Security Outlook of Iran Under Ahmadinejad

Security Outlook of Iran Under Ahmadinejad*

Bayram Sinkaya

June 5, 2007

 Abstract

Developments in the aftermath of September 11 have profoundly influenced Iranian politics. Initially, Iran’s security environment has totally changed. For Iran, hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq were replaced by another hostile power that is more efficient; the United States. In addition to the US military presence in the Persian Gulf prior to the Iraq war of 2003, this new environment posed a notable security challenge to Iran. Increasing security challenges for Iran led to the consolidation of establishment regarding domestic politics in Iran which culminated in neo-conservatives’ ascent to power. This paper is aimed at analyzing the change in security challenges for Iran, and discussing Iran’s responses to the new security challenges.

Introduction

Sources of and reasons for security challenges for Iran could be analyzed in two categories. Firstly, structural reasons which are existent independent of will of states and ruling regimes, includes geographic location, history, and demographic structure. They are always there and rarely changes. Iran is located in an area that has been at the heart of major geopolitical theories devised by A. Mahan, M. Spykman etc. For this reason throughout its history Iran has attracted the attention of major powers. On the other hand thanks to its historical roots and capabilities Iran has been a candidate for regional hegemony. This background left Iran today with border disagreements with several of its neighbors (disagreement over the small Gulf islands, status of the Caspian etc.) and historical animosities. Because Iran has been invaded many times, its current demographic structure is far from being homogeneous. Rather, contemporary population of Iran is composed of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities. Especially after penetration of nationalism to the geography where Iran is located, ethnic-nationalist movements emerged in Iran.

 The second group of reasons determining security challenges and security policies of Iran has been constructed ones, deriving from ideological posture of the ruling regime. For instance, the revolution in 1979 fundamentally altered ideological position of Iran from a pro-western and American ally to an anti-West, and anti-American. That is why the United States which was friendly to the Pahlavi regime has become a leading hostile power to the Islamic Republic. Ideological position of Iran has also directly affected its bilateral relations with its neighbors. Additionally, depending on the ideological position of the ruling regime, Iran faces challenges posed by regime opponents. Regime opponents living inside and outside Iran, try to overthrow the regime.

Security Challenges to the Islamic Republic

In accordance with this framework we can define major security challenges to Islamic Republic as follows.

1- Structural Challenges

a) Border disagreements with neighboring states: Iran has border disagreements with the UAE over the sovereignty of three islands (the Great and Lesser Tonbs and Abu Musa), Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, disagreement over the status of the Caspian Sea emerged in the 1990s. Iran’s disagreement with Iraq has been the most determinant one which culminated in the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980. Eight-year war with Iraq (1980-88) has imprinted Iran’s security policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Iraq continued to be perceived as the leading threat by the Iranian officials until the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and overthrown of Saddam regime.

b) Etnic-nationalist movements: The Iranian people is composed of many different ethnic and linguistic groups including Fars, Azari, Kurd, Balouch, Turkoman, Arap etc. Since the beginning of the 20^th century, there have been ethnic-nationalist movements which surfaced at certain times, and even established independent states. Nevertheless Iran managed to keep its territorial unity, and to keep majority of these people loyal. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War in the early 1990s flamed Iran’s concerns regarding political stance of Azeris and Kurds living in Iran, yet ethnic-nationalist movements have not created major security threats to the Islamic Republic.

2. Conjectural Challenges

This kind of challenges to the Islamic Republic of Iran has sprung from the ideological posture of the regime. That is, it is directly related with the existence and survival of the regime. It could be analyzed under two headings as well.

a) Challenges deriving from the existence of the regime opponents: Since the establishment of Islamic Republic, there have been opposition movements extending from Mujaheden-Khalq to monarchists that fighting against the regime and denying its legitimacy. Struggle against counter-revolutionaries is a long term agenda of the revolutionary Iran. Additionally, developments throughout the Khatami administration caused some doubts in the establishment who are apprehensively watching the reform movement. In their view the reform movement might shelter regime opponents, who had been working against the Islamic Republic. Especially, according to many among the Revolutionary Guards and conservative lines the so-called liberals gathering around Khatami had been trying to dismantle the system of Islamic Republic.[1]

b) Challenges stemming from the existence of “hostile states”: Iran just after the revolution identified itself as an Islamic state. Moreover Iran asserted itself as the protector and defender of Islam, Islamic nations, and oppressed peoples of the world. This revolutionary agenda has also been enforced through the policies of exporting the regime. The policy of exporting revolution raised concerns among neighboring Muslim countries including Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq etc. On the other hand, Islamic Revolution in 1979 was perceived as a “Shiite movement” above else, and raised concerns in Sunni movements and those countries like S. Arabia championing the Sunni/Wahhabi branch of Islam. Nevertheless these concerns did not lead to “severe”/military conflicts between Iran and the neighboring countries with the exception of Iraq.

