The “Fall” of Turkey-Iran Relations
The “Fall” of Turkey-Iran Relations
Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA, ORSAM Middle East Advisor, Ataturk University, bsinkaya@yahoo.com
In the wake of the spread of the “Arab Spring” into Syria in March 2011, rumours regarding the worsening of Turkey-Iran relations have occupied a considerable place in public news and comments. There were concrete developments that backed those rumours. For instance, in March, two Iranian cargo planes flying over the Turkish aerospace were forced to land because they were supposedly carrying arms to Syria. And then Turkey reported to the UN Security Council Iran Sanctions Panel that one of the planes had military equipment, which was banned with the UN Security Council resolutions. However, simply to challenge those claims, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, meeting with his Iranian counterpart on the occasion of inauguration ceremony of the Kapıkoy (Razi) border gate on April 16, stated; “We announce to the world that Turkey and Iran will remain friends forever.” [1] After then, there were some ups and downs in the relations between Turkey and Iran; however, those problems that aroused in bilateral relations have never been publicized at the official level. The highest-level connotation implying that there are some drawbacks in Turkey-Iran relations came from Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan.
When he was asked “Is there any tension with Iran?” throughout his visit to the North Africa that included Egypt, Tunisia and Libya on September 12 to 16, which was aimed at manifesting the Turkish support for the “Arab Spring,” Prime Minister Erdogan said; “I cannot say there has been tension with Iran.”[2] Considering his earlier “friendly” statements regarding Iran, the statement of “I cannot say there been tension with Iran” reveals that there are some drawbacks in Turkey-Iran relations; if not tension for the time being.
Then what are the drawbacks in the relations between Turkey and Iran? The principal issue, somone can call, is the PKK. Although the PKK issue had led severe problems in Turkey-Iran relations in the past, it has become a subject for cooperation between the two countries work together for the last ten years. Contrary to PKK-affiliated sources’ claims that Turkey and Iran have agreed to fight against the PKK, it appeared in the last couple of months that the two countries could not coordinate their struggle against the PKK and the PJAK. When Iran initiated a military operation towards the north of Iraq, where the PJAK and PKK militants have been settled in July, Turkey remained silent. In the meantime, Turkey started its own air strikes at the Qandil Mountain in the north of Iraq in response to the increasing PKK attacks. At that time Turkish warplanes used the air space of Iran. However, this cooperation was put into question with the “Karayılan Mystery.” Officials of the Turkish Intelligence Agency were reportedly informed their Iranian counterparts on coordinates related to sanctuaries of Murat Karayılan and other PKK leaders at the Iranian side of the Qandil. Escape of Karayilan in spite of that information led some assessments in the Turkish press arguing either Iran let Karayılan to go or, it would like to use Karayılan as a trump card against Turkey. [3] Although the news regarding the “seize of Karayılan” were disclaimed by Iran, lack of his visiual appearance in media for a while, boosted the claims that Iran is using Karayılan. This situation resulted in great reaction in Turkish public opinion, which was voiced by Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc at the highest level who said, “There are wheels within wheels” regarding Karayilan’s fate.[4] The latest development revealing the lack of proper coordination between the parties to fight the PKK came with Prime Minister Erdogan’s assessment. Erdogan, during his visit of the “Arab Spring”, implied that Turkey and Iran could conduct a joint operation against the PKK in Qandil. However, the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, Bahman Husseinpour, declared that they would support the struggle of Turkey against the PKK, yet indicated “a joint operation towards the Northern Iraq is out of the question.” [5]
Another matter that is not going well between the two countries is the different approaches of Turkey and Iran towards the ‘popular’ unrest in Syria. In fact, both Turkey and Iran demonstrated similar attitudes after the start of the demonstrations in Syria. As a matter of fact, Bashar al-Assad was in good relations with both countries. After the demonstrations spread to Syria, Turkey supported the Assad administration provided that he would do reforms as he had the capacity to do so. Recognizing the needs for reform in Syria, the Iranian administration also welcomed the “reform package” announced by Assad in May. However, Iran has given unconditional support to the Assad administration against the demonstrators. Hence, the perspective of both countries regarding the Syrian opposition has become different. While Turkey has supported the Syrian opposition and hosted some of the opponents of the Assda administration, Iran has considered the Syrian opposition as the puppet of the Zionist and the imperialist that aimed at destroying the so-called “resistance front.” Thus, the Turkish hospitality towards the Syrian opposition has caused reactions in Iran. Considering the long-lasting and wide-spread demonstrations against the Syrian regime, when the Turkish government withdrew its support from the Assad administration in mid-August 2011, Iranian President Ahmadinejad called Prime Minister Erdogan and invited him to make cooperation to stabilize Syria. Erdogan underlined the importance of Iran’s attitude towards regional matters. However, he warned Ahmedinecad, “the Assad administration is getting spoiled with your encouragement,” with Erdogan’s words. Thus, he urged Iran to withdraw its support from to the Assad administration.[6]
On the other hand the both countries involved in a regional rivalry to inspire the “Arab Spring” and to further their influence in the “revolutionary” countries. As a matter of fact, the messages given by Erdogan during his visit for the Arab Spring that underlined the importance of “secularism” in government affairs clearly showed the difference between the Turkish and the Iranian “models.” On the other hand, one of the leading religious and political figures in Iran Ayatollah Shahroudi stated that Turkey “is trying to use the regional developments in favour of herself by encouraging liberal Islam.”[7] Coinciding almost with Erdogan’s visit to the “revolutionary” countries Iran hosted the first “International Conference on Islamic Awakening,” which indicated that the Turkey-Iran rivalry in the region would continue in the foreseeable future. While Turkey has been expected to support the moderate political movements that are ready to cooperate with the West, Iran has been anticipated to consolidate its relations with the “radical Islamist” movements.
