasion against Iran, and undermining the Islamic Republic supporting counter-revolutionaries. Certainly, throughout the 27 years of Islamic Republic notable changes took place in foreign and security policies of Iran. Islamic Republic under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, M. Khatami moderated its ideological position, gave up the policy of exporting revolution. Iran resumed diplomatic relations with Western countries as well as Arab countries, and endeavored to integrate in world economy and world politics. However, Iran’s looking towards the United States, Israel and Iraq remained unchanged. The first Gulf war of 1991 degraded the threat perceived from Iraq, replacing it with the increasing threats perceived from the United States. Iranian establishment started to view the United States not only as a politically hostile state but also as a military threat. In an occasion in 1996 Brigadier General B. Zolqadr, deputy IRGC commander of Revolutionary Guards said: “Today, the United States is the only enemy we take as a main threat in our strategy.”[2]

The Immediate Threat to Iran: The United States


The United States has been accusing Iran of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and supporting international terrorism which are evaluated not as a threat to the US national interests, but also as a threat to the international community.[3] Moreover, Bush Administration has adopted an “assertive” approach toward Iran. US President George W. Bush depicted Iran as the third member of the “axis of evil”.[4]  The neo-conservatives who are influential in the Bush Administration have been advising to change regime in Iran. Even the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld obviously said he supported a policy of regime change in Iran.[5] Eventually, Iran has started to be mentioned as the second military “target” – after Iraq -- of the United States.
In fact, the US charges against Iran and its “assertive” approach is not new for US-Iran relations. However, the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq now has made the case more serious. It seems that “dual containment policy” of the Clinton Administration that aimed to contain Iraq and Iran now has been transformed into containment of only Iran. Besides containment, the United States tries to increase pressure on Iran both from inside and outside.
The United States has been trying to increase international pressure on Islamic Republic of Iran arguing that Iran has been developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting international terrorism. Anti-Israel statements of the Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad provided the United States with another instrument to increase international pressure on Iran.
It seems that, for the United States, the most preeminent instrument to increase outside pressure on Iran is to prevent Iran’s developing nuclear technology.  Iran has been pursuing a nuclear program, and argues that it aims to utilize “peaceful nuclear energy” in accordance with the NPT. However, the United States charges Iran with pursuing nuclear weapons. By arguing that Iran has been developing nuclear weapons, the United States tries to convince international community to increase pressure on Iran.[6] Eventually, as a result of US initiatives nuclear case of Iran was transferred to the UN Security Council in March 2006 who adopted the Resolution 1737 that urged Iran to suspend all nuclear activities an envisaged a kind of sanctions against Iran, in July 2006.[7]
In order to pressure Iran inside the United States has two influential tools. Firstly, as mentioned above, Iranian population is composed of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities.  Furthermore, the existence of “ethnic-nationalist” movements among these communities, like Arabs, Balouchis, Kurds and Azeris, provide a leverage to the United States to increase pressure on Iran.
Similarly, the United States has been hosting opponents of the Iran regime. Still, it has not disbanded Mujaheeden militias based in Iraq, an armed group fighting against the Islamic Republic, and holds it to use as leverage against Iran.[8] It has been broadcasting anti-Islamic Republic programs to Iran, and allocating remarkable money to support so-called “democratic” organizations. Additionally, it is reported that the United States hosted a meetings with the leaders of influential groups opposing the Islamic Republic.[9]
            In its initiatives to increase pressure on Iran inside, the United States hopes to get supports of Iranians who are disillusioned with the regime, as well. The US officials define Iran as a theocratic-despotic regime un-responsible to the Iranian people who are essentially friendly to the United States.[10]  The US officials think that the Iranian people would be sided with the United States in its struggle against the Islamic Republic.[11] Considering the increasing number of disillusioned people, and considering the fact that seventy percent of them are below the age of thirty, and are living in severe economic conditions would rise up against the regime. Hence, the US President has urged Iranian people to rise up against the regime in Iran and pledged to be sided with them.

