The Role of Iran in the Syrian Conflict

 Soon after the Arab Spring shattered Arab politics in the early 2010s, Bashar al-Assad, who had replaced his father as the head of the Baath regime in Syria, has faced with a cohort of domestic, regional and international challenges that aimed to force him to leave the power. Iran has remained one of few international actors that have stood alongside the Assad administration. In this regard, Iran’s policies have varied from diplomatic support to the mobilization of militia forces and troop deployment in support of Assad. Since then Iran’s motivations for standing behind Assad have been questioned by many analysts. Arguments that were put forward to explain Iranian policy toward Syria during the crisis have been ranged from a hypothetical view of Iranian fear of encirclement by the hostile forces to a sectarian consolidation under the Shiite axis. This article asserts that Islamic Republican regime in Iran has a keen interest in maintaining a foothold in Syria, and circulated several complementary narratives to justify its involvement and role in the crisis. The article reviews those narratives in order to comprehend Tehran’s enduring support for the Assad administration, and examines the ways in which Iran supported Assad throughout the conflict.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354578987_The_Role_of_Iran_in_the_Syrian_Conflict

Federalism in Syria, PYD and Ambivalent Position of Iran

2017-04-04

After the escalation of clashes between the Syrian regime and its opponents, the Assad administration withdrew its armed forces from some pre-dominantly Kurdish inhabited settlements in the north of country. Thus, the Syrian Kurds have experienced self-administration in those settlements since July 2012. Afterwards, they built ‘autonomous’ ‘canton’ administrations led by PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian offshoot of PKK. In due course, the PYD has created alliances with various actors inside and outside Syria in the name of ‘fighting against ISIS’. Its armed wing, YPG consolidated its grip over the ground and expanded its sphere of control due to its partnership with the Syrian regime, and American and Russian support.  Former US Secretary of State,John Kerry told the Senate foreign relations committee  in February 2016, ‘it may be too late to keep it as a whole Syria whole’ if they fail to establish a transitional administration, and he talked likelihood of ‘a plan B.’ Shortly after him, Sergei Riyabkov, Russian deputy foreign minister, said; ‘If as a result of talks, consultations and discussions on Syria's future state order ... they come to an opinion that namely this (federal) model will work ... then who will object to this?’ Stefan de Mistura, special representative of the UN Secretary General, also expressed similar views. These statements unleashed a new debate revolving around the establishment of a federal system in Syria. Both the Syrian government, and the opposition and some regional countries rejected federalism for Syria. However, PYD and its partners proclaimed the establishment of a federal region named ‘Rojava and Northern Syria United Democratic System’ on March 16, 2016, in Rimelan. Although none of the influential actors recognized the proclamation of federalism, the Assad administration, the United States and Russia have maintained their close cooperation with PYD and YPG. Moreover, this partnership was decisive to stop the march of Turkish armed forces and its allies towards Manbij, after taking control of al-Bab. These developments have led to question position of Iran, one of the most notable actors influential over the Syrian regime.

Iran has taken an ambivalent, murky standing with regard to the debates on federalism in Syria, either becauseit has different priorities, or in a conscious way. On the one hand, Iranian officials declared that federal system would not contribute to solution of the Syrian crisis, and continuously talked on preserving territorial integrity of Syria. Salih Muslim, PYD leader, also acknowledged Iran’s strong opposition to federalism. On the other hand, it remained silent onRussian bid for midwifery to deliver Kurdish federalism or autonomy, and developing close relations with PYD. Moreover, intricate relations between PYD and the Assad regime makes it harder to comprehend Iranian stance.

The ambivalent position of Iran has led two different, and contrasting assessments. First assessment suggests that Iran is in partnership with PKK with regard to regional issuesfor a while. Accordingly, having assisted by PUK that has been long time friend of Tehran, Iran brokered an agreementbetween PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK and the Assad administration. Accordingly, Assad surrendered the north of Syria to PYD in return for its promise to avoid joining the Syrian opposition,and to suppress anti-regime protests in the region.As stated by Nuri Brimo, a member of Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), ‘PYD turned into gendarmerie of Assad and Iran’. That is, the declaration of autonomous or federal region by PYD is not beyond information and control of Iran. Moreover, the Assad administration and Iran have supported PYD both as part of their strategy to struggle against extremist ‘takfiri movements,’ and to prevent Turkey from mounting influence in the region.

