Iran’s Negotiations with the 5 +1 Group: Negotiations Only in Name?
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Political Advisor
Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group (the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members and Germany), which Turkey wants to host so that it will be included in the talks, are going to be held on October 1, in Geneva. The secretary of National Security Said Celili will be chair of the Iranian delegation, and European Commission Foreign Policy Commissioner Javier Solana will preside as moderator of the 5 +1 group's delegation. In April Iran responded to the P5+1 group’s proposal package which was prepared for the deliberation of Iran's nuclear program by preparing its own proposal package. The parties will begin negotiations over the package of proposals offered by Iran. However, both parties’ negotiating agendas and their expectations seem to be different, and this is expected to affect these negotiations negatively.
The P5+1 group’s purpose in these talks is to negotiate and come to an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program, and to persuade their Iranian counterparts to confirm that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. However, the Iranian side even did not even discuss its nuclear program in the proposal package, and the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has often proclaimed that Iran’s "nuclear rights" would never be subject to negotiation. Iran, a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), sees its peaceful nuclear energy program as a right, and recognizes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) instead of Security Council. During the October 1 negotiations, according to Iran’s proposal package, Iran is expected to discuss comprehensive subjects such as general international security issues, reorganization of the UN and its Security Council, and the nonproliferation and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.
Even though Solana will chair the P5+1 delegation, the P5+1 group’s disagreements about Iran’s nuclear program should be specified. While the US, England, France and Germany believe that Iran's nuclear program aims to produce nuclear weapons, Russia and China disagree in this regard.
While preparing for negotiations, the Western nations made an important move. On Friday, September 25 at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, President B. Obama, the British Prime Minister G. Brown, and the French President N. Sarkozy, based on information from the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), declared a secret and new uranium enrichment plant near the Iranian city of Qom (Ferduu). The three leaders reported that German Chancellor A. Merkel also supports them, and that in order to eliminate concerns about its nuclear program, Iran has two months to comply with international demands. Otherwise, they said that Iran will be subjected to more severe sanctions.
While this development complicates Iran's position, if Western nations fail in the negotiations, garnering international support for sanctions against Iran will be easier, especially when it comes to persuading Russia and China. In fact, Russia's attitude towards Iran’s nuclear program has changed significantly. While President D. Medvedev was saying that the implementation of sanctions against Iran might be inevitable, Russian Foreign Minister S. Rushdie Lavrov, who negotiated with Iran’s Foreign Minister M. Mottaki, has said that he “expects results” from Iran. China has important trade relations with Iran, and its position is still ambiguous. Despite its good relations with Iran, previously in the Security Council, because Iran had not stopped the uranium enrichment program, China consented to three measure about sanctions against Iran. Given the potential sanctions package, it is possible that China, in order to align itself with the U.S., will support the sanctions.
The U.S. and its Western allies expect an effective result from sanctions against Iran during this period. The Secretary of Defense, R. Gates pointed out Iran’s economic difficulties and political problems, and claimed that increased economic and diplomatic pressure might get results, causing Iran to change its nuclear policy. Gates says that stiffer sanctions may restrict access to technology needed for banking, machinery, natural gas and oil.
In response to the Western attack, Iran immediately opened the Qom facility for UAE inspection. According to the claims of the Western nations, because they understood that the Qom facility was identified by Western intelligence agencies, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, acknowledged the existence of facility in a letter to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) on Monday, September 21. He stipulated that the facility will be open to the inspection agency, like Iran’s other facilities. Iranian officials pointed out that Salehi’s letter had been written before the statements issued by Western leaders. Thus, they accused Western countries of pressuring Iran prior to the negotiations. Iran also claims that the stage when the obligation to notify the agencies had not yet been reached. According to the relevant regulation, a nuclear facility should be reported to the agency 180 days before its begins to operate. However, more than a year remains before the facility in question can be put into operation. Iranian officials, unlike their Western counterparts, assert that the Qom facility is not suitable for making nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the uranium will be enriched only to 5%, whereas nuclear weapons require uranium enriched to nearly 90%. Second, like Iran's other nuclear facilities, the facility is subject to the inspection of IAEA.
With all the events of Holy Defense Week, military ceremonies and new missile experiments, Iran found itself in a difficult situation just before the negotiations. In particular, on Monday, September 28, testing the Shahab 3 and Sajjil missiles, which have a 2000 kilometer range from land to land, along with the threats of military officials to Israel and the U.S. were found extremely “provocative.” On one hand, simulated military operations and the commanders’ threatening speeches were seen as display of power. On the other hand, they highlighted the seriousness of the Iranian threat to the West.
Just before the October 1 negotiations, the disclosure of new nuclear facilities, the relationship between the two sides, military exercises, and the American recession were the reasons that caused the decision to implement more severe sanctions in the case of inconclusive negotiations and reduced the likelihood of the negotiations’ success. Now, both sides think that the negotiations are a test intended to gauge the “real intentions’’ of the other. In a declaration published on Tuesday, September 29, 239 Iranian senators stated that these negotiations were identified as a “test’’ for the P5+1 group, so they wanted to avoid replicating prior mistakes. Likewise, Secretary of State H. Clinton, in her speech on CBS, said that they were expecting convincing evidence regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear program. However, both sides will try not to make a significant change in their position, and expect that the other side will also be successful in this test. While the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Chairman, Alaadin Burucerdi, says that Iran will continue to cooperate with the UAE, but that Iran will not accept any restrictions of its nuclear program in Geneva, Clinton says that the US will not meet Iran’s expectations. Given this situation, the talks that will begin on October 1 are not going to resolve the problems. They will merely strengthen the arguments of both parties.
October 7 2009
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=83
The Cabinet of Ahmadinejad Has Changed, but not His Policies
The Cabinet of Ahmadinejad Has Changed, but not His Policies
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Advisor
The new cabinet of the Islamic Republic of Iran has finally been formed, after the contested June 12 Elections. Eighteen of the twenty-one candidates that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed for the cabinet managed to receive a vote of confidence on Thursday September 3, following heated arguments in the Iranian Majlis (legislature). [1]
Ahmadinejad’s second cabinet differs from the first in important ways. The most important of these differences is the fact that the members of the previous cabinet have nearly all been replaced. Only six of the ministers from Ahmadinejad’s first cabinet remain in the new one. In the new cabinet, Manoucheher Mottaki was selected to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Mehrabian as the Minister of Industry and Mines, Mohammad Abbasi as the Minister of Cooperatives, and Ahmed Hurrem as the Minister of Roads and Transportation, while Masoud Mirkazemi, the Minister of Trade in the previous cabinet, was selected to be the Minister of Oil and Mohammad Najjar, the Minister of Defense in the previous cabinet, was appointed to the new Ministry of the Interior. Thus, Ahmadinejad replaced all of the administrators of the economy, and sacked the majority of the former ministers with whom he had been in disagreements. [2]
The biggest change in the new cabinet is that it is the first time since the Revolution that women have been given posts as ministers in the new cabinet. However, only one of the three female candidates that Ahmadinejad nominated, Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, the new Minister of Health, received enough votes in the Majlis to be approved. The other two female nominees, Fatemeh Ajarlou and Sousan Keshavarz, nominated by Ahmadinejad to be the new Minister of Welfare and Social Security and the new Minister of Education, respectively, did not receive the vote of confidence as they were not thought to be eligible for the posts. [3]
Such major chages in the new cabinet left Ahmadinejad in a difficult position during the process of ratifying his nominees. Ahmadinejad was accused of appointing inexperienced but loyal people to the cabinet, and he was criticized for not preparing a comprehensive government program and not consulting the deputies when he was selecting ministers for the cabinet. For these reasons, the quality of the candidates for the ministries was discussed at length before the vote of confidence was held, because most of the nominees were thought to be inexperienced. Thus, Mohammad Aliabadi, nominated to be the new Minister of Energy, along with Ajarlou and Keshavarz, were rejected by the Majlis since they were thought not to lack the experience and the knowledge required of them. The former Minister of Trade and the current Minister of Oil, Mirkazemi was criticized for not knowing enough about oil (vital to the national economy), and as a result, his candidacy was most vigorously opposed.
The most “popular” member of the new cabinet is the new Minister of Defense, who won the highest number of votes (227) from the Majlis. A senior general in the Revolutionary Guards, Vahidi is the founder of the famous Jerusalem Forces, included by the US on its list of terrorist organizations, and he has been the commander of the Jerusalem Forces for a long time. While commander of the Jerusalem Forces, he was one of the people held responsible for the more than 80 deaths caused by the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Culture Center in Argentina, and is therefore wanted by Interpol. Despite the reaction of the international community, no speeches were delivered in opposition to Vahidi’s candidacy, and only anti-Israel slogans were pronounced.
Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, the Minister of Interior, is the second cabinet member from the military. Naccar, one of the commanders of Revolutionary Guards, was Minister of Defense in the previous cabinet. Following the appointment of Naccar as the Minister of Interior, the Revolutionary Guards are thought to have greater influence on provinces and provincial institutions. The new Minister of Intelligence, Huccetulislam Heydar Moslehi, is also affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. He was the former representative of the Religious Leader in the Revolutionary Guards and Besic.
One of the most eye-catching members of the new parliament is the Minister of Science, Research and Technology, Kamran Daneshjou. Formerly Deputy Minister of Political Affairs, Daneshjou was the Head of the Election Council for the June 12 elections. The appointment of Daneshjou, seen by the Reformists as “the architect of the election coup,” has attracted lots of attention.
There are important security, foreign policy problems and financial issues on the agenda of the cabinet, which will hold its first meeting on Sunday in Meshed. Instead of forming a cabinet that would include other political groups as an attempt to bring peace and unity to the country, Ahmadinejad decided to create a radical cabinet that is loyal to himself and relies on the state security apparatus. As a matter of fact, along with the Revolutionary Guards in the cabinet, six more ministers are thought to be in contact with the Revolutionary Guards and Besic. This foreshadows Ahmadinejad’s intention not to compromise on domestic or foreign policy and to pursue radical policies. He is expected, especially, to tighten security measures in a so called attempt to prevent a velvet revolution and marginalize the “reformist” opposition that continue to challenge him. However, as the Majlis debates show, the strongest opposition to Ahmadinejad will come from the conservatives, because politics in Iran is now dominated by the conservatives and the radicals. Although it is expected that the new Ahmadinejad government will initiate diplomatic meetings regarding the nuclear weapon issue in order to restore Iran’s image in the international arena, it does not seem likely that there will be major changes in Iran’s approach to this issue and other problems in the region, such as the Israel-Palestine problem. As a result, Ahmadinejad has almost completely replaced his cabinet, but has not defined new policies since there is no “new” element either in Ahmadinejad’s speeches or the statements of his ministers.
Moreover, although the selection of women by Ahmadinejad as ministers for the first time is a “nominal” reform and the women candidates have no reputation regarding the protection of women rights – for example, Vahid Dastjerdi opposed to the Agreement on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Women in Iran – this step is, nevertheless, important in breaking the taboos. The importance of this reform will be better understood if we remember Muhammed Hatemi’s promise for such a reform but giving no seats to women in his own cabinet.
[1] In Iran, a separate vote of confidence is held for each minister and the nominee needs to win at least half of the votes to be confirmed. In place of candidates who fail to be confirmed, the president chooses three new candidates to be selected.
[2] Some ministers, including the Minister of Intelligence, Mohsen Ejei, and the Minister of Islamic Guidance and Culture, Saffar Harandi, were critical of the appointment of Esfendiyar Rahim Meshai, who is the father-in-law of Ahmedinejad’s child, as the First Deputy of the President. After this, Ahmedinejad deposed Eje and did not give the other ministers any ministries in the new cabinet. However, Ahmedinejad had to backdown because the Islamic Leader Ali Khamanei also opposed the appointmentment of Rahim Meshai.
[3] It is said that Keshavarz took part in Moussawi’s election campaign and was therefore rejected.
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=143
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Advisor
The new cabinet of the Islamic Republic of Iran has finally been formed, after the contested June 12 Elections. Eighteen of the twenty-one candidates that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed for the cabinet managed to receive a vote of confidence on Thursday September 3, following heated arguments in the Iranian Majlis (legislature). [1]
Ahmadinejad’s second cabinet differs from the first in important ways. The most important of these differences is the fact that the members of the previous cabinet have nearly all been replaced. Only six of the ministers from Ahmadinejad’s first cabinet remain in the new one. In the new cabinet, Manoucheher Mottaki was selected to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Mehrabian as the Minister of Industry and Mines, Mohammad Abbasi as the Minister of Cooperatives, and Ahmed Hurrem as the Minister of Roads and Transportation, while Masoud Mirkazemi, the Minister of Trade in the previous cabinet, was selected to be the Minister of Oil and Mohammad Najjar, the Minister of Defense in the previous cabinet, was appointed to the new Ministry of the Interior. Thus, Ahmadinejad replaced all of the administrators of the economy, and sacked the majority of the former ministers with whom he had been in disagreements. [2]
The biggest change in the new cabinet is that it is the first time since the Revolution that women have been given posts as ministers in the new cabinet. However, only one of the three female candidates that Ahmadinejad nominated, Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, the new Minister of Health, received enough votes in the Majlis to be approved. The other two female nominees, Fatemeh Ajarlou and Sousan Keshavarz, nominated by Ahmadinejad to be the new Minister of Welfare and Social Security and the new Minister of Education, respectively, did not receive the vote of confidence as they were not thought to be eligible for the posts. [3]
Such major chages in the new cabinet left Ahmadinejad in a difficult position during the process of ratifying his nominees. Ahmadinejad was accused of appointing inexperienced but loyal people to the cabinet, and he was criticized for not preparing a comprehensive government program and not consulting the deputies when he was selecting ministers for the cabinet. For these reasons, the quality of the candidates for the ministries was discussed at length before the vote of confidence was held, because most of the nominees were thought to be inexperienced. Thus, Mohammad Aliabadi, nominated to be the new Minister of Energy, along with Ajarlou and Keshavarz, were rejected by the Majlis since they were thought not to lack the experience and the knowledge required of them. The former Minister of Trade and the current Minister of Oil, Mirkazemi was criticized for not knowing enough about oil (vital to the national economy), and as a result, his candidacy was most vigorously opposed.
