Turkey and Iran Relations on the Eve of President Gul’s Visit: The Steady Improvement of A Pragmatic Relationship

Turkey and Iran Relations on the Eve of President Gul’s Visit: The Steady Improvement of A Pragmatic Relationship
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Advisor & METU/Atatürk Univ.

At a time that “mass movements” have been determining the Middle Eastern agenda and amidst the intensive debates on the whether the the “Turkish Model” or the “Iranian Model” best serve to the Middle East, the presidents of Turkey and Iran are getting ready to come together in Tehran on February 13. Though the leaders will “exchange views” about the critical developments in the region in the summit, the essential agenda of the President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iran will be primarily about bilateral relations between the two ocuntries.

The most important item on the agenda of the Turkish-Iranian relations is economic relations between the two countries that have accelareted in recent years. The political leaders of the countries aimed to increase the volume of bilateral trade to the level of 30 billion dollars from an amount of 8 billion dollars on the occasion of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in November 2009. Within this framework, in order to further the increase in bilateral trade relationsbetween the two countries border trade has been promoted; the national currencies were accepted as “reserve currencies”; and several fairs were organised mutually. Through the rapproachment in Turkish-Iranian political relations and the determination of the parties to boost up their economic relations becoming, Turkey has become the most important regional partner of Iran in trade and has started to take place of Dubai as being the Iranian foreign economic operation center. Especially since June 2010, when the UN Security Council, the US and the EU sanctions towards Iran that aimed at Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs that resulted in the geated scrutiny over Iran’s commercial and economic facilities in Dubai, the Iranian businessmen have begun to court with Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, more than 600 Iranian investors have established more than 600 companies solely in Istanbul. As a result of such activities Turkey’s export to Iran increased to 3.4 billions of dollars in 2010 from being at 2 billions of dollars in 2008. Iran is also one of the “target countries” wihtin the context of “foreign trade strategy” for the year 2011.

The Joint Economic Commission convenes once a year in order to oversee the coordination of economic relations between Turkey and Iran and to solve problems. This year’s meeting was held in Tahran on 7 February. As the Minister of State Cevdet Yılmaz who had attended this meeting and become the chairman of the Turkish delegation mentioned, the meeting was meant to be the technical preparation for the President’s visit. The Minister Yılmaz emphasized that the ways of cooperation in the fields of “trade, free economic zones, contractorship-technical consultancy, transportation, industry, customs, investments, private sector, international coopretations, technical cooperation in exporting, standardization, accreditation, meteorology, science, energy, agriculture, environment, broadcasting, employment, social security and SME(small and medium size enterprises)” were negotiated in this framework. During these negotiations, technical preparetions for the agreement on “preferential tariffs” were completed and it has been expected to be signed during the visit of the President Gul.

It is expected that the visit of the President Gul will be accompanied by a great number of businessmen. Despite the fact that the Iranian politicians deny the impact of international sanctions, that country is in dire need of foreign investments especially in the fields of energy and industry. While numerous foreign companies decided to withdraw from Iran because of the sanctions, Iran has been trying either to convince them to remain in the country or substitute them with new ones in its efforts to lessen the negative impact of the sanctions. Because of the increasing political relations between two countries, Iran has also started to show interest in Turkish companies in recent years. Though Iran annulled the contracts that were granted to Turkcell and TAV in previous years, now the change of its attitude towards Turkey can be clearly observed when the efficient activities of GUBRETAS in Iran are taken into consideration. Turkish businessmen who desire to profit from this particular opportunity want to have a voice in the fields of energy, infrastructure, transportation and industry as well.

The biggest obstacle in the improvement of economic relations between the two countries is the international sanctions. Turkey both officially accepts the UN sanctions and implements them, but it leaves the private companies free to decide if their decisions violate the sanctions put directly and unilaterally by the US and EU. Thus, the companies that could avoid the EU and the US penalties could take this risk to trade with Iran.. Likewise, recently two Turkish businessmen and three Turkish companies were included in the penal list of the United States due to the fact that they exported dual-use goods to Iran. But the Turkish government did not took any measure related to this issue. As a result, small and medium size enterprises tha have no relationship with the EU and the United States, thereby could avoid their pressure, try to take place in Iranian sector.

