Iran’s Negotiations with the 5 +1 Group: Negotiations Only in Name?
Iran’s Negotiations with the 5 +1 Group: Negotiations Only in Name?
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Political Advisor
Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group (the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members and Germany), which Turkey wants to host so that it will be included in the talks, are going to be held on October 1, in Geneva. The secretary of National Security Said Celili will be chair of the Iranian delegation, and European Commission Foreign Policy Commissioner Javier Solana will preside as moderator of the 5 +1 group's delegation. In April Iran responded to the P5+1 group’s proposal package which was prepared for the deliberation of Iran's nuclear program by preparing its own proposal package. The parties will begin negotiations over the package of proposals offered by Iran. However, both parties’ negotiating agendas and their expectations seem to be different, and this is expected to affect these negotiations negatively.
The P5+1 group’s purpose in these talks is to negotiate and come to an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program, and to persuade their Iranian counterparts to confirm that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. However, the Iranian side even did not even discuss its nuclear program in the proposal package, and the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has often proclaimed that Iran’s "nuclear rights" would never be subject to negotiation. Iran, a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), sees its peaceful nuclear energy program as a right, and recognizes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) instead of Security Council. During the October 1 negotiations, according to Iran’s proposal package, Iran is expected to discuss comprehensive subjects such as general international security issues, reorganization of the UN and its Security Council, and the nonproliferation and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.
Even though Solana will chair the P5+1 delegation, the P5+1 group’s disagreements about Iran’s nuclear program should be specified. While the US, England, France and Germany believe that Iran's nuclear program aims to produce nuclear weapons, Russia and China disagree in this regard.
While preparing for negotiations, the Western nations made an important move. On Friday, September 25 at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, President B. Obama, the British Prime Minister G. Brown, and the French President N. Sarkozy, based on information from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), declared a secret and new uranium enrichment plant near the Iranian city of Qom (Ferduu). The three leaders reported that German Chancellor A. Merkel also supports them, and that in order to eliminate concerns about its nuclear program, Iran has two months to comply with international demands. Otherwise, they said that Iran will be subjected to more severe sanctions.
While this development complicates Iran's position, if Western nations fail in the negotiations, garnering international support for sanctions against Iran will be easier, especially when it comes to persuading Russia and China. In fact, Russia's attitude towards Iran’s nuclear program has changed significantly. While President D. Medvedev was saying that the implementation of sanctions against Iran might be inevitable, Russian Foreign Minister S. Rushdie Lavrov, who negotiated with Iran’s Foreign Minister M. Mottaki, has said that he “expects results” from Iran. China has important trade relations with Iran, and its position is still ambiguous. Despite its good relations with Iran, previously in the Security Council, because Iran had not stopped the uranium enrichment program, China consented to three measure about sanctions against Iran. Given the potential sanctions package, it is possible that China, in order to align itself with the U.S., will support the sanctions.
The U.S. and its Western allies expect an effective result from sanctions against Iran during this period. The Secretary of Defense, R. Gates pointed out Iran’s economic difficulties and political problems, and claimed that increased economic and diplomatic pressure might get results, causing Iran to change its nuclear policy. Gates says that stiffer sanctions may restrict access to technology needed for banking, machinery, natural gas and oil.
In response to the Western attack, Iran immediately opened the Qom facility for UAE inspection. According to the claims of the Western nations, because they understood that the Qom facility was identified by Western intelligence agencies, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, acknowledged the existence of facility in a letter to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) on Monday, September 21. He stipulated that the facility will be open to the inspection agency, like Iran’s other facilities. Iranian officials pointed out that Salehi’s letter had been written before the statements issued by Western leaders. Thus, they accused Western countries of pressuring Iran prior to the negotiations. Iran also claims that the stage when the obligation to notify the agencies had not yet been reached. According to the relevant regulation, a nuclear facility should be reported to the agency 180 days before its begins to operate. However, more than a year remains before the facility in question can be put into operation. Iranian officials, unlike their Western counterparts, assert that the Qom facility is not suitable for making nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the uranium will be enriched only to 5%, whereas nuclear weapons require uranium enriched to nearly 90%. Second, like Iran's other nuclear facilities, the facility is subject to the inspection of IAEA.
With all the events of Holy Defense Week, military ceremonies and new missile experiments, Iran found itself in a difficult situation just before the negotiations. In particular, on Monday, September 28, testing the Shahab 3 and Sajjil missiles, which have a 2000 kilometer range from land to land, along with the threats of military officials to Israel and the U.S. were found extremely “provocative.” On one hand, simulated military operations and the commanders’ threatening speeches were seen as display of power. On the other hand, they highlighted the seriousness of the Iranian threat to the West.
Just before the October 1 negotiations, the disclosure of new nuclear facilities, the relationship between the two sides, military exercises, and the American recession were the reasons that caused the decision to implement more severe sanctions in the case of inconclusive negotiations and reduced the likelihood of the negotiations’ success. Now, both sides think that the negotiations are a test intended to gauge the “real intentions’’ of the other. In a declaration published on Tuesday, September 29, 239 Iranian senators stated that these negotiations were identified as a “test’’ for the P5+1 group, so they wanted to avoid replicating prior mistakes. Likewise, Secretary of State H. Clinton, in her speech on CBS, said that they were expecting convincing evidence regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear program. However, both sides will try not to make a significant change in their position, and expect that the other side will also be successful in this test. While the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Chairman, Alaadin Burucerdi, says that Iran will continue to cooperate with the UAE, but that Iran will not accept any restrictions of its nuclear program in Geneva, Clinton says that the US will not meet Iran’s expectations. Given this situation, the talks that will begin on October 1 are not going to resolve the problems. They will merely strengthen the arguments of both parties.