The most “popular” member of the new cabinet is the new Minister of Defense, who won the highest number of votes (227) from the Majlis. A senior general in the Revolutionary Guards, Vahidi is the founder of the famous Jerusalem Forces, included by the US on its list of terrorist organizations, and he has been the commander of the Jerusalem Forces for a long time. While commander of the Jerusalem Forces, he was one of the people held responsible for the more than 80 deaths caused by the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Culture Center in Argentina, and is therefore wanted by Interpol. Despite the reaction of the international community, no speeches were delivered in opposition to Vahidi’s candidacy, and only anti-Israel slogans were pronounced.
Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, the Minister of Interior, is the second cabinet member from the military. Naccar, one of the commanders of Revolutionary Guards, was Minister of Defense in the previous cabinet. Following the appointment of Naccar as the Minister of Interior, the Revolutionary Guards are thought to have greater influence on provinces and provincial institutions. The new Minister of Intelligence, Huccetulislam Heydar Moslehi, is also affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. He was the former representative of the Religious Leader in the Revolutionary Guards and Besic.
One of the most eye-catching members of the new parliament is the Minister of Science, Research and Technology, Kamran Daneshjou. Formerly Deputy Minister of Political Affairs, Daneshjou was the Head of the Election Council for the June 12 elections. The appointment of Daneshjou, seen by the Reformists as “the architect of the election coup,” has attracted lots of attention.
There are important security, foreign policy problems and financial issues on the agenda of the cabinet, which will hold its first meeting on Sunday in Meshed. Instead of forming a cabinet that would include other political groups as an attempt to bring peace and unity to the country, Ahmadinejad decided to create a radical cabinet that is loyal to himself and relies on the state security apparatus. As a matter of fact, along with the Revolutionary Guards in the cabinet, six more ministers are thought to be in contact with the Revolutionary Guards and Besic. This foreshadows Ahmadinejad’s intention not to compromise on domestic or foreign policy and to pursue radical policies. He is expected, especially, to tighten security measures in a so called attempt to prevent a velvet revolution and marginalize the “reformist” opposition that continue to challenge him. However, as the Majlis debates show, the strongest opposition to Ahmadinejad will come from the conservatives, because politics in Iran is now dominated by the conservatives and the radicals. Although it is expected that the new Ahmadinejad government will initiate diplomatic meetings regarding the nuclear weapon issue in order to restore Iran’s image in the international arena, it does not seem likely that there will be major changes in Iran’s approach to this issue and other problems in the region, such as the Israel-Palestine problem. As a result, Ahmadinejad has almost completely replaced his cabinet, but has not defined new policies since there is no “new” element either in Ahmadinejad’s speeches or the statements of his ministers.
Moreover, although the selection of women by Ahmadinejad as ministers for the first time is a “nominal” reform and the women candidates have no reputation regarding the protection of women rights – for example, Vahid Dastjerdi opposed to the Agreement on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Women in Iran – this step is, nevertheless, important in breaking the taboos. The importance of this reform will be better understood if we remember Muhammed Hatemi’s promise for such a reform but giving no seats to women in his own cabinet.
[1] In Iran, a separate vote of confidence is held for each minister and the nominee needs to win at least half of the votes to be confirmed. In place of candidates who fail to be confirmed, the president chooses three new candidates to be selected.
[2] Some ministers, including the Minister of Intelligence, Mohsen Ejei, and the Minister of Islamic Guidance and Culture, Saffar Harandi, were critical of the appointment of Esfendiyar Rahim Meshai, who is the father-in-law of Ahmedinejad’s child, as the First Deputy of the President. After this, Ahmedinejad deposed Eje and did not give the other ministers any ministries in the new cabinet. However, Ahmedinejad had to backdown because the Islamic Leader Ali Khamanei also opposed the appointmentment of Rahim Meshai.
[3] It is said that Keshavarz took part in Moussawi’s election campaign and was therefore rejected.
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=143
The Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s Visits to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
The Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s Visits to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Political Advisor
Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Iran's relations with the West have broken down again. In spite of Western efforts, in particular, US led efforts, to isolate Iran, Iran chose to diversify its foreign policy and to improve its relations with its neighbors. During this period, Iran worked on Africa and Latin America initiatives on one hand, and tried to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the other. Moreover, Iran’s "river basin" extending from the Middle East to the Caucasus, South Asia and Central Asia occupied the top position on the Iran's foreign policy agenda. In contrast to its relations with the West and Israel, Iran avoided creating problems in these areas by emphasizing cooperation. This is the context for Iran’s President Ahmadinejad visit to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan on January 4 and 6, 2010.
Tajikistan has a significant place in Iran’s foreign policy. In an earlier speech, Ahmadinejad described the two countries as “one soul with two bodies.” After Tajikistan declared independence, Iran became the main supporter of the country and made great efforts to end the civil war in Tajikistan. The most important reason for the closeness between Iran and Tajikistan is that they share the same language (Tajik is a dialect of Persian) and the same cultural background. Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan share similar languages and cultures, and have organized meetings between Persian speaking countries. The first Persian Speaking Countries Summit was held on May 11, 1997, and most recent was held on March 9, 2009 in Tehran. A commission was formed to foster the development of cultural cooperation between these three countries. A council consisting of the foreign ministers of these three nations for the oversight and implementation of cooperation agreements that were signed regarding trade, transportation, energy, education, health and security.
In addition to cultural activities, Iran continues to work on major infrastructure investments in Tajikistan. More than 150 Iranian companies are working in Tajikistan on construction projects in a variety of fields. An important part of Iran's investments consists in the construction of roads, tunnels, dams and hydroelectric power plants. Furthermore, road and rail connections ha established to connect Tajikistan to Iran by way of Afghanistan. Cooperation between two countries is also reflected in foreign policy. Tajikistan, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, supports Iran’s initiatives to join this organization. Tajikistan also supports Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program.
During his most recent visit to Tajikistan, President Ahmadinejad and Tajikistan’s President Emomalii Rahmon called the relationship between the two countries "strategic.” Between Tajikistan and Iran have signed cooperation agreements in the fields of extradition, mining and tourism, and Iran has invested in new projects such as the Iran Istiglal Tunnel, Tude Dam 2 and the construction of energy power plants.
Turkmenistan neighbors one of Iran’s important borders, and it also has an important place in Iran’s foreign policy due to its Caspian Sea coast. The status of the Caspian Sea issue is a matter of dispute between the two countries. In addition, Turkmenistan has become Iran’s largest trading partner in Central Asia with trade volume between two countries exceeding 3 billion dollars in 2009. Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan targeted increased trade volume between the two countries, and technology, trade and energy cooperation agreements were signed.
Cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran has two important dimensions, transport and energy. Turkmenistan has an important geographical position, opening Central Asia to Iran, whereas Iran’s important geographical position enables Turkmenistan to reach the Gulf of Basra. Parallel to this geographical complementarity, the two nations decided to merge the railways, and the Meshed-Serahs railway, which began service in 1995, was the first step in this direction. To support this measure, the Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (Gorgan-Etrak-Uzen) railway agreement was signed in 2007, and during Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan, the agreement was extended so as to complete theIran-Turkmenistan portion of this line (Gorgan-Etra).
The natural gas trade forms the basis of energy relations between Iran and Turkmenistan. Iran has imported a yearly average of 8 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan by way of Körpece-Kurtköy gas pipeline since 1997. In February 2009 the two nations agreed to increase the amount of Turkmenistan's natural gas sold to Iran, and to fulfill this purpose they have been agreed to the construction of a new pipeline between the two countries. In addition, they made a deal on Iran’s natural gas research in Yolatan, part of Turkmenistan, and with this agreement Iran could receive a portion of its natural gas.
.
Following the February 2009 agreement, the Devletabad-Serahs-Hangiran gas pipeline, extending from the natural gas fields of Turkmenistan's Devletabad to Iran's Caspian coast, was completed very quickly and the inauguration ofthepipeline took place during Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan. Turkey's Energy Minister, Taner Yıldız, attended the ceremony. Thus, the amount of Turkmenistan's natural gas sold to Iran is expected to increase from 14 billion to 30 billion cubic meters. Iran is planning to export a greater portion of its own gas, produced in southern Iran, replacing the difference with natural gas from Turkmenistan in northeastern Iran.
During President Ahmedinejad’s visits to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, he signed a series of cooperation agreements and sought support for the Iran's foreign policy. During his meetings in these countries, he asserted that the existing international system had crashed, and pointed out the development of cooperation between countries in the region. During Tajikistan’s President Emomalii Rahmon’s meeting with Ahmedinejad, he expressed his support for Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, and he expressed his desire to solve this problem by diplomatic means. During Ahmedinejad’s meeting of with Turkmenistan President Berdimuhammedov, he praised Turkmenistan's neutral stance towards regional problems. On the other hand, Berdimuhammedov said that Turkmenistan shares very similar ideas about regional affairs with Iran.
In conclusion, although the United States tried to isolate Iran and revive new sanctions against Iran, Iran is strengthening its ties and trade cooperation with its neighboris. Moreover, the question of whether or not Iran’s policy will affect the US remains valid. The answer to this question depends on the nature of of the United States’ concrete steps.
January 18 2010
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=143
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Political Advisor
Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Iran's relations with the West have broken down again. In spite of Western efforts, in particular, US led efforts, to isolate Iran, Iran chose to diversify its foreign policy and to improve its relations with its neighbors. During this period, Iran worked on Africa and Latin America initiatives on one hand, and tried to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the other. Moreover, Iran’s "river basin" extending from the Middle East to the Caucasus, South Asia and Central Asia occupied the top position on the Iran's foreign policy agenda. In contrast to its relations with the West and Israel, Iran avoided creating problems in these areas by emphasizing cooperation. This is the context for Iran’s President Ahmadinejad visit to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan on January 4 and 6, 2010.
Tajikistan has a significant place in Iran’s foreign policy. In an earlier speech, Ahmadinejad described the two countries as “one soul with two bodies.” After Tajikistan declared independence, Iran became the main supporter of the country and made great efforts to end the civil war in Tajikistan. The most important reason for the closeness between Iran and Tajikistan is that they share the same language (Tajik is a dialect of Persian) and the same cultural background. Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan share similar languages and cultures, and have organized meetings between Persian speaking countries. The first Persian Speaking Countries Summit was held on May 11, 1997, and most recent was held on March 9, 2009 in Tehran. A commission was formed to foster the development of cultural cooperation between these three countries. A council consisting of the foreign ministers of these three nations for the oversight and implementation of cooperation agreements that were signed regarding trade, transportation, energy, education, health and security.
In addition to cultural activities, Iran continues to work on major infrastructure investments in Tajikistan. More than 150 Iranian companies are working in Tajikistan on construction projects in a variety of fields. An important part of Iran's investments consists in the construction of roads, tunnels, dams and hydroelectric power plants. Furthermore, road and rail connections ha established to connect Tajikistan to Iran by way of Afghanistan. Cooperation between two countries is also reflected in foreign policy. Tajikistan, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, supports Iran’s initiatives to join this organization. Tajikistan also supports Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program.
During his most recent visit to Tajikistan, President Ahmadinejad and Tajikistan’s President Emomalii Rahmon called the relationship between the two countries "strategic.” Between Tajikistan and Iran have signed cooperation agreements in the fields of extradition, mining and tourism, and Iran has invested in new projects such as the Iran Istiglal Tunnel, Tude Dam 2 and the construction of energy power plants.
Turkmenistan neighbors one of Iran’s important borders, and it also has an important place in Iran’s foreign policy due to its Caspian Sea coast. The status of the Caspian Sea issue is a matter of dispute between the two countries. In addition, Turkmenistan has become Iran’s largest trading partner in Central Asia with trade volume between two countries exceeding 3 billion dollars in 2009. Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan targeted increased trade volume between the two countries, and technology, trade and energy cooperation agreements were signed.
Cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran has two important dimensions, transport and energy. Turkmenistan has an important geographical position, opening Central Asia to Iran, whereas Iran’s important geographical position enables Turkmenistan to reach the Gulf of Basra. Parallel to this geographical complementarity, the two nations decided to merge the railways, and the Meshed-Serahs railway, which began service in 1995, was the first step in this direction. To support this measure, the Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (Gorgan-Etrak-Uzen) railway agreement was signed in 2007, and during Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan, the agreement was extended so as to complete theIran-Turkmenistan portion of this line (Gorgan-Etra).
The natural gas trade forms the basis of energy relations between Iran and Turkmenistan. Iran has imported a yearly average of 8 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan by way of Körpece-Kurtköy gas pipeline since 1997. In February 2009 the two nations agreed to increase the amount of Turkmenistan's natural gas sold to Iran, and to fulfill this purpose they have been agreed to the construction of a new pipeline between the two countries. In addition, they made a deal on Iran’s natural gas research in Yolatan, part of Turkmenistan, and with this agreement Iran could receive a portion of its natural gas.
.