Revolutionary and anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli rhetoric of the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the policy of exporting revolution raised severe concerns in the United States and Israel. Eventually, these two states have become the leading enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Establishment in Iran viewed the United States both as an ideological threat, heading the cultural invasion against Iran, and undermining the Islamic Republic supporting counter-revolutionaries. Certainly, throughout the 27 years of Islamic Republic notable changes took place in foreign and security policies of Iran. Islamic Republic under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, M. Khatami moderated its ideological position, gave up the policy of exporting revolution. Iran resumed diplomatic relations with Western countries as well as Arab countries, and endeavored to integrate in world economy and world politics. However, Iran’s looking towards the United States, Israel and Iraq remained unchanged. The first Gulf war of 1991 degraded the threat perceived from Iraq, replacing it with the increasing threats perceived from the United States. Iranian establishment started to view the United States not only as a politically hostile state but also as a military threat. In an occasion in 1996 Brigadier General B. Zolqadr, deputy IRGC commander of Revolutionary Guards said: “Today, the United States is the only enemy we take as a main threat in our strategy.”[2]

The Immediate Threat to Iran: The United States

The United States has been accusing Iran of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and supporting international terrorism which are evaluated not as a threat to the US national interests, but also as a threat to the international community.[3] Moreover, Bush Administration has adopted an “assertive” approach toward Iran. US President George W. Bush depicted Iran as the third member of the “axis of evil”.[4]  The neo-conservatives who are influential in the Bush Administration have been advising to change regime in Iran. Even the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld obviously said he supported a policy of regime change in Iran.[5] Eventually, Iran has started to be mentioned as the second military “target” – after Iraq -- of the United States.

In fact, the US charges against Iran and its “assertive” approach is not new for US-Iran relations. However, the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq now has made the case more serious. It seems that “dual containment policy” of the Clinton Administration that aimed to contain Iraq and Iran now has been transformed into containment of only Iran. Besides containment, the United States tries to increase pressure on Iran both from inside and outside.

The United States has been trying to increase international pressure on Islamic Republic of Iran arguing that Iran has been developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting international terrorism. Anti-Israel statements of the Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad provided the United States with another instrument to increase international pressure on Iran.

It seems that, for the United States, the most preeminent instrument to increase outside pressure on Iran is to prevent Iran’s developing nuclear technology.  Iran has been pursuing a nuclear program, and argues that it aims to utilize “peaceful nuclear energy” in accordance with the NPT. However, the United States charges Iran with pursuing nuclear weapons. By arguing that Iran has been developing nuclear weapons, the United States tries to convince international community to increase pressure on Iran.[6] Eventually, as a result of US initiatives nuclear case of Iran was transferred to the UN Security Council in March 2006 who adopted the Resolution 1737 that urged Iran to suspend all nuclear activities an envisaged a kind of sanctions against Iran, in July 2006.[7]

In order to pressure Iran inside the United States has two influential tools. Firstly, as mentioned above, Iranian population is composed of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual communities.  Furthermore, the existence of “ethnic-nationalist” movements among these communities, like Arabs, Balouchis, Kurds and Azeris, provide a leverage to the United States to increase pressure on Iran.

Similarly, the United States has been hosting opponents of the Iran regime. Still, it has not disbanded Mujaheeden militias based in Iraq, an armed group fighting against the Islamic Republic, and holds it to use as leverage against Iran.[8] It has been broadcasting anti-Islamic Republic programs to Iran, and allocating remarkable money to support so-called “democratic” organizations. Additionally, it is reported that the United States hosted a meetings with the leaders of influential groups opposing the Islamic Republic.[9]

            In its initiatives to increase pressure on Iran inside, the United States hopes to get supports of Iranians who are disillusioned with the regime, as well. The US officials define Iran as a theocratic-despotic regime un-responsible to the Iranian people who are essentially friendly to the United States.[10]  The US officials think that the Iranian people would be sided with the United States in its struggle against the Islamic Republic.[11] Considering the increasing number of disillusioned people, and considering the fact that seventy percent of them are below the age of thirty, and are living in severe economic conditions would rise up against the regime. Hence, the US President has urged Iranian people to rise up against the regime in Iran and pledged to be sided with them.

Iran’s Responses to Security Challenges

Until today, there is no remarkable change in the security outlook of Iran in terms of structural security challenges. That is, the potential for challenges deriving from territorial disagreements and ethnic-nationalist movements still valid, yet they have not transformed into urgent and prevalent security questions. However, security outlook of Iran has dramatically changed in terms of conjectural security challenges. To begin with, the US threat for the Islamic Republic has become more severe and urgent issue. Additionally, and relevant to the first one, the reformist movement in Iran started to be perceived as a remarkable threat to survival of the Islamic Republic by the Iranian establishment.