Iran’s Responses to Security Challenges


Until today, there is no remarkable change in the security outlook of Iran in terms of structural security challenges. That is, the potential for challenges deriving from territorial disagreements and ethnic-nationalist movements still valid, yet they have not transformed into urgent and prevalent security questions. However, security outlook of Iran has dramatically changed in terms of conjectural security challenges. To begin with, the US threat for the Islamic Republic has become more severe and urgent issue. Additionally, and relevant to the first one, the reformist movement in Iran started to be perceived as a remarkable threat to survival of the Islamic Republic by the Iranian establishment.
The emerging security challenges provoked the Iranian establishment including the Leader, judiciary, conservative clerics etc. in Iran, and the Revolutionary Guards -- who is in charge of “guarding the Revolution and its achievements” -- to take action. They argued that the nation must lay aside any differences and band together to repel outside menace.[12] Eventually they managed victory in local elections (February 2003), and parliamentary elections (March 2004). Indeed, M. Ahmadinejad’s ascent to power following the presidential elections of June 2005 was a result of conservative consolidation in Iran.[13]
In order to response the security challenges, new president Ahmadinejad applied several politics in conducting foreign policy. Some of these politics are intended to address Iranians, while some of them addressing outside audiences stretching from Muslims to miserables of the USA. Here are some basic features of Ahmadinejad’s policy towards the security challenges.
Ideological and security consolidation: Ahmadinejad appointed the Revolutionary Guards, and ideologically indoctrinated ones to leading posts. While other conservative presidential candidate Ali Larijani replacing Hasan Rowhani as the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, Deputy Commander of Revolutionary Guards, General Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr, allegedly ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad become deputy of Larijani. Almost ten members of the cabinet are composed of former Revolutionary Guards. Virtually all governor-generals were replaced with those coming from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards and Ministry of Intelligence and Security. This policy aimed at empowering ideological and instrumental bases of the Islamic Republic.[14]
Resorting to populism and nationalism: Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, leaders have been emphasizing “popular” side of the regime, and they evaluate this as leverage against foreign powers. In an occasion, the Leader Khamanei said: “The government that arises from people and the ruling system that is supported and maintained by people cannot be frightened by treating.” Ahmadinejad is also known as a populist leader. When he was asked about to be radical he replied “if radicalism is insisting on the rights of people, then it is proud of us.” Iranian leaders are also known as their references to national sentiments such as referring to glory of the great Iranian civilization. This policy seems directed to maintain people’s loyalty to the regime.
Resorting to Islamism: The Islamic Republic has resorted to Islam(ism) both as a response to ethnic challenges and an endeavor to obtain support of Muslim states in international arena. In fact the Iranian leaders have been championing the Islamist causes since the revolution, at least at the discourse level. Although this policy had been relatively eroded during the reformist government of Khatami, Ahmadinejad has revitalized this discourse. Iranian official’s belief in the popularity of Islamists throughout the Islamic world is an important factor for the revitalization of Islamism. Within this framework Khamenei argued “the present era is an era of Islamic awakening with Palestine at its very core.” Ahmadinejad’s remarks against Israel and his championing of the Palestine case is a result of this Islamist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy.
Recalling Anti-Imperialist Discourse, and emphasizing equality and justice: Anti-imperialism has also been one of the fundamentals of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Iranian officials try to decrease international pressure on Iran by resorting to anti-imperialism. They may also aim at provoking revolutionary ideals among the Iranians. Anti-imperialist rhetoric has become more apparent especially in meetings between the Iranian officials and members of Non-Aligned Movement and Latin American states. Additionally, Ahmadinejad pledges to share nuclear technology with developing countries. Anti-imperialist discourse and exaltation of equality and justice are also apparent in Ahmadinejad’s letter to Bush (dated May 8, 2006)[15] where he questions the rationale of the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq arguing that “in some states of your country, people are living in poverty. Many thousands are homeless and unemployment is a huge problem.” In the letter, Ahmadinejad reminds US policies in Africa and Latin America and questions them.  Emphasizing equality and justice in international relations has a remarkable place in Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourse probably because he believe double standards against Iran, and probably because to gain sympathy among the “third world” countries.
            Leaning on Diplomacy: Iran has been avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States. In order to avoid military confrontation with the United States, and struggle against international pressure Iran has been leaning on diplomacy.  For instance, although Iran declares that it will not withdraw from its internationally recognized rights, it has always kept the door open for negotiations and its readiness to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency. The new government terminated the voluntary implementation of Additional Protocol to the NPT in June 2006, and restarted its uranium enrichment project. Nevertheless it seems as a step to utilize as a trump card throughout future negotiations.

 

Conclusion


In the aftermath of the September 11, security outlook of Iran has been changed dramatically. Currently prevailed security challenges for Iran are mainly directed to survive of the Islamic Republic, one is deriving from hostile policies of the United States against the Islamic Republic, and other is deriving from internal dynamics. These challenges led to the consolidation of establishment in Iran including the Leader, judiciary, conservative clerics, revolutionary guards etc. and culminated in Ahmedinejad’s ascent to the presidency. In order to deal with challenges threatening the existence of Islamic Republic, the regime in Iran preferred to lean on revolutionary guards as well as indoctrinated elite, to resort to Islamism, nationalism, and anti-imperialism as political instruments, and to leans on diplomacy in order to diffuse internal and outside pressure.