Following the February 2009 agreement, the Devletabad-Serahs-Hangiran gas pipeline, extending from the natural gas fields of Turkmenistan's Devletabad to Iran's Caspian coast, was completed very quickly and the inauguration ofthepipeline took place during Ahmadinejad's visit to Turkmenistan. Turkey's Energy Minister, Taner Yıldız, attended the ceremony. Thus, the amount of Turkmenistan's natural gas sold to Iran is expected to increase from 14 billion to 30 billion cubic meters. Iran is planning to export a greater portion of its own gas, produced in southern Iran, replacing the difference with natural gas from Turkmenistan in northeastern Iran.
During President Ahmedinejad’s visits to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, he signed a series of cooperation agreements and sought support for the Iran's foreign policy. During his meetings in these countries, he asserted that the existing international system had crashed, and pointed out the development of cooperation between countries in the region. During Tajikistan’s President Emomalii Rahmon’s meeting with Ahmedinejad, he expressed his support for Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, and he expressed his desire to solve this problem by diplomatic means. During Ahmedinejad’s meeting of with Turkmenistan President Berdimuhammedov, he praised Turkmenistan's neutral stance towards regional problems. On the other hand, Berdimuhammedov said that Turkmenistan shares very similar ideas about regional affairs with Iran.
In conclusion, although the United States tried to isolate Iran and revive new sanctions against Iran, Iran is strengthening its ties and trade cooperation with its neighboris. Moreover, the question of whether or not Iran’s policy will affect the US remains valid. The answer to this question depends on the nature of of the United States’ concrete steps.
January 18 2010
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=143
Turkey and Iran Relations on the Eve of President Gul’s Visit: The Steady Improvement of A Pragmatic Relationship
Turkey and Iran Relations on the Eve of President Gul’s Visit: The Steady Improvement of A Pragmatic Relationship
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Advisor & METU/Atatürk Univ.
At a time that “mass movements” have been determining the Middle Eastern agenda and amidst the intensive debates on the whether the the “Turkish Model” or the “Iranian Model” best serve to the Middle East, the presidents of Turkey and Iran are getting ready to come together in Tehran on February 13. Though the leaders will “exchange views” about the critical developments in the region in the summit, the essential agenda of the President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iran will be primarily about bilateral relations between the two ocuntries.
The most important item on the agenda of the Turkish-Iranian relations is economic relations between the two countries that have accelareted in recent years. The political leaders of the countries aimed to increase the volume of bilateral trade to the level of 30 billion dollars from an amount of 8 billion dollars on the occasion of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in November 2009. Within this framework, in order to further the increase in bilateral trade relationsbetween the two countries border trade has been promoted; the national currencies were accepted as “reserve currencies”; and several fairs were organised mutually. Through the rapproachment in Turkish-Iranian political relations and the determination of the parties to boost up their economic relations becoming, Turkey has become the most important regional partner of Iran in trade and has started to take place of Dubai as being the Iranian foreign economic operation center. Especially since June 2010, when the UN Security Council, the US and the EU sanctions towards Iran that aimed at Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs that resulted in the geated scrutiny over Iran’s commercial and economic facilities in Dubai, the Iranian businessmen have begun to court with Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, more than 600 Iranian investors have established more than 600 companies solely in Istanbul. As a result of such activities Turkey’s export to Iran increased to 3.4 billions of dollars in 2010 from being at 2 billions of dollars in 2008. Iran is also one of the “target countries” wihtin the context of “foreign trade strategy” for the year 2011.
The Joint Economic Commission convenes once a year in order to oversee the coordination of economic relations between Turkey and Iran and to solve problems. This year’s meeting was held in Tahran on 7 February. As the Minister of State Cevdet Yılmaz who had attended this meeting and become the chairman of the Turkish delegation mentioned, the meeting was meant to be the technical preparation for the President’s visit. The Minister Yılmaz emphasized that the ways of cooperation in the fields of “trade, free economic zones, contractorship-technical consultancy, transportation, industry, customs, investments, private sector, international coopretations, technical cooperation in exporting, standardization, accreditation, meteorology, science, energy, agriculture, environment, broadcasting, employment, social security and SME(small and medium size enterprises)” were negotiated in this framework. During these negotiations, technical preparetions for the agreement on “preferential tariffs” were completed and it has been expected to be signed during the visit of the President Gul.
It is expected that the visit of the President Gul will be accompanied by a great number of businessmen. Despite the fact that the Iranian politicians deny the impact of international sanctions, that country is in dire need of foreign investments especially in the fields of energy and industry. While numerous foreign companies decided to withdraw from Iran because of the sanctions, Iran has been trying either to convince them to remain in the country or substitute them with new ones in its efforts to lessen the negative impact of the sanctions. Because of the increasing political relations between two countries, Iran has also started to show interest in Turkish companies in recent years. Though Iran annulled the contracts that were granted to Turkcell and TAV in previous years, now the change of its attitude towards Turkey can be clearly observed when the efficient activities of GUBRETAS in Iran are taken into consideration. Turkish businessmen who desire to profit from this particular opportunity want to have a voice in the fields of energy, infrastructure, transportation and industry as well.
The biggest obstacle in the improvement of economic relations between the two countries is the international sanctions. Turkey both officially accepts the UN sanctions and implements them, but it leaves the private companies free to decide if their decisions violate the sanctions put directly and unilaterally by the US and EU. Thus, the companies that could avoid the EU and the US penalties could take this risk to trade with Iran.. Likewise, recently two Turkish businessmen and three Turkish companies were included in the penal list of the United States due to the fact that they exported dual-use goods to Iran. But the Turkish government did not took any measure related to this issue. As a result, small and medium size enterprises tha have no relationship with the EU and the United States, thereby could avoid their pressure, try to take place in Iranian sector.
The most important element of economic relations between Turkey and Iran is the energy issue. Almost all import of Turkey from Iran is consisting of oil and natural gas. However, the well-publicized, “Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation” signed between the two countries with great enthusiasm and stirred the Western reactions in the preceeding years, failed to be implemented due to technical problems and the American pressures. Nevertheless, throughout the contacts of the Minister of Energy Taner Yıldız in Tehran in the last January, Iran offered Turkey to explore new oil and gas fields smaller than those mentioned within this MoU. The Minister Yıldız stated that they were inclined to direct this offer that requires an investment about 400 millions of dollars to private companies. Therefore, energy cooperation will continue to occupy a place on the agenda of both countries, despite being through private sector.
We will see in the years ahead to what extent this energy cooperation between Turkey and Iran will be realized. Just as the energy cooperation agreement that signed by high-level officials including Erdoğan and Ahmedinecad has not been realized, many steps that have been taken in order to strengthen bilateral relations have also remained inconclusive. Although the international system was influential in nulling the parties’ efforts to cooperate in banking, the lack of political determination and the bureaucratic inertia is responsible for much of the failures. This also explains why the problems about transportation and shipment could not have been solved for years and the agreements on educational and cultural cooperation could not have been put into practise. It would not be wrong to say that some parts of this agreement were signed mainly because of diplomatic delicacy.
Notwithstanding the continuing problems in bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey, the visit of the President Gul to Iran that designed on 13-16 February might be interpreted in certain circles as another indication of Turkish-Iranian rapproachment. Many will see the prospective agreements that President Gul will sign in Tehran as complementing Turkey’s efforts to mediate the conflict between Iran and the West, Turkey’s veto on the UN sanctions on Iran as well as Turkey’s demand in the latest NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 that Iran not be named as a ‘source of theat’. Moreover, this visit will be seen as a sign of “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy emanating from ideological motives.
In fact, Turkey’s Iran policy has been rather pragmatic. Its main purpose is to develop economic realtions with Iran and to incrase the volume of export to Iran. As of today, while the ideological factor has had a positive role in Iran’s approache towards Turkey, it is far away from shaping Turkey’s policies towards Iran. While Turkey has been trying to improve its relations with Iran, simultanously it is cautios not to be seen in the same camp with Iran. for this reason, Turkey quickly relinquieshed its discourse that appearently in favor of Iran’s nuclear program, and restored its image as an impartial mediator. through hosting the negotiations between Iran and the P 5+1 on 21-22 January, Turkey has further strenghtened its impartial role. Therefore, it would not be surprising when the President Gul, on , would express Turkey’s impartiality and wish that the problem stemming from Iran’s nuclear program be solved through dialogue, on his visit to Iran
The most important sign of Turkey’s pragmatic approach towards Iran can be seen in the fact that these countries could not cooperate at regional level. These two countries are not able to make common decions on some regional issues even though they might have similar approaches as well as discourses. For instance, even though both Iran and Turkey host regular trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan as regards the solution of their bilateral problems, they could not act jointly. Likewise, Iran has continuously offered regional cooperation schemes with Iraq and Syria including Turkey; yet Turkey has prefereed to deal with Syria and Iraq on its own. Hence, , both sides will exchange views on regional issues and express similar points during Gul’s visit to Iran; yet no one should expect that Gul and Ahmedinecad will come up with a joint declaration on regional issues.
To sum up, pragmatic considerations have replaced security anxieties and ideological appraoches that shaped bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran for a long time. In line with this pragmatic relationship, while Turkey has been trying to improve economic realtions with Iran as an important market and trade partner, Iran has been trying to break international political pressures and isolation through Turkey. While significant part of problems in bilateral relations are being kept away from “the table”, the discourses of cooperation remain greatly at a level of “wish”. Therefore, President Gul’s designated official visit to Iran on 13-16 February will neither cause an important change in the tone of relations, nor be the harbinger of an important change in the region. Yet, this will certainly contribute to the sustainability of decade-long pragmatic relations between Turkey and Iran.
February 10 2011
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=408
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Middle East Advisor & METU/Atatürk Univ.
At a time that “mass movements” have been determining the Middle Eastern agenda and amidst the intensive debates on the whether the the “Turkish Model” or the “Iranian Model” best serve to the Middle East, the presidents of Turkey and Iran are getting ready to come together in Tehran on February 13. Though the leaders will “exchange views” about the critical developments in the region in the summit, the essential agenda of the President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iran will be primarily about bilateral relations between the two ocuntries.
The most important item on the agenda of the Turkish-Iranian relations is economic relations between the two countries that have accelareted in recent years. The political leaders of the countries aimed to increase the volume of bilateral trade to the level of 30 billion dollars from an amount of 8 billion dollars on the occasion of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Tehran in November 2009. Within this framework, in order to further the increase in bilateral trade relationsbetween the two countries border trade has been promoted; the national currencies were accepted as “reserve currencies”; and several fairs were organised mutually. Through the rapproachment in Turkish-Iranian political relations and the determination of the parties to boost up their economic relations becoming, Turkey has become the most important regional partner of Iran in trade and has started to take place of Dubai as being the Iranian foreign economic operation center. Especially since June 2010, when the UN Security Council, the US and the EU sanctions towards Iran that aimed at Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs that resulted in the geated scrutiny over Iran’s commercial and economic facilities in Dubai, the Iranian businessmen have begun to court with Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, more than 600 Iranian investors have established more than 600 companies solely in Istanbul. As a result of such activities Turkey’s export to Iran increased to 3.4 billions of dollars in 2010 from being at 2 billions of dollars in 2008. Iran is also one of the “target countries” wihtin the context of “foreign trade strategy” for the year 2011.
The Joint Economic Commission convenes once a year in order to oversee the coordination of economic relations between Turkey and Iran and to solve problems. This year’s meeting was held in Tahran on 7 February. As the Minister of State Cevdet Yılmaz who had attended this meeting and become the chairman of the Turkish delegation mentioned, the meeting was meant to be the technical preparation for the President’s visit. The Minister Yılmaz emphasized that the ways of cooperation in the fields of “trade, free economic zones, contractorship-technical consultancy, transportation, industry, customs, investments, private sector, international coopretations, technical cooperation in exporting, standardization, accreditation, meteorology, science, energy, agriculture, environment, broadcasting, employment, social security and SME(small and medium size enterprises)” were negotiated in this framework. During these negotiations, technical preparetions for the agreement on “preferential tariffs” were completed and it has been expected to be signed during the visit of the President Gul.
It is expected that the visit of the President Gul will be accompanied by a great number of businessmen. Despite the fact that the Iranian politicians deny the impact of international sanctions, that country is in dire need of foreign investments especially in the fields of energy and industry. While numerous foreign companies decided to withdraw from Iran because of the sanctions, Iran has been trying either to convince them to remain in the country or substitute them with new ones in its efforts to lessen the negative impact of the sanctions. Because of the increasing political relations between two countries, Iran has also started to show interest in Turkish companies in recent years. Though Iran annulled the contracts that were granted to Turkcell and TAV in previous years, now the change of its attitude towards Turkey can be clearly observed when the efficient activities of GUBRETAS in Iran are taken into consideration. Turkish businessmen who desire to profit from this particular opportunity want to have a voice in the fields of energy, infrastructure, transportation and industry as well.
The biggest obstacle in the improvement of economic relations between the two countries is the international sanctions. Turkey both officially accepts the UN sanctions and implements them, but it leaves the private companies free to decide if their decisions violate the sanctions put directly and unilaterally by the US and EU. Thus, the companies that could avoid the EU and the US penalties could take this risk to trade with Iran.. Likewise, recently two Turkish businessmen and three Turkish companies were included in the penal list of the United States due to the fact that they exported dual-use goods to Iran. But the Turkish government did not took any measure related to this issue. As a result, small and medium size enterprises tha have no relationship with the EU and the United States, thereby could avoid their pressure, try to take place in Iranian sector.
