Iran's Reaction to the 'Kurdistan Independence Referendum'

The announcement of Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRG) on June 7 that a referendum for independence of the Kurdistan regionwould be held on September 25 sparked harsh reactions from almost all parts of the Iranian administration. Iranian officials have arguedon all occasions that the decision for independence referendum is a one-sided decision that threatens sovereignty and territorial integrity of Irak, and urged the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to give up on this decision.

Through mutual visits subsequent to the announcement of referendum, Iranian officials tried to persuade the KRG to shelve itsdecision. In response to invitation of Iran, a delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) including Jalal Talabani, Mullah Bahtiyar, Kosrat Rasul Ali went to Tehran in the middle of July, and met Iranian officials. Secretary General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)and Ayatollah Khamenei's representativeat the SNSC, Ali Shamkhani warned the delegation that the referendum was not a priority, or need of people, and it would weaken Kurdistan and all Iraq.

Ahmad Khatami, Tehran's Friday prayer leader,claimed in his speech delivered on September 15 that the independence ‘referendum ispart of a plot to create another Israel in the region.’ Recalling the fact that while the regional countries are opposing the referendum only Israel publiclysupports it, he calledauthorities in the Kurdistan region to ‘come to their senses and give up the Israeli plot.Likewise, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser of Ayatollah Khameneiclaimed that the independence referendum would be the first step for the disintegration of Iraq, and argued that this would weaken regional countries, and pave the ground for penetration of foreigners, especially Zionistsinto the region.

Iranian government plainlyrejectedthe independence referendum when it was first put forward by KRG in 2014, and since thenit has continuously stated the importance of protecting Iraq's territorial integrity. When the referendum issuecame back to the agenda, Iran initially wanted this issue to be dealtwith through negotiations between Arbil and Baghdad, and declared its readiness to mediate between the parties. In fact, Qassem Suleimani, Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)recently met the KDP, PUK and Gorran officials in Arbil and Sulaymaniyah. He is reportedly reminded his collocutors thatsafeguarding territorial integrity of Iraq is regarded by Iran as the red line. He promised that Iran wouldstrive for the improvement of relations between Arbil and Baghdad, if the referendum were cancelled; otherwise, the KRG wouldbe left alone against potential threats.

The second step taken by Iran is to talk with regional countries,especially with Turkey, and to take a jointposition against the referendum. In was on the agenda of Geneal Bagher,
Chief of General Staff of Iranian Armed Forces, when hepaid a rare visit to Ankara on 15-17 August. Later on, Bagheri and his Turkish counterpart, General Hulusi Akar addressed the given issue in atelephone conversation.  Akar is expected to visit Tehran in the coming days. Additionally, Ayatollah Shahroudi, Chairman of Expediency Discernment Council, and Mohsen Rezaee, Secretary General of the given Council and former commander of IRGC,visited Baghdad in early September, and held a series of talks with Iraqi officials.

Because of the KRG’s insistence on holding the referendum on the scheduled day, Tehran has begun to intimidate on the Iraqi Kurdistan leaders. Ali Shamkhani indicated that if the KRG declared its independence, Iran mightrevise its relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan, close theborder gates, andsuspend military and security agreements between the KRG and Iran. It was alleged that Suleimanithreatened his interlocutors during his visit to Iraq byany action of Hashd al-Shaabi.

Why does Iran oppose the referendum?

Despite occasional disputes between them, Iran has been in good relations with the KRG since its foundation. In fact, Iran was the only regional country to support the KRG as a federal region within Iraq. Yet, why does Iran oppose independence of the KRG?

First, from the Iranian point of view, disintegration of the territorial integrity of Iraq that isrecognised as a sovereign state by the international system and regional statesmay trigger new security challenges in the region. The disintegration of Iraq could encourage separatist movements in Syria, Iran and Turkey. This process can affect not only the Kurds but also other ethnic groups. For this reason, Iran, hosting many ethnic minorities, is highly concerned with this process.

