The Iranian elections in the shadow of the Ayetollah’s tutelage
The Iranian elections in the shadow of the Ayetollah’s tutelage
10 June 2013, New Turkey
http://www.thenewturkey.org/the-iranian-elections-in-the-shadow-of-the-ayetollahs-tutelage/new-region/1347
Iran prepares for the 11th presidential elections scheduled for June 14, 2013. According to some, the elections look like a screen play and the end will not change anything because they are not fair and reliable. After every election in the last decade, the claims of election fraud have been made. Following the presidential elections in 2009, these claims had caused big mass demonstrations. The protests were suppressed through brute force and the opposition was kept silent. Even in April, according to the claims, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a confession in a voice recording about the election irregularities. The second and other reason why the elections are not found reliable is that the sphere of politics inIran narrows more and more every day. Since the establishment of the “Islamic Republic” regime, a tug of war has continued between the “elected” and the “appointed.” In order to balance the unforeseeable acts of the elected, the regime of Islamic Republic has placed the loyals of the revolution ideology and the leadership into key positions. This effort of balancing out the elected, however, has ended with the tutelage of clerics over the system. The Iranian revolutionists setting up a tutelary system were concerned that the elected would turn into dictators, but they did not calculate that the Supreme Leader himself would become a dictator as well. As the supreme leader, the Ayetollah Khamanei, with his unrestricted and unsupervised constitutional authority, has gone beyond the mission of providing balance and coordination between the state powers and political groups. Khamanei gradually consolidated his power against the parliamentary and presidential posts, - the elected bodies - to a degree that neither the Parliament nor the Presidential Office could act against the will of the Ayetollah. This is the background of the last few years’ contention between Ahmadinejad and Khamanei. Although formation of the government, appointment and discharge of the ministers are part of the president’s duties, Ahmadinejad has faced Khamanei’s intervention; therefore, the government’s authority to make foreign policy has almost ended.
The clerics-politics dissension
Another result of the narrowing of the Iranian political sphere is that the grassroots and the elites, whom the regime relies on, weaken more in every crisis. Demographic transformation of the Iranian population, the youth’s demands differing with this transformation, yet the regime’s being in conflict with the world and efforts to increase pressure and control over the people have caused the alienation of the young population in particular. The Islamic Republic refraining from providing the opportunities expected by the youth has also failed in the economic prosperity due to the international economic sanctions. On the other hand, the opponents of the regime have been suppressed in every political crisis so much that considerable numbers of the cadres involved in the revolution process were disbanded from politics and marginalized for various reasons in the last 30 years. For instance, former President Khatemi, former Prime Minister Mir Hossain Mousavi and the Speaker of the Parliament Mehdi Karroubi were accused of being “instigators” following the protests of the “Green Movement” in the near past. Khatemi was banned from leaving the country as Mousavi and Karroubi were taken under house arrest. The Ahmadinejad-Khamanei dispute has also caused a crack in the doctrinarian/conservative, “usulgera,” front which is the only opposing group to the reformists. Khamanei discharged political elites, who were marginalized after each crisis, through effective use of the tutelary mechanism. The political sphere, therefore, has been narrowed as active political elites composed a “small” group and gathered around Khamanei.
For the June 14 elections, the Guardian Council of the Constitution, a mechanism of the clerics’ tutelage, is involved in the process, as it is accustomed to, and only eight were found “worthy of” the presidential race among 600 nominees. The rejected two names grab the attention: Hashemi Rafsanjani and Esfandiar Rahim Meshaei.
One of the few founders of the Islamic Republic regime, Rafsanjani this time is not found worthy of the presidency. The reasons behind such decisions have never been announced by the Council. However, the Spokesman of the Council had previously implied the 78-year-old Rafsanjani’s rejection. A group of parliamentary deputies also raised objections to Rafsanjani’s nomination for the same reason. Despite his advanced age, however, Rafsanjani’s registering at the last minute had become the hope of the reformist parties although they were quite weakened. Rafsanjani was expected of liberalizing the political sphere and moderating the foreign politics. When he criticized the regime during and after the protests of the Green Movement and supported the opposition indirectly, his relations with Khamanei had turned sour. However, the disapproval of Rafsanjani’s presidential nomination shows how much the circle which the regime relies on is narrowed and became authoritarian.