The most important element of economic relations between Turkey and Iran is the energy issue. Almost all import of Turkey from Iran is consisting of oil and natural gas. However, the well-publicized, “Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation” signed between the two countries with great enthusiasm and stirred the Western reactions in the preceeding years, failed to be implemented due to technical problems and the American pressures. Nevertheless, throughout the contacts of the Minister of Energy Taner Yıldız in Tehran in the last January, Iran offered Turkey to explore new oil and gas fields smaller than those mentioned within this MoU. The Minister Yıldız stated that they were inclined to direct this offer that requires an investment about 400 millions of dollars to private companies. Therefore, energy cooperation will continue to occupy a place on the agenda of both countries, despite being through private sector.
We will see in the years ahead to what extent this energy cooperation between Turkey and Iran will be realized. Just as the energy cooperation agreement that signed by high-level officials including Erdoğan and Ahmedinecad has not been realized, many steps that have been taken in order to strengthen bilateral relations have also remained inconclusive. Although the international system was influential in nulling the parties’ efforts to cooperate in banking, the lack of political determination and the bureaucratic inertia is responsible for much of the failures. This also explains why the problems about transportation and shipment could not have been solved for years and the agreements on educational and cultural cooperation could not have been put into practise. It would not be wrong to say that some parts of this agreement were signed mainly because of diplomatic delicacy.
Notwithstanding the continuing problems in bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey, the visit of the President Gul to Iran that designed on 13-16 February might be interpreted in certain circles as another indication of Turkish-Iranian rapproachment. Many will see the prospective agreements that President Gul will sign in Tehran as complementing Turkey’s efforts to mediate the conflict between Iran and the West, Turkey’s veto on the UN sanctions on Iran as well as Turkey’s demand in the latest NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 that Iran not be named as a ‘source of theat’. Moreover, this visit will be seen as a sign of “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy emanating from ideological motives.
In fact, Turkey’s Iran policy has been rather pragmatic. Its main purpose is to develop economic realtions with Iran and to incrase the volume of export to Iran. As of today, while the ideological factor has had a positive role in Iran’s approache towards Turkey, it is far away from shaping Turkey’s policies towards Iran. While Turkey has been trying to improve its relations with Iran, simultanously it is cautios not to be seen in the same camp with Iran. for this reason, Turkey quickly relinquieshed its discourse that appearently in favor of Iran’s nuclear program, and restored its image as an impartial mediator. through hosting the negotiations between Iran and the P 5+1 on 21-22 January, Turkey has further strenghtened its impartial role. Therefore, it would not be surprising when the President Gul, on , would express Turkey’s impartiality and wish that the problem stemming from Iran’s nuclear program be solved through dialogue, on his visit to Iran
The most important sign of Turkey’s pragmatic approach towards Iran can be seen in the fact that these countries could not cooperate at regional level. These two countries are not able to make common decions on some regional issues even though they might have similar approaches as well as discourses. For instance, even though both Iran and Turkey host regular trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan as regards the solution of their bilateral problems, they could not act jointly. Likewise, Iran has continuously offered regional cooperation schemes with Iraq and Syria including Turkey; yet Turkey has prefereed to deal with Syria and Iraq on its own. Hence, , both sides will exchange views on regional issues and express similar points during Gul’s visit to Iran; yet no one should expect that Gul and Ahmedinecad will come up with a joint declaration on regional issues.
To sum up, pragmatic considerations have replaced security anxieties and ideological appraoches that shaped bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran for a long time. In line with this pragmatic relationship, while Turkey has been trying to improve economic realtions with Iran as an important market and trade partner, Iran has been trying to break international political pressures and isolation through Turkey. While significant part of problems in bilateral relations are being kept away from “the table”, the discourses of cooperation remain greatly at a level of “wish”. Therefore, President Gul’s designated official visit to Iran on 13-16 February will neither cause an important change in the tone of relations, nor be the harbinger of an important change in the region. Yet, this will certainly contribute to the sustainability of decade-long pragmatic relations between Turkey and Iran.
February 10 2011
http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=408
Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi
ADAM AKADEMİ Sayı 1 Haziran 2011
Başlık :Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi
Yazarlar :BAYRAM SİNKAYA
Özet
Türkiye’nin Batı bağlantısı uzun bir süre boyunca Ortadoğu ile ilişkilerinin şekillenmesinde değişik açılardan olumlu ya da olumsuz bir biçimde etkili olmuştur. Ancak bu süreç son birkaç yılda tersine dönmeye başlamıştır. Bu yeni dönemde Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ile ilişkileri öyle bir değişim göstermiştir ki bazı durumlarda Batı ile ilişkilerini olumsuz etkilemeye başlamıştır. Bu durum dikkate alınarak bu makalede Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası ve bu politikada Batının etkisi ele alınmıştır. Batı, Türkiye ve Ortadoğu arasındaki bu karşılıklı etkileşimin anlaşılabilmesi için Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası tarihi, bu üçlü ilişkilerdeki hâkim olan tarza göre belirli dönemlere ayrılmıştır. Makalede Türkiye’nin Batılı ve laik kimliği ile Batı ittifakına sıkı sıkıya bağlı olması nedeniyle bölgede hakim olan dinamiklerle çatışma içine girdiği, dolayısıyla Türkiye’nin uzunca bir süre bölgeden uzaklaştığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Ancak, 1990’lı yıllardan sonra hem Türkiye hem de bölge köklü dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu dönüşüm Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ülkeleri ile daha iyi ilişkiler kurmasını mümkün kılmıştır. Zamanla bölgenin jeopolitik yapısındaki değişiklikler nedeniyle de Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikasında Batı’nın etkisi giderek azalmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Ortadoğu, Batı, dış politika, güvenlik.
http://ybuankara.academia.edu/BayramSinkaya/Papers/1155611/Gecmisten_Gunumuze_Turkiyenin_Ortadogu_Politikasi_ve_Bati_Etkisi
Başlık :Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi
Yazarlar :BAYRAM SİNKAYA
Özet
Türkiye’nin Batı bağlantısı uzun bir süre boyunca Ortadoğu ile ilişkilerinin şekillenmesinde değişik açılardan olumlu ya da olumsuz bir biçimde etkili olmuştur. Ancak bu süreç son birkaç yılda tersine dönmeye başlamıştır. Bu yeni dönemde Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ile ilişkileri öyle bir değişim göstermiştir ki bazı durumlarda Batı ile ilişkilerini olumsuz etkilemeye başlamıştır. Bu durum dikkate alınarak bu makalede Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası ve bu politikada Batının etkisi ele alınmıştır. Batı, Türkiye ve Ortadoğu arasındaki bu karşılıklı etkileşimin anlaşılabilmesi için Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikası tarihi, bu üçlü ilişkilerdeki hâkim olan tarza göre belirli dönemlere ayrılmıştır. Makalede Türkiye’nin Batılı ve laik kimliği ile Batı ittifakına sıkı sıkıya bağlı olması nedeniyle bölgede hakim olan dinamiklerle çatışma içine girdiği, dolayısıyla Türkiye’nin uzunca bir süre bölgeden uzaklaştığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Ancak, 1990’lı yıllardan sonra hem Türkiye hem de bölge köklü dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu dönüşüm Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu ülkeleri ile daha iyi ilişkiler kurmasını mümkün kılmıştır. Zamanla bölgenin jeopolitik yapısındaki değişiklikler nedeniyle de Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu politikasında Batı’nın etkisi giderek azalmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Ortadoğu, Batı, dış politika, güvenlik.
Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East from
the past to the present and the Impact of the West
ABSTRACT
Turkey’s alliance relationship with the West has dominated its Middle East policy for a long time and adversely or affirmatively affected it. However, this interaction seems to be reversed in the last couple of years. In this new era Turkish engagement with the Middle East so intensified that it started to adversely affect Turkey’s relations with the West in some cases. Considering that point, this article has dealt with Turkey’s relations with Middle East and searched for the Western impact on that relationship. In order to comprehend that interaction between the West, Turkey, and the Middle East, it divided history of Turkey-Middle East relations into several period in
accordance with the dominant form of interactions. It concluded that Turkey’s political identity as Western oriented and secular country and its strict alliance relationship with the West confronted with the regional dynamics in the Middle East, which culminated in Turkey’s distance relations with the region for a long time. However, after the 1990s, both Turkey and the regions has transformed profoundly that paved the way for better relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. In the course of time, because of the geopolitical shift in the region, the Western impact on this relationship gradually decreased.
Key Words: Turkey, Middle East, West, foreign policy, security.
http://ybuankara.academia.edu/BayramSinkaya/Papers/1155611/Gecmisten_Gunumuze_Turkiyenin_Ortadogu_Politikasi_ve_Bati_Etkisi
Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'ün Ziyaretinin Arefesinde Türkiye-İran İlişkileri: Pragmatik Bir İlişkinin İstikrarlı İlerleyişi
CUMHURBAŞKANI GÜL’ÜN ZİYARETİNİN AREFESİNDE TÜRKİYE-İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ: PRAGMATİK BİR İLİŞKİNİN İSTİKRARLI İLERLEYİŞİ
Bayram Sinkaya
“Halk hareketlerinin” Ortadoğu gündemini belirlediği şu sıralarda Ortadoğu için “Türkiye modeli” mi, “İran modeli” mi tartışmaları oldukça yoğunlaşmışken Türkiye ve İran Cumhurbaşkanları 13 Şubat’ta Tahran’da bir araya gelmeye hazırlanıyor. Bu zirvede tabii ki bölgedeki “kritik” gelişmeler hakkında “görüş alış-verişinde” bulunulacaktır ancak, Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ün İran’a yapacağı ziyaretin asıl gündemini Türkiye-İran ikili ilişkileri oluşturacaktır.
Türkiye-İran ilişkilerindeki en önemli gündem maddesi ise son yıllarda giderek ivme kazanan iki ülke arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerdir. İki ülke siyasi liderleri Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Kasım 2009’da Tahran ziyareti sırasında, o zaman 8 milyar dolar olan ticaret hacminin en kısa süre içerisinde 30 milyar dolara çıkarılmasını hedeflemiştir. Bu çerçevede iki ülke arasındaki ticaret hacminin artırılabilmesi için sınır ticareti teşvik edilmeye başlandı; iki ülke milli paraları “rezerv para” olarak kabul edildi; çok sayıda karşılıklı fuar düzenlendi. Hem Türkiye-İran siyasi ilişkilerindeki yakınlaşma hem de iki ülkenin ekonomik ilişkilerini güçlendirme politikası sayesinde Türkiye, İran’ın en önemli bölgesel ticaret ortağı ve ekonomik operasyon merkezi Dubai’nin yerini almaya başladı. Özellikle Haziran 2010’dan itibaren İran’ın “balistik füze ve nükleer programlarını” hedef alan BM, ABD ve AB ambargo kararları ve Dubai’nin ABD baskısı neticesinde Dubai merkezli İran ticari ve ekonomik faaliyetleri üzerindeki denetimlerini artırması nedeniyle İranlı işadamları Dubai’ye alternatif olarak Türkiye’ye yöneldi. Bunun sonucunda 600’den fazla İranlı yatırımcı sadece İstanbul’da 600’den fazla şirket kurdu. Bu çalışmaların sonucunda Türkiye’nin İran’a yaptığı ihracat 2008 yılında 2 milyar dolar civarında iken 2010 yılı sonunda 3,4 milyar dolara çıktı. İran, 2011 yılı için “Dış Ticaret Stratejisi” kapsamında da hedef ülkelerden birisidir.
Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin koordinasyonunu sağlamak ve sorunları çözmek üzere yılda bir kez Karma Ekonomik Komisyon (KEK) toplanmaktadır. Bu yılki KEK toplantısı 7 Şubat’ta Tahran’da yapıldı. Bu toplantıya katılan Türk heyetine başkanlık eden Devlet Bakanı Cevdet Yılmaz’ın da belirttiği gibi KEK toplantısı adeta Cumhurbaşkanı’nın ziyaretinin teknik hazırlığı niteliğindeydi. Bakan Yılmaz, bu çerçevede “ticaret, serbest bölgeler, müteahhitlik-teknik müşavirlik hizmetleri, ulaştırma, sanayi, gümrükler, yatırım, özel sektör arasında işbirliği, uluslararası alanda işbirliği, ihracatta teknik işbirliği, standardizasyon, akreditasyon, meteoroloji, bilim, enerji, tarım, çevre, radyo-televizyon, çalışma-sosyal güvenlik ve KOBİ'ler gibi konularda işbirliği yollarının görüşüldüğünü” belirtti. Bu görüşmeler sırasında “tercihli tarifeler” anlaşmasının teknik hazırlıkları tamamlandı ve Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün ziyareti sırasında söz konusu anlaşmanın imzalanması bekleniyor.
Ziyaret sırasında Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’e kalabalık bir işadamı grubunun eşlik etmesi bekleniyor. Zira İranlı siyasiler uluslararası yaptırımların etkisini inkâr etseler de bu ülke özellikle enerji ve sanayi alanında yabancı yatırımlara ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Yaptırımlar nedeniyle birçok yabancı şirket İran’dan çekilme kararı alırken İran, yaptırımları etkisizleştirmek için bu şirketleri ülke içinde tutmaya ya da onları yeni şirketlerle ikame etmeye çalışmaktadır. İki ülke arasında artan siyasi ilişkiler nedeniyle İran son yıllarda Türk şirketlerine oldukça ilgi göstermeye başlamıştır. Daha önceki yıllarda Turkcell ve TAV’ın kazandığı ihaleleri ve yaptıkları sözleşmeleri iptal eden İran’ın tavrındaki değişiklik, GÜBRETAŞ’ın İran’daki etkin faaliyetleri dikkate alındığında net bir şekilde görülmektedir. Bu durumdan istifade etmek isteyen Türk işadamları İran’da enerji, altyapı, ulaştırma ve sanayi alanlarında söz sahibi olmak istiyor.