Additionally, there is an apparent sympathy in Iranian media towards the Syrian Kurds, especially PYD. One of the reasons for that sympathy is the emergence of PYD as an ‘efficient’ actor that has been fighting against ‘takfiri terrorists’.  Second, a sense of consolidation with the Kurdsas part of ‘Irani’ peoples is prevalent in Iranian media, which boosted by ‘neo-Aryanist’ feelings. Additionally some people are advocates of building close relations with Kurdish movements in the region, for strategic reasons, in order to assure Kurdish support in future. Hence, relations between Iran and PYD/PKK are not only forced by contextual developments, but also shaped by strategic calculations.

According to the second assessment, Iran is discomforted with PYD attempts for autonomy. This view is dictated by the fear that the establishment of autonomous or federal regions will eventually lead into disintegration of Syria. With the words of Mohammad Ali Mohtadi, Iranian analyst, ‘the enemy that failed to disassociate Syria from the axis of resistance is now trying to fragment it’.  In this respect, many people draw attention to dramatic Israeli and American support for the Kurdish autonomy. Additionally, they are concerned with a potential geopolitical earthquake to be triggered by the Kurdish autonomy, which will adversely affect all countries in the region including Iran.

Iran, arguably discomforted from PYD’s desire for autonomy, has continuously called for preserving territorial integrity of Syria, and approached Turkey in order to increase their cooperation to foment Kurdish bid for federalism. Soon after the outbreak of federalism debates, Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Tehran on March 3-4. At that occasion, Davutoğlu called his Iranian collocutors that they ‘should not leave the fate of the region to extra-territorial powers’. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who met his Iranian counterpart M. Cevad Zarif in İstanbul on Match 19, lashed out PYD’s declaration of federal region, and said, ‘They want to divide Syria. With Iran, we support the territorial integrity of Syria’. The Euphrates Shield Operation that begun soon after mutual visits of Iranian and Turkish foreign ministers in August 2016 is viewed by many people as a reflection of cooperation between Ankara and Tehran, who are embarrassed with the Syrian Kurdish attempt for building federal region.

Iranian and Turkish search for partnership, however, did not last long. Before anything else, Iran has preserved its ambivalent stance with regard to federalism in Syria. Second, Iran severely criticized Turkish military intervention in the region. Additionally, it has maintained its ties to PKK, and has secured continuation of cooperation between the regime and PYD. For instance, Basnews reported in November 2016 that Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Qods Force of Iran frequently met PKK leaders. Likewise, Azad Osman, a member ofthe Rojava Independent Kurdish Union, claimed that high-level officials from the Syrian regime, together with some IRGC officers met PKK leaders in the region in Rimelan in March 2017, when they negotiated the surrender of Manbij by PYD to the Syrian army.

Iran considers it is unlikely to return status quo ante in Syria prior to 2011, that is, a central government could establish its authority over the whole country. However, it is concerned with the prospective change of borders in the region, and the emergence of new political systems without Iranian influence. That is why Iran consciously takes an ambivalent stand with regard to federalism debates in Syria. Iranian call for the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria doe not mean its opposition the Kurdish autonomy or federalism. As a matter of fact, Iran was among the few regional countries that supported the establishment of a federal system in Iraq in 2005. Then, why does it oppose the formation of an autonomous or federal Kurdish region that permits Iranian meddlingunless it remained within Syria, and did not damage territorial integrity of the country?

