Looking back on the Iran-Britain hostage crisis
After the Iranian Revolutionary Guards took 15 British soldiers captive in the Persian Gulf on March 23, new worries emerged that it would lead to new fighting in the region. As it was the possibility of a serious clash between the US and Iran was already being discussed and, after the capture of the 15 British soldiers, a third US air carrier was moved to the Gulf. Was the capture of those 15 British soldiers going to be like the definitive Gulf of Tonkin episode, which wound up pulling the US into the Vietnam War, except this time would it signal the start of serious clashes between the US and Iran? After around 12 days of anxious waiting we were able to breathe a sigh of relief when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad decided to free the 15 soldiers on April 4, in honor of, as he noted, the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday and Easter. Now we can look back and ask ourselves what actually happened.
The first thing to come to mind right after the capture of the 15 soldiers was the arrest of the five Iranian “diplomats” in Iraq, the disappearance in Turkey of former Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ali Reza Asghari and the rising protests over the presence of US military in the Persian Gulf, plus the likelihood that this would be used in any negotiations to follow. In truth, “hostage taking” had been used frequently before as a means of negotiation. But at those times it had been Hezbollah in Lebanon acting in the place of Iran. Hezbollah would take Westerners in Lebanon hostage, and then there would be bargaining between Iran and other countries, after which Iran would use its power over Hezbollah to arrange the freedom of the hostage(s). In any case the events of March 23 were different from all this.
There had been an event quite similar to the March 23 crisis in 2004: At that time the Iranians had again grabbed eight British soldiers whom they accused of straying out of Iraqi waters and into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. These hostages had been marched out blindfolded on Iranian television, and they had “admitted” to their crimes on live television. These hostages were set free three days after their capture. But at that time it was Muhammed Hatemi who was in power in Tehran, and the release of the hostages was attributed to Hatemi’s “moderate nature.” This time, though, it was the comparatively radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power in Tehran, and whether through his radical stance on Israel or his “stubborn” stance on Iran’s nuclear program, Ahmadinejad’s very presence sparked more question marks in the minds of those watching events unfold.
Thus the events this time round resembled much more the events of 1979, when Khomeini was in power in Iran. On Nov. 4, 1979, “revolutionary” university students took over the US Embassy in Tehran, accusing it of being a “den of spies,” and taking the embassy employees inside hostage. One interesting parallel between the 1979 and 2007 crises has been the prominent role played by the Revolutionary Guards. Not only did these Revolutionary Guards play a trigger role in both crises, but the declarations in each incident that female hostages would be released first was also another parallel. Though these similarities seemed to strengthen suspicions that this 2007 crisis would only continue, in the end, it was over in 12 days, while the 1979 crisis lasted 444.
Another factor making it seem likely that the Iranian-British hostage crisis would lead to warfare was that during the 1979 hostage crisis the US had embarked on an unsuccessful attempt on April 25, 1980 to rescue the hostages. Despite the domestic political chaos of Iran during 1979-80, Iran had itself slipped completely under the sphere of Soviet influence, meaning that international strategic worries and plans prevented a new operation from taking place against Iran in 1979 and no violent clashes took place between the US and Iran over this crisis. In this 2007 crisis, however, the international situation was very different than what it was nearly 30 years beforehand. There was a much more tension in place between the US and Iran due to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the US Middle East policies.
And so there was no guarantee that this particular crisis would not end in a military clash. First of all, Iran made visible attempts to treat the captured soldiers well, and clarified that it wanted to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. For this reason, Iran expected Britain to apologize for what it maintained had been a violation of its waters. But, as is known, nations do not make apologies. Still the fact that Iran was insisting on a diplomatic solution to the crisis was a source of comfort to many.
Another reason for optimism in this crisis had to do with Iran’s domestic politics. In Iran, even if there is no “democracy,” there is a “pluralistic” political structure. What this means is that since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has been wavering between radicalism and pragmatism in its politics and foreign policy. No matter how fiercely Iran denounces the various international rulings, embargoes and isolationary measures against it, Iran can come to agreement when faced with the greater interests of its revolution and people. This is precisely how Ayatollah Khomeini behaved. And it was within just such a framework that Iran avoiding entering into violent clashes with the US, whom it would not have been able to face one-on-one. The limited clashes that broke out in 1988 in the Basra Gulf between the Revolutionary Guards and the US military, even the striking of a Iranian Airlines civilian flight by a missile from a US warship, never opened the path to violent clashes between Iran and the US. To the contrary, Ayatollah Khomeini even made a decision about which he commented, “working for the greatest interest of the people of the nation is sometimes like drinking hemlock,” and he then put a stop to the clashes in the Persian Gulf between Iraqi and Iranian forces. Today, no matter how thin the wire is stretched on both sides of these matters, Iran will still, if necessary to escape entering into clashes with the US, drink that same hemlock.
One of the many reasons for the Nov. 4, 1979 take over of the US Embassy in Tehran was that it was a response to the Nov. 2, 1979 meeting between then-temporary Prime Minister Mehdi Bazergan and US National Security Consultant Zbigniew Brezinski. And thus how interesting it is that this past March American and Iranian diplomats once again met together in Baghdad! The events of Nov. 4 had ended with moderate Bazergan's government having to step back from power, but the events of March 23 allowed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to firm up his stance against domestic "pragmatists" who had been making things tougher within Iran for him by championing the development of more constructive relations with the rest of the world.
In the end, Ahmadinejad's administration let the British hostage crisis end in a successful manner, and thus the crisis ended surprisingly in both manner and method. Ahmadinejad had expressed to the world outside Iran his nation's desire to avoid military clashes, while also relaying the message that Iran is not a rogue state. At the same time, within Iran, he let his competition know that he would protect the country's honor while developing relations with the West. In this way, the 2007 Britain-Iran hostage crisis was prevented from turning into another Gulf of Tonkin episode, though this in no way means that the waters of the Persian Gulf are calm again.