İki ülke arasında ekonomik ilişkilerin gelişmesinin önündeki en büyük engel uluslararası yaptırımlardır. Türkiye BM yaptırımlarını resmen tanıyor ve uyguluyor, ancak Amerikan ve AB yaptırımları doğrudan ilgili şirketleri – yaptırım kararlarını ihlal eden şirketleri – hedef aldığı için bunun değerlendirmesini ilgili şirkete bırakıyor. Söz konusu riski göze alabilen şirketler İran ile ticaret yapabilirken, bunu göze alamayanlar İran ile ilişkilerden sakınmaktadır. Nitekim geçtiğimiz hafta içerisinde iki Türk iş adamı ve üç Türk şirketi İran’a çift-kullanımlı mal ihraç ettikleri gerekçesiyle Amerikan ceza listesine alındı, ancak Türk hükümeti bu konuda hiçbir işlem yapmadı. Netice itibariyle, AB ve ABD ile ilişkisi bulunmayan, dolayısıyla AB ve ABD’nin cezalandıramayacağı küçük ve orta ölçekli şirketler İran piyasasında yer almaya çalışmaktadır.
Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin en önemli unsuru enerjidir. Türkiye’nin İran’dan ithalatının neredeyse tamamını petrol ve doğalgaz oluşturmaktadır. Önceki yıllarda iki ülke arasında büyük bir “kampanya” ile imzalanan ve büyük tepkilere yol açan “enerji işbirliği mutabakatı” gerek teknik nedenlerden dolayı gerekse Amerikan baskısı nedeniyle akamete uğradı ve anlaşma hayata geçirilemedi. Bununla birlikte Enerji Bakanı Taner Yıldız’ın Ocak ayı içerisinde Tahran’daki temasları sırasında İran, Türkiye’ye mutabakat zaptı sırasında gündeme gelen doğalgaz sahalarına göre daha küçük doğalgaz ve petrol alanlarının geliştirilmesi önerisinde bulundu. Bakan Yıldız, 400 milyon dolar civarında yatırım gerektiren bu öneriyi özel şirketlere yönlendirme eğiliminde olduklarını söyledi. Dolayısıyla enerji işbirliği iki ülke gündeminde özel sektör üzerinden de olsa yer almaya devam edecektir.
Türkiye ile İran arasında enerji işbirliğinin ne kadar somutlaşacağını ancak önümüzdeki yıllarda görebileceğiz. Zira tıpkı en üst düzeyde imzalanan, hem Başbakan Erdoğan’ın hem de İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmedinecad’ın imza koyduğu enerji mutabakat zaptı uygulamaya geçirilemediği gibi iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi hususunda atılan birçok adım bugüne kadar sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Bu durum bankacılık alanındaki işbirliğinin ilerleyememesinde olduğu gibi bir ölçüde uluslararası sistemden kaynaklanırken, her iki ülkedeki siyasi iradenin tabana yayılamaması ve bürokratik direnç, iki ülke arasındaki anlaşmaların uygulanmasının, dolayısıyla ikili ilişkilerin ilerletilmesinin önündeki en büyük engeldir. Bu nedenle yıllardır ulaşım-nakliye sorunları çözülememiş, eğitim ve kültür alanındaki işbirliği anlaşmalarının tam olarak uygulanamamıştır. Gerçi bu anlaşmaların bir kısmının aslında diplomatik nezaket icabı imza edildiğini ileri sürmek de yanlış olmayacaktır…
Hal böyle iken Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün 13-16 Şubat tarihlerinde İran’a yapacağı çalışma ziyareti, bazı mahfillerde Türkiye-İran yakınlaşmasının bir göstergesi olarak yorumlanacaktır. Gül’ün burada imza atacağı anlaşmalar, Türkiye’nin İran ile Batı arasında arabuluculuk girişimlerinin ardından Haziran 2010’da BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nde yaptırıma karşı “hayır” oyu kullanmasının ve Kasım 2010’da Lizbon’daki NATO Zirvesi sırasında İran’ın “tehdit” kaynağı olarak belirtilmemesi hususundaki gayretinin tamamlayıcı bir unsuru olarak görülecektir. Dahası bu ziyaret, muhtemelen, Türkiye’nin dış politikasında “ideolojik” saiklerle eksen kaymasının bir sonucu olarak görülecektir.
Oysa Türkiye’nin İran politikası oldukça pragmatiktir; esas amacı İran ile ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirmek ve bu ülkeye yapılan ihracatı artırmaktır. Bugün itibariyle ideolojik unsur İran yönetiminin Türkiye politikasında “olumlu” bir rol oynarken, Türkiye’nin İran politikasını belirlemekten uzaktır. Türkiye bir taraftan İran ile ilişkilerini ilerletmeye çalışırken diğer yandan İran ile aynı eksende görünmemeye dikkat etmektedir. Bu nedenle İran’ın nükleer programına ilişkin olarak İran’ı koruduğu izlenimini veren söylemden kendisini çabucak kurtararak tekrar tarafsız arabulucu rolüne soyunmuştur. Türkiye, İran ile 5+1 grubu arasındaki müzakerelere 21-22 Ocak tarihlerinde ev sahipliği yaparak tarafsız durumunu pekiştirmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün de İran ziyareti sırasında Türkiye’nin tarafsız tutumunu dile getirmesi ve İran’ın nükleer programından kaynaklanan sorunun diyalog yoluyla çözülmesini temenni etmesi şaşırtıcı olmayacaktır.
Türkiye’nin İran politikasının pragmatik olduğunun en büyük işareti ise iki ülkenin bölgesel işbirliği yap(a)mamalarında somut olarak görülmektedir. Her iki ülke benzer yaklaşımlara sahip oldukları ve benzer söylemleri dile getirdikleri bölgesel meselelerde dahi ortak tutum benimse(ye)memekte ve ortak karar al(a)mamaktadır. Mesela hem İran hem de Türkiye, Afganistan ile Pakistan arasındaki sorunların çözümü için düzenli olarak 3’lü toplantılara ev sahipliği yapmakta, ancak ortak hareket etmemektedir. Keza, İran’ın Türkiye dâhil olmak üzere Irak ve Suriye ile bölgesel işbirliği önerisine rağmen Türkiye, Irak ve Suriye ile ilişkilerini ayrı ayrı ilerletmektedir. Gül’ün İran ziyareti sırasında da bölgesel gelişmelere ilişkin olarak görüş alışverişinde bulunulacaktır ve İranlı muhatapları ile benzer görüşleri dile getirecektir ancak, Gül ile Ahmedinecad’ın bölgesel meselelere ilişkin ortak bir deklarasyon yayınlamalarını kimse bekleyemez.
Sonuç olarak, Türkiye ve İran ilişkilerini uzun yıllar boyunca belirleyen güvenlik kaygılarının ve ideolojik yaklaşımların yerini son on yılda büyük ölçüde pragmatik kaygılar almıştır. Bu pragmatik ilişki tarzında Türkiye, önemli bir pazar ve ticaret ortağı olarak gördüğü İran ile ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirmeye çalışırken, İran uluslararası siyasi baskı ve izolasyondan Türkiye üzerinden kurtulmaya çalışmaktadır. İkili ilişkilerdeki sorunların önemli bir kısmı “masadan” uzak tutulurken, “işbirliği” söylemleri temenni düzeyinde kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün 13-16 Şubat tarihlerinde İran’a yapacağı ziyaret, ne iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin niteliğinde önemli bir değişime yol açacak, ne de bölgedeki önemli bir değişikliğin habercisi olacaktır; ancak Türkiye ile İran arasındaki on yıllık pragmatik ilişkinin sürdürülmesine katkı sağlayacaktır.
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=1499
Bayram Sinkaya
“Halk hareketlerinin” Ortadoğu gündemini belirlediği şu sıralarda Ortadoğu için “Türkiye modeli” mi, “İran modeli” mi tartışmaları oldukça yoğunlaşmışken Türkiye ve İran Cumhurbaşkanları 13 Şubat’ta Tahran’da bir araya gelmeye hazırlanıyor. Bu zirvede tabii ki bölgedeki “kritik” gelişmeler hakkında “görüş alış-verişinde” bulunulacaktır ancak, Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül’ün İran’a yapacağı ziyaretin asıl gündemini Türkiye-İran ikili ilişkileri oluşturacaktır.
Türkiye-İran ilişkilerindeki en önemli gündem maddesi ise son yıllarda giderek ivme kazanan iki ülke arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerdir. İki ülke siyasi liderleri Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Kasım 2009’da Tahran ziyareti sırasında, o zaman 8 milyar dolar olan ticaret hacminin en kısa süre içerisinde 30 milyar dolara çıkarılmasını hedeflemiştir. Bu çerçevede iki ülke arasındaki ticaret hacminin artırılabilmesi için sınır ticareti teşvik edilmeye başlandı; iki ülke milli paraları “rezerv para” olarak kabul edildi; çok sayıda karşılıklı fuar düzenlendi. Hem Türkiye-İran siyasi ilişkilerindeki yakınlaşma hem de iki ülkenin ekonomik ilişkilerini güçlendirme politikası sayesinde Türkiye, İran’ın en önemli bölgesel ticaret ortağı ve ekonomik operasyon merkezi Dubai’nin yerini almaya başladı. Özellikle Haziran 2010’dan itibaren İran’ın “balistik füze ve nükleer programlarını” hedef alan BM, ABD ve AB ambargo kararları ve Dubai’nin ABD baskısı neticesinde Dubai merkezli İran ticari ve ekonomik faaliyetleri üzerindeki denetimlerini artırması nedeniyle İranlı işadamları Dubai’ye alternatif olarak Türkiye’ye yöneldi. Bunun sonucunda 600’den fazla İranlı yatırımcı sadece İstanbul’da 600’den fazla şirket kurdu. Bu çalışmaların sonucunda Türkiye’nin İran’a yaptığı ihracat 2008 yılında 2 milyar dolar civarında iken 2010 yılı sonunda 3,4 milyar dolara çıktı. İran, 2011 yılı için “Dış Ticaret Stratejisi” kapsamında da hedef ülkelerden birisidir.
Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin koordinasyonunu sağlamak ve sorunları çözmek üzere yılda bir kez Karma Ekonomik Komisyon (KEK) toplanmaktadır. Bu yılki KEK toplantısı 7 Şubat’ta Tahran’da yapıldı. Bu toplantıya katılan Türk heyetine başkanlık eden Devlet Bakanı Cevdet Yılmaz’ın da belirttiği gibi KEK toplantısı adeta Cumhurbaşkanı’nın ziyaretinin teknik hazırlığı niteliğindeydi. Bakan Yılmaz, bu çerçevede “ticaret, serbest bölgeler, müteahhitlik-teknik müşavirlik hizmetleri, ulaştırma, sanayi, gümrükler, yatırım, özel sektör arasında işbirliği, uluslararası alanda işbirliği, ihracatta teknik işbirliği, standardizasyon, akreditasyon, meteoroloji, bilim, enerji, tarım, çevre, radyo-televizyon, çalışma-sosyal güvenlik ve KOBİ'ler gibi konularda işbirliği yollarının görüşüldüğünü” belirtti. Bu görüşmeler sırasında “tercihli tarifeler” anlaşmasının teknik hazırlıkları tamamlandı ve Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün ziyareti sırasında söz konusu anlaşmanın imzalanması bekleniyor.
Ziyaret sırasında Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’e kalabalık bir işadamı grubunun eşlik etmesi bekleniyor. Zira İranlı siyasiler uluslararası yaptırımların etkisini inkâr etseler de bu ülke özellikle enerji ve sanayi alanında yabancı yatırımlara ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Yaptırımlar nedeniyle birçok yabancı şirket İran’dan çekilme kararı alırken İran, yaptırımları etkisizleştirmek için bu şirketleri ülke içinde tutmaya ya da onları yeni şirketlerle ikame etmeye çalışmaktadır. İki ülke arasında artan siyasi ilişkiler nedeniyle İran son yıllarda Türk şirketlerine oldukça ilgi göstermeye başlamıştır. Daha önceki yıllarda Turkcell ve TAV’ın kazandığı ihaleleri ve yaptıkları sözleşmeleri iptal eden İran’ın tavrındaki değişiklik, GÜBRETAŞ’ın İran’daki etkin faaliyetleri dikkate alındığında net bir şekilde görülmektedir. Bu durumdan istifade etmek isteyen Türk işadamları İran’da enerji, altyapı, ulaştırma ve sanayi alanlarında söz sahibi olmak istiyor.
İki ülke arasında ekonomik ilişkilerin gelişmesinin önündeki en büyük engel uluslararası yaptırımlardır. Türkiye BM yaptırımlarını resmen tanıyor ve uyguluyor, ancak Amerikan ve AB yaptırımları doğrudan ilgili şirketleri – yaptırım kararlarını ihlal eden şirketleri – hedef aldığı için bunun değerlendirmesini ilgili şirkete bırakıyor. Söz konusu riski göze alabilen şirketler İran ile ticaret yapabilirken, bunu göze alamayanlar İran ile ilişkilerden sakınmaktadır. Nitekim geçtiğimiz hafta içerisinde iki Türk iş adamı ve üç Türk şirketi İran’a çift-kullanımlı mal ihraç ettikleri gerekçesiyle Amerikan ceza listesine alındı, ancak Türk hükümeti bu konuda hiçbir işlem yapmadı. Netice itibariyle, AB ve ABD ile ilişkisi bulunmayan, dolayısıyla AB ve ABD’nin cezalandıramayacağı küçük ve orta ölçekli şirketler İran piyasasında yer almaya çalışmaktadır.