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The “Fall” of Aleppo and Iran

2017-02-06

It was announced on December 13, 2016 that the forces affiliated with the Assad government and its allies seized control in the east of Aleppo. Russian Representative to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin stated that Syrian army retook control of the regions held by rebels, and a deal was broken for the withdrawal of rebel fighters from the city. Therefore, the armed opposition groups who had been holding a part of Aleppo since July 2012, had to leave the city. Whereas the supporters of the Assad administration viewed this development as the “liberation of Aleppo”, the opposition and its supporters called it the “fall” of Aleppo. Even though it was not the end of Syrian civil war, the “fall” of Aleppo remarkably excited Assad supporters in Syria and the region.

Iranian government, who resolutely backed the Assad government since the outbreak of crisis, and provided it with every kind of support, delighted with the “fall” of Aleppo. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani congratulated the “Syrian government” for “saving” Aleppo. Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani said that the liberation of Aleppo “was a milestone in the fight against terrorism”. Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy advisor to the Iranian Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who plays an efficient role in shaping Iran’s relations with the Arab world, underlined, “the victory in is considered as the introduction of other victories”. Other Iranian officials also called their counterparts in Syria and congratulated Syrian people and government for “the success gained in the fight against terrorism”. Friday prayer leaders delivered speeches praising the “resistance against imperialist designs of the West and Zionists,” and the “success recorded in the fight against terrorism.”

Iran’s Euphoria

There are various reasons why Iran is so pleased with the success of Syrian regime forces against the opposition: Firstly, this is not a war waged only by Iran’s ally with its own means. With the words of Yahya R. Safavi, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and advisor to Khamenei on military affairs, “Aleppo was liberated thanks to a coalition between Iran, Syria, Russia, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.” Iran has actively involved in organizing, training and leading pro-Assad National Defense Forces in addition to its military advisory missions, and logistical support provided to the Syrian army. Furthermore, besides Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement, it mobilized Shiite militia from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and led them into a number of fronts in Syria in the name of protecting Sayyidah Zaynab shrine. Moreover, in addition to the officers of the Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guards in charge of extraterritorial operations, some units from the army were deployed in Syria in order to join the fight. A number of insurgents claimed that they have been fighting against the forces affiliated with Iran, rather than the Assad regime. Iran suffered heavy losses for this cause, as well. Besides hundreds of militia and soldiers, many experienced generals like Hossein Hamadani who had orchestrated Iran’s military operations in the field lost their life in Syria. It is reported that Brigadier General Javad Ghafari took the command of Iranian operations in Syria after Hamadani, who was killed in October 2015. Therefore, Iranians counted a big part of the “success” gained in Aleppo on their own account.

Indeed, next to the military support given to the Assad government, political and diplomatic efforts of Iran contributed much to the current situation in Syria. Russian military involvement in Syria in support of the regime in September 2015 changed the military balance on the ground in favor of the Assad government. It is claimed by some rings that Iran was influential in the Russian intervention. Indeed, Tehran and Moscow, who agreed to support the Assad government, and “fight against terrorism” have coordinated their steps since the start of the conflict. The relationship between two countries has been deepened in the past year. Iranian, Syrian and Russian ministers of defense met in Tehran in June 2016. A tripartite meeting was held among the foreign ministers in Moscow in October 2016. Iran and Russia kept in touch with each other during the recent conflicts in Aleppo. Special Representative of Russian President Vladimir Putin for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev was in Tehran shortly before and after the Syrian army took control in Aleppo. In his visit to Tehran, Lavrentiev met with Velayeti and Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s Secretary of Supreme National Security Council and coordinator of military, political and security cooperation with Russia and Syria.

Secondly, the consolidation of the government control in Aleppo, boosted Iranian arguments that Assad should be part of the transition process. In fact, the priorities of most of the regional and global actors have shifted in Syria for a while ago; instead of overthrowing the Assad regime they have focused on the fight against terrorism and extremism signified by ISIS and al-Nusra Front. The withdrawal of armed insurgents from Aleppo has strengthened both the position of Iran and Russia in the field, and their arguments in international forums.

Another reason why Iranians are pleased with the development in Aleppo is the special meaning that they ascribe to the fight in Syria. Many Iranians view the reclamation of Aleppo from the insurgents not only as the defeat of “rebels and terrorists” but also that of the regional actors and the USA that have supported the opposition. Such an assessment of the regional developments has made some Iranian officials, especially the military ones euphoric.

