Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Issue: From a Passive Stance to the Actual Contributor tho the Peaceful Solution?
Bayram Sinkaya, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of International Relations, METU / ORSAM Middle E
Turkey’s approach towards the Iranian nuclear program has been widely regarded the political circles, especially in the Western ones, as a litmus testing for its loyalty to the alliance with the West. Turkey’s compromising attitude towards Iran in the last year, particularly its opposition to the imposition of new round of UN sanctions on Iran, and its improving bilateral relations with Iran considered by some analysts as a change of axis in Turkish foreign policy, or Islamification of Turkish foreign policy under the ruling AK Party government. This paper argues that Turkey’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Iran and the West, and its compromising attitude towards Iran is based on its interests invested in balancing its good relations with the West and its improving relations with Iran, and preventing escalation of conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, rather than ideological convictions. That is why, Turkey’s position towards the Iranian nuclear issue changed three times, under the same government, the ruling AK Party, from a passive stance to the facilitator, and to the mediator, all aimed at a peaceful solution of the issue. Indeed, regarding the conflict between Iran and the West that aroused from Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey’s national interest lies in the peaceful solution of the issue. Therefore, Turkey ought to, and could, play an active role in peaceful solution of the conflict on Iran’s nuclear program.
A Passive Stance
Although the Iranian nuclear program has been one of the top issues on the international agenda since the mid-1990s, Turkey remained indifferent towards the issue for a long time. Until 2005, Iranian nuclear program has been rarely addressed in the Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkish officials recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology and advocated solution of the issue by diplomatic means.
Meanwhile the great powers adopted different approaches towards Iran; while the United States runs an uncompromising containment policy against Iran, in order to force it to abandon the considered policies; the EU countries instead adopted a policy of diplomatic engagement and negotiation in the Iranian issue. Concomitantly, Russia and China enhanced their relations with Iran and helped it to advance its nuclear program and missile technology. Different attitudes of the great powers relieved to Turkey’s hand to act freely in its relations with Iran. Although the security elite in Turkey steadily raised concerns about the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, the Turkish government did not want to disturb its relations with Iran. Because the prospective nuclear Iran regarded by the US-led international community as a threat to international security, the Turkish governments adopted a wait-and-see policy and waited for a solution for the issue through negotiations between the conflicting parties.
From a Passive Stance to the Facilitator
The failure of the EU strategy to negotiate with Iran in due process was probably the main reason for the other great powers to join ranks with the US. Meanwhile, emergence of a hardliner political leadership in Iran under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad worsened the prospect of a negotiable solution for the Iranian nuclear issue. Eventually, the Iranian nuclear dossier was transferred to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Those developments pushed Turkey in an awkward situation that enforced it to make a choice between its Western allies and neighboring Iran.
Although the US administration of the time was undecided how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, alongside with rumors ranging from imposing various kind of embargos to an unilateral military attack, the US officials continuously urged their Turkish counterparts to cooperate against Iran. It was difficult for the Turkish government to turn down US demands, because it was seeking to restore its relations with the United States that had been deteriorated in the preceding years. On the other hand, Iran presented a growing market and partnership in regional security matters. Additionally, it started to supply thirty percent of Turkey’s natural gas consumption. Meanwhile, some Turkish officials, military officials and diplomats publicly declared their concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear program was identified as a precarious issue for Turkey in the National Security Policy Document of 2005.
Consequently, Turkey avoided publicly siding either with the United States or with Iran. However, the deadlock over the issue was suspended over Turkey like the looming sword of Damocles. As a matter of fact, an assertive policy against Iran as championed by the United States in order to stop Iran’s nuclear program was unlikely a policy to be favored by Turkey, which would be brought in an impasse between the two sides – a move which would adversely affect stability and security in its immediate neighborhood. Under those circumstances, Turkey abandoned its wait-and-see policy and adopted a facilitator position, encouraging the parties to reach a solution through negotiations. A negotiated solution for the issue would release Turkey from its difficult position to balance its warm relations both with the Western countries and with Iran. Additionally it would prevent adverse affects of a likely military conflict between the United States and Iran, or the sanction regime against Iran.