Türkiye ile İran arasındaki ekonomik ilişkilerin en önemli unsuru enerjidir. Türkiye’nin İran’dan ithalatının neredeyse tamamını petrol ve doğalgaz oluşturmaktadır. Önceki yıllarda iki ülke arasında büyük bir “kampanya” ile imzalanan ve büyük tepkilere yol açan “enerji işbirliği mutabakatı” gerek teknik nedenlerden dolayı gerekse Amerikan baskısı nedeniyle akamete uğradı ve anlaşma hayata geçirilemedi. Bununla birlikte Enerji Bakanı Taner Yıldız’ın Ocak ayı içerisinde Tahran’daki temasları sırasında İran, Türkiye’ye mutabakat zaptı sırasında gündeme gelen doğalgaz sahalarına göre daha küçük doğalgaz ve petrol alanlarının geliştirilmesi önerisinde bulundu. Bakan Yıldız, 400 milyon dolar civarında yatırım gerektiren bu öneriyi özel şirketlere yönlendirme eğiliminde olduklarını söyledi. Dolayısıyla enerji işbirliği iki ülke gündeminde özel sektör üzerinden de olsa yer almaya devam edecektir.
Türkiye ile İran arasında enerji işbirliğinin ne kadar somutlaşacağını ancak önümüzdeki yıllarda görebileceğiz. Zira tıpkı en üst düzeyde imzalanan, hem Başbakan Erdoğan’ın hem de İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmedinecad’ın imza koyduğu enerji mutabakat zaptı uygulamaya geçirilemediği gibi iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi hususunda atılan birçok adım bugüne kadar sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Bu durum bankacılık alanındaki işbirliğinin ilerleyememesinde olduğu gibi bir ölçüde uluslararası sistemden kaynaklanırken, her iki ülkedeki siyasi iradenin tabana yayılamaması ve bürokratik direnç, iki ülke arasındaki anlaşmaların uygulanmasının, dolayısıyla ikili ilişkilerin ilerletilmesinin önündeki en büyük engeldir. Bu nedenle yıllardır ulaşım-nakliye sorunları çözülememiş, eğitim ve kültür alanındaki işbirliği anlaşmalarının tam olarak uygulanamamıştır. Gerçi bu anlaşmaların bir kısmının aslında diplomatik nezaket icabı imza edildiğini ileri sürmek de yanlış olmayacaktır…
Hal böyle iken Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün 13-16 Şubat tarihlerinde İran’a yapacağı çalışma ziyareti, bazı mahfillerde Türkiye-İran yakınlaşmasının bir göstergesi olarak yorumlanacaktır. Gül’ün burada imza atacağı anlaşmalar, Türkiye’nin İran ile Batı arasında arabuluculuk girişimlerinin ardından Haziran 2010’da BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nde yaptırıma karşı “hayır” oyu kullanmasının ve Kasım 2010’da Lizbon’daki NATO Zirvesi sırasında İran’ın “tehdit” kaynağı olarak belirtilmemesi hususundaki gayretinin tamamlayıcı bir unsuru olarak görülecektir. Dahası bu ziyaret, muhtemelen, Türkiye’nin dış politikasında “ideolojik” saiklerle eksen kaymasının bir sonucu olarak görülecektir.
Oysa Türkiye’nin İran politikası oldukça pragmatiktir; esas amacı İran ile ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirmek ve bu ülkeye yapılan ihracatı artırmaktır. Bugün itibariyle ideolojik unsur İran yönetiminin Türkiye politikasında “olumlu” bir rol oynarken, Türkiye’nin İran politikasını belirlemekten uzaktır. Türkiye bir taraftan İran ile ilişkilerini ilerletmeye çalışırken diğer yandan İran ile aynı eksende görünmemeye dikkat etmektedir. Bu nedenle İran’ın nükleer programına ilişkin olarak İran’ı koruduğu izlenimini veren söylemden kendisini çabucak kurtararak tekrar tarafsız arabulucu rolüne soyunmuştur. Türkiye, İran ile 5+1 grubu arasındaki müzakerelere 21-22 Ocak tarihlerinde ev sahipliği yaparak tarafsız durumunu pekiştirmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün de İran ziyareti sırasında Türkiye’nin tarafsız tutumunu dile getirmesi ve İran’ın nükleer programından kaynaklanan sorunun diyalog yoluyla çözülmesini temenni etmesi şaşırtıcı olmayacaktır.
Türkiye’nin İran politikasının pragmatik olduğunun en büyük işareti ise iki ülkenin bölgesel işbirliği yap(a)mamalarında somut olarak görülmektedir. Her iki ülke benzer yaklaşımlara sahip oldukları ve benzer söylemleri dile getirdikleri bölgesel meselelerde dahi ortak tutum benimse(ye)memekte ve ortak karar al(a)mamaktadır. Mesela hem İran hem de Türkiye, Afganistan ile Pakistan arasındaki sorunların çözümü için düzenli olarak 3’lü toplantılara ev sahipliği yapmakta, ancak ortak hareket etmemektedir. Keza, İran’ın Türkiye dâhil olmak üzere Irak ve Suriye ile bölgesel işbirliği önerisine rağmen Türkiye, Irak ve Suriye ile ilişkilerini ayrı ayrı ilerletmektedir. Gül’ün İran ziyareti sırasında da bölgesel gelişmelere ilişkin olarak görüş alışverişinde bulunulacaktır ve İranlı muhatapları ile benzer görüşleri dile getirecektir ancak, Gül ile Ahmedinecad’ın bölgesel meselelere ilişkin ortak bir deklarasyon yayınlamalarını kimse bekleyemez.
Sonuç olarak, Türkiye ve İran ilişkilerini uzun yıllar boyunca belirleyen güvenlik kaygılarının ve ideolojik yaklaşımların yerini son on yılda büyük ölçüde pragmatik kaygılar almıştır. Bu pragmatik ilişki tarzında Türkiye, önemli bir pazar ve ticaret ortağı olarak gördüğü İran ile ekonomik ilişkileri geliştirmeye çalışırken, İran uluslararası siyasi baskı ve izolasyondan Türkiye üzerinden kurtulmaya çalışmaktadır. İkili ilişkilerdeki sorunların önemli bir kısmı “masadan” uzak tutulurken, “işbirliği” söylemleri temenni düzeyinde kalmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’ün 13-16 Şubat tarihlerinde İran’a yapacağı ziyaret, ne iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin niteliğinde önemli bir değişime yol açacak, ne de bölgedeki önemli bir değişikliğin habercisi olacaktır; ancak Türkiye ile İran arasındaki on yıllık pragmatik ilişkinin sürdürülmesine katkı sağlayacaktır.
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=1499
Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Issue: From a Passive Stance to the Actual Contributor tho the Peaceful Solution?
Bayram Sinkaya, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of International Relations, METU / ORSAM Middle E
Turkey’s approach towards the Iranian nuclear program has been widely regarded the political circles, especially in the Western ones, as a litmus testing for its loyalty to the alliance with the West. Turkey’s compromising attitude towards Iran in the last year, particularly its opposition to the imposition of new round of UN sanctions on Iran, and its improving bilateral relations with Iran considered by some analysts as a change of axis in Turkish foreign policy, or Islamification of Turkish foreign policy under the ruling AK Party government. This paper argues that Turkey’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Iran and the West, and its compromising attitude towards Iran is based on its interests invested in balancing its good relations with the West and its improving relations with Iran, and preventing escalation of conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, rather than ideological convictions. That is why, Turkey’s position towards the Iranian nuclear issue changed three times, under the same government, the ruling AK Party, from a passive stance to the facilitator, and to the mediator, all aimed at a peaceful solution of the issue. Indeed, regarding the conflict between Iran and the West that aroused from Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey’s national interest lies in the peaceful solution of the issue. Therefore, Turkey ought to, and could, play an active role in peaceful solution of the conflict on Iran’s nuclear program.
A Passive Stance
Although the Iranian nuclear program has been one of the top issues on the international agenda since the mid-1990s, Turkey remained indifferent towards the issue for a long time. Until 2005, Iranian nuclear program has been rarely addressed in the Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkish officials recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology and advocated solution of the issue by diplomatic means.
Meanwhile the great powers adopted different approaches towards Iran; while the United States runs an uncompromising containment policy against Iran, in order to force it to abandon the considered policies; the EU countries instead adopted a policy of diplomatic engagement and negotiation in the Iranian issue. Concomitantly, Russia and China enhanced their relations with Iran and helped it to advance its nuclear program and missile technology. Different attitudes of the great powers relieved to Turkey’s hand to act freely in its relations with Iran. Although the security elite in Turkey steadily raised concerns about the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, the Turkish government did not want to disturb its relations with Iran. Because the prospective nuclear Iran regarded by the US-led international community as a threat to international security, the Turkish governments adopted a wait-and-see policy and waited for a solution for the issue through negotiations between the conflicting parties.
From a Passive Stance to the Facilitator
The failure of the EU strategy to negotiate with Iran in due process was probably the main reason for the other great powers to join ranks with the US. Meanwhile, emergence of a hardliner political leadership in Iran under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad worsened the prospect of a negotiable solution for the Iranian nuclear issue. Eventually, the Iranian nuclear dossier was transferred to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Those developments pushed Turkey in an awkward situation that enforced it to make a choice between its Western allies and neighboring Iran.
Although the US administration of the time was undecided how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, alongside with rumors ranging from imposing various kind of embargos to an unilateral military attack, the US officials continuously urged their Turkish counterparts to cooperate against Iran. It was difficult for the Turkish government to turn down US demands, because it was seeking to restore its relations with the United States that had been deteriorated in the preceding years. On the other hand, Iran presented a growing market and partnership in regional security matters. Additionally, it started to supply thirty percent of Turkey’s natural gas consumption. Meanwhile, some Turkish officials, military officials and diplomats publicly declared their concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear program was identified as a precarious issue for Turkey in the National Security Policy Document of 2005.
Consequently, Turkey avoided publicly siding either with the United States or with Iran. However, the deadlock over the issue was suspended over Turkey like the looming sword of Damocles. As a matter of fact, an assertive policy against Iran as championed by the United States in order to stop Iran’s nuclear program was unlikely a policy to be favored by Turkey, which would be brought in an impasse between the two sides – a move which would adversely affect stability and security in its immediate neighborhood. Under those circumstances, Turkey abandoned its wait-and-see policy and adopted a facilitator position, encouraging the parties to reach a solution through negotiations. A negotiated solution for the issue would release Turkey from its difficult position to balance its warm relations both with the Western countries and with Iran. Additionally it would prevent adverse affects of a likely military conflict between the United States and Iran, or the sanction regime against Iran.
Within the framework of its policy as a facilitator, Turkey encouraged the parties to take an affirmative position in the negotiations. In this regard, Iranian chief negotiator and Secretary of National Security Council, Ali Larijani visited Ankara in May 2006 and met with high-level Turkish officials. The message given by the Turkish officials to Larijani was clear: although Turkey recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, Iran’s stand against the nuclear watchdog, i.e. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Security Council would not serve Iranian interests, which implied Turkey’s disturbance with the handling of the issue.[i] Furthermore Turkey hosted a meeting between Javier Solana, High Commissar of the EU in charge of negotiation with Iran, and Laricani in Ankara in April 2007. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan received Larijani before the meeting and asked him to be affirmative to resolve the issue through negotiation and international cooperation.[ii] Turkey stepped in again in order to ease the tension between Iran and the Six (The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that came to the negotiation table in July 2008, when, the Six offered Iran a package of incentives in return for freezing uranium enrichment. In due process, the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who replaced Larijani in October 2007, paid a visit to Istanbul and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on his way back from Geneva to Teheran. Babacan defined Turkey’s role as a facilitator that was trying “to rectify any misunderstandings and ensure that they better understand their mutual concerns.”[iii]
But the ongoing negotiations between the Six and Iran failed to reach a solution, as well. Meanwhile the UN Security Council resolute five consecutive decisions against Iran, which asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, complete cooperation with the IAEA, and envisaged limited sanctions against Iran on ground of its nuclear and missile program. However, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program and enrich uranium.
From the Facilitator to the Mediator
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue changed again in late 2008. In a visit to the United States in November, Erdogan announced that Turkey could officially mediate between the United States and Iran based on its previous experiences.[iv] The new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomed Turkey’s bid for the mediator position, and said that the new administration would ask Turkey’s support to engage with Iran. However, the Iranian officials denied Turkey’s claim for mediation. President Ahmadinejad stated that there was no need for Turkey’s mediation.[v]
Turkey’s actual mediation started only after the failure of the swap agreement negotiated in Vienna, in October 2009, between the Six and Iran. Then, Director of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradey put forward the idea of placing Iran’s low-enriched uranium in the custody, until the Vienna group supply Iran with uranium fuel. The idea, which was immediately accepted by Turkey, was also backed by the United States and Russia. However, Iran remained cautious towards Baradey’s suggestion and announced that it would not ship its low-enriched uranium outside the country.
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to press Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap agreement, and continuously talked to the officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA. In April, after President Obama’s request, Brazil also involved in Turkey’s mediation efforts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey persuaded Iran to sign a framework agreement in May 2010, which would facilitate uranium swap between the Vienna group and Iran. However, the Vienna group found the agreement inadequate and rejected it, which was ensued by a new round of UN Security Council sanctions (RES 1929) against Iran.
Disappointed with the West
The rejection of the swap agreement by the Vienna group, i.e. the Western countries, provoked a Turkish reaction against the Western countries and their demand for additional sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it rejected to approve the new sanctions in the UN Security Council.
