Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey

Iranian Military Chief Bagheri's Visit to Turkey 

Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri,Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Iran paid a 

three-day visit to Ankara on August 15, in response to invitation of his Turkish counterpart, 

General Hulusi Akar. Bagheri was accompanied by a crowded delegation of high-level military officials 

including Mohammad Pakpur, Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces. In addition to his counterpart 

Akar, Bagheri held meetings with Chief of MIT (National Intelligence Agency) Hakan Fidan, Defense 

Minister Nurettin Canikli and President Recep T. Erdogan.

At his arrival to Ankara, Bagheri spoke to Iranian state television and described Turkey as an 

important neighbor with a vital position in the region and the Islamic world. He

underlined thatthis visit to Turkey was necessary due to regional developments and security issues. 

Indeed, bilateral security relations, border security, and the fight against terrorism; 

developments in Syria, and the bid of Iraq Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) to hold 

a referendum for independence come into prominence during his meetings in Ankara.

Bilateral Security Relations and Border Security

Border security is an important concern for both countries. Turkish officials have long been 

complaining about PKK crossing the Iranian border to commit terror attacks in Turkish lands. 

Smuggling and drug trafficking are also challenging issues around the border. Ankara and Tehran took 

steps towards tightening the border security and to combat terrorism, smuggling and drug trafficking. 

Starting from 1992, there were several joint commissions for security (High Commission for Security 

which gathered undersecretaries of interior ministers of the two countries, Joint Security Committee 

which consisted of Deputy Undersecretaries and Subcommittees on Security which included border 

guards) holding meetings periodically and numerous protocols were signed. However, after 2010, 

the bilateral cooperation for security was interrupted. While bilateral political and economic relations 

kept on growing, security relations remained strained. The disruption of security cooperation despite 

advancing problems around the border led Turkey to build a 2-meter wide, 3-meter high wall to improve 

border security. The construction of the wall began in the early days of August and is planned to 

cover 500 kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border. Iran supported the idea, hoping the wall boosts 

the border security and diminishes smuggling.

For Iran, border security has always been a prominent issue due the instability of some of its neighbors 

and various separatist movements benefiting from the highly permeable nature of borders.  Recently, 

Iranian Kurdish militants such as PKK's Iranian branch PJAK as well as KDP-Iran and Komala have 

revitalized their activities, which alerted Iran to tighten the security of its western borders. In the last 

May, two Iranian soldiers died and seven more were injured in a clash between PJAK and Iranian security 

forces. Then, the commander of Iran's border guards Qassem Rezayee stated that the militants came 

through the Turkish border. Reminding the country's responsibility to protect its borders, Rezayee 

blamed Turkey for the incident. Recently, two other developmentshave increased Iranian concerns 

for security of the western and northeastern (Iraq and Turkey) borders. First, considering the increasing 

U.S. pressure on Iran under Trump, and the risingtension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iranians 

have been anxious with prospective support of international actors towards Iranian Kurdish movements.

In fact, Kurdish militia already escalated their armed attacks inside Iranian soils.  Second, the rise of 

ISIS threat to Iran has prompted its concerns about border security. ISIS, which recently attacked the 

Iranian parliament building in Tehran in the last June, has been calling Sunnis of 
the country (Kurds and Balochis) to rise up against the Shia regime. 

Following these incidents, the security of the Turkish border in the northwest of Iran has become even 

more significant for Tehran. In this respect, a joint working group was formed to enhance security 

cooperation between Turkey and Iran; and Undersecretaries of the Ministry of Interiors of both countries 

held the first meeting in Tehran on July 25. Commenting on Bagheri's visit to Turkey, Revolutionary 

Guards spokesperson Ramazan Sharif stated his country is seeking a good deal with Turkey to improve 

border security.

At Bagheri's visit to Turkey, both countries agreed on more meetings among senior security officials of 

the countries. According to Bagheri's account, Turkey and Iran settled upon arranging joint training 

programs, exchanging military students and sharing intelligence to combat terrorism. President Erdoğan

also stated that soon, Iran and Turkey might conduct a joint operation to Sinjar and Qandil Mountains 

where PKK is located. According to Erdoğan, this issue has long been on the table and is also recently 

discussed during Bagheri's visit.

Regional Issues and Ankara-Tehran Relations

The recent developments in Syria were another issue that came up during the talks of Bagheri in Ankara. 

Having been partners in the Astana talks, Turkey and Iran are currently working on the formation of 

de-escalation zones in Syria. During Bagheri's visit, the two countries affirmed their resolution to 

maintain Astana talks and holding political meetings to establish peace and security in Syria, to build

de-escalation zones and to find a definitive solution to the Syrian issue.