Additionally, the rejection of the referendum by the Iraqi Government,and disagreements overcontrol of the disputed territories,including Kirkuk,mayunleasharmed clashes between the Kurds and the Iraqi Government. Hence, the Iraqi Kurdish bid for independence is seen as a step that can bring about instability and new conflicts both inside Iraq, and in the region. Moreover, newconflicts and crises that is highly likely to arise in the region may hinder the struggle against ISIS.

It is also crucial to maintain stability in Iraq for the security of Iran’s western borders. However, in case the referendum triggers new conflicts in Iraq, Iran’s western borders may be destabilized and the security may fall into danger. For long years,Iran has already faced security challenges arising from the armed activities of Kurdish movements(KDPI, Komala, PJAK etc.)based in Iraqi Kurdish territories. The fact that these groups have recently intensified their anti-Iran activities has alarmed Iran.

Holding a referendum for independence, according to the evaluations of Iranian officials, is not demanded by people, but is required for personal accounts ofBarzani. A significant number of Kurdish leaders are opposing it. Therefore, it is likely that new clashes may take place between the opposing Kurdish groupsduring the referendum. This, in turn, could be a new source of instability in the region.

The United States, the UN, and the European countries are, at least rhetorically, opposing to the referendum as well. The UN and European countries also refused to send observers to oversee the referendum. Despite its ostensible opposition to the referendum, many Iranian analysts blame the United States is to engineer all this stuff.Additionally, one of the long-term concerns of Iran, since the early 1990s,with regard to the Iraqi Kurdistan is its potential turninto an arena that could be easily exploited by Israel. Now, the plain support of Israel given for the referendum, and Iranian suspicions towards the American policies in the region highlight its concerns.

Finally, prospective independence of the Iraqi Kurdistan may decrease Iranian capacity to interferein the region. Till the present time, Iran hasbeen able to intervene in the region through its bilateral relations with different Kurdish groups, the Arbil Administration or Baghdad. Moreover, Tehran could use its influence over the Kurds in the overall Iraqi politics. The Iranian role and interests cannot be denied in the Shiite-Kurdish alliance that emerged after the US occupation of Iraq. Therefore, Iran can be deprived of an effective leverage on Iraqi politics. On the other hand, as a federal region in Iraq, the KRG has been in need of Tehran's support from the political and security perspectives. As a matter of fact, this hasbeen clearly seen during the ISIS threat. This asymmetric relationship has provided Iran with the opportunity to put pressure on Iraqi Kurds. However, the declaration of independence of the KRG and its recognition as a sovereign state by the international community can reduce Iran's influence on the Kurds.

20.09.2017
http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14503?dil=en

İran Genelkurmay Başkanı Bagheri’nin Türkiye Ziyareti

İran Genelkurmay Başkanı Tümgeneral Muhammed Hüseyin Bagheri, Türk mevkidaşı Org. Hulusi Akar’ın daveti üzerine 15-17 Ağustos tarihlerinde Ankara’ya bir ziyaret gerçekleştirdi. Bagheri’ye İslam Devrimi Muhafızları Ordusu’nun Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Muhammed Pakpur dahil çok sayıda üst düzey askeri yetkiliden oluşan bir heyet eşlik etti. Bagheri,ziyaret sırasında Genelkurmay Başkanı Hulusi Akar, MİT Müsteşarı Hakan Fidan, Savunma Bakanı Nurettin Canikli ve Cumhurbaşkanı Recep T. Erdoğan ile görüştü.

Bagheri, Ankara’ya vardıktan sonra İran televizyonuna yaptığı açıklamada Türkiye’yi  bölgede ve İslam dünyasında önemli bir yeri olan mühim komşularından birisi diye nitelendirdi. Bölgesel gelişmeler ile güvenlik meselelerine işaret eden Bagheri, bu çerçevede böyle bir ziyaretin gerekli olduğunu belirtti. Nitekim, Bagheri’nin Ankara temaslarında üç husus öne çıktı; ikili güvenlik ilişkileri, sınır güvenliği ve terörizme karşı mücadele; Suriye’de meydana gelen gelişmeler ve Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi Hükümeti’nin (IKBY) bağımsızlık referandumu hazırlığı.