Within the framework of its policy as a facilitator, Turkey encouraged the parties to take an affirmative position in the negotiations. In this regard, Iranian chief negotiator and Secretary of National Security Council, Ali Larijani visited Ankara in May 2006 and met with high-level Turkish officials. The message given by the Turkish officials to Larijani was clear: although Turkey recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, Iran’s stand against the nuclear watchdog, i.e. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Security Council would not serve Iranian interests, which implied Turkey’s disturbance with the handling of the issue.[i] Furthermore Turkey hosted a meeting between Javier Solana, High Commissar of the EU in charge of negotiation with Iran, and Laricani in Ankara in April 2007. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan received Larijani before the meeting and asked him to be affirmative to resolve the issue through negotiation and international cooperation.[ii] Turkey stepped in again in order to ease the tension between Iran and the Six (The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that came to the negotiation table in July 2008, when, the Six offered Iran a package of incentives in return for freezing uranium enrichment. In due process, the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who replaced Larijani in October 2007, paid a visit to Istanbul and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on his way back from Geneva to Teheran. Babacan defined Turkey’s role as a facilitator that was trying “to rectify any misunderstandings and ensure that they better understand their mutual concerns.”[iii]
But the ongoing negotiations between the Six and Iran failed to reach a solution, as well. Meanwhile the UN Security Council resolute five consecutive decisions against Iran, which asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, complete cooperation with the IAEA, and envisaged limited sanctions against Iran on ground of its nuclear and missile program. However, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program and enrich uranium.
From the Facilitator to the Mediator
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue changed again in late 2008. In a visit to the United States in November, Erdogan announced that Turkey could officially mediate between the United States and Iran based on its previous experiences.[iv] The new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomed Turkey’s bid for the mediator position, and said that the new administration would ask Turkey’s support to engage with Iran. However, the Iranian officials denied Turkey’s claim for mediation. President Ahmadinejad stated that there was no need for Turkey’s mediation.[v]
Turkey’s actual mediation started only after the failure of the swap agreement negotiated in Vienna, in October 2009, between the Six and Iran. Then, Director of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradey put forward the idea of placing Iran’s low-enriched uranium in the custody, until the Vienna group supply Iran with uranium fuel. The idea, which was immediately accepted by Turkey, was also backed by the United States and Russia. However, Iran remained cautious towards Baradey’s suggestion and announced that it would not ship its low-enriched uranium outside the country.
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to press Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap agreement, and continuously talked to the officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA. In April, after President Obama’s request, Brazil also involved in Turkey’s mediation efforts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey persuaded Iran to sign a framework agreement in May 2010, which would facilitate uranium swap between the Vienna group and Iran. However, the Vienna group found the agreement inadequate and rejected it, which was ensued by a new round of UN Security Council sanctions (RES 1929) against Iran.
Disappointed with the West
The rejection of the swap agreement by the Vienna group, i.e. the Western countries, provoked a Turkish reaction against the Western countries and their demand for additional sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it rejected to approve the new sanctions in the UN Security Council.
Turkey’s reaction to the Western countries stemmed from Turkish officials’ disappointment with the US and European officials, who encouraged Turkey to persuade Iran for a compromise over the swap agreement. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, pointed out that in view of the fact that Turkey had virtually accomplished everything in its negotiations demanded by Western officials, it is understandable that the rejection of this agreement evoked the idea among Turkish officials that the West does not recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and wishes to keep its monopoly over the nuclear energy. Furthermore, the Turkish officials argued that Western countries ran a hypocritical policy as they deny Iran the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, whilst turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons of Israel. For the very same reason Turkish officials firmly repudiated the call of Western countries for additional sanctions towards Iran. Davutoglu stated that it is unacceptable that sanction resolutions are drafted by only a few countries, which try to urge the remaining members of the UN Security Council to approve them.
Apart from a critical approach to the West, Turkey’s opposition to the new sanctions was also based on some rational reasons. To begin with, the Turkish government argued that any sanction against the regime is bound to fail, as in most cases sanctions end inconclusively. Moreover, while sanctions have been inconclusive in terms of political outcomes, they may entail human disasters instead. Moreover the Turkish officials claimed that sanctions would further isolate Iran, which would consequently adopt a more aggressive role, and thus destabilize Turkey’s neighborhood. Besides the common view on sanctions is that they might form the prelude for the very same military hostilities Turkey has been trying to avoid for years. Additionally, in case of an approval of the sanction resolution drafted by the United States, Turkey’s ambition to emerge as an influential and powerful regional player would be hampered considerably. The additional sanctions also threatened Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. Turkey, with its 10-bilion US dollars trade volume with Iran, emerged as one of the few countries that would be adversely affected by the sanctions.