KRG's bid for independence referendum was also on the agenda of the meetings. Both Ankara and 

Tehran stand out against the independence referendum claiming under current conditions it would only 

lead to further instability in Iraq as well as in the region. In a statement upon his return from Ankara, 

Bagheri said the referendum is not only an Iraqi issue, but also involves Turkey and Iran, both of whom 

are in agreement for cancellation of the referendum.

Despite their differences on regional visions and policies, Turkey and Iran share the same perspective 

on the necessity of protecting territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq, and they share threats arising from 

terrorism (ISIS and PKK). Both countries are concerned about the U.S. cooperation with PYD, Syrian 

branch of PKK. Similarly, both Iran and Turkey are startled to see the U.S. and Russia agreed on 

ceasefire in southern Syria. The rise of common threats in the region has brought Ankara and Tehran 

closer. In this regard, the visit of former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's to Tehran in March 

2015 could be considered as a milestone, when he called "the destiny of this region should not be 

leaved to external forces." Since then bilateral relations between the two countriesfind a new 

momentum. The ties have grown even stronger after Iranian support for Turkey in the face of the 

July 15 coup attempt.

Security elites in both countries have traditionally been skeptical towards one another due to some 

ideological, historical, and strategic reasons. Therefore, security relations and military cooperation 

between the two countries were out of question. Therefore, the fact that Bagheri, who took over the post 

of the Chief of Staff for the Iranian Armed Forces in July 2016, made his first foreign trip to Turkey 

becomes truly historical.It was the first meeting among senior military officials of Turkey and Iran 

thereby it indicates the relations between these two countries have gone beyond economic and political 

aspects in order to enhance cooperation on security and regional issues. Bagheri underlined that 

Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, approved this visit. This statement illustrates 

the willingness of all parts of the Iranian administration to increase security relations with Turkey.

23.08.2017

http://orsam.org.tr/orsam/DPAnaliz/14494?dil=en

Iran-Pakistan Relations within the Framework of Regional Competition

Iran-Pakistan Relations within the Framework of Regional Competition

The inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2017 has begun to affect geopolitics of Middle East.  Unlike his predecessor, Obama, who advised the regional countries to reconcile with Iran, President Trump believes that Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, have hands in every problem in the region. In order to contain Iranian threat in Trump administration has tended to improve partnership with conventional American allies in the region. These developments have energized the Saudi Arabian campaign against Iran. Recently, Prince Mohammed B. Salman, then Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister stated in a TV interview on May 2: "We are a primary target for the Iranian regime. We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran.” He argued that there is no room for dialogue with the Iranian regime. Iran heavily reacted to the statement of Prince Salman. Iranian Defense Minister Hussein Dehqan threatened Saudi Arabia: "If they do something stupid, we will leave nowhere untouched apart from Mecca and Medina."

The growing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia has affected not only the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf, but also the 'wider Middle East.' Pakistan is one of the countries that are highly vulnerable to these effects. Bordering with Iran, Pakistan used to have close relations with Saudi Arabia for long years. But the growing tension between Tehran and Riyadh forces the Pakistani government to face tough choices. On the one hand it tries to develop good relations with Iran for economic concerns, on the other hand it is concerned with antagonizing Saudi Arabia by getting closes to Tehran. In this context, recently there have been two eye-catching developments in Iran-Pakistan relations. First one is the escalation of clashes between the regime opponents and security forces in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, adjacent to the Iran-Pakistan border. Secondly, former Pakistani Chief of General Staff Raheel Sharif's has taken the command of the Islamic Military Alliance Against Terrorism, which is established under the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

The Baluchistan Question

Despite having considerable mineral reserves, Sistan and Baluchistan province, located on the border of Pakistan and on the southeast of Iran, is one of the least developed regions of the country. These regions is considered as challenging in terms of security since it is regarded as functional route for smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking coming through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, the majority of people living in the region is Baluchi. There are some reactions against the Iranian government among the Baluchis, who are numbering around two million, speaking the Baluchi language, and mostly Sunnis in terms of denomination.  Moreover, there is a considerable Baluch population living next to the Iranian border in Pakistan. This fact makes the Iranian government more anxious with regard to this region. After 2003, the region has witnessed the rise of Militant Salafi movements that have carried out armed attacks targeting Iranian security forces and officials. The most known among these movements is the Jundallah organization led by Abdolmalek Rigi. It is claimed that, over the past decade, Iran has lost around three thousand guards in the armed clashes that took place in the region for different reasons.