Former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Safavi claimed that the coalition that led to the liberation of Aleppo “will next liberate Mosul.” He also claimed that the victories of the Iran, Russia, Syria and Hezbollah coalition underlined Iran’s increasing regional influence. Safavi said, “the United States has found out very well that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the first power in the region”. He added that the new US President Trump should “accept the reality that Iran is the leading power in the region.” Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami stated that “the length of swords of the Islamic Revolution of Iran that stands against the excesses of global arrogance reached from Tehran to the east of Mediterranean.” Salami praised the “liberation of Aleppo” as the “first step of the success of the army of Islam,” and stated “God willing, the liberation of Mosul, Yemen, and Bahrain will soon be achieved.” IRGC Spokesman Ramazan Sharif maintained, “the liberation of Aleppo would prepare the ground for the liberation of Mosul and the resolution of crisis in Yemen and Bahrain.” In an article published in Javan newspaper affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Babaei argued; “Almost all observers agree in that the result of the battle will open a new chapter in the Middle East which will be under Iran’s leadership.”

Negotiation and Struggle in Iranian Foreign Policy

Since the outset of the crisis, Iranian officials and diplomats stated in various statements that the Syrian crisis could not be solved through military means, but a diplomatic and political solution should be sought. A small group has occasionally criticized the reckless support given to the Assad regime in a low tune. Against those critics and the call for political solution, neo-conservative rings and the Revolutionary Guards have continuously called “resistance and fight” as the only solution for the Syrian crisis. Recently, Velayati, who appeared in a television program in November 2016, condemned those who were in favor of negotiations with the United States on regional issues including the Syrian crisis, and said they “are not aware of the hostile nature of the USA”.

Neo-conservative circle and the Revolutionary Guards considered the liberation of Aleppo as a success for the “resistance and fight”. In his sermon on December 16, Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani raised the question of Aleppo after he reminded that Iran sincerely fulfilled all its liabilities arising from the nuclear deal but the USA violated the deal by extending the embargoes. Congratulating Syrian nation and army for the liberation of Aleppo, Emami-Kashani said that the victory was won in light of resistance in Aleppo. Friday Prayer Leader of Qom, Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Bushehri claimed that the “liberation of Aleppo” was an “honorable example” of “relying on struggle, not on surrendering and negotiating fruitlessly.”

When Hassan Rouhani took office as the President of Iran with his discourse of “moderate foreign policy” in August 2013, most observers expected Iran, to adopt a more compromising approach with regard to the regional issues, notably the Syrian crisis, and the nuclear issue. Iran opted for negotiations in order to solve the nuclear question, however, it opted for “resistance” in the Syrian crisis. The negotiation process initially yielded positive outcomes, and the nuclear deal was broken. Nevertheless, Iranian officials accuse the USA of violating the deal due to the problems recently faced in the implementation of the nuclear deal and the ongoing American sanctions on their country. The rise of accusations against the USA is actually weakening the Rouhani government who defended a negotiated solution for the nuclear issue.

While the problems encountered in the implementation of the nuclear deal make “negotiations” less preferable in Iran’s foreign policy, the re-establishment of control in Aleppo by the Assad regime is seen as the success of the policy “resistance and fight”. Iranian neo-conservatives and military officials, who are currently in euphoria, have been assured that the “success” gained in Aleppo through “resistance and fight” would be repeated on other fronts as well. Moreover, they believe that Iran will be the most powerful and influential actor in the Middle East at the end of this process. Therefore, considering the consequences of the ‘liberation’ of Aleppo, Iran is likely to pursue politically and military more aggressive policies in the region.