İkili Güvenlik İlişkileri ve Sınır Güvenliği

Türkiye ile İran ilişkilerinde öne çıkan en önemli hususlardan birisi sınır güvenliği. Türk yetkililer uzun yıllar boyunca PKK’nın İran sınırını kullanarak Türkiye topraklarında terör eylemleri yapmasından şikayetçi oldu. Ayrıca iki ülke arasındaki sınır, kaçakçılık ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı sorunlarıyla öne çıktı. Ankara ile Tahran arasında sınır güvenliğinin artırılması, terörizm, kaçakçılık ve uyuşturucu ile mücadele çerçevesinde çeşitli adımlar atıldı. Temelleri 1992’de atılan ortak güvenlik komisyonları (İçişleri bakanlıkları müsteşarlarından müteşekkil Yüksek Güvenlik Komisyonu, müsteşar yardımcılarından oluşan Ortak Güvenlik Komitesi ve sınır bölgelerinde görev yapan güvenlik görevlileri düzeyinde toplanan Güvenlik Alt Komiteleri) belirli aralıklarla toplandı ve bir dizi protokol imzalandı. Ne var ki 2010 yılından sonra ikili güvenlik işbirliği kesintiye uğradı.İkili siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler gelişme kaydederken güvenlik ilişkileri sınırlı kaldı. Güvenlik işbirliğindeki kesinti ve sınırdaki sorunların devam etmesi üzerine Türkiye sınır güvenliğini artırmak için İran sınırına 2 metre genişliğinde, 3 metre yüksekliğinde ve 500 kilometre uzunluğunda duvar örmeye karar verdi ve Ağustos ayının başında duvarın inşasına başladı. İran tarafı, Türkiye’nin sınıra duvar inşa etmesini hem sınır güvenliğinigüçlendirmesi, hem de kaçakçılıkla mücadele yardımcı olması temennisiyle ve memnuniyetle karşıladı.

Gerek bazı komşularındaki istikrarsızlık, gerekse çeşitli ayrılıkçı silahlı hareketlerin geçişken sınırları kullanması, İran için sınır güvenliği meselesini hep öne çıkardı.  PKK’nın İran kolu PJAK’ın yanı sıra KDP-İran ve Komala gibi İran Kürt militan hareketlerinin geçtiğimiz yıllarda silahlı faaliyetlerine tekrar başlaması İran’ı batı sınırlarında güvenlik alarmına geçirdi. Geçtiğimiz Mayıs ayında PJAK ile İran güvenlik güçleri arasında çıkan çatışmada iki İranlı askerin ölmesi ve yedi askerin yaralanmasından sonra Sınır Muhafızları Komutanı Kasım Rızayi, saldırganların  Türkiye’den girdiğini belirtmiş, sınırı koruma sorumluluğundan bahsederek Türkiye’yi eleştirmişti. Son aylarda İran’ın batı ve kuzeybatı (Irak ve Türkiye) sınırları ile ilgili hassasiyetini artıran iki önemli gelişme daha oldu. Birincisi, ABD’nin İran üzerindeki baskıyı artırması ve İran ile Suudi Arabistan arasındaki gerilim gibinedenlerle uluslararası güçlerin silahlı İran Kürt hareketini teşvik etmesi ihtimali belirdi. Nitekim bu Kürt milisleri son zamanlarda İran topraklarındaki silahlı faaliyetlerini artırdı. İran’ın sınır güvenliği hassasiyetini artıran ikinci husus ise IŞİD tehdidi. Haziran ayında Tahran’da İran Meclis binasına terörist saldırı düzenleyen IŞİD, bir müddettir İran’ı tehdit etmeye devam ediyor ve ülkedeki Sünnileri (Kürtleri ve Belucileri), Şii rejimine karşı ayaklanmaya çağırıyor.