The Baluchistan question constitutes one of the important subjects in the Iran-Pakistan relations. Iranian officials repeatedly blamed Pakistan, who is dealing with its own "Baluch question", for allowing activities of organizations fighting against Iran. It is known that Pakistan helped Iran in February 2010 to arrest Jundallah's leader Rigi, who was executed later. The execution of Rigi, led to the dissolution of Jundallah, which led to the emergence of new militant organizations. One of these new organizations is called Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) under the leadership of Abdolrahim Mollazadeh, whose alias is Salahuddin al Farooqui. Having an anti-Shia position, Jaish al-Adl claims to fight against "Rafidas" and the "Safavid regime". This organization that has been settled in Pakistan territories has been targeting Iranian border guards since 2013.

Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility for an attack that killed ten border guards patrolling Iran-Pakistan border in the Mirjaveh region, on 26 April 2017. The assailants fired at soldiers with long barreled guns at the zero point of border and fled into Pakistan soils after the incident. This attack led Iranian reaction against Pakistan for it did not "fight effectively against terrorist groups and armed bandits in its territory," and that it did not take necessary measures on border security. Shortly after the attack, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani penned a letter addressing Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in which he asked that perpetrators of the attack to be arrested and handed over to Iran. Soon after then, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Islamabad on 3 May, met with Pakistani senior officials and asked for increased security measures at the border. Pakistani authorities assured Zarif that the necessary measures, including the deployment of additional troops in the region, would be taken.

Despite the assurances of Islamabad, Iranian military officials continued to make statements targeting Pakistan. In his speech on May 8, M. Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces argued; "Unfortunately, Iran's eastern border regions with Pakistan have become a safe haven for training and equipping terrorists recruited by Saudi Arabia and supported by the United States." He asked Pakistani officials to control the borders, arrest the terrorists and shut down their bases. “If the terrorist attacks continue, we will hit their safe havens and cells, wherever they are!” he said.

Sharif’s Command of the ‘Islamic Military Alliance’

Armed attacks on Iran originated from Pakistan territories are partly responsible for the rise of tension between Islamabad and Tehran. Another reason for the tension is the improvement of military and security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Iranian officials have been accusing Saudi Arabia for provoking minorities and supporting armed groups against the Iranian government.  Additionally, it is also claimed that the Saudis have organized and supported the Baluch rebels, while the Pakistan government has glossed over it. Hence, Pakistan's growing security partnership with Saudi Arabia may be considered as the root cause of heavy Iranian reactions against Pakistan.

Military cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia dates back to the 1980s. Thousands of Pakistani officers have already provided "consultation" services to Saudi Arabia. As an extension of the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia cooperation, former Pakistani military members were recruited into Bahrain security forces to suppress the upheavals in Bahrain in April 2011. Today, nearly thirty percent of the Bahrain security forces are reportedly consisted of Pakistanis. Nonetheless, the alliance between two countries was shadowed in 2015. Saudi Arabia that militarily intervened in Yemen in March 2015 in response to Houthi takeover, asked Pakistan to support the Saudi military coalition through providing warplanes, warships and troops. Pakistan, which at that time tried to develop its relations with Iran and fought against militant organizations within its country, remained neutral on the Yemen issue and did not provide any military support to Riyadh. However, the Pakistani government declared that it would take side with Saudi Arabia in case of a direct threat to its security. It is claimed that the absence of Pakistan is responsible for the weakness of the coalition.

Although Saudi Arabia did not receive any support from Pakistan in the Yemen war; it pressured over the Pakistani government to participate in the Islamic Military Alliance against Terrorism established in December 2015. Finally, it is announced in January 2017 that Pakistan's former Chief of General Staff Raheel Sharif was appointed as the commander of the 41-member alliance headquartered in Riyadh. Following the approval of Pakistani authorities in early April, Sharif moved to Riyadh. Iran, excluded from the Islamic Alliance, has been disturbed by this appointment. While talking to the Pakistani press on April 4 Mehdi Honardost, Iranian ambassador to Islamabad said, "this issue needs an explanation." Having noted that the Pakistani government informed Iranian authorities before giving an approval to Shariff's appointment, "this does not mean that Iran accepted this decision," Honadost stated. Pakistani officials have tried to ease Tehran by arguing that General Sharif’s appointment does not carry hostile intentions against Iran. “The Islamic alliance is against terrorism, not any country,” Pakistani Foreign Minister Tehmina Janjua stated by emphasizing that Pakistan will not go against Iran’s interests. Defense Minister M. Asif also underlined that Pakistan's role in alliance will be within the Saudi borders and will not take a role in Yemen.

It is difficult to say that Iran and Pakistan are enjoying good relations in general, as the Iranian Ambassador Honardoost acknowledged. However, both Pakistan and Iran want to develop bilateral relations due to some economic and strategic interests, and in the last couple of years they have taken remarkable steps in this respect. Mutual high-level have taken place between the two countries, which addressed issues such as promoting the trade volume to five billion dollars within five years, completing Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and making it operative, and the involvement of Iran in “China-Pakistan economic corridor.” Nevertheless, both the increasing armed attacks on the Iran-Pakistan border, and the rising tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia make Pakistan to face with difficult choices.