Convention of the Iranian Neighbors: A Prospective Contribution to the Peaceful Solution?
It has become a cliché that “Turkey is a country that will be most negatively affected by a nuclear Iran.” It appears that the deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue is also equally adversely affecting Turkey. Turkey, as the first country adversely affected either by a deadlock over Iran’s nuclear issue, or nuclear-armed Iran, should found a solution to the issue. But it is a difficult mission for Turkey because of its institutional liabilities to realize alone. Nevertheless, Turkey is not the only country which raises concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran or deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran has twelve additional neighbors and, probably with the exception of Pakistan, all share this common concern with Turkey on regard to Iran. They are also agitated by the idea of a possible military attack against Iran in order to stop its nuclear program.
Different from the United States and the EU countries, all neighbors of Iran, including Turkey, have recognized Iran’s right to develop, possess, and use peaceful nuclear energy and uranium enrichment respectively. Moreover, Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy is guaranteed by international agreements, the NPT. Although the Western countries also admitted Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear energy, they deny Iran’s right to enrich uranium, because they do not trust in the political regime in Iran. The ups and downs in Iran’s relations with the atomic watchdog, IAEA, further fuels suspicions of the Western countries about Iran’s intentions. Moreover, Irans uncompromising stance on the issue and the ups and downs in its relations with the IAEA, made the neighboring countries to question Iran’s hidden intentions, too.
Therefore, in any bid to provide a peaceful solution to the issue, the Iranian officials should convince their colleagues that Iran’s nuclear program is certainly peaceful. Since any conviction, in this regard, is bound to the complete supervision of the IAEA that would be facilitated through Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Until now, the Western countries failed to persuade Iran to the complete supervision of the IAEA.
Contrary to its confrontationist policy towards the West regarding the nuclear issue, however, Iran has been courting for political support of its neighboring countries, thus trying to allay their suspicions. In this regard, Turkey may take the lead to convene Iran’s neighbors and convey the following message to Iran: Although the neighboring countries recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, they have been concerned with uncertainty over the Iranian nuclear program, and asking further cooperation with the atomic watchdog, the IAEA. If Iran accepts the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which will facilitate further IAEA inspections over the Iranian nuclear program, both Turkey and other neighbors of Iran, and the Western countries could be relieved of their suspicion towards Iran. Thus, if Iran accepts implementation of the Protocol, the Western countries might concede to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the key issue for the solution of the problem.
Whether Iran concedes to implement the Protocol considering the fact that it rejected such demands of the Western countries throughout the negotiation process? Iran’s opposition to the Additional Protocol derives from its ‘nationalist’ concerns because it entailed the uninformed verifications of the IAEA officials. Furthermore, Iran concerned with probable penetration of Western intelligence agents into the verification teams. Last, but not least, although the West arrogantly asked Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, in return, it did compromised on anything.
Therefore, if the neighboring countries ask Iran to implement the Additional Protocol in return for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, it may sense for the Iranian leadership. Under an increased international and internal pressure, Iran may respond positively to such demand for the expediency of the political regime. Moreover, if the neighboring countries may coordinate their negotiations with Iran and the West, the chance of the initiative to reach a peaceful solution would increase, as it shown in the swap agreement. Finally, relying on its previous experiences in the conventions of the Iraqi neighboring countries, mediation of efforts, and regional approaches, Turkey could take the lead to launch such an initiative.
* This paper is draft of author’s presentation at the MERIJ-ORSAM-METU Joint Meeting titled “Contemporary Middle East: The Turkish and Japanese Perspectives,” held in METU, Ankara, Turkey, on November 23, 2010.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Milliyet, 8 May 2006.
[ii] Zaman, 26 April 2007; Hilal Köylü, “İran’la nükleer gerilime Ankara’da deva aranıyor,” Radikal, 26 April 2007.
[iii] “Turkey Intensifies Efforts to Mediate between Iran, West,” Fars News Agency, 22 July 2008.
[iv] “Erdoğan Washington’da Konuştu,” Hürriyet, 14 November 2008.
[v] “Ahmadinejad: No need for Turkish mediation,” Press TV, 11 March 2009.