Another drawback that emerged recently in Turkey-Iran relations is the Turkish government’s decision to install US radars in its soil within the framework of the NATO missile defence shield. The Turkish government argues that because those radars have included only the early warning system, they are merely defence-oriented and does not threat security of the any of the neighbouring countries. However, establishment of the radar system would adversely affect defence strategy of Iran. In fact, because of the ‘deterrence’ affect, medium and long-range missiles have an important place in the Iranian defence strategy. However, the radar system to be established in Turkey will damage the capability of Iran to react to any attack, even if not for offensive purposes, as well as its “deterrent capacity.” Therefore, Iranian officials voiced their concerns with Turkey’s decision. Recently, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salehi asked Turkey to make an explanation over the radar system in order to avoid any misunderstanding between the parties.[8]
Considering all these developments, it is evident to conclude that there are considerable drawbacks in Turkey-Iran relations. Some part of those problems, especially the PKK issue, stems from the lack of coordination between the parties. Therefore, their resolutions are relatively easier. Prime Minister Erdogan revealed through his statements regarding Iran that chief of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, would go to Iran soon. Taking the recent drawbacks in Turkey-Iran relations, the visit of Fidan to Iran means the re-surface of “security” in bilateral relations.
The other part of the drawbacks that aroused in bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran derives from the deep-rooted political and ideological differences of the two countries regarding the region. The regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran also reinforces those differences. Thus, Prime Minister Erdogan’s projected visit to Iran within the next couple of months has become very crucial for the resolution of those drawbacks and improvement of bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran.
References
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[1] “Davutoğlu: Türkiye ve İran Ebedi Dost,” April 16, 2011, http://www.beyazgazete.com/haber/2011/04/1
6/davutoglu-turkiye-ve-iran-ebedi-dost.html (Date of Access: September 19, 2011).
[2]“Erdoğan’dan Sert Mesajlar: Habur Anlayışı Bitti! İran’la Ortak Kandil Harekatı,” September 16, 2011, http://www.euractiv.com.tr/politika-000110/article/erd
oandan-sert-mesajlar-habur-anlay-bitti-iranla-ortak-kandil-harekat-021154, (Date of Access: September 19, 2011).
[3] “Karayılan’ı İran Kurtardı,” Sabah, August 20, 2011; “Karayılan ve PKK Hakkında İlginç İddia,” Radikal, August 24, 2011.
[4] “Karayılan İran’ın Elinde mi,” Doğan News Agency, August 24, 2011.
[5] “İran Büyükelçisi: Kandil’e Ortak Operasyon Yok,” Radikal, September 16, 2011.
[6]“Erdoğan’dan Sert Mesajlar: Habur Anlayışı Bitti! İran’la Ortak Kandil Harekatı,” September 16, 2011, http://www.euractiv.com.tr/politika-000110/article/erdoand
an-sert-mesajlar-habur-anlay-bitti-iranla-ortak-kandil-harekat-021154, (Date of Access: September 19, 2011).
[7] “Ayatollah Shahroudi: Turkey Seeking to Promote Liberal Islam,” Mehr News Agency, August 24, 2011.
[8] “Iran Calls for Turkey's Explanation over NATO Missile Shield,” Fars News Agency, September 19, 2011.
September 22 2011
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