Bayram Sinkaya

Translation of 'Bölgesel Rekabet ve İran-Pakistan İlişkileri,' Ortadoğu Analiz, cilt 9, sayı 80 (Mayıs-Haziran 2017), http://orsam.org.tr/files/OA/80/15_bayramsinkaya.pdf 

Bölgesel Rekabet ve İran-Pakistan İlişkileri

Bölgesel Rekabet ve İran-Pakistan İlişkileri

Trump yönetiminin Ocak 2017’de işbaşına gelme- si Ortadoğu jeopolitiğini etkilemeye başladı. Trump, böl- ge ülkelerine İran ile uzlaşmaları tavsiyesinde bulunan selefi Oba- ma’nın aksine her sorunun altında terörizm destekçisi İran’ın parmağı olduğunu düşünüyor. İran tehdi- dinin kuşatılması için de bölgede geleneksel Amerikan müttefikleriy- le iş birliğinin güçlendirme eğili- minde. Bu gelişmeler, Suudi Ara- bistan’ın İran karşıtı kampanyasını ateşledi. Son olarak Suudi Savun- ma Bakanı Prens Muhammed b. Salman 2 Mayıs’ta televizyonda yayınlanan konuşmasında “İran ile diyaloğun mümkün olmadığı- nı” söyledi ve şöyle dedi: “Biliyoruz ki, biz İran’ın asıl hedefiyiz. Savaşın Suudi Arabistan topraklarına ulaş- masını beklemeden İran sınırları içinde gerçekleşmesi için çalışaca- ğız.” Prens Selman’ın bu konuşma- sına İran’dan aynı derecede sert bir açıklama geldi. Savunma Bakanı Hüseyin Dehgan “Suudiler düşün- cesizce bir harekette bulunurlarsa, Mekke ve Medine hariç tüm kral- lıkları İran ordusu tarafından yok edilecek.” tehdidinde bulundu.

İran ve Suudi Arabistan arasın- da artan gerilim sadece Maşrık ve Basra Körfezi’ni değil ‘Geniş Or- tadoğu’yu da etkisi altına almaya başladı. Bu etkiye en açık ülkeler- den birisi de Pakistan. İran’ın sınır komşusu olan Pakistan’ın uzun yıllardan beri Suudi Arabistan ile yakın ilişkileri var. Fakat Pakistan hükümeti, Tahran ile Riyad ara- sında artan gerilim nedeniyle zor seçimlerle karşı karşıya. Pakistan bir taraftan ekonomik beklentiler- le İran ile ilişkilerini geliştirmeye çalışırken, diğer taraftan Tahran’a fazla yaklaşarak Suudi Arabistan’ı kızdırmak istemiyor. Bu bağlamda son zamanlarda İran-Pakistan iliş- kilerinde dikkat çeken iki gelişme var: Birincisi, İran-Pakistan sını- rında yer alan Sistan ve Belucistan eyaletinde rejim karşıtı örgütlerle güvenlik güçleri arasındaki çatış- maların şiddetlenmesi. İkincisi ise Pakistan eski Genelkurmay Başka- nı Rahel Şerif’in Suudi Arabistan öncülüğünde kurulan Terörizme Karşı İslam Askeri İttifakı’nın ko- mutasını üslenmesi.

Belucistan Sorunu

İran’ın güneydoğusunda, Pakistan sınırında yer alan Sistan ve Belucis- tan vilayeti, önemli maden yatak- larının varlığına rağmen ülkenin en az gelişmiş bölgelerinden birisi. Bu bölge, Afganistan ve Pakistan üzerinden gelen kaçakçılık, uyuştu- rucu ticareti, insan kaçakçılığı vb. güzergahı olması nedeniyle güven- lik açısından sorunlu görülüyor. Ayrıca, bölgede yaşayan insanların çoğunluğu Beluç etnik kökenine mensup. İki milyon civarında nü- fusu olan, Beluç dili konuşan ve mezhep açısından çoğunluğu Sün- ni olan Beluçlar arasında İran yö- netimine karşı çeşitli tepkiler var. Üstelik sınırın hemen öte yanında, Pakistan’da yoğun bir Beluç nüfusu yaşıyor. Bu durum İran hüküme- ti için bölgenin hassasiyetini daha da artıyor. Bölgede 2003’ten sonra İran güvenlik güçlerini ve yetkili- lerini hedef alan silahlı saldırılar gerçekleştiren militan selefî hare- ketler ortaya çıktı. Bunlardan en çok bilineni Abdülmelik Rigi’nin önderliğindeki Cundullah hareke- ti. İran’ın bu bölgede çeşitli neden- lerle yaşanan çatışmalarda son on yılda üç bine yakın güvenlik gö- revlisini kaybettiği iddia ediliyor.