Bu çerçevede İran, Türkiye ile sınır güvenliğinin artırılmasına büyük önem vermeye başladı.İki ülke arasında güvenlik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi için içişleri bakanları müsteşarları düzeyinde oluşturulan ortak çalışma grubunun ilk toplantısı 25 Temmuz’da Tahran’da düzenlendi. Bagheri’nin Türkiye ziyaretini değerlendiren Devrim Muhafızları Sözcüsü Ramezan Şerif, ülkesinin sınır güvenliğinin artırılması için Türkiye ile iyi bir anlaşma arayışında olduğunu söyledi.

Bagheri’nin ziyareti sonunda iki ülke arasında güvenlik alanında üst düzey ziyaretlerin sürdürülmesi konusunda mutabakata varıldı. Bagheri’nin açıklamalarına göre iki ülke ortak eğitim programlarının düzenlenmesi, askeri öğrenci değişimi ve terörizme karşı istihbarat paylaşımı yapılması konusunda adımlar atacak. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ise Türkiye ile İran’ın PKK’nın yerleştiği Kandil dağına ve Sincar’a ortak operasyonlar yapmasının an meselesi olduğunu söyledi. Erdoğan, bu meselenin uzun zamandan beri gündemde olduğunu ve Bagheri’nin ziyaretinde de bu konunun ele alındığını belirtti.

Bölgesel Meseleler ve Ankara-Tahran İlişkileri

Bagheri’nin Ankara temaslarında öne çıkan ikinci husus Suriye’deki gelişmelerdi. Astana sürecinde işbirliği yapan iki ülke Suriye’de oluşturulacak çatışmasızlık bölgelerinin belirlenmesi için çalışmalarını sürdürüyor. Bagheri’nin ziyaretinde de Suriye’de güvenliğin ve huzurun sağlanması için iki ülkenin çalışmalarını koordine etmesi, Astana müzakerelerinin devam etmesi, çatışmasızlık bölgelerinin kurulması ve soruna nihai çözüm bulunması için siyasi görüşmelerin sürdürülmesi hususları teyit edildi.

Ziyaretin üçüncü önemli gündem maddesi ise IKBY’nin bağımsızlık referandumu hazırlığı idi. Hem Ankara, hem de Tahran mevcut şartlarda bağımsızlık referandumunun Irak içinde ve bölgede istikrarsızlığa neden olacağını ileri sürüyor ve referandumun yapılmasına karşı çıkıyor. Bagheri, Ankara ziyaretinden sonra yaptığı açıklamada ‘referandumun yapılması yalnızca Irak’ı değil, İran ve Türkiye’yi de yakında ilgilendirir’ dedi ve iki ülke yetkililerinin referandumun yapılmaması konusunda hemfikir olduğunu belirtti.

Türkiye ve İran bölgesel politikalarındaki ve vizyonlarındaki farklılıklara rağmen terörizm (PKK ve IŞİD) tehdidine karşı ortak mücadele ile Irak ve Suriye’nin toprak bütünlüğünün korunması konusunda anlaşıyorlar. ABD’nin Suriye’de PKK’nın kolu PYD ile aktif bir işbirliğine gitmesi her iki ülkeyi de endişelendiriyor. Keza, iki ülke de ABD ile Rusya’nın Suriye’nin güneyindeki topraklar üzerinde yaptığı ateşkes anlaşmasını şaşkınlıkla karşıladı. Bölgede ortak tehditlerin artması, Ankara ile Tahran’ı birbirine yakınlaştırdı. Bu açıdan Eski Başbakan Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun 4-5 Mart 2016’da Tahran’a yaptığı ziyaret bir dönüm noktası olarak alınabilir. Davutoğlu’nuno ziyaret sırasında yaptığı“bölgenin kaderinin dış güçlere bırakılmaması” çağrısı Ankara ile Tahran ilişkilerine yeni bir ivme kattı. 15 Temmuz darbe girişiminde İran’ın Türkiye’ye destek vermesi ikili ilişkileri daha da güçlendirdi.