The emerging security challenges provoked the Iranian establishment including the Leader, judiciary, conservative clerics etc. in Iran, and the Revolutionary Guards -- who is in charge of “guarding the Revolution and its achievements” -- to take action. They argued that the nation must lay aside any differences and band together to repel outside menace.[12] Eventually they managed victory in local elections (February 2003), and parliamentary elections (March 2004). Indeed, M. Ahmadinejad’s ascent to power following the presidential elections of June 2005 was a result of conservative consolidation in Iran.[13]

In order to response the security challenges, new president Ahmadinejad applied several politics in conducting foreign policy. Some of these politics are intended to address Iranians, while some of them addressing outside audiences stretching from Muslims to miserables of the USA. Here are some basic features of Ahmadinejad’s policy towards the security challenges.

Ideological and security consolidation: Ahmadinejad appointed the Revolutionary Guards, and ideologically indoctrinated ones to leading posts. While other conservative presidential candidate Ali Larijani replacing Hasan Rowhani as the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, Deputy Commander of Revolutionary Guards, General Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr, allegedly ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad become deputy of Larijani. Almost ten members of the cabinet are composed of former Revolutionary Guards. Virtually all governor-generals were replaced with those coming from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards and Ministry of Intelligence and Security. This policy aimed at empowering ideological and instrumental bases of the Islamic Republic.[14]

Resorting to populism and nationalism: Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, leaders have been emphasizing “popular” side of the regime, and they evaluate this as leverage against foreign powers. In an occasion, the Leader Khamanei said: “The government that arises from people and the ruling system that is supported and maintained by people cannot be frightened by treating.” Ahmadinejad is also known as a populist leader. When he was asked about to be radical he replied “if radicalism is insisting on the rights of people, then it is proud of us.” Iranian leaders are also known as their references to national sentiments such as referring to glory of the great Iranian civilization. This policy seems directed to maintain people’s loyalty to the regime.

Resorting to Islamism: The Islamic Republic has resorted to Islam(ism) both as a response to ethnic challenges and an endeavor to obtain support of Muslim states in international arena. In fact the Iranian leaders have been championing the Islamist causes since the revolution, at least at the discourse level. Although this policy had been relatively eroded during the reformist government of Khatami, Ahmadinejad has revitalized this discourse. Iranian official’s belief in the popularity of Islamists throughout the Islamic world is an important factor for the revitalization of Islamism. Within this framework Khamenei argued “the present era is an era of Islamic awakening with Palestine at its very core.” Ahmadinejad’s remarks against Israel and his championing of the Palestine case is a result of this Islamist dimension of Iran’s foreign policy.

Recalling Anti-Imperialist Discourse, and emphasizing equality and justice: Anti-imperialism has also been one of the fundamentals of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Iranian officials try to decrease international pressure on Iran by resorting to anti-imperialism. They may also aim at provoking revolutionary ideals among the Iranians. Anti-imperialist rhetoric has become more apparent especially in meetings between the Iranian officials and members of Non-Aligned Movement and Latin American states. Additionally, Ahmadinejad pledges to share nuclear technology with developing countries. Anti-imperialist discourse and exaltation of equality and justice are also apparent in Ahmadinejad’s letter to Bush (dated May 8, 2006)[15] where he questions the rationale of the Bush administration’s policies in Iraq arguing that “in some states of your country, people are living in poverty. Many thousands are homeless and unemployment is a huge problem.” In the letter, Ahmadinejad reminds US policies in Africa and Latin America and questions them.  Emphasizing equality and justice in international relations has a remarkable place in Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy discourse probably because he believe double standards against Iran, and probably because to gain sympathy among the “third world” countries.

            Leaning on Diplomacy: Iran has been avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States. In order to avoid military confrontation with the United States, and struggle against international pressure Iran has been leaning on diplomacy.  For instance, although Iran declares that it will not withdraw from its internationally recognized rights, it has always kept the door open for negotiations and its readiness to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency. The new government terminated the voluntary implementation of Additional Protocol to the NPT in June 2006, and restarted its uranium enrichment project. Nevertheless it seems as a step to utilize as a trump card throughout future negotiations.

 

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the September 11, security outlook of Iran has been changed dramatically. Currently prevailed security challenges for Iran are mainly directed to survive of the Islamic Republic, one is deriving from hostile policies of the United States against the Islamic Republic, and other is deriving from internal dynamics. These challenges led to the consolidation of establishment in Iran including the Leader, judiciary, conservative clerics, revolutionary guards etc. and culminated in Ahmedinejad’s ascent to the presidency. In order to deal with challenges threatening the existence of Islamic Republic, the regime in Iran preferred to lean on revolutionary guards as well as indoctrinated elite, to resort to Islamism, nationalism, and anti-imperialism as political instruments, and to leans on diplomacy in order to diffuse internal and outside pressure.