* This article is a revised version of the paper presented at The Fifth METU Conference on International Relations: International Security: Old Issues and New Challenges, Ankara, Turkey, June 15-17, 2006.

[1] See Daniel L Byman (eds), Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Rand Corporation;2001), pp.45-52. 24 Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders signed a letter to Khatami threatening him to take matters into their own hands if he did not quell student riots going on at the time in July 1999.
[2] Ibid., p. 91.
[3] See, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2030313-9.html >; RFE/RL Iran Report, vol. 6, no.13 (March 24, 2003).
[4] Bush’s depiction of “axis of evil” slammed the door on any chance of détente between the United States and Iran that had emerged following Bush’s coming to power and Iran’s adoption of collaborative stance throughout the US operation against the Taliban-governed Afghanistan. See Gawdat Baghat, “Iran the United States, and the War on Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol.26, no.2 (March-April 2003); Garry Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism”, The Washington Quarterly, vol.26, no.4 (Autumn 2003).; Bahman Baktiari, “Iranian Foreign Policy” (in “The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East”), Middle East Policy, vol. 9, no.4 (December 2002).
[5] Alistair Millar, “Next Stop, Iran?,” www.iranexpert.com/2003/nextstopiran15december.htm >(accessed in January 02, 2004).
[6] Bayram Sinkaya, “İran Nükleerde Köşeye Sıkıştı” (Iran was Pressured on Nuclear), Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu Website, (October 2003), http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Diger/bs_nukler.htm >.
[8]  It has been a real dilemma for the Americans to deal with the MKO (Mujaheden-e Khalq Organisation), a highly disciplined armed force committed to fight against Iranian regime and based in Iraq since 1986. The MKO has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US State Department since 1997—apparently in hopes of encouraging a dialogue with Iran’s then newly elected president, Khatami. Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, argued that maintaining the MKO “as an organized group in separate camps in Iraq offers an excellent way to intimidate and gain leverage over Tehran ... to deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps, supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons”. “Iran; Friend or Foe?,” The Middle East, (July 2003), pp.16-17.
[9] RFE/RL Iran Report, vol.8, no 17 (April 25, 2005).; For the text of the proposed bill see: http://www.theorator.com/bills109/hr282.html >; See, http://www.2005nationalconvention.org >.
[10] For instance the US President Bush said: “The people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as people around the world. Their government should listen to their hopes. In the last two Iranian presidential elections and in nearly a dozen parliamentary and local elections, the vast majority of the Iranian people voted for political and economic reform. Yet their voices are not being listened to by the unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran. Uncompromising, destructive policies have persisted, and far too little has changed in the daily lives of the Iranian people.... There is a long history of friendship between the American people and the people of Iran. As Iran's people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United States of America.”  in www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2002/july/0714014.html>. See Patrick Clawson, “The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 8, no.1 (March, 2004).
[11] Patrick Clawson also gives reference to a poll published in Yas-e Now daily on June 22, 2003. According to that poll, “45 percent – of the questioners-- chose change in the political system, even with foreign intervention." However, according to evidence produced by another poll “only 10.7% of the respondents said that the current situation was satisfactory. A resounding 66.2% believed the current situation could be improved with a few changes, while the remaining 23.1% felt that fundamental change was needed.” See Nazgol Ashouri, “Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions,” Policy Watch, no.757 (May 14, 2003).
[12] Middle East International, 13 June 2003, p.24.; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam,” The Washington Quarterly, vol.26., no.4 (Autumn 2003).
[13] Ali Gaheissari and Vali Nasr, The Conservative Consolidation in Iran, Survival, vol.47, no.2 (Summer 2005), pp.175-190.
[14] http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3311>. According to A.W.Samii “the appointment of former Revolutionary Guards, furthermore, has several implications. The first is that Ahmadinejad, a former member of the IRGC, trusts people with a shared background and with whom he feels a connection. The second is that such people are more likely to use force to deal with civil unrest, and they would be more willing to implement martial law should there be a crisis. The third implication is that the appointments are a payoff for the support the IRGC and the Basij militia gave Ahmadinejad during the election.”   http://www.rferl.org/reports/iran-report/2006/03/7-030306.asp >.

http://www.turkishweekly.net/2007/06/05/article/security-outlook-of-iran-under-ahmadinejad/ 

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