Geleneksel olarak her iki ülkede güvenlik elitleri tarihi, ideolojik ve  stratejik nedenlerle mütemadiyen diğerine karşı şüpheci yaklaşıyor. Bu nedenle güvenlik ve askeri işbirliği Türkiye-İran ilişkilerinin en zayıf tarafı olageldi. Bu açıdan bakıldığında geçen yıl Temmuz ayında İran Genelkurmay Başkanlığını devralan Bagheri’nin ilk yurt dışı ziyaretini Türkiye’ye yapması gerçekten tarihi bir olay. Bu ziyaretin Türk ve İranlı askeri yetkililer arasında gerçekleştirilen en yüksek düzeyli görüşme olması, iki ülke arasında ilişkilerin siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerin ötesine geçtiğini, iki ülkenin güvenlik alanında ve bölgesel meselelerde işbirliğini artırma eğiliminde olduğunu gösteriyor.Bagheri yaptığı açıklamalarda ziyaretin İran lideri Ayetullah Ali Hamanei’nin de onayıyla yapıldığını belirtti. Bu açıklama, İran devletinin hemen her kademesinin Türkiye ile güvenlik işbirliğini artırma isteğinin işareti olarak değerlendirilebilir.

23.08.2017

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14494?dil=tr

Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey

Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey 

Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri,Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Iran paid a 

three-day visit to Ankara on August 15, in response to invitation of his Turkish counterpart, 

General Hulusi Akar. Bagheri was accompanied by a crowded delegation of high-level military officials 

including Mohammad Pakpur, Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces. In addition to his counterpart 

Akar, Bagheri held meetings with Chief of MIT (National Intelligence Agency) Hakan Fidan, Defense 

Minister Nurettin Canikli and President Recep T. Erdogan.

At his arrival to Ankara, Bagheri spoke to Iranian state television and described Turkey as an 

important neighbor with a vital position in the region and the Islamic world. He

underlined thatthis visit to Turkey was necessary due to regional developments and security issues. 

Indeed, bilateral security relations, border security, and the fight against terrorism; 

developments in Syria, and the bid of Iraq Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) to hold 

a referendum for independence come into prominence during his meetings in Ankara.

Bilateral Security Relations and Border Security

Border security is an important concern for both countries. Turkish officials have long been 

complaining about PKK crossing the Iranian border to commit terror attacks in Turkish lands. 

Smuggling and drug trafficking are also challenging issues around the border. Ankara and Tehran took 

steps towards tightening the border security and to combat terrorism, smuggling and drug trafficking. 

Starting from 1992, there were several joint commissions for security (High Commission for Security 

which gathered undersecretaries of interior ministers of the two countries, Joint Security Committee 

which consisted of Deputy Undersecretaries and Subcommittees on Security which included border 

guards) holding meetings periodically and numerous protocols were signed. However, after 2010, 

the bilateral cooperation for security was interrupted. While bilateral political and economic relations 

kept on growing, security relations remained strained. The disruption of security cooperation despite 

advancing problems around the border led Turkey to build a 2-meter wide, 3-meter high wall to improve 

border security. The construction of the wall began in the early days of August and is planned to 

cover 500 kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border. Iran supported the idea, hoping the wall boosts 

the border security and diminishes smuggling.

For Iran, border security has always been a prominent issue due the instability of some of its neighbors 

and various separatist movements benefiting from the highly permeable nature of borders.  Recently, 

Iranian Kurdish militants such as PKK's Iranian branch PJAK as well as KDP-Iran and Komala have 

revitalized their activities, which alerted Iran to tighten the security of its western borders. In the last 

May, two Iranian soldiers died and seven more were injured in a clash between PJAK and Iranian security 

forces. Then, the commander of Iran's border guards Qassem Rezayee stated that the militants came 

through the Turkish border. Reminding the country's responsibility to protect its borders, Rezayee 

blamed Turkey for the incident. Recently, two other developmentshave increased Iranian concerns 

for security of the western and northeastern (Iraq and Turkey) borders. First, considering the increasing 

U.S. pressure on Iran under Trump, and the risingtension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iranians 

have been anxious with prospective support of international actors towards Iranian Kurdish movements.