2017-02-06

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From 2011 to Astana: The Cost of Iranian Policy Towards Syria

2017-01-24

Iran has stood behind the Assad administration since the outset of demonstrations against the regime in Syria. The initial differences among some Iranian officials regarding the meaning of the demonstrations in Syria, and responses of the Assad administrationsoon replaced by a policy that envisaged standingbehindAssad. Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution,proclaimed in June 2011 thatIran would stand behind the Syrian regime in the face of the opposition protests, which, heclaimed, were organized by external forces, and served American and Israeli interests.

Although the content and rhetoric of Iranian support for the Assad administrationhave changed over time, the essence of this policy has not changed. The scope of the military and economic support to the regime provided byIran that has never withdrawn her political support from Assad,has gradually expanded.

Support for the Assad Regime

The Iranian support was initially limited to providingadvisory services and technical assistance to the Syrian security forces in suppressing anti-regime demonstrations. After the deepening of conflict between the armed opposition and the regime, Iran has directly or indirectly involved in clashes. The increasing numbers of Quds Forceofficers affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corpshave come to Syria in order to provide 'military consultancy' service to the Syrian forces.

The Lebanese Hezbollah,promoted by Iran, has sided with the regime forces and actively taken part in the clashes since the beginning of 2013. Additionally, the Shiite militia forces from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan were mobilizedin the name of protectingthe Sayyidah Zaynab Shrine,and they backed up the regime forces. Since the regime forces were unable to take control of country,the Iranian government has increased its military forces in Syria from September 2015 onward; volunteer militia forces and special forces such as the 65th Airborne Brigade were sent to Syria.

It is not known exactly how many Iranian soldiers are in Syria. It was estimated that there were about 2,000 Iranian warriors in Syria by the middle of 2015. However, as mentioned above, the number of Iranian warriors has increased in the last year. According to a report published in September 2016by the National Resistance Council (People's Mujahedeen Organization of Iran -PMOI) thatopposes the Islamic Republic regime in Iran, 8-10 thousand troops from the Revolutionary Guards and 5-6 thousand troops from the army have been deployed in Syria. The same rapport claimed that besides7-10 thousand Hezbollah militants, 20 thousand Iraqi and 15-20 thousandAfghan militants, and 5-7 thousand militants from Pakistan, Palestine and some other countrieswere fighting in Syria under the control of Iran. These figures provided by the PMOI may have been exaggerated; nevertheless, the fact that Iran is not transparent in this regard opens the way for speculation.

Military losses and Economic cost

Iran lost more than 30 generals,including Hassan Shateri who ruled his country’s military operations in Syria, and his successor Hossein Hamadani, and many soldiers in the conflict. Mohammad Ali Shahidi Mahallati, Director of Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, declared in his statement on November 22, 2016 that "the number of Iranians martyred in Syria for defending the Shrine exceeded a thousand." According to thePMOIclaims, the IRGC alone has lostaround 1,500 fighters. Losses of foreign Shia fighters who are operating under the Iranian command are in total more than 10 thousand. However, there is no clear information regarding military losses.

The continuous support for the Assad regimehas some economic burdens for Iran, as well. Iran became the main supplier of basic consumption goods, oil, weapons and ammunition, which Syria needed in the course of the civil war. Iran also directly provided the Assad regime with financial assistance. In addition, the expenses of training and equipment, and salaries of the militia forces that are sent to Syria for fightingwith the Assad regimeare again covered by Iran. Shia militias that fightunder the command of Iranare reportedly paid between 500 and 1000 US dollars per month.

Total economic costfor continuous Iranian involvementin the war in Syria is unknown. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League to Syria put forward that Iran spends approximately6 billion dollars per year in support of the Syrian regime. However, some researchers claim that the cost of supporting Assad for Iran amounts on average to 15-20 billion dollars a year. Thus, it is estimated that up to now Iran has spentabout 100 billion dollars.

Regional implications of Iran’s Syria policy

The Iranian resolve to support the Assad's administration has also affected its foreign relations. Shortly after the beginning of the crisis, the US and the European Union began imposing sanctions on some Iranian figures and institutions because of the military support they gave to the Assad regime. Iran, on the other hand, severely blamed regional countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia,who have actively supported the Syrian opposition. Along with some other regional disputes, the tension between Iran and these two countries, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who have been confronted each other in the Syrian crisis, has escalated at some times. While Iran accused these countries of interfering in Syria's internal affairs and supporting terrorists, Turkey and Saudi Arabia blamed Iran for supporting a cruel dictator due to its own regional and sectarian ambitions.