Belucistan sorunu İran’ın Pa- kistan ile ilişkilerindeki önemli meselelerden birisi. İranlı yetkili- ler, sık sık kendisi de ‘Beluç isya- nı’ ile meşgul olan Pakistan’ı İran aleyhine faaliyet gösteren örgütlere müsamaha göstermekle suçluyor. Gerçi Cundullah lideri Rigi’nin Şubat 2010’da tutuklanmasında –sonra idam edildi– Pakistan’ın yardımcı olduğu biliniyor. Rigi’nin idamından sonra Cundullah dağıl- ma sürecine girdi ve yeni örgütler ortaya çıktı. Bu örgütlerden birisi Selahaddin el-Faruki takma adını kullanan Abdürrahim Mulazade liderliğindeki Ceyş el-Adl (Adalet Ordusu). Açıkça Şii karşıtı bir du- ruşu olan Ceyş el-Adl ‘râfizîlere’ ve ‘Safevî rejimine karşı’ savaş verdi- ğini iddia ediyor. Pakistan toprak- larında yerleşen bu örgüt 2013’ten beri İran sınır muhafızlarını hedef alan saldırılar gerçekleştiriyor.

Ceyş el-Adl, son olarak 26 Ni- san 2017’de İran-Pakistan sınırında Mirjaveh bölgesinde devriye gezen on sınır muhafızının öldürüldüğü saldırıyı üstlendi. Saldırganlar sı- nırın sıfır noktasından uzun nam- lulu silahlarla askerlere ateş açtı ve çatışmadan sonra Pakistan içlerine kaçtı. Bu olay İran kamuoyunda, ‘kendi topraklarında terörist grup- lara ve çetelere karşı etkili şekilde mücadele etmediği’ ve sınır güven- liği konusunda gerekli tedbirleri al- madığı gerekçesiyle Pakistan’a karşı tepki oluşmasına neden oldu. Sal- dırıdan kısa bir süre sonra Pakistan Başbakanı Navaz Şerif ’e hitaben bir mektup yazan İran Cumhur- başkanı Ruhani saldırının sorum- lularının tutuklanmasını ve İran’a teslim edilmesini istedi. Ardından İran Dışişleri Bakanı Cevad Zarif 3 Mayıs’ta İslamabad’ı ziyaret ede- rek üst düzey yetkililerle görüştü ve sınırda güvenlik tedbirlerinin artı- rılmasını istedi. Pakistanlı yetkili- ler bölgeye ilave askerî birliklerin sevkiyatı dâhil gerekli önlemlerin artırılması konusunda Zarif’e gü- vence verdi.

Zarif’in İslamabad ziyaretinde aldığı güvencelere rağmen İranlı as- kerî yetkililer Pakistan’ı hedef alan açıklamalar yapmaya devam etti. Genel Kurmay Başkanı M. Bage- ri, 8 Mayıs’ta yaptığı bir konuşma- da Pakistan topraklarının “Suudi Arabistan tarafından devşirilen ve ABD tarafından desteklenen terö- ristlerin donatımı ve eğitimi için güvenli bir barınağa dönüşmüş” olduğunu iddia etti. “Pakistan yet- kililerinden sorumluluk gösterme- lerini, sınırlarını kontrol etmeleri- ni, teröristleri tutuklamalarını ve illegal oluşumların kapatılmasını” isteyen Bageri, “terörist saldırılar devam ederse sığınakları ve hücre- leri nerede olursa olsun vururuz!” dedi.

Şerif’in ‘İslam Askerî İttifakı’nın Komutasını Alması

İslamabad ile Tahran arasındaki ilişkilerin gerilmesinin bir sebebi Pakistan toprakları üzerinden ya- pılan saldırılarsa, bir sebebi de Pa- kistan’ın Suudi Arabistan ile askerî ve güvenlik iş birliğini geliştirmesi- dir. Nitekim, İranlı yetkililer Suudi Arabistan’ı azınlıkları kışkırtmak ve rejim karşıtı silahlı örgütlere destek vermekle suçluyor. Suudi- lerin Beluç isyancıları örgütleyip desteklediği, Pakistan’ın da buna müsamaha gösterdiği iddia edili- yor. Dolayısıyla, İran’ın Pakistan’a yönelik sert tepkisinin arkasında bu ülkenin Suudi Arabistan ile gü- venlik iş birliğini artırması var.