Mashaei’s announcement for presidential nomination was like turkey’s voting for an early Christmas. Blamed for the Ahmadinejad-Khamanei dispute by the regime supporters, Meshaei was even labeled as the leader of the deviants by some of Khamanei’s close circles. Still, his announcement for nomination and open support to Ahmadinejad would be for two reasons: one of which would be that the Ahmadinejad group’s “blackmailing” Khamanei and the conservatives around him worked, and the second reason would be the expectation about Meshaei’s approval. For a long time, Ahmadinejad has implied to have information and evidence about the corruptions of some key figures. He even used this method to protect a minister during a motion of no-confidence session recently. Ahmadinejad in his parliamentary speech had the deputies listen to a tape recording about one of Ali Larijani’s brothers offering bribery. With this, it was considered that Ahmadinejad would expose the documents and threaten the regime’s leading figures if the nomination of his favorite candidate is not approved. However, rejection of Meshaei shows that the Ayetollah and his circles did not surrender to Ahmadinejad’s blackmail. According to the emerging picture, the Guarding Council gave a green light to the candidates who remain loyal to Khamanei and who are less likely to cause any problems by acting independently. Nonetheless, the upcoming presidential elections are critical for the politics inIran. First of all, the elections will be an opportunity forIranto iron out the relations with the world. Although the Ayetollah controls the Iranian foreign policy, a pragmatic president who can have the majority’s consent would facilitate to leave the crisis period behind. In fact, significant numbers of the presidential candidates are known to be pragmatic though they have conservative backgrounds.
Would the foreign policy change?
Another factor that makes the elections critical is the ballot-box’s being put in front of the Iranian people although the results might be questionable and choices are limited. This means the voters’ arbitration is asked about changing the elites in the system. As a matter of fact, no one can claim the eight candidates’ being carbon copies of each other despite their common qualities. For instance, Hassan Rouhani had worked with Khatemi and Rafsanjani in the past. Rouhani, a member of the Council of Experts, served as Khamanei’s representative in the National Security Council, also representedIranin the three-party negotiations in 2003-2005 with the European Union (EU) trio and was relatively successful. With his campaign slogan “Restraint, Wisdom and Foresight,” Rouhani represents technocracy and pragmatism as he is able to address both reformists and conservatives. The second candidate seeking the support of the reformists is Mohammed Reza Arif, Khamanei’s former aide. In his campaign, Arif highlights the “rationality.”
The current Secretary of the National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, has been effective in continuation of the aforementioned negotiations though not a concrete conclusion is reached; therefore, he effectively acted in defense of Iran’s rights. On the other hand, Jalili represents the second generation of the Iran Islamic Revolution, which had been quite influential in the streets and later on went to the front to fight againstIraqduring the Iran-Iraq war. Jalili, as a veteran, inspirited revolution with his modest lifestyle and in the election trail he addresses the relatively young generation. For his proximity to the Ayetollah and his mastery in the security issues, Rouhani is a favorite candidate. Qalibaf is the other favorite name of the election campaigns. He ran a splendid campaign in the 2005 presidential elections and won over four million votes. Qalibaf sits as the Mayor of Tehran since 2005. With his campaign slogan “Life for better economy and people,” he seeks the support of the “reformist” youth and the “conservatives.” Other candidates Mohsin Rezai, Gulamai Haddad Adel, Ali Akbar Velayati and Mohammed Harrazi represent the “older generation” of the Iranian elites as far as their slogans and personalities are concerned.
Despite all, the presidential elections in Iran are full of surprises. The election of Khatemi and of Ahmedinajad and then the Khamanei-Ahmadinejad dispute were all surprises. The dynamic structure and surprises of the political sphere - although gradually narrows and becomes more authoritarian - bring excitement to the polls.