In fact, Kurdish militia already escalated their armed attacks inside Iranian soils.  Second, the rise of 

ISIS threat to Iran has prompted its concerns about border security. ISIS, which recently attacked the 

Iranian parliament building in Tehran in the last June, has been calling Sunnis of 
the country (Kurds and Balochis) to rise up against the Shia regime. 

Following these incidents, the security of the Turkish border in the northwest of Iran has become even 

more significant for Tehran. In this respect, a joint working group was formed to enhance security 

cooperation between Turkey and Iran; and Undersecretaries of the Ministry of Interiors of both countries 

held the first meeting in Tehran on July 25. Commenting on Bagheri's visit to Turkey, Revolutionary 

Guards spokesperson Ramazan Sharif stated his country is seeking a good deal with Turkey to improve 

border security.

At Bagheri's visit to Turkey, both countries agreed on more meetings among senior security officials of 

the countries. According to Bagheri's account, Turkey and Iran settled upon arranging joint training 

programs, exchanging military students and sharing intelligence to combat terrorism. President Erdoğan

also stated that soon, Iran and Turkey might conduct a joint operation to Sinjar and Qandil Mountains 

where PKK is located. According to Erdoğan, this issue has long been on the table and is also recently 

discussed during Bagheri's visit.

Regional Issues and Ankara-Tehran Relations

The recent developments in Syria were another issue that came up during the talks of Bagheri in Ankara. 

Having been partners in the Astana talks, Turkey and Iran are currently working on the formation of 

de-escalation zones in Syria. During Bagheri's visit, the two countries affirmed their resolution to 

maintain Astana talks and holding political meetings to establish peace and security in Syria, to build

de-escalation zones and to find a definitive solution to the Syrian issue.

KRG's bid for independence referendum was also on the agenda of the meetings. Both Ankara and 

Tehran stand out against the independence referendum claiming under current conditions it would only 

lead to further instability in Iraq as well as in the region. In a statement upon his return from Ankara, 

Bagheri said the referendum is not only an Iraqi issue, but also involves Turkey and Iran, both of whom 

are in agreement for cancellation of the referendum.

Despite their differences on regional visions and policies, Turkey and Iran share the same perspective 

on the necessity of protecting territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq, and they share threats arising from 

terrorism (ISIS and PKK). Both countries are concerned about the U.S. cooperation with PYD, Syrian 

branch of PKK. Similarly, both Iran and Turkey are startled to see the U.S. and Russia agreed on 

ceasefire in southern Syria. The rise of common threats in the region has brought Ankara and Tehran 

closer. In this regard, the visit of former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's to Tehran in March 

2015 could be considered as a milestone, when he called "the destiny of this region should not be 

leaved to external forces." Since then bilateral relations between the two countriesfind a new 

momentum. The ties have grown even stronger after Iranian support for Turkey in the face of the 

July 15 coup attempt.

Security elites in both countries have traditionally been skeptical towards one another due to some 

ideological, historical, and strategic reasons. Therefore, security relations and military cooperation 

between the two countries were out of question. Therefore, the fact that Bagheri, who took over the post 

of the Chief of Staff for the Iranian Armed Forces in July 2016, made his first foreign trip to Turkey 

becomes truly historical.It was the first meeting among senior military officials of Turkey and Iran 

thereby it indicates the relations between these two countries have gone beyond economic and political 

aspects in order to enhance cooperation on security and regional issues. Bagheri underlined that 

Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, approved this visit. This statement illustrates 

the willingness of all parts of the Iranian administration to increase security relations with Turkey.