Pakistan ile Suudi Arabistan arasında geçmişi 1980’lere kadar giden askerî iş birliği var. Bin kadar Pakistanlı subay halihazırda Suudi Arabistan’da ‘danışmanlık’ hizmeti veriyor. Pakistan-Suudi Arabistan

iş birliğinin uzantısı olarak Nisan 2011’de Bahreyn’de ortaya çıkan is- yanların bastırılması için Pakistanlı eski ordu mensupları devşirilerek Bahreyn güvenlik güçlerine dâhil edildi. Bugün Bahreyn güvenlik güçlerinin neredeyse %30’u Pa- kistanlılardan oluşuyor. Bununla birlikte iki ülke arasındaki iş bir- liği 2015’te sekteye uğradı. Mart 2015’te Husi isyanına karşı Ye- men’e askerî müdahalede bulunan Suudi Arabistan, Pakistan’dan savaş uçağı, savaş gemisi ve asker gön- dererek koalisyona destek verme- sini istemişti. O dönemde İran ile ilişkilerini geliştirmeye çalışan ve içeride de militan örgütlere karşı mücadele veren Pakistan, Yemen konusunda tarafsız kaldı ve Riyad’a istediği askerî desteği vermedi. Bu- nunla birlikte Pakistan hüküme- ti, Suudi Arabistan güvenliğine doğrudan bir tehdit olması duru- munda Suudi Arabistan’ın yanında duracağını söyledi. Pakistan’ın ek- sikliği, koalisyonun performansı- nın zayıf olmasının nedeni olarak gösteriliyor.

Suudi Arabistan, Yemen sava- şında Pakistan’dan beklediği des- teği alamadı; ama Aralık 2015’te kurulduğu ilan edilen ‘Terörizme Karşı İslam Askerî İttifakı’na ka- tılması için Pakistan hükümetine baskı yaptı. Nihayet Ocak 2017’de Pakistan eski Genel Kurmay Baş- kanı Rahel Şerif ’in merkezi Ri- yad’da bulunan ve 41 üyesi olan ittifakın komutanı olarak atanacağı açıklandı. Pakistan makamlarının bu atamayı Nisan ayının başların- da onaylamasından sonra Şerif, Riyad’a hareket etti. Şerif ’in bu göreve gelmesi, İslam İttifakından dışlanan İran’ı rahatsız etti. İran’ın Pakistan’daki Büyükelçisi Mehdi Honardost, 4 Nisan’da Pakistan basınına yaptığı açıklamada “bu konunun izaha muhtaç olduğu- nu” söyledi. Pakistan hükümetinin atamaya onay vermeden önce İran makamlarına bilgi verdiğini belir- ten Honardost, “bunun İran’ın bu karara razı olduğu anlamına gelme- diğini” söyledi. Pakistanlı yetkililer ise Şerif ’in bu görevi üslenmesinin İran’a karşı hasmane bir hareket ol- madığını belirtti. Pakistan Dışişleri Bakanı Tehmina Janjua, ittifakın herhangi bir ülkeye karşı değil te- rörizme karşı olduğunu belirtti ve ülkesinin “İran’ın çıkarları aleyhi- ne hareket etmeyeceğini” söyledi. Savunma Bakanı M. Asif de Pakistan’ın ittifak içindeki görevinin Suudi sınırları içinde olacağını ve Yemen’de bir rol almayacağını söyledi.

İran Büyükelçisi Honardost’un da belirttiği gibi İran ile Pakistan arasındaki ilişkilerin genel olarak çok iyi olduğunu söylemek müm- kün değil. Fakat hem Pakistan hem de İran gerek ekonomik gerekse stratejik nedenlerle ikili ilişkileri- ni geliştirmek istiyor ve bu yönde geçtiğimiz yıl önemli adımlar da atıldı. İki ülke arasında karşılıklı üst düzey ziyaretler yapıldı. Bu zi- yaretlerde ticaret hacminin beş yıl içerisinde 5 milyar dolara çıkarıl- ması, İran-Pakistan gaz boru hat- tının tamamlanması ve faaliyete geçirilmesi, İran’ın ‘Çin-Pakistan ekonomik koridoru’na dâhil ol- ması gibi meseleler ele alındı. Ne var ki hem İran-Pakistan sınırın- da artan saldırılar hem de İran ile Suudi Arabistan arasında yükselen gerilim Pakistan’ı zor seçimlerle baş başa bırakıyor.

 Yrd. Doç. Dr., Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, ORSAM Ortadoğu Danışmanı 
Ortadoğu Analiz, Mayıs-Haziran 2017 Cilt: 9 Sayı: 80 
http://orsam.org.tr/files/OA/80/15_bayramsinkaya.pdf

Politics and Media in Iran

11.09.2017, https://orsam.org.tr/en/yayinlar/politics-and-media-in-iran/

In Iran, where no political party is institutionalized or established on a national scale, media plays an important role in bringing different political opinions and reactions to the people. However, Iran is usually listed among countries with no freedom of press. For instance, in 2014 the country ranked 173rd among 180 countries in Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders. Regardless of the discussions on the accuracy of such assessments, Iranian media undoubtedly does not enjoy a complete freedom of press.