December 3 2010
http://orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=323
Turkey’s approach towards the Iranian nuclear program has been widely regarded the political circles, especially in the Western ones, as a litmus testing for its loyalty to the alliance with the West. Turkey’s compromising attitude towards Iran in the last year, particularly its opposition to the imposition of new round of UN sanctions on Iran, and its improving bilateral relations with Iran considered by some analysts as a change of axis in Turkish foreign policy, or Islamification of Turkish foreign policy under the ruling AK Party government. This paper argues that Turkey’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Iran and the West, and its compromising attitude towards Iran is based on its interests invested in balancing its good relations with the West and its improving relations with Iran, and preventing escalation of conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, rather than ideological convictions. That is why, Turkey’s position towards the Iranian nuclear issue changed three times, under the same government, the ruling AK Party, from a passive stance to the facilitator, and to the mediator, all aimed at a peaceful solution of the issue. Indeed, regarding the conflict between Iran and the West that aroused from Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey’s national interest lies in the peaceful solution of the issue. Therefore, Turkey ought to, and could, play an active role in peaceful solution of the conflict on Iran’s nuclear program.
A Passive Stance
Although the Iranian nuclear program has been one of the top issues on the international agenda since the mid-1990s, Turkey remained indifferent towards the issue for a long time. Until 2005, Iranian nuclear program has been rarely addressed in the Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkish officials recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology and advocated solution of the issue by diplomatic means.
Meanwhile the great powers adopted different approaches towards Iran; while the United States runs an uncompromising containment policy against Iran, in order to force it to abandon the considered policies; the EU countries instead adopted a policy of diplomatic engagement and negotiation in the Iranian issue. Concomitantly, Russia and China enhanced their relations with Iran and helped it to advance its nuclear program and missile technology. Different attitudes of the great powers relieved to Turkey’s hand to act freely in its relations with Iran. Although the security elite in Turkey steadily raised concerns about the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, the Turkish government did not want to disturb its relations with Iran. Because the prospective nuclear Iran regarded by the US-led international community as a threat to international security, the Turkish governments adopted a wait-and-see policy and waited for a solution for the issue through negotiations between the conflicting parties.
From a Passive Stance to the Facilitator
The failure of the EU strategy to negotiate with Iran in due process was probably the main reason for the other great powers to join ranks with the US. Meanwhile, emergence of a hardliner political leadership in Iran under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad worsened the prospect of a negotiable solution for the Iranian nuclear issue. Eventually, the Iranian nuclear dossier was transferred to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Those developments pushed Turkey in an awkward situation that enforced it to make a choice between its Western allies and neighboring Iran.
Although the US administration of the time was undecided how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, alongside with rumors ranging from imposing various kind of embargos to an unilateral military attack, the US officials continuously urged their Turkish counterparts to cooperate against Iran. It was difficult for the Turkish government to turn down US demands, because it was seeking to restore its relations with the United States that had been deteriorated in the preceding years. On the other hand, Iran presented a growing market and partnership in regional security matters. Additionally, it started to supply thirty percent of Turkey’s natural gas consumption. Meanwhile, some Turkish officials, military officials and diplomats publicly declared their concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear program was identified as a precarious issue for Turkey in the National Security Policy Document of 2005.
Consequently, Turkey avoided publicly siding either with the United States or with Iran. However, the deadlock over the issue was suspended over Turkey like the looming sword of Damocles. As a matter of fact, an assertive policy against Iran as championed by the United States in order to stop Iran’s nuclear program was unlikely a policy to be favored by Turkey, which would be brought in an impasse between the two sides – a move which would adversely affect stability and security in its immediate neighborhood. Under those circumstances, Turkey abandoned its wait-and-see policy and adopted a facilitator position, encouraging the parties to reach a solution through negotiations. A negotiated solution for the issue would release Turkey from its difficult position to balance its warm relations both with the Western countries and with Iran. Additionally it would prevent adverse affects of a likely military conflict between the United States and Iran, or the sanction regime against Iran.