23.08.2017

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14494?dil=en

Iran-Pakistan Relations within the Framework of Regional Competition

Iran-Pakistan Relations within the Framework of Regional Competition

The inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2017 has begun to affect geopolitics of Middle East.  Unlike his predecessor, Obama, who advised the regional countries to reconcile with Iran, President Trump believes that Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, have hands in every problem in the region. In order to contain Iranian threat in Trump administration has tended to improve partnership with conventional American allies in the region. These developments have energized the Saudi Arabian campaign against Iran. Recently, Prince Mohammed B. Salman, then Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister stated in a TV interview on May 2: "We are a primary target for the Iranian regime. We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran.” He argued that there is no room for dialogue with the Iranian regime. Iran heavily reacted to the statement of Prince Salman. Iranian Defense Minister Hussein Dehqan threatened Saudi Arabia: "If they do something stupid, we will leave nowhere untouched apart from Mecca and Medina."

The growing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia has affected not only the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf, but also the 'wider Middle East.' Pakistan is one of the countries that are highly vulnerable to these effects. Bordering with Iran, Pakistan used to have close relations with Saudi Arabia for long years. But the growing tension between Tehran and Riyadh forces the Pakistani government to face tough choices. On the one hand it tries to develop good relations with Iran for economic concerns, on the other hand it is concerned with antagonizing Saudi Arabia by getting closes to Tehran. In this context, recently there have been two eye-catching developments in Iran-Pakistan relations. First one is the escalation of clashes between the regime opponents and security forces in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, adjacent to the Iran-Pakistan border. Secondly, former Pakistani Chief of General Staff Raheel Sharif's has taken the command of the Islamic Military Alliance Against Terrorism, which is established under the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

The Baluchistan Question

Despite having considerable mineral reserves, Sistan and Baluchistan province, located on the border of Pakistan and on the southeast of Iran, is one of the least developed regions of the country. These regions is considered as challenging in terms of security since it is regarded as functional route for smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking coming through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, the majority of people living in the region is Baluchi. There are some reactions against the Iranian government among the Baluchis, who are numbering around two million, speaking the Baluchi language, and mostly Sunnis in terms of denomination.  Moreover, there is a considerable Baluch population living next to the Iranian border in Pakistan. This fact makes the Iranian government more anxious with regard to this region. After 2003, the region has witnessed the rise of Militant Salafi movements that have carried out armed attacks targeting Iranian security forces and officials. The most known among these movements is the Jundallah organization led by Abdolmalek Rigi. It is claimed that, over the past decade, Iran has lost around three thousand guards in the armed clashes that took place in the region for different reasons.

The Baluchistan question constitutes one of the important subjects in the Iran-Pakistan relations. Iranian officials repeatedly blamed Pakistan, who is dealing with its own "Baluch question", for allowing activities of organizations fighting against Iran. It is known that Pakistan helped Iran in February 2010 to arrest Jundallah's leader Rigi, who was executed later. The execution of Rigi, led to the dissolution of Jundallah, which led to the emergence of new militant organizations. One of these new organizations is called Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) under the leadership of Abdolrahim Mollazadeh, whose alias is Salahuddin al Farooqui. Having an anti-Shia position, Jaish al-Adl claims to fight against "Rafidas" and the "Safavid regime". This organization that has been settled in Pakistan territories has been targeting Iranian border guards since 2013.

Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility for an attack that killed ten border guards patrolling Iran-Pakistan border in the Mirjaveh region, on 26 April 2017. The assailants fired at soldiers with long barreled guns at the zero point of border and fled into Pakistan soils after the incident. This attack led Iranian reaction against Pakistan for it did not "fight effectively against terrorist groups and armed bandits in its territory," and that it did not take necessary measures on border security. Shortly after the attack, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani penned a letter addressing Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in which he asked that perpetrators of the attack to be arrested and handed over to Iran. Soon after then, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Islamabad on 3 May, met with Pakistani senior officials and asked for increased security measures at the border. Pakistani authorities assured Zarif that the necessary measures, including the deployment of additional troops in the region, would be taken.