Turkey’s reaction to the Western countries stemmed from Turkish officials’ disappointment with the US and European officials, who encouraged Turkey to persuade Iran for a compromise over the swap agreement. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, pointed out that in view of the fact that Turkey had virtually accomplished everything in its negotiations demanded by Western officials, it is understandable that the rejection of this agreement evoked the idea among Turkish officials that the West does not recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and wishes to keep its monopoly over the nuclear energy. Furthermore, the Turkish officials argued that Western countries ran a hypocritical policy as they deny Iran the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, whilst turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons of Israel. For the very same reason Turkish officials firmly repudiated the call of Western countries for additional sanctions towards Iran. Davutoglu stated that it is unacceptable that sanction resolutions are drafted by only a few countries, which try to urge the remaining members of the UN Security Council to approve them.
Apart from a critical approach to the West, Turkey’s opposition to the new sanctions was also based on some rational reasons. To begin with, the Turkish government argued that any sanction against the regime is bound to fail, as in most cases sanctions end inconclusively. Moreover, while sanctions have been inconclusive in terms of political outcomes, they may entail human disasters instead. Moreover the Turkish officials claimed that sanctions would further isolate Iran, which would consequently adopt a more aggressive role, and thus destabilize Turkey’s neighborhood. Besides the common view on sanctions is that they might form the prelude for the very same military hostilities Turkey has been trying to avoid for years. Additionally, in case of an approval of the sanction resolution drafted by the United States, Turkey’s ambition to emerge as an influential and powerful regional player would be hampered considerably. The additional sanctions also threatened Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. Turkey, with its 10-bilion US dollars trade volume with Iran, emerged as one of the few countries that would be adversely affected by the sanctions.
Convention of the Iranian Neighbors: A Prospective Contribution to the Peaceful Solution?
It has become a cliché that “Turkey is a country that will be most negatively affected by a nuclear Iran.” It appears that the deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue is also equally adversely affecting Turkey. Turkey, as the first country adversely affected either by a deadlock over Iran’s nuclear issue, or nuclear-armed Iran, should found a solution to the issue. But it is a difficult mission for Turkey because of its institutional liabilities to realize alone. Nevertheless, Turkey is not the only country which raises concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran or deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran has twelve additional neighbors and, probably with the exception of Pakistan, all share this common concern with Turkey on regard to Iran. They are also agitated by the idea of a possible military attack against Iran in order to stop its nuclear program.
Different from the United States and the EU countries, all neighbors of Iran, including Turkey, have recognized Iran’s right to develop, possess, and use peaceful nuclear energy and uranium enrichment respectively. Moreover, Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy is guaranteed by international agreements, the NPT. Although the Western countries also admitted Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear energy, they deny Iran’s right to enrich uranium, because they do not trust in the political regime in Iran. The ups and downs in Iran’s relations with the atomic watchdog, IAEA, further fuels suspicions of the Western countries about Iran’s intentions. Moreover, Irans uncompromising stance on the issue and the ups and downs in its relations with the IAEA, made the neighboring countries to question Iran’s hidden intentions, too.
Therefore, in any bid to provide a peaceful solution to the issue, the Iranian officials should convince their colleagues that Iran’s nuclear program is certainly peaceful. Since any conviction, in this regard, is bound to the complete supervision of the IAEA that would be facilitated through Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Until now, the Western countries failed to persuade Iran to the complete supervision of the IAEA.
Contrary to its confrontationist policy towards the West regarding the nuclear issue, however, Iran has been courting for political support of its neighboring countries, thus trying to allay their suspicions. In this regard, Turkey may take the lead to convene Iran’s neighbors and convey the following message to Iran: Although the neighboring countries recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, they have been concerned with uncertainty over the Iranian nuclear program, and asking further cooperation with the atomic watchdog, the IAEA. If Iran accepts the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which will facilitate further IAEA inspections over the Iranian nuclear program, both Turkey and other neighbors of Iran, and the Western countries could be relieved of their suspicion towards Iran. Thus, if Iran accepts implementation of the Protocol, the Western countries might concede to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the key issue for the solution of the problem.
Whether Iran concedes to implement the Protocol considering the fact that it rejected such demands of the Western countries throughout the negotiation process? Iran’s opposition to the Additional Protocol derives from its ‘nationalist’ concerns because it entailed the uninformed verifications of the IAEA officials. Furthermore, Iran concerned with probable penetration of Western intelligence agents into the verification teams. Last, but not least, although the West arrogantly asked Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, in return, it did compromised on anything.
Therefore, if the neighboring countries ask Iran to implement the Additional Protocol in return for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, it may sense for the Iranian leadership. Under an increased international and internal pressure, Iran may respond positively to such demand for the expediency of the political regime. Moreover, if the neighboring countries may coordinate their negotiations with Iran and the West, the chance of the initiative to reach a peaceful solution would increase, as it shown in the swap agreement. Finally, relying on its previous experiences in the conventions of the Iraqi neighboring countries, mediation of efforts, and regional approaches, Turkey could take the lead to launch such an initiative.
* This paper is draft of author’s presentation at the MERIJ-ORSAM-METU Joint Meeting titled “Contemporary Middle East: The Turkish and Japanese Perspectives,” held in METU, Ankara, Turkey, on November 23, 2010.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Milliyet, 8 May 2006.
[ii] Zaman, 26 April 2007; Hilal Köylü, “İran’la nükleer gerilime Ankara’da deva aranıyor,” Radikal, 26 April 2007.
[iii] “Turkey Intensifies Efforts to Mediate between Iran, West,” Fars News Agency, 22 July 2008.
[iv] “Erdoğan Washington’da Konuştu,” Hürriyet, 14 November 2008.
[v] “Ahmadinejad: No need for Turkish mediation,” Press TV, 11 March 2009.
December 3 2010
http://orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=323
Turkey’s approach towards the Iranian nuclear program has been widely regarded the political circles, especially in the Western ones, as a litmus testing for its loyalty to the alliance with the West. Turkey’s compromising attitude towards Iran in the last year, particularly its opposition to the imposition of new round of UN sanctions on Iran, and its improving bilateral relations with Iran considered by some analysts as a change of axis in Turkish foreign policy, or Islamification of Turkish foreign policy under the ruling AK Party government. This paper argues that Turkey’s involvement in the mediation efforts between Iran and the West, and its compromising attitude towards Iran is based on its interests invested in balancing its good relations with the West and its improving relations with Iran, and preventing escalation of conflicts in its immediate neighborhood, rather than ideological convictions. That is why, Turkey’s position towards the Iranian nuclear issue changed three times, under the same government, the ruling AK Party, from a passive stance to the facilitator, and to the mediator, all aimed at a peaceful solution of the issue. Indeed, regarding the conflict between Iran and the West that aroused from Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey’s national interest lies in the peaceful solution of the issue. Therefore, Turkey ought to, and could, play an active role in peaceful solution of the conflict on Iran’s nuclear program.
A Passive Stance
Although the Iranian nuclear program has been one of the top issues on the international agenda since the mid-1990s, Turkey remained indifferent towards the issue for a long time. Until 2005, Iranian nuclear program has been rarely addressed in the Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkish officials recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology and advocated solution of the issue by diplomatic means.
Meanwhile the great powers adopted different approaches towards Iran; while the United States runs an uncompromising containment policy against Iran, in order to force it to abandon the considered policies; the EU countries instead adopted a policy of diplomatic engagement and negotiation in the Iranian issue. Concomitantly, Russia and China enhanced their relations with Iran and helped it to advance its nuclear program and missile technology. Different attitudes of the great powers relieved to Turkey’s hand to act freely in its relations with Iran. Although the security elite in Turkey steadily raised concerns about the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, the Turkish government did not want to disturb its relations with Iran. Because the prospective nuclear Iran regarded by the US-led international community as a threat to international security, the Turkish governments adopted a wait-and-see policy and waited for a solution for the issue through negotiations between the conflicting parties.
From a Passive Stance to the Facilitator
The failure of the EU strategy to negotiate with Iran in due process was probably the main reason for the other great powers to join ranks with the US. Meanwhile, emergence of a hardliner political leadership in Iran under the leadership of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad worsened the prospect of a negotiable solution for the Iranian nuclear issue. Eventually, the Iranian nuclear dossier was transferred to the UN Security Council in February 2006. Those developments pushed Turkey in an awkward situation that enforced it to make a choice between its Western allies and neighboring Iran.
Although the US administration of the time was undecided how to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, alongside with rumors ranging from imposing various kind of embargos to an unilateral military attack, the US officials continuously urged their Turkish counterparts to cooperate against Iran. It was difficult for the Turkish government to turn down US demands, because it was seeking to restore its relations with the United States that had been deteriorated in the preceding years. On the other hand, Iran presented a growing market and partnership in regional security matters. Additionally, it started to supply thirty percent of Turkey’s natural gas consumption. Meanwhile, some Turkish officials, military officials and diplomats publicly declared their concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear and missile programs. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear program was identified as a precarious issue for Turkey in the National Security Policy Document of 2005.
Consequently, Turkey avoided publicly siding either with the United States or with Iran. However, the deadlock over the issue was suspended over Turkey like the looming sword of Damocles. As a matter of fact, an assertive policy against Iran as championed by the United States in order to stop Iran’s nuclear program was unlikely a policy to be favored by Turkey, which would be brought in an impasse between the two sides – a move which would adversely affect stability and security in its immediate neighborhood. Under those circumstances, Turkey abandoned its wait-and-see policy and adopted a facilitator position, encouraging the parties to reach a solution through negotiations. A negotiated solution for the issue would release Turkey from its difficult position to balance its warm relations both with the Western countries and with Iran. Additionally it would prevent adverse affects of a likely military conflict between the United States and Iran, or the sanction regime against Iran.
Within the framework of its policy as a facilitator, Turkey encouraged the parties to take an affirmative position in the negotiations. In this regard, Iranian chief negotiator and Secretary of National Security Council, Ali Larijani visited Ankara in May 2006 and met with high-level Turkish officials. The message given by the Turkish officials to Larijani was clear: although Turkey recognized Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, Iran’s stand against the nuclear watchdog, i.e. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Security Council would not serve Iranian interests, which implied Turkey’s disturbance with the handling of the issue.[i] Furthermore Turkey hosted a meeting between Javier Solana, High Commissar of the EU in charge of negotiation with Iran, and Laricani in Ankara in April 2007. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan received Larijani before the meeting and asked him to be affirmative to resolve the issue through negotiation and international cooperation.[ii] Turkey stepped in again in order to ease the tension between Iran and the Six (The five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that came to the negotiation table in July 2008, when, the Six offered Iran a package of incentives in return for freezing uranium enrichment. In due process, the Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who replaced Larijani in October 2007, paid a visit to Istanbul and met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on his way back from Geneva to Teheran. Babacan defined Turkey’s role as a facilitator that was trying “to rectify any misunderstandings and ensure that they better understand their mutual concerns.”[iii]
But the ongoing negotiations between the Six and Iran failed to reach a solution, as well. Meanwhile the UN Security Council resolute five consecutive decisions against Iran, which asked Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program, complete cooperation with the IAEA, and envisaged limited sanctions against Iran on ground of its nuclear and missile program. However, Iran continued to advance its nuclear program and enrich uranium.
From the Facilitator to the Mediator
Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear issue changed again in late 2008. In a visit to the United States in November, Erdogan announced that Turkey could officially mediate between the United States and Iran based on its previous experiences.[iv] The new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomed Turkey’s bid for the mediator position, and said that the new administration would ask Turkey’s support to engage with Iran. However, the Iranian officials denied Turkey’s claim for mediation. President Ahmadinejad stated that there was no need for Turkey’s mediation.[v]
Turkey’s actual mediation started only after the failure of the swap agreement negotiated in Vienna, in October 2009, between the Six and Iran. Then, Director of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradey put forward the idea of placing Iran’s low-enriched uranium in the custody, until the Vienna group supply Iran with uranium fuel. The idea, which was immediately accepted by Turkey, was also backed by the United States and Russia. However, Iran remained cautious towards Baradey’s suggestion and announced that it would not ship its low-enriched uranium outside the country.
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to press Iran to make a compromise to accept the uranium swap agreement, and continuously talked to the officials of the United States, the EU countries, and the IAEA. In April, after President Obama’s request, Brazil also involved in Turkey’s mediation efforts. Finally, Brazil and Turkey persuaded Iran to sign a framework agreement in May 2010, which would facilitate uranium swap between the Vienna group and Iran. However, the Vienna group found the agreement inadequate and rejected it, which was ensued by a new round of UN Security Council sanctions (RES 1929) against Iran.
Disappointed with the West
The rejection of the swap agreement by the Vienna group, i.e. the Western countries, provoked a Turkish reaction against the Western countries and their demand for additional sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it rejected to approve the new sanctions in the UN Security Council.
Turkey’s reaction to the Western countries stemmed from Turkish officials’ disappointment with the US and European officials, who encouraged Turkey to persuade Iran for a compromise over the swap agreement. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, pointed out that in view of the fact that Turkey had virtually accomplished everything in its negotiations demanded by Western officials, it is understandable that the rejection of this agreement evoked the idea among Turkish officials that the West does not recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and wishes to keep its monopoly over the nuclear energy. Furthermore, the Turkish officials argued that Western countries ran a hypocritical policy as they deny Iran the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, whilst turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons of Israel. For the very same reason Turkish officials firmly repudiated the call of Western countries for additional sanctions towards Iran. Davutoglu stated that it is unacceptable that sanction resolutions are drafted by only a few countries, which try to urge the remaining members of the UN Security Council to approve them.