Contrary to popular belief, the pressure on Iranian media is not exerted by the government but by the establishment, the Islamic Republic regime. Thus, concerns on press freedom continue even after the change ofruling administrations.The status of media has not seen much improvement during the time of Hassan Rouhani who came into power following the June 2013 presidential elections. The regime views the media as a way to educate people according to certain values, inform them on issues and even as a tool to shape politics. "Free press" is perceived as a potential threat to the regime since it could be utilized by its enemies, which forces the regime to impose strict control over media.

In the Islamic Republican regime, freedom of press is legally constrained in order to protect public interests and Islamic principles. According to press and criminal laws, main press crimes include spreading propaganda against the state, defamation of religion, and creating fabricated news. Besides these crimes, the regime has unwritten red lines which are criticizing the leader of Iran's Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and questioning the principle of velayat-e faqih which constitutes the basis of Islamic Republican system. Additionally, Iranian government, security organizations, and judiciarymay prohibitpublishing on certain subjects. The media, compelled to survive within strict boundaries, has some significant challengesincluding editorial independence, state censorship on certain issues, and self-censorship by media professionals to avoid violating the regime's red lines.

According to current regulations all media outlets have to obtain publication permission from Press Supervisory Board under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The board, consisting of Minister of Culture, a university professor and a member each from  following institutions; Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, Supreme Judiciary Council, Supreme Council of the Religious Seminary of Qom, has the authority to transfer perpetrators ofpotentialoffends to the Press Court or Revolutionary Courts, and cancel licenses when it deems to be necessary.

Iranian press has had its glory days during the first term of President Mohammad Khatami at the end of 1990's.  There was an increase in the number of magazines and newspapers some of which had a circulation of almost a million. However, numerous newspapers and magazines were shut down following the new regulations in the Press Law in 2000. The pressure on the media continued during the governments of Ahmadinejad. Despite the increased pressure, types of media were widened with the spread of the Internet during this period.

Today the most efficient type of media in Iran is the news agencies with their number close to 20; they prepare news for printed and visual media and publish in several languages. The monopoly of the official news agency of the countryIRNAcame to an end with the establishment of ISNA in 1999 to support the reformist government, and Fars News Agency (FNA) in 2003 to present views of the radicals and conservatives. FNA, managed by directors with close ties to Revolutionary Guards, is accepted as the most influential news agency in Iran. In addition to that Iran has more than 42 million of Internet users, many news portals and more than 60, 000 thousand personal blogs that are regularly updated. Tabnak, Asr-e Iran and Khabaronline are the most visited news sites.

Despite this variety in the media, the principal news sources for 80% of Iranian people are radio and TV. The broadcast of radios and TV channels are under the monopoly of the state and managed by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). IRIB is supervised by a board consisting of a representative from legislature, judiciary, executive branches; however, the director-general is directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. IRIB has 8 national, and 29 local TV channels and almost 50 national or local radio channels. International TV channels such as Al-Alam and Press TV are also controlled by IRIB.

There are TV channels broadcasting through satellites to Iran where radio and TV broadcast is under the monopoly of the state. Satellite dishes were prohibited in 1994 to inhibit this type of broadcast that was supported by foreign states and anti-regime groups. Despite this prohibition, at least 40% of Iranians are believed to have connections to the international broadcasts through satellites.

The Outlook of Iranian Media 

Even though Iranian media has serious problems with regard to the press freedom, it is highly active and diverse within the allowed limits. Almost all the principal media sources are owned by certain political groups, people or institutions. According to their institutional ties and editorial policies, media of Iran can be divided into five categories.

Firstly, a portion of the media is directly connected to Supreme Leader Khamenei. As previously mentioned IRIB, which holds the monopoly of radio and TV broadcasting, is controlled by Supreme Leader Khamenei. IRIB also publishes a daily newspaper named Jam-e Jam and various weekly and monthly magazines. Government reshuffles do not change its editorial policy much since IRIB is not affiliated with the government. Supreme Leader Khamenei assigns the editors of Kayhan (The Cosmos), a newspaper which was formed before the Revolution, and Ettelaat, the oldest newspaper in Iran. Khorasan, a newspaper based in Mashhad but gets distributed nationally, and Qods also supervised by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Additionally, Khamenei still owns the licence of Jomhouri-e Eslami, a newspaper which was once owned by Islamic Republican Party. These newspapers usually reflect Khamenei's stance.