Within the framework of its policy as a facilitator, Turkey encouraged the parties to take an affirmative position in the negotiations. In this regard, Iranian chief negotiator and Secretary of National Security Council, Ali Larijani visited Ankara in May 2006 and met with high-level Turkish officials. The message given by the Turkish officials to Larijani was clear: although Turkey recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, Iran’s stand against the nuclear watchdog, i.e. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Security Council would not serve Iranian interests, which implied Turkey’s disturbance with the handling of the issue.[i] Furthermore Turkey hosted a meeting between Javier Solana, High Commissar of the EU in charge of negotiation with Iran, and Laricani in Ankara in April 2007. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan received Larijani before the meeting and asked him to be affirmative to resolve the issue through negotiation and international cooperation.[ii] Turkey stepped in again in order to ease the tension between Iran and the Six (The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that came to the negotiation table in July 2008, when, the Six offered Iran a package of incentives in return for freezing uranium enrichment. In due process, the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who replaced Larijani in October 2007, paid a visit to Istanbul and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on his way back from Geneva to Teheran. Babacan defined Turkey’s role as a facilitator that was trying “to rectify any misunderstandings and ensure that they better understand their mutual concerns.”[iii]
But the ongoing negotiations between the Six and Iran failed to reach a solution, as well. Meanwhile the UN Security Council resolute five consecutive decisions against Iran, which asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, complete cooperation with the IAEA, and envisaged limited sanctions against Iran on ground of its nuclear and missile program. However, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program and enrich uranium.
From the Facilitator to the Mediator
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue changed again in late 2008. In a visit to the United States in November, Erdogan announced that Turkey could officially mediate between the United States and Iran based on its previous experiences.[iv] The new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomed Turkey’s bid for the mediator position, and said that the new administration would ask Turkey’s support to engage with Iran. However, the Iranian officials denied Turkey’s claim for mediation. President Ahmadinejad stated that there was no need for Turkey’s mediation.[v]
Turkey’s actual mediation started only after the failure of the swap agreement negotiated in Vienna, in October 2009, between the Six and Iran. Then, Director of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradey put forward the idea of placing Iran’s low-enriched uranium in the custody, until the Vienna group supply Iran with uranium fuel. The idea, which was immediately accepted by Turkey, was also backed by the United States and Russia. However, Iran remained cautious towards Baradey’s suggestion and announced that it would not ship its low-enriched uranium outside the country.
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to press Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap agreement, and continuously talked to the officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA. In April, after President Obama’s request, Brazil also involved in Turkey’s mediation efforts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey persuaded Iran to sign a framework agreement in May 2010, which would facilitate uranium swap between the Vienna group and Iran. However, the Vienna group found the agreement inadequate and rejected it, which was ensued by a new round of UN Security Council sanctions (RES 1929) against Iran.
Disappointed with the West
The rejection of the swap agreement by the Vienna group, i.e. the Western countries, provoked a Turkish reaction against the Western countries and their demand for additional sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it rejected to approve the new sanctions in the UN Security Council.
Turkey’s reaction to the Western countries stemmed from Turkish officials’ disappointment with the US and European officials, who encouraged Turkey to persuade Iran for a compromise over the swap agreement. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, pointed out that in view of the fact that Turkey had virtually accomplished everything in its negotiations demanded by Western officials, it is understandable that the rejection of this agreement evoked the idea among Turkish officials that the West does not recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and wishes to keep its monopoly over the nuclear energy. Furthermore, the Turkish officials argued that Western countries ran a hypocritical policy as they deny Iran the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, whilst turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons of Israel. For the very same reason Turkish officials firmly repudiated the call of Western countries for additional sanctions towards Iran. Davutoglu stated that it is unacceptable that sanction resolutions are drafted by only a few countries, which try to urge the remaining members of the UN Security Council to approve them.
Apart from a critical approach to the West, Turkey’s opposition to the new sanctions was also based on some rational reasons. To begin with, the Turkish government argued that any sanction against the regime is bound to fail, as in most cases sanctions end inconclusively. Moreover, while sanctions have been inconclusive in terms of political outcomes, they may entail human disasters instead. Moreover the Turkish officials claimed that sanctions would further isolate Iran, which would consequently adopt a more aggressive role, and thus destabilize Turkey’s neighborhood. Besides the common view on sanctions is that they might form the prelude for the very same military hostilities Turkey has been trying to avoid for years. Additionally, in case of an approval of the sanction resolution drafted by the United States, Turkey’s ambition to emerge as an influential and powerful regional player would be hampered considerably. The additional sanctions also threatened Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. Turkey, with its 10-bilion US dollars trade volume with Iran, emerged as one of the few countries that would be adversely affected by the sanctions.