The most important element of economic relations between Turkey and Iran is the energy issue. Almost all import of Turkey from Iran is consisting of oil and natural gas. However, the well-publicized, “Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation” signed between the two countries with great enthusiasm and stirred the Western reactions in the preceeding years, failed to be implemented due to technical problems and the American pressures. Nevertheless, throughout the contacts of the Minister of Energy Taner Yıldız in Tehran in the last January, Iran offered Turkey to explore new oil and gas fields smaller than those mentioned within this MoU. The Minister Yıldız stated that they were inclined to direct this offer that requires an investment about 400 millions of dollars to private companies. Therefore, energy cooperation will continue to occupy a place on the agenda of both countries, despite being through private sector.

We will see in the years ahead to what extent this energy cooperation between Turkey and Iran will be realized. Just as the energy cooperation agreement that signed by high-level officials including Erdoğan and Ahmedinecad has not been realized, many steps that have been taken in order to strengthen bilateral relations have also remained inconclusive. Although the international system was influential in nulling the parties’ efforts to cooperate in banking, the lack of political determination and the bureaucratic inertia is responsible for much of the failures. This also explains why the problems about transportation and shipment could not have been solved for years and the agreements on educational and cultural cooperation could not have been put into practise. It would not be wrong to say that some parts of this agreement were signed mainly because of diplomatic delicacy.

Notwithstanding the continuing problems in bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey, the visit of the President Gul to Iran that designed on 13-16 February might be interpreted in certain circles as another indication of Turkish-Iranian rapproachment. Many will see the prospective agreements that President Gul will sign in Tehran as complementing Turkey’s efforts to mediate the conflict between Iran and the West, Turkey’s veto on the UN sanctions on Iran as well as Turkey’s demand in the latest NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 that Iran not be named as a ‘source of theat’. Moreover, this visit will be seen as a sign of “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy emanating from ideological motives.

In fact, Turkey’s Iran policy has been rather pragmatic. Its main purpose is to develop economic realtions with Iran and to incrase the volume of export to Iran. As of today, while the ideological factor has had a positive role in Iran’s approache towards Turkey, it is far away from shaping Turkey’s policies towards Iran. While Turkey has been trying to improve its relations with Iran, simultanously it is cautios not to be seen in the same camp with Iran. for this reason, Turkey quickly relinquieshed its discourse that appearently in favor of Iran’s nuclear program, and restored its image as an impartial mediator. through hosting the negotiations between Iran and the P 5+1 on 21-22 January, Turkey has further strenghtened its impartial role. Therefore, it would not be surprising when the President Gul, on , would express Turkey’s impartiality and wish that the problem stemming from Iran’s nuclear program be solved through dialogue, on his visit to Iran
The most important sign of Turkey’s pragmatic approach towards Iran can be seen in the fact that these countries could not cooperate at regional level. These two countries are not able to make common decions on some regional issues even though they might have similar approaches as well as discourses. For instance, even though both Iran and Turkey host regular trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan as regards the solution of their bilateral problems, they could not act jointly. Likewise, Iran has continuously offered regional cooperation schemes with Iraq and Syria including Turkey; yet Turkey has prefereed to deal with Syria and Iraq on its own. Hence, , both sides will exchange views on regional issues and express similar points during Gul’s visit to Iran; yet no one should expect that Gul and Ahmedinecad will come up with a joint declaration on regional issues.

To sum up, pragmatic considerations have replaced security anxieties and ideological appraoches that shaped bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran for a long time. In line with this pragmatic relationship, while Turkey has been trying to improve economic realtions with Iran as an important market and trade partner, Iran has been trying to break international political pressures and isolation through Turkey. While significant part of problems in bilateral relations are being kept away from “the table”, the discourses of cooperation remain greatly at a level of “wish”. Therefore, President Gul’s designated official visit to Iran on 13-16 February will neither cause an important change in the tone of relations, nor be the harbinger of an important change in the region. Yet, this will certainly contribute to the sustainability of decade-long pragmatic relations between Turkey and Iran.





February 10 2011
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=408

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