Iranthat supports the Assad regime without any conditionwas excluded from international conferences that sought peaceful solution of the crisis in Syria. A 'quadruple dialogue group' wasset up between Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in September 2012; nonetheless,after the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia, this initiative lost its essence. In the wake of the nuclear deal in 2015, Iran has been considered by the Western states as a regional partner for the solution of regional affairs. For the first time, Iran was invited by the US and Russian foreign ministers to an international meeting in Vienna on October 31, 2015, and thus Iran became a member of the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG).

The 'counter-revolutionary' role that Iran played in the Syrian crisis has extremely tarnished its image in the Arab and Islamic world. According to the Global Attitudes & Trends survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2015, the percentage of those who expressed positive views on Iran fell dramatically in many Islamic countries compared to the data obtained in 2006-2007. In the Arab and Islamic world, on average 58 percent of the population express a negative opinion about Iran.

One of the regional reflections of Iran's Syria policy is the regionalization of sectarian divisions. Iran mobilizesparticularly Shia warriors to defend the Shiite sanctuaries and to 'fight against the takfiriterrorists'. This situation has sharpened the sectarian consolidation both around Iran and against it. As a result, while the popularity of Iran has decreased across the wider Arab and Islamic world, the number of Iraqi, Lebanese, and Pakistani Shi'ites who sympathize with Iran is increasing. Likewise, the countries, which are mostly sympathized with by the Iranians in the Middle East are Syria and Iraq.

Additionally, Iranian determination to stand behind Assad has worsened its image among the Syrian opposition. Many opposition groups,who have seen Iran as an invading force in Syria, claim that they have beenfightingnot only against the Assad regime, but also against the‘Safavid Iran'.

Internal political implications of Iran’sSyria policy

One of the decisiveoutcomesof Iranian involvement in the Syrian crisis is the rising influence of the Revolutionary Guards in foreign policy. In addition to military and security aspects of the Syrian crisis for Iran, ideological and geopolitical dimensions of this conflict have led IRGCplay a more active role in Iranianpolicy towards Syria. Today, it is deemed thatQasem Soleimani, commander the Quds Force, has controlled the filesof Iraq and Syria.

Another prominent figure,who play an active role in Iranian policy towards Syria, is Ali Akbar Velayati, former Foreign Minister and adviser of Ayatollah Khamenei on foreign policy issues. Recently, Admiral Ali Shamhani, one of the former commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, the current Secretary of the Supreme National Security Councilhas come forward with his mission as the coordinator of relations between Iran, Russia and Syria. Therefore, the office of President,and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were expected to carry out Iranian foreign policy have begun to play subsidiary roles instead of formulating and implementing policies.

Despite all the previouslymentioned costs and challenges above, there is a very weak opposition in Iran to criticize policy towards Syria. It is understandable that there is a certain amount of consensus among variousfactions on this ground. However, the fact that the leaders of the "Green Movement" have been put under house arrest and that the opposition has been severely suppressed also makes it hardto criticize Iranian government.

The militarization and securitization of Iran's Syria policy have increased the level of authoritarianism and prevented the formulation of alternative politics. Perhaps this is the greatest price for the war in Syria for Iran. Only Hashemi Rafsanjani, who passed away in the last week, dared to speak againsthis country’s handling of the Syrian crisis on several occasions. In a speech he delivered in August 2013, Rafsanjani said that the Assad regimeused chemical weapons and tyrannized his people. In an interview in May 2016, drawing attention to his country's engagements in the region, particularly in Syria and Iraq he pointed out thatit would not be sustainable and that Iran would day by day getinto a scrape in the region.