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* Atatürk University/Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ) International Relations Faculty research assistant
13 April 2007, Friday
TODAY'S ZAMAN
The first thing to come to mind right after the capture of the 15 soldiers was the arrest of the five Iranian “diplomats” in Iraq, the disappearance in Turkey of former Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ali Reza Asghari and the rising protests over the presence of US military in the Persian Gulf, plus the likelihood that this would be used in any negotiations to follow. In truth, “hostage taking” had been used frequently before as a means of negotiation. But at those times it had been Hezbollah in Lebanon acting in the place of Iran. Hezbollah would take Westerners in Lebanon hostage, and then there would be bargaining between Iran and other countries, after which Iran would use its power over Hezbollah to arrange the freedom of the hostage(s). In any case the events of March 23 were different from all this.
There had been an event quite similar to the March 23 crisis in 2004: At that time the Iranians had again grabbed eight British soldiers whom they accused of straying out of Iraqi waters and into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. These hostages had been marched out blindfolded on Iranian television, and they had “admitted” to their crimes on live television. These hostages were set free three days after their capture. But at that time it was Muhammed Hatemi who was in power in Tehran, and the release of the hostages was attributed to Hatemi’s “moderate nature.” This time, though, it was the comparatively radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power in Tehran, and whether through his radical stance on Israel or his “stubborn” stance on Iran’s nuclear program, Ahmadinejad’s very presence sparked more question marks in the minds of those watching events unfold.
Thus the events this time round resembled much more the events of 1979, when Khomeini was in power in Iran. On Nov. 4, 1979, “revolutionary” university students took over the US Embassy in Tehran, accusing it of being a “den of spies,” and taking the embassy employees inside hostage. One interesting parallel between the 1979 and 2007 crises has been the prominent role played by the Revolutionary Guards. Not only did these Revolutionary Guards play a trigger role in both crises, but the declarations in each incident that female hostages would be released first was also another parallel. Though these similarities seemed to strengthen suspicions that this 2007 crisis would only continue, in the end, it was over in 12 days, while the 1979 crisis lasted 444.
Another factor making it seem likely that the Iranian-British hostage crisis would lead to warfare was that during the 1979 hostage crisis the US had embarked on an unsuccessful attempt on April 25, 1980 to rescue the hostages. Despite the domestic political chaos of Iran during 1979-80, Iran had itself slipped completely under the sphere of Soviet influence, meaning that international strategic worries and plans prevented a new operation from taking place against Iran in 1979 and no violent clashes took place between the US and Iran over this crisis. In this 2007 crisis, however, the international situation was very different than what it was nearly 30 years beforehand. There was a much more tension in place between the US and Iran due to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the US Middle East policies.
And so there was no guarantee that this particular crisis would not end in a military clash. First of all, Iran made visible attempts to treat the captured soldiers well, and clarified that it wanted to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. For this reason, Iran expected Britain to apologize for what it maintained had been a violation of its waters. But, as is known, nations do not make apologies. Still the fact that Iran was insisting on a diplomatic solution to the crisis was a source of comfort to many.
Another reason for optimism in this crisis had to do with Iran’s domestic politics. In Iran, even if there is no “democracy,” there is a “pluralistic” political structure. What this means is that since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has been wavering between radicalism and pragmatism in its politics and foreign policy. No matter how fiercely Iran denounces the various international rulings, embargoes and isolationary measures against it, Iran can come to agreement when faced with the greater interests of its revolution and people. This is precisely how Ayatollah Khomeini behaved. And it was within just such a framework that Iran avoiding entering into violent clashes with the US, whom it would not have been able to face one-on-one. The limited clashes that broke out in 1988 in the Basra Gulf between the Revolutionary Guards and the US military, even the striking of a Iranian Airlines civilian flight by a missile from a US warship, never opened the path to violent clashes between Iran and the US. To the contrary, Ayatollah Khomeini even made a decision about which he commented, “working for the greatest interest of the people of the nation is sometimes like drinking hemlock,” and he then put a stop to the clashes in the Persian Gulf between Iraqi and Iranian forces. Today, no matter how thin the wire is stretched on both sides of these matters, Iran will still, if necessary to escape entering into clashes with the US, drink that same hemlock.
One of the many reasons for the Nov. 4, 1979 take over of the US Embassy in Tehran was that it was a response to the Nov. 2, 1979 meeting between then-temporary Prime Minister Mehdi Bazergan and US National Security Consultant Zbigniew Brezinski. And thus how interesting it is that this past March American and Iranian diplomats once again met together in Baghdad! The events of Nov. 4 had ended with moderate Bazergan's government having to step back from power, but the events of March 23 allowed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to firm up his stance against domestic "pragmatists" who had been making things tougher within Iran for him by championing the development of more constructive relations with the rest of the world.
In the end, Ahmadinejad's administration let the British hostage crisis end in a successful manner, and thus the crisis ended surprisingly in both manner and method. Ahmadinejad had expressed to the world outside Iran his nation's desire to avoid military clashes, while also relaying the message that Iran is not a rogue state. At the same time, within Iran, he let his competition know that he would protect the country's honor while developing relations with the West. In this way, the 2007 Britain-Iran hostage crisis was prevented from turning into another Gulf of Tonkin episode, though this in no way means that the waters of the Persian Gulf are calm again.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Atatürk University/Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ) International Relations Faculty research assistant
13 April 2007, Friday
TODAY'S ZAMAN