Despite the assurances of Islamabad, Iranian military officials continued to make statements targeting Pakistan. In his speech on May 8, M. Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces argued; "Unfortunately, Iran's eastern border regions with Pakistan have become a safe haven for training and equipping terrorists recruited by Saudi Arabia and supported by the United States." He asked Pakistani officials to control the borders, arrest the terrorists and shut down their bases. “If the terrorist attacks continue, we will hit their safe havens and cells, wherever they are!” he said.

Sharif’s Command of the ‘Islamic Military Alliance’

Armed attacks on Iran originated from Pakistan territories are partly responsible for the rise of tension between Islamabad and Tehran. Another reason for the tension is the improvement of military and security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Iranian officials have been accusing Saudi Arabia for provoking minorities and supporting armed groups against the Iranian government.  Additionally, it is also claimed that the Saudis have organized and supported the Baluch rebels, while the Pakistan government has glossed over it. Hence, Pakistan's growing security partnership with Saudi Arabia may be considered as the root cause of heavy Iranian reactions against Pakistan.

Military cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia dates back to the 1980s. Thousands of Pakistani officers have already provided "consultation" services to Saudi Arabia. As an extension of the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia cooperation, former Pakistani military members were recruited into Bahrain security forces to suppress the upheavals in Bahrain in April 2011. Today, nearly thirty percent of the Bahrain security forces are reportedly consisted of Pakistanis. Nonetheless, the alliance between two countries was shadowed in 2015. Saudi Arabia that militarily intervened in Yemen in March 2015 in response to Houthi takeover, asked Pakistan to support the Saudi military coalition through providing warplanes, warships and troops. Pakistan, which at that time tried to develop its relations with Iran and fought against militant organizations within its country, remained neutral on the Yemen issue and did not provide any military support to Riyadh. However, the Pakistani government declared that it would take side with Saudi Arabia in case of a direct threat to its security. It is claimed that the absence of Pakistan is responsible for the weakness of the coalition.

Although Saudi Arabia did not receive any support from Pakistan in the Yemen war; it pressured over the Pakistani government to participate in the Islamic Military Alliance against Terrorism established in December 2015. Finally, it is announced in January 2017 that Pakistan's former Chief of General Staff Raheel Sharif was appointed as the commander of the 41-member alliance headquartered in Riyadh. Following the approval of Pakistani authorities in early April, Sharif moved to Riyadh. Iran, excluded from the Islamic Alliance, has been disturbed by this appointment. While talking to the Pakistani press on April 4 Mehdi Honardost, Iranian ambassador to Islamabad said, "this issue needs an explanation." Having noted that the Pakistani government informed Iranian authorities before giving an approval to Shariff's appointment, "this does not mean that Iran accepted this decision," Honadost stated. Pakistani officials have tried to ease Tehran by arguing that General Sharif’s appointment does not carry hostile intentions against Iran. “The Islamic alliance is against terrorism, not any country,” Pakistani Foreign Minister Tehmina Janjua stated by emphasizing that Pakistan will not go against Iran’s interests. Defense Minister M. Asif also underlined that Pakistan's role in alliance will be within the Saudi borders and will not take a role in Yemen.

It is difficult to say that Iran and Pakistan are enjoying good relations in general, as the Iranian Ambassador Honardoost acknowledged. However, both Pakistan and Iran want to develop bilateral relations due to some economic and strategic interests, and in the last couple of years they have taken remarkable steps in this respect. Mutual high-level have taken place between the two countries, which addressed issues such as promoting the trade volume to five billion dollars within five years, completing Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and making it operative, and the involvement of Iran in “China-Pakistan economic corridor.” Nevertheless, both the increasing armed attacks on the Iran-Pakistan border, and the rising tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia make Pakistan to face with difficult choices.

Bayram Sinkaya

Translation of 'Bölgesel Rekabet ve İran-Pakistan İlişkileri,' Ortadoğu Analiz, cilt 9, sayı 80 (Mayıs-Haziran 2017), http://orsam.org.tr/files/OA/80/15_bayramsinkaya.pdf