The second category is the media affiliated with the government which sometimes called "national media". The principal element of this category is government's official news agency IRNA and its daily newspaper Iran. Some other news agencies in the "national media" are ISNA, ILNA, and Mowj, all are managed by various institutions associated with the government.  The media of this category work according to political views of the ruling government since they are directly linked to the government.

The third category of the media consists of the reformist press. The major reformist newspapers are Afetab-e Yazd, mostly controlled by reformist religious group of Ruhaniyun, Etemad, published by Elias Hazrati who is a member of National Trust Party, and Shargh which was shut down for 4 times since 2002. Besides these newspapers, the magazines Chashmandaz-e Iran, Nasim-e Bidari, Mehrname, and Gozaresh belong to this category. Reformist news websites include Asr-e Iran, Fararu,and Diplomasi-yi Irani.

The newspapers which are not supervised by Khamenei but still have a conservative voice could form another group.  Resalat reflects the views of Motelefeh Party and the Islamic Society of Engineers; both are known for their close ties to the Bazaar of Tehran. Hamshahri, which used to be the most influential newspaper of the reformists, has had a more conservative view since 2003 as it is owned by Tehran Municipality. Hamshahri Media Group has many periodicals including Hamshahri Diplomatic.

Last category of the Iranian press could be entitled as neo-radical since it consists of media that used to immensely support Ahmadinejad and now harshly criticizes the government of Rouhani. Vatan-e Emrooz and Javan newspapers, Fars and Tasnim news agencies, Rajanews and Mashreghnews news portals belong to this category.

Media and Politics under President Rouhani

Following his election as a president, Rouhani took two actions with related to the press. The first one aimed to increase his influence on the media, as the press is the most important tool for the government in Iranian system, where power of elected officials are structurally limited. The government affiliated press as well as the reformist press have widely supported Rouhani government to survive both in social and political spheres. Traditionally conservative press also supports the government of Rouhani on some aspects.  Thus, the government is not only influential on its affiliated press but also on reformist and traditionally conservative press. However, this is not an absolute and unquestioned support and since the press applauds the government's achievements but  avoids its deficiencies. According to his opponents, the government of Rouhani both harshly criticizes the governments of Ahmedinejad, and also divides the people as the moderates and the extremes to compensate for his weakness. The dissenting journalists express discomfort about not being allowed to speak during the meetings held by the President and not being included in the President's tours.

On July 22, 2015 Ministry of Culture sent a secret notice to the press about things to consider while covering Iran's nuclear program. Ministry's Spokesperson Hossein Noushabadi stated that the notice is in line with the decisions of Supreme National Security Council and these decisions are binding for everyone. The9-Dey newspaper's license was canceled and Kayhangot a warning for not conforming to these decisions. This is regarded as the most significant evidence for the government's desire to increase its control over the media. However, this pressure is not only aimed at the opponents of Rouhani's government but also the reformists. For instance, a site named Entekhab was temporarily barred access in October 2014 and the publication of the Roozan newspaper was suspended because of the story it ran about the death anniversary of Ayatollah Montazeri. After a well-known reformist journalist Mohammed Quchani could obtain a license for the Aseman newspaper in February 2014, itgot shut down only after publishing six issues because of an article criticizing Qisas (eye for eye) laws.

As his opponents claim that he "controls the media", President Rouhani says nuclear negotiations are unjustly criticized in various reports and the government's achievements in many fields are not sufficiently covered in the press. He even claimed that state-run TV channel "IRIB is 100% against the government". Rouhani's advisor in charge of cultural affairs and government's representative in IRIB Board of Directors Husameddin Ashna once stated that the IRIB administration refuse implementing the board's decisions.  At his speech on National Journalism Day, Ashna said that the small press is under huge supervision however, the bigger ones are under almost no supervision at all. He also mentioned some publications of Ettelaat and Kayhan and asked "Why can't we do anything about these?"

The second action the government of Rouhani took with the press was expanding the press freedom.  In this context, Rouhani promised to re-open several NGOs that got shut down in 2009 including a journalist organization, the Press Union however, there has been no steps towards it. Moreover, Minister of Culture Ali Jannati prompted a debate in the country when he stated during a speech in March 2014 that the precautions has been taken since 1979 such as filtering the Internet to control the flow of information is "absurd". In response, Friday Prayer leader of Tehran, Mohammad Ali Movahedi-Kermani said Minister of Culture should take measures so as to "prevent the enemies from corrupting the Iranian society with their dangerous culture". Popular social media sites such as Youtube, Facebook and Twitter are still blocked.

Consequently, President Rouhani attempted to implement two big projects to control the press but also to expand their freedom however, he was not successful in either of them. Moreover, during Rouhani's term, freedom of press got worsened as even publishing pictures of an important member of the reformist movement Mohammad Khatami was prohibited by the establishment.