Rafsanjani's criticisms did not arouse much interest in the public opinion. Moreover, a survey conducted in early 2016 revealed that most of the Iranian people were in favour of their government’s sending troops to Syria, and maintaining its support for Assad. Indeed, the emergence of the ISIS as a serious threat has made Iranians moresupportive forIran’s Syria policy. As a matter of fact, it is seen that many Iranians are more interested in fighting against ISIS than safeguarding Assad's power.

Astana

What did Iran gain in Syria in return for all the prices she paid? The Assad regimeis still standing, but itcannot control a significant part ofthe country. All Syria is in ruins. Moreover, the Iranian support was insufficient to keep Assad on his feet, and Iran lost a significant part of her role to Russia. Nevertheless, she has been a part of the efforts for international solutions from whichshe was excluded for a long time. The tripartite meeting in Moscow on December 21, 2016 enabled Iran to stand outin this process.

Under these circumstances, Iran,as a party to the Moscow Declaration, is now trying to be one of the architects of the Syrian peace process in Astana. Iran will work there for a building a consensus on a transition process under the stewardship of Assad. Thus, she aims both to recoverher regional popularity to some extent, and to have a say in the future of Syria. The prospective positive outcomes that would be yielded in Astana will also help to satisfy Iran's search for regional status.

http://orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/5058?s=orsam|english 

Trilateral Meeting Between Turkey, Iran and Russia and the Moscow Declaration

Trilateral Meeting Between Turkey, Iran and Russia and the Moscow Declaration

Bayram Sinkaya

Diplomatic interactions have been accelerated between Turkey, Iran and Russia since August 2016. Issues like the crisis in Syria, the Operation Euphrates Shield, and fight against terrorism have constituted the main agenda of those diplomatic contacts. Additionally, there has been an ongoing close cooperation between Iran and Russia particularly with regard to Syria. After the Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis, the two countries have set up a joint ‘information center’ in Baghdad in order to coordinate their relations, which has also been joined by the Assad administration and the Iraqi government. Iran permitted Russian warplanes to use its aerospace and airbase in Hamadan. They have also assigned Alexander Lavrentiev, Special Representative of Russian President Vladimir Putin for Syria, and Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of Iran, for the coordination of cooperation between the two countries with related to the Syria issue. As in the words of Ali Akbar Velayati, a key figure in decision-making regarding Iranian policy towards Syria, Iran and Russia have a “common ground” with regard to Syria, for the “prevention of the collapse of Syria and protection of its territorial integrity” and they corresponded their activities in the region with the Assad administration. Defense ministers of the three countries held a joint meeting in Tehran in June 2016, and their foreign ministers met at Moscow in October 2016.

While Turkey has intensified its relations and exchanges with Russia and Iran, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Javad Zarif, according to the Iranian sources, put forward the idea of trilateral meeting of the three countries to address the Syria issue. The failure of previous attempts led by Russia and the United States to solve the issue, in other words, “the failure to implement decisions” that were made with the United States, as stated by Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, paved the ground for the trilateral meeting. The fact that all the three states have been disturbed by some of the US policies in Syria, and they have common concerns with regard to the preservation of territorial integrity of Syria and the fight against terrorism,helped to devise a mechanism for trilateral meeting. Yet, it was not easy to come that point. Mistrust between the parties turned into a crisis at times as in the case of evacuation of civilians and armed opposition from Aleppo. Some militiamen affiliated with Iran, who thought themselves to be excluded from the deal brokered between Turkey and Russia, attacked the evacuation convoys. Iran was thinking that a cease-fire and evacuation would serve to interests of the insurgents. Additionally, in return for the evacuation of opposition from Aleppo, Iranian allied forces asked the evacuation of Shiite civilians and wounded people in the towns of Foua and Kafraya that have been besieged by the opposition forces in the countryside of Idlib. Then, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rezai tweeted on December 18, “any secret political or field agreement in Syria is doomed to failure without Iran’s participation.”