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* This article is a revised version of the paper presented at The Fifth METU Conference on International Relations: International Security: Old Issues and New Challenges, Ankara, Turkey, June 15-17, 2006.

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[1] See Daniel L Byman (eds), Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Rand Corporation;2001), pp.45-52. 24 Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders signed a letter to Khatami threatening him to take matters into their own hands if he did not quell student riots going on at the time in July 1999.

[2] Ibid., p. 91.

[3] See, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2030313-9.html >; RFE/RL Iran Report, vol. 6, no.13 (March 24, 2003).

[4] Bush’s depiction of “axis of evil” slammed the door on any chance of détente between the United States and Iran that had emerged following Bush’s coming to power and Iran’s adoption of collaborative stance throughout the US operation against the Taliban-governed Afghanistan. See Gawdat Baghat, “Iran the United States, and the War on Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol.26, no.2 (March-April 2003); Garry Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism”, The Washington Quarterly, vol.26, no.4 (Autumn 2003).; Bahman Baktiari, “Iranian Foreign Policy” (in “The Impact of 9/11 on the Middle East”), Middle East Policy, vol. 9, no.4 (December 2002).

[5] Alistair Millar, “Next Stop, Iran?,” www.iranexpert.com/2003/nextstopiran15december.htm >(accessed in January 02, 2004).

[6] Bayram Sinkaya, “İran Nükleerde Köşeye Sıkıştı” (Iran was Pressured on Nuclear), Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu Website, (October 2003), http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Diger/bs_nukler.htm >.

[7]   UNSCR 1737 (2006) http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2759983.html >.

[8]  It has been a real dilemma for the Americans to deal with the MKO (Mujaheden-e Khalq Organisation), a highly disciplined armed force committed to fight against Iranian regime and based in Iraq since 1986. The MKO has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US State Department since 1997—apparently in hopes of encouraging a dialogue with Iran’s then newly elected president, Khatami. Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson, argued that maintaining the MKO “as an organized group in separate camps in Iraq offers an excellent way to intimidate and gain leverage over Tehran ... to deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps, supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons”. “Iran; Friend or Foe?,” The Middle East, (July 2003), pp.16-17.

[9] RFE/RL Iran Report, vol.8, no 17 (April 25, 2005).; For the text of the proposed bill see: http://www.theorator.com/bills109/hr282.html >; See, http://www.2005nationalconvention.org >.

[10] For instance the US President Bush said: “The people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as people around the world. Their government should listen to their hopes. In the last two Iranian presidential elections and in nearly a dozen parliamentary and local elections, the vast majority of the Iranian people voted for political and economic reform. Yet their voices are not being listened to by the unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran. Uncompromising, destructive policies have persisted, and far too little has changed in the daily lives of the Iranian people.... There is a long history of friendship between the American people and the people of Iran. As Iran's people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United States of America.”  in www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2002/july/0714014.html>. See Patrick Clawson, “The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 8, no.1 (March, 2004).

[11] Patrick Clawson also gives reference to a poll published in Yas-e Now daily on June 22, 2003. According to that poll, “45 percent – of the questioners-- chose change in the political system, even with foreign intervention." However, according to evidence produced by another poll “only 10.7% of the respondents said that the current situation was satisfactory. A resounding 66.2% believed the current situation could be improved with a few changes, while the remaining 23.1% felt that fundamental change was needed.” See Nazgol Ashouri, “Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions,” Policy Watch, no.757 (May 14, 2003).

[12] Middle East International, 13 June 2003, p.24.; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam,” The Washington Quarterly, vol.26., no.4 (Autumn 2003).

[13] Ali Gaheissari and Vali Nasr, The Conservative Consolidation in Iran, Survival, vol.47, no.2 (Summer 2005), pp.175-190.

[14] http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=3311>. According to A.W.Samii “the appointment of former Revolutionary Guards, furthermore, has several implications. The first is that Ahmadinejad, a former member of the IRGC, trusts people with a shared background and with whom he feels a connection. The second is that such people are more likely to use force to deal with civil unrest, and they would be more willing to implement martial law should there be a crisis. The third implication is that the appointments are a payoff for the support the IRGC and the Basij militia gave Ahmadinejad during the election.”   http://www.rferl.org/reports/iran-report/2006/03/7-030306.asp >.

[15] http://www.president.ir/eng/ahmadinejad/cronicnews/1385/02/19/index-e.htm#b3 >.

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