Convention of the Iranian Neighbors: A Prospective Contribution to the Peaceful Solution?
It has become a cliché that “Turkey is a country that will be most negatively affected by a nuclear Iran.” It appears that the deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue is also equally adversely affecting Turkey. Turkey, as the first country adversely affected either by a deadlock over Iran’s nuclear issue, or nuclear-armed Iran, should found a solution to the issue. But it is a difficult mission for Turkey because of its institutional liabilities to realize alone. Nevertheless, Turkey is not the only country which raises concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran or deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran has twelve additional neighbors and, probably with the exception of Pakistan, all share this common concern with Turkey on regard to Iran. They are also agitated by the idea of a possible military attack against Iran in order to stop its nuclear program.
Different from the United States and the EU countries, all neighbors of Iran, including Turkey, have recognized Iran’s right to develop, possess, and use peaceful nuclear energy and uranium enrichment respectively. Moreover, Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy is guaranteed by international agreements, the NPT. Although the Western countries also admitted Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear energy, they deny Iran’s right to enrich uranium, because they do not trust in the political regime in Iran. The ups and downs in Iran’s relations with the atomic watchdog, IAEA, further fuels suspicions of the Western countries about Iran’s intentions. Moreover, Irans uncompromising stance on the issue and the ups and downs in its relations with the IAEA, made the neighboring countries to question Iran’s hidden intentions, too.
Therefore, in any bid to provide a peaceful solution to the issue, the Iranian officials should convince their colleagues that Iran’s nuclear program is certainly peaceful. Since any conviction, in this regard, is bound to the complete supervision of the IAEA that would be facilitated through Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Until now, the Western countries failed to persuade Iran to the complete supervision of the IAEA.
Contrary to its confrontationist policy towards the West regarding the nuclear issue, however, Iran has been courting for political support of its neighboring countries, thus trying to allay their suspicions. In this regard, Turkey may take the lead to convene Iran’s neighbors and convey the following message to Iran: Although the neighboring countries recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, they have been concerned with uncertainty over the Iranian nuclear program, and asking further cooperation with the atomic watchdog, the IAEA. If Iran accepts the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which will facilitate further IAEA inspections over the Iranian nuclear program, both Turkey and other neighbors of Iran, and the Western countries could be relieved of their suspicion towards Iran. Thus, if Iran accepts implementation of the Protocol, the Western countries might concede to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the key issue for the solution of the problem.
Whether Iran concedes to implement the Protocol considering the fact that it rejected such demands of the Western countries throughout the negotiation process? Iran’s opposition to the Additional Protocol derives from its ‘nationalist’ concerns because it entailed the uninformed verifications of the IAEA officials. Furthermore, Iran concerned with probable penetration of Western intelligence agents into the verification teams. Last, but not least, although the West arrogantly asked Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, in return, it did compromised on anything.
Therefore, if the neighboring countries ask Iran to implement the Additional Protocol in return for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, it may sense for the Iranian leadership. Under an increased international and internal pressure, Iran may respond positively to such demand for the expediency of the political regime. Moreover, if the neighboring countries may coordinate their negotiations with Iran and the West, the chance of the initiative to reach a peaceful solution would increase, as it shown in the swap agreement. Finally, relying on its previous experiences in the conventions of the Iraqi neighboring countries, mediation of efforts, and regional approaches, Turkey could take the lead to launch such an initiative.
* This paper is draft of author’s presentation at the MERIJ-ORSAM-METU Joint Meeting titled “Contemporary Middle East: The Turkish and Japanese Perspectives,” held in METU, Ankara, Turkey, on November 23, 2010.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Milliyet, 8 May 2006.
[ii] Zaman, 26 April 2007; Hilal Köylü, “İran’la nükleer gerilime Ankara’da deva aranıyor,” Radikal, 26 April 2007.
[iii] “Turkey Intensifies Efforts to Mediate between Iran, West,” Fars News Agency, 22 July 2008.
[iv] “Erdoğan Washington’da Konuştu,” Hürriyet, 14 November 2008.
[v] “Ahmadinejad: No need for Turkish mediation,” Press TV, 11 March 2009.
December 3 2010
http://orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=323
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