October 7 2009
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=83
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Political Advisor
Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group (the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members and Germany), which Turkey wants to host so that it will be included in the talks, are going to be held on October 1, in Geneva. The secretary of National Security Said Celili will be chair of the Iranian delegation, and European Commission Foreign Policy Commissioner Javier Solana will preside as moderator of the 5 +1 group's delegation. In April Iran responded to the P5+1 group’s proposal package which was prepared for the deliberation of Iran's nuclear program by preparing its own proposal package. The parties will begin negotiations over the package of proposals offered by Iran. However, both parties’ negotiating agendas and their expectations seem to be different, and this is expected to affect these negotiations negatively.
The P5+1 group’s purpose in these talks is to negotiate and come to an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program, and to persuade their Iranian counterparts to confirm that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. However, the Iranian side even did not even discuss its nuclear program in the proposal package, and the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has often proclaimed that Iran’s "nuclear rights" would never be subject to negotiation. Iran, a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), sees its peaceful nuclear energy program as a right, and recognizes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) instead of Security Council. During the October 1 negotiations, according to Iran’s proposal package, Iran is expected to discuss comprehensive subjects such as general international security issues, reorganization of the UN and its Security Council, and the nonproliferation and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.
Even though Solana will chair the P5+1 delegation, the P5+1 group’s disagreements about Iran’s nuclear program should be specified. While the US, England, France and Germany believe that Iran's nuclear program aims to produce nuclear weapons, Russia and China disagree in this regard.
While preparing for negotiations, the Western nations made an important move. On Friday, September 25 at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, President B. Obama, the British Prime Minister G. Brown, and the French President N. Sarkozy, based on information from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), declared a secret and new uranium enrichment plant near the Iranian city of Qom (Ferduu). The three leaders reported that German Chancellor A. Merkel also supports them, and that in order to eliminate concerns about its nuclear program, Iran has two months to comply with international demands. Otherwise, they said that Iran will be subjected to more severe sanctions.
While this development complicates Iran's position, if Western nations fail in the negotiations, garnering international support for sanctions against Iran will be easier, especially when it comes to persuading Russia and China. In fact, Russia's attitude towards Iran’s nuclear program has changed significantly. While President D. Medvedev was saying that the implementation of sanctions against Iran might be inevitable, Russian Foreign Minister S. Rushdie Lavrov, who negotiated with Iran’s Foreign Minister M. Mottaki, has said that he “expects results” from Iran. China has important trade relations with Iran, and its position is still ambiguous. Despite its good relations with Iran, previously in the Security Council, because Iran had not stopped the uranium enrichment program, China consented to three measure about sanctions against Iran. Given the potential sanctions package, it is possible that China, in order to align itself with the U.S., will support the sanctions.
The U.S. and its Western allies expect an effective result from sanctions against Iran during this period. The Secretary of Defense, R. Gates pointed out Iran’s economic difficulties and political problems, and claimed that increased economic and diplomatic pressure might get results, causing Iran to change its nuclear policy. Gates says that stiffer sanctions may restrict access to technology needed for banking, machinery, natural gas and oil.
In response to the Western attack, Iran immediately opened the Qom facility for UAE inspection. According to the claims of the Western nations, because they understood that the Qom facility was identified by Western intelligence agencies, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, acknowledged the existence of facility in a letter to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) on Monday, September 21. He stipulated that the facility will be open to the inspection agency, like Iran’s other facilities. Iranian officials pointed out that Salehi’s letter had been written before the statements issued by Western leaders. Thus, they accused Western countries of pressuring Iran prior to the negotiations. Iran also claims that the stage when the obligation to notify the agencies had not yet been reached. According to the relevant regulation, a nuclear facility should be reported to the agency 180 days before its begins to operate. However, more than a year remains before the facility in question can be put into operation. Iranian officials, unlike their Western counterparts, assert that the Qom facility is not suitable for making nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the uranium will be enriched only to 5%, whereas nuclear weapons require uranium enriched to nearly 90%. Second, like Iran's other nuclear facilities, the facility is subject to the inspection of IAEA.
With all the events of Holy Defense Week, military ceremonies and new missile experiments, Iran found itself in a difficult situation just before the negotiations. In particular, on Monday, September 28, testing the Shahab 3 and Sajjil missiles, which have a 2000 kilometer range from land to land, along with the threats of military officials to Israel and the U.S. were found extremely “provocative.” On one hand, simulated military operations and the commanders’ threatening speeches were seen as display of power. On the other hand, they highlighted the seriousness of the Iranian threat to the West.
Just before the October 1 negotiations, the disclosure of new nuclear facilities, the relationship between the two sides, military exercises, and the American recession were the reasons that caused the decision to implement more severe sanctions in the case of inconclusive negotiations and reduced the likelihood of the negotiations’ success. Now, both sides think that the negotiations are a test intended to gauge the “real intentions’’ of the other. In a declaration published on Tuesday, September 29, 239 Iranian senators stated that these negotiations were identified as a “test’’ for the P5+1 group, so they wanted to avoid replicating prior mistakes. Likewise, Secretary of State H. Clinton, in her speech on CBS, said that they were expecting convincing evidence regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear program. However, both sides will try not to make a significant change in their position, and expect that the other side will also be successful in this test. While the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Chairman, Alaadin Burucerdi, says that Iran will continue to cooperate with the UAE, but that Iran will not accept any restrictions of its nuclear program in Geneva, Clinton says that the US will not meet Iran’s expectations. Given this situation, the talks that will begin on October 1 are not going to resolve the problems. They will merely strengthen the arguments of both parties.
October 7 2009
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=83