The growing cooperation and dialogue between the three countries, however, yielded first concrete results on the issue of evacuation from Aleppo. Despite the frequent attacks on the evacuation convoys, the operations were maintained through intensive exchanges between Ankara, Tehran and Moscow. Eventually, the trilateral meeting, which was initially designed to be held on December 27, moved to an earlier date and heldin Moscow on December 20. Russian Foreign Minister initially held bilateral meetings with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, and then they held a joint session. In the meantime, Sergei Shoigu, Russian defense minister, met his Turkish and Iranian counterparts Fikri Işık and Hossein Dehqhan respectively. At the end of the talks, they issued the Joint Statement of Iranian, Russian and Turkish Foreign Ministers; in other words, the ‘Moscow Declaration.’

The Moscow Declaration 

The Moscow Declaration that consisted of eight articles, “reiterated full respect” of the three countries “for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as multi-ethnic, multi-religious, non-sectarian, democratic and secular state.” The parties welcomed “joint efforts in Eastern Aleppo allowing for voluntary evacuation of civilians and organized departure of armed opposition.” They underlined “the importance of expanding ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian assistance and free movement of civilians throughout the country.” Turkey, Iran, and Russia reiterated “their determination to fight jointly against ISIL/DAESH and Al-Nusra and to separate from them armed opposition groups.”

It is stated in the declaration that “there is no military solution to the Syrian conflict.” The parties recognized “the essential role of the United Nations in the efforts to resolve this crisis in accordance with UNSC resolution 2254 (2015).” The Ministers also noted “the decisions of the International Syria Support Croup (ISSG).” Iran, Russia and Turkey expressed “their readiness to facilitate and become the guarantors of the prospective agreement, being negotiated, between the Syrian Government and the opposition.” The parties stated, “they strongly believe” that the Moscow Declaration would be “instrumental to create the necessary momentum for the resumption of the political process in Syria in accordance with the UNSC resolution 2254.”

The most important outcome of the Moscow meeting was that for the first time such a trilateral session of Turkey, Iran and Russia for the solution of Syria crisis was held. Indeed, the three countries have previously joined various multilateral conferences in different formats. But, the three countries joined together for the first time in the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG), which was held in Vienna in October 2015. The UNSC Resolution 2254 dated December 18, 2015 endorsed the “Vienna statements”as well as the 2012 Geneva Communiqué that envisaged “a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in order to end the conflict in Syria.” Nevertheless, tangible outcomes have not been achieved until today because of the ongoing clashes in the field and various problems that come up in the implementation of agreed points.

Apparently, the Moscow Declaration complemented the Vienna statements of ISSG and UNSC Resolution 2254. In other words, most of the points stated in the Moscow Declaration were the points that were agreed in previous international meetings. In his address to the press after the trilateral session, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, stated that “some countries” that were pursuing “the goal of changing the government in Syria” have come to “see that the top priority should not be government change but the liquidation of the terrorist threat.” “The three countries that are represented here share this understanding”, he added. Nevertheless, though the declaration did not directly address the transition issue, the references to UNSC Resolution 2254 and to the statements of ISSG demonstrate the commitment of the three countries to “transition process” envisaged by the Geneva Communiqué.

The Moscow Declaration, however, differed from previous international initiatives because it stated that Turkey, Iran and Russia “expressed their readiness” to become “the guarantors of the prospective agreement” to be negotiated between the Syrian government and the opposition. The record of cooperation between the three countries on the evacuation from the Eastern Aleppo is promising for reaching a settlement under their mediation and guarantee. Additionally, continuation of the trilateral meetings and prospective positive outcomes of the negotiations may lay the ground for establishment and institutionalization of a regional cooperation mechanism to address regional issues.

Although the three countries have reached an agreement on certain points, those factors that hindered the realization of previous international decisionsfor solution of the Syriancrisis are still there. The prolongation of clashes in the field, divisions within the opposition and disagreements on the representation of the opposition, problems regarding the implementation of agreed points, and rival interests and policies of other regional and international actors etc. may prevent a rapid political solutionfor the Syriancrisis.

 2016-12-22

https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/trilateral-meeting-between-turkey-iran-and-russia-and-the-moscow-declaration/