Apart from a critical approach to the West, Turkey’s opposition to the new sanctions was also based on some rational reasons. To begin with, the Turkish government argued that any sanction against the regime is bound to fail, as in most cases sanctions end inconclusively. Moreover, while sanctions have been inconclusive in terms of political outcomes, they may entail human disasters instead. Moreover the Turkish officials claimed that sanctions would further isolate Iran, which would consequently adopt a more aggressive role, and thus destabilize Turkey’s neighborhood. Besides the common view on sanctions is that they might form the prelude for the very same military hostilities Turkey has been trying to avoid for years. Additionally, in case of an approval of the sanction resolution drafted by the United States, Turkey’s ambition to emerge as an influential and powerful regional player would be hampered considerably. The additional sanctions also threatened Turkey’s economic relations with Iran. Turkey, with its 10-bilion US dollars trade volume with Iran, emerged as one of the few countries that would be adversely affected by the sanctions.
Convention of the Iranian Neighbors: A Prospective Contribution to the Peaceful Solution?
It has become a cliché that “Turkey is a country that will be most negatively affected by a nuclear Iran.” It appears that the deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue is also equally adversely affecting Turkey. Turkey, as the first country adversely affected either by a deadlock over Iran’s nuclear issue, or nuclear-armed Iran, should found a solution to the issue. But it is a difficult mission for Turkey because of its institutional liabilities to realize alone. Nevertheless, Turkey is not the only country which raises concerns over a nuclear-armed Iran or deadlock over the Iranian nuclear issue. Iran has twelve additional neighbors and, probably with the exception of Pakistan, all share this common concern with Turkey on regard to Iran. They are also agitated by the idea of a possible military attack against Iran in order to stop its nuclear program.
Different from the United States and the EU countries, all neighbors of Iran, including Turkey, have recognized Iran’s right to develop, possess, and use peaceful nuclear energy and uranium enrichment respectively. Moreover, Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy is guaranteed by international agreements, the NPT. Although the Western countries also admitted Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear energy, they deny Iran’s right to enrich uranium, because they do not trust in the political regime in Iran. The ups and downs in Iran’s relations with the atomic watchdog, IAEA, further fuels suspicions of the Western countries about Iran’s intentions. Moreover, Irans uncompromising stance on the issue and the ups and downs in its relations with the IAEA, made the neighboring countries to question Iran’s hidden intentions, too.
Therefore, in any bid to provide a peaceful solution to the issue, the Iranian officials should convince their colleagues that Iran’s nuclear program is certainly peaceful. Since any conviction, in this regard, is bound to the complete supervision of the IAEA that would be facilitated through Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Until now, the Western countries failed to persuade Iran to the complete supervision of the IAEA.
Contrary to its confrontationist policy towards the West regarding the nuclear issue, however, Iran has been courting for political support of its neighboring countries, thus trying to allay their suspicions. In this regard, Turkey may take the lead to convene Iran’s neighbors and convey the following message to Iran: Although the neighboring countries recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy, they have been concerned with uncertainty over the Iranian nuclear program, and asking further cooperation with the atomic watchdog, the IAEA. If Iran accepts the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which will facilitate further IAEA inspections over the Iranian nuclear program, both Turkey and other neighbors of Iran, and the Western countries could be relieved of their suspicion towards Iran. Thus, if Iran accepts implementation of the Protocol, the Western countries might concede to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the key issue for the solution of the problem.
Whether Iran concedes to implement the Protocol considering the fact that it rejected such demands of the Western countries throughout the negotiation process? Iran’s opposition to the Additional Protocol derives from its ‘nationalist’ concerns because it entailed the uninformed verifications of the IAEA officials. Furthermore, Iran concerned with probable penetration of Western intelligence agents into the verification teams. Last, but not least, although the West arrogantly asked Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, in return, it did compromised on anything.
Therefore, if the neighboring countries ask Iran to implement the Additional Protocol in return for recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, it may sense for the Iranian leadership. Under an increased international and internal pressure, Iran may respond positively to such demand for the expediency of the political regime. Moreover, if the neighboring countries may coordinate their negotiations with Iran and the West, the chance of the initiative to reach a peaceful solution would increase, as it shown in the swap agreement. Finally, relying on its previous experiences in the conventions of the Iraqi neighboring countries, mediation of efforts, and regional approaches, Turkey could take the lead to launch such an initiative.
* This paper is draft of author’s presentation at the MERIJ-ORSAM-METU Joint Meeting titled “Contemporary Middle East: The Turkish and Japanese Perspectives,” held in METU, Ankara, Turkey, on November 23, 2010.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Milliyet, 8 May 2006.
[ii] Zaman, 26 April 2007; Hilal Köylü, “İran’la nükleer gerilime Ankara’da deva aranıyor,” Radikal, 26 April 2007.
[iii] “Turkey Intensifies Efforts to Mediate between Iran, West,” Fars News Agency, 22 July 2008.
[iv] “Erdoğan Washington’da Konuştu,” Hürriyet, 14 November 2008.
[v] “Ahmadinejad: No need for Turkish mediation,” Press TV, 11 March 2009.
December 3 2010
http://orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=323
Iran’da Asker–Siyaset İlişkileri ve Devrim Muhafızları’nın Yükselişi
ORSAM :: Dış Politika Analizleri:
Iran’da Asker–Siyaset İlişkileri ve Devrim Muhafızları’nın Yükselişi
Bayram SİNKAYA, ORSAM Danışmanı, ODTÜ/Atatürk Üniversitesi Araştırma Görevlisi.
Devrim Muhafızları’nın İran siyaseti üzerindeki etkisi 1990’ların ortalarından beri belirgin bir şekilde artmıştır. Devrim Muhafızları Hatemi’nin liderliğindeki reformcu hükümet ile çatışma içerisinde iken onun yerini alan Ahmedinecad liderliğindeki radikal hükümetle işbirliği içerisinde olmuştur. Bu makale, Devrim Muhafızları’nın siyasi yükselişinde etkili olan faktörleri ve Devrim Muhafızları-siyaset ilişkilerinin nasıl şekillendiğini incelemektedir. Makalede Muhafızların İran siyasetindeki yükselişi Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu ekseninde ve devrim sonrası ortaya çıkan dinamikler çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. 1990’lı yıllarda kurumsallaşmasını tamamlayan ideolojik düzeyi yüksek devrimci ordunun, siyasi elitler arasındaki bölünme ve şiddetli rekabet ortamında öneminin arttığı görülmektedir. Böyle bir ortamda İran rejimine yönelik tehdit algılarının niteliğinin değişmesi; askeri tehditlerin yerini kültürel saldırı, kadife devrim girişimi gibi “yumuşak” tehditlere bırakması, Devrim Muhafızları’nın hızla siyasal alana yönelmesine neden olmuştur. Devrim Muhafızları’nın ideolojik-siyasi bakışı ile hükümette egemen elitlerin ideolojik duruşları arasındaki fark veya uyum Devrim Muhafızları’nın hükümetle ilişkilerinin niteliğini belirlemiştir.
Metnin Tamamı
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=677
Iran’da Asker–Siyaset İlişkileri ve Devrim Muhafızları’nın Yükselişi
Bayram SİNKAYA, ORSAM Danışmanı, ODTÜ/Atatürk Üniversitesi Araştırma Görevlisi.
Devrim Muhafızları’nın İran siyaseti üzerindeki etkisi 1990’ların ortalarından beri belirgin bir şekilde artmıştır. Devrim Muhafızları Hatemi’nin liderliğindeki reformcu hükümet ile çatışma içerisinde iken onun yerini alan Ahmedinecad liderliğindeki radikal hükümetle işbirliği içerisinde olmuştur. Bu makale, Devrim Muhafızları’nın siyasi yükselişinde etkili olan faktörleri ve Devrim Muhafızları-siyaset ilişkilerinin nasıl şekillendiğini incelemektedir. Makalede Muhafızların İran siyasetindeki yükselişi Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu ekseninde ve devrim sonrası ortaya çıkan dinamikler çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. 1990’lı yıllarda kurumsallaşmasını tamamlayan ideolojik düzeyi yüksek devrimci ordunun, siyasi elitler arasındaki bölünme ve şiddetli rekabet ortamında öneminin arttığı görülmektedir. Böyle bir ortamda İran rejimine yönelik tehdit algılarının niteliğinin değişmesi; askeri tehditlerin yerini kültürel saldırı, kadife devrim girişimi gibi “yumuşak” tehditlere bırakması, Devrim Muhafızları’nın hızla siyasal alana yönelmesine neden olmuştur. Devrim Muhafızları’nın ideolojik-siyasi bakışı ile hükümette egemen elitlerin ideolojik duruşları arasındaki fark veya uyum Devrim Muhafızları’nın hükümetle ilişkilerinin niteliğini belirlemiştir.
Metnin Tamamı
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=677
İran’ın Nükleer Programına Arap Ülkelerinin Yaklaşımı
ORSAM :: Dış Politika Analizleri:
"İran’ın Nükleer Programına Arap Ülkelerinin Yaklaşımı
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Ortadoğu Danışmanı
İran’ın nükleer programı neredeyse on yıldır uluslararası gündemin ilk sıralarında yer almaktadır. Bu durum büyük ölçüde İsrail, Batı Avrupa ülkeleri ve ABD’nin İran’ın nükleer programının silah yapmaya dönük olduğu iddiasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Söz konusu ülkeler İran’ın nükleer programının yalnızca kendi güvenlikleri için değil, komşuları, bütün Ortadoğu bölgesi ve uluslararası sistem için tehdit olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu iddiaya dayanarak adı geçen ülkeler İran’ın nükleer programının durdurulması amacıyla İran üzerinde büyük bir baskı kurmaya çalışmış ve bu amaçla BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nden İran aleyhine bazı yaptırım kararlarının çıkmasını sağlamışlardır. İran’ın nükleer programını varlığına yönelik en ciddi tehdit olarak gören İsrail ise İran’a yönelik acilen daha ciddi tedbirler alınmasını istemektedir. ABD, İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya İran’ın nükleer programının durdurulması amacıyla BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nden İran aleyhine yeni yaptırım kararları çıkartabilmek için uğraşmaktadır ve bu yönde bir kampanya yürütmektedir.
Metnin Tamamı"
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=646
"İran’ın Nükleer Programına Arap Ülkelerinin Yaklaşımı
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Ortadoğu Danışmanı
İran’ın nükleer programı neredeyse on yıldır uluslararası gündemin ilk sıralarında yer almaktadır. Bu durum büyük ölçüde İsrail, Batı Avrupa ülkeleri ve ABD’nin İran’ın nükleer programının silah yapmaya dönük olduğu iddiasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Söz konusu ülkeler İran’ın nükleer programının yalnızca kendi güvenlikleri için değil, komşuları, bütün Ortadoğu bölgesi ve uluslararası sistem için tehdit olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu iddiaya dayanarak adı geçen ülkeler İran’ın nükleer programının durdurulması amacıyla İran üzerinde büyük bir baskı kurmaya çalışmış ve bu amaçla BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nden İran aleyhine bazı yaptırım kararlarının çıkmasını sağlamışlardır. İran’ın nükleer programını varlığına yönelik en ciddi tehdit olarak gören İsrail ise İran’a yönelik acilen daha ciddi tedbirler alınmasını istemektedir. ABD, İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya İran’ın nükleer programının durdurulması amacıyla BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nden İran aleyhine yeni yaptırım kararları çıkartabilmek için uğraşmaktadır ve bu yönde bir kampanya yürütmektedir.
Metnin Tamamı"
http://orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=646
İran Yaptırımlarının Mali Boyutları
ORSAM :: Dış Politika Analizleri
İran Yaptırımlarının Mali Boyutları
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Ortadoğu Danışmanı; Ali Kemal Yıldırım, Bankacı
5+1 Grubu (BM Güvenlik Konseyi Daimi üyeleri ve Almanya) ile müzakerelerinin sonuçsuz kalması üzerine İran yeni yaptırım tehditleriyle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. İran hâlihazırda ABD, AB ve BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nin birbirinden bağımsız yaptırımlarına maruz durumdadır. Bu yaptırımların bir kısmı İranlı üst düzey bürokratın seyahatlerini kısıtlamayı ve mal varlıklarına el koymayı öngörmektedir, bir kısmı ise İran’ın enerji sektörünü hedef almaktadır. Bununla birlikte İran’a yönelik yaptırımların önemli bir kısmı İran’ın nükleer faaliyetleri ve terörizmin finansmanı ile ilgili olduğu iddia edilen bankaları ve şirketleri hedef almaktadır.
http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/13/2bayram.pdf
İran Yaptırımlarının Mali Boyutları
Bayram Sinkaya, ORSAM Ortadoğu Danışmanı; Ali Kemal Yıldırım, Bankacı
5+1 Grubu (BM Güvenlik Konseyi Daimi üyeleri ve Almanya) ile müzakerelerinin sonuçsuz kalması üzerine İran yeni yaptırım tehditleriyle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. İran hâlihazırda ABD, AB ve BM Güvenlik Konseyi’nin birbirinden bağımsız yaptırımlarına maruz durumdadır. Bu yaptırımların bir kısmı İranlı üst düzey bürokratın seyahatlerini kısıtlamayı ve mal varlıklarına el koymayı öngörmektedir, bir kısmı ise İran’ın enerji sektörünü hedef almaktadır. Bununla birlikte İran’a yönelik yaptırımların önemli bir kısmı İran’ın nükleer faaliyetleri ve terörizmin finansmanı ile ilgili olduğu iddia edilen bankaları ve şirketleri hedef almaktadır.
http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/13